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Abstract 
Countries live in an age of interdependenoo. Although there are &>me studies 
conoorned with the U.S.-Saudi relationship, to my knowledge, this is the first 
comprehensive study that analyses the U.S.-Saudi relationship as it relates to the 
conoopts of interdependenoo to be written sinoo the Gulf war of 1991. This study 
particularly examines the level of interdependenoo between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia as it affects their relationship. 
The oil embargo of 1973 marked a turning point in Saudi Arabia's relations with the 
United States. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has emerged as the most important 
foreign &>urce of American petroleum requirements. The U.S. for its part has 
supported Saud Arabia with security assistanoo and anTIS while seeking in return to 
affect Saudi Arabia's oil production and prioo decisions. For both countries 
maintenanoo of the supply of oil and anTIS are of vital importance, but each oountry 
has different priorities. The different positions taken by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is 
affected by the fact that Saudi Arabia is the worlds' largest exporter of oil and that 
the U.S. is the world's largest oil consumer. The connection gave way to a more 
complex relationship of interdependenoo, involving shared as well as divergent 
interest and therefore, increased the potential for adversarial bargaining as well as 
agreement, antagonism as well as cooperation. 
The plan of this study is to explore whether the cooperation between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia in the fields of oil, politics, eoonomics and military developments has 
increased their interdependence. In addition, this study explores why the 
relationships between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has moved over time from simple 
cooperation to oomplexity and how the two oountries have changed in their relative 
importanoo to each other and what has been the impact of changes in the 
international system, the Middle East, or within the U.S. and Saudi Arabia on U.S. -
Saudi relations. 
XIV 
Introduction 
The protection of oil reserves and other strategic considerations have been 
constituent elements of the special relationship between the United States and 
Saudi Arabia since World War II. The United States and Saudi Arabia have been 
engaged in a mutually beneficial relationship. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has 
emerged as the most important foreign source of American petroleum requirements. 
Saudi Arabia, on the other hand, needs America for arms supplies and training, 
technology and many other items necessary for a developing country, including vital 
supplies of foodstuffs. For both countries, maintenance of the supply of arms and oil 
are of vital importance, but each country has different priorities. 
The scale of the United States military deployment in the Gulf during the Gulf war 
in 1990 - half of all U.S. combat forces world-wide - was a shock to the American 
people. Washington's decision to send those forces, though, should come as no 
surprise. Tracing U.S. -Saudi relations to their origins has shown the singular 
degree of certainty which has characterised the relationship.i Common interests 
were first explored and defined when President Roosevelt met King Abdulaziz in 
1945. It is well known that many of the failures of American and Saudi foreign 
policy had their sources in the limitations of realistic assumptions, particularly 
about the analysis of economic issues and of the roles played by formal and informal 
international institutions.2 In fact, the world community lives in an age of 
interdependence, which led Henry Kissinger to state that "The traditional agenda of 
international affairs - the balance among major powers, the security of nations - no 
longer defines our perils or possibilities. The world has become interdependent in 
economics, in communications, in human aspirations".3 
The plan of this thesis is to demonstrate if the political, economic and military 
concept of interdependence can illustrate the results of increasing interdependence 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The thesis examines how interdependence 
affects the U.S. - Saudi Arabia relationship. United States - Saudi interdependence 
includes the supply of oil and the recycling of petrodollars, the continuing American 
1 
support for Saudi security. However, the Saudis can take advantage of their superior 
position on economic issues, such as oil. The special relationship between Saudi 
Arabia and the United States, after the 1973 embargo, represents the highest stage 
of mutual co-operation. Military and technical co-operation strengthened the 
interdependence even more. Saudi Arabia is not dependent on U.S. foreign aid, but 
it is buying American technology, arms and expertise. The United States is buying 
Saudi oil. Both are able to diversify their sources of supply. The translation of this 
interdependence into specific trade-offs, however, in a natural way involves 
manoeuvring and bargaining by each side to obtain the most advantageous terms. 
The Saudi - American relationship has undergone a deep transformation in the 
character and scope of their relationship, the connection gave way to a more complex 
relationship of interdependence, involving shared as well as divergent interest 
between them and, therefore, the potential for adversarial bargaining as well as 
agreement, antagonism as well as co-operation. This study explores why the 
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia has moved at times from 
simple co-operation to complexity. How have the two countries changed in their 
relative importance to each other and what have been the impact of changes in the 
international system, the Middle East, or within the United States, and Saudi 
Arabia on U.S. - Saudi relations. The stable community of interests has further been 
characterised by the relatively independent set of dynamics that have guided each of 
its four major components - oil, economic, military, and political components. The 
study seeks to focus on the history, nature and objectives of each component. There 
is also a case study exploring U.S. - Saudi relations throughout the Gulf crisis, 
which divides the analysis of the thesis into focus of their relations before the Gulf 
war of 1991 and after the Gulf war. The conclusion presents the U.S. - Saudi 
bilateral interdependence and its consequences as well as the findings of the 
research. 
The thesis· comes through the study of one of the most significant facts of the 
international system and its effects on the relationship. This thesis searches through 
U.S. - Saudi interdependence and its results in terms of co-operation and conflict. 
The outcomes of interdependence dimensions on co-operation and conflict can be 
2 
determined as well as the amount of alteration in the dependant variables which 
can be illustrated by the independent variables operating together. 
Since most studies of interdependence have concentrated mainly on relations among 
developed states and seldom on developing countries, this thesis seeks to evaluate 
the consequences and impact of the changing levels of interdependence on U.S. -
Saudi relations. Therefore, the beginning of the Chapter One will discuss the 
definitions of the concepts of interdependence. 
3 
Chapter one 
Conceptual and Historical Background 
1. The Concept or interdependence 
Modern writings on interdependence point out that much of the contemporary actuality 
of world politics demands radical change in the way traditional nations implement their 
strategies for international relations. 1 Some analysts argue that increased 
interdependence and the development of non-state actors essentially change the nature 
of contemporary international relations.2 Military force is no longer a decisive policy tool 
in the mutual influence of international politics? The dominant approach to the study of 
international relations has refused this demand.4 Realists persist that the state is the 
maIn actor in international relations; that military force and security issues are the 
most important Issues m contemporary international relations and that 
interdependence is a legend. 5 Realists including Hans ~J. Morganthau, have described a 
world in which states, acting from self - interest, struggle for "power and Peace".6 
Security issues are dominant; war threatens. 7 
However, the contrary view is that the fast expansion of trade, foreign investment and 
manufacturing activities which came between the 1950s and 1970s, made an 
interdependent world. 8 Even those countries which had before been mainly 
self-sufficient in primary goods became more dependent on trade, foreign investment 
and exports.9 Thus, in contrast to the dominant realist stance, theorists of 
transnationalism argue that the role of the state has declined. A diversity of non state 
actors are now very im portan t in key areas. The use of force is restricted and national 
societies are more interdependent In the sense that domestic occurrences are 
crucially influenced by external variables. Issues significant to national governments 
(especially economic ones) have become more differentiated. lo 
Transnationalists do not argue that the realist stance is totally irrelevant but that it 
fails to p~S(>nt significant issues of contemporary international politics. lt S. Hoffmann 
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stated "We are movIng to an era dominated by economic power - an era which war 
between major states may virtually disappear.,,12 National economies are more closely 
connected than at any time in history.13 The number of actors in international economic 
relations has also increase with the diffusion of transnational corporations and the 
increase in international banking. 14 Lars Anell defines the international economic order 
as "The rules and norms applying to international economic co-operation".15 Werner 
Levi asserted in his book, The Coming End of War, that war is outmoded because of the 
internationalisation of national interests, its gains are unlike those of the past, nuclear 
power makes war more dangerous and the overall changes that have taken place in the 
international system make it unlikely.16 It was evaluating the transnationalist proposal 
that war is an anachronism which led Michael Sullivan to make three critical points: (1) 
the signs that war is declining in the international system are mixed; (2) it is possible 
that war itself might be subject to cyclical changes; and (3) that war remains a possibly 
in the contemporary intentional system. 17 
In the 1960's and early 1970's many people thought that it was possible that there 
would be no more wars. IS However, in the wake of the events of the 1970's e.g. the 
American hostage crisis in Iran and the Russian invasion of Mghanistan, this optimism 
became untenable. fJefJrey Hart examined the background in which developing 
countries introduced their demands for the reform of the international economic order in 
this era. 19 He provided a structure within which the negotiations within the new 
international economic order could be analysed.20 The increased agitation within the 
international economic system during the 1970s was the consequence of three changes. 
Firstly, there was an increase in the numbers of effective actors. The success of the 
Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in raising oil prices in 1973174 
increased the capability of these countries to effect international decision making. The 
fast growth of the newly industrialised countries and their incre3.c~ portion of world 
manufacturing output improved their capability to influence global conditions. Secondly, 
doubt about trade-offs increased during the 1970s. This was the consequence of (a) the 
failure of demand management policies in the industrialised countries and confusion 
regarding the appropriate policies to be pursued; (b) uncertainty in developing countries 
in respect to the correct model of development; and (c) uncertainty about how to deal 
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with the OPEC threat. Thirdly, increased interdependence and complexity contributed 
to turbulence. 2] 
Non state actors and interdependencies have always played a part in international 
relations, issues are continuously in flux, and war is periodically viewed as no longer an 
option.22 Kenneth Waltz made the follOwing conclusion about interdependence: 
It is surprising then, that so much recent writing about interdependence reads 
as though it were written at the turn of the century, Economist and political 
scientists, like others, make free use of the cliches of our day: spaceship Earth, 
the shrinking planet, our global village. international interdependence. 23 
Definitions of interdependence 
Interdependence has been defined in a diversity of ways. As Edward L. Morse states: 
"Interdependence is a state of affairs where what one nation does impinges directly 
upon other nations. "24 He has also stated that "Interdependent behaviour may be 
understood in terms of the outcome of specified actions taken by two or more parties 
(individuals, governments, corporations). When such actions are mutually contingent, 
these parties then, are interdependent with respect to speCific issues area and not with 
respect to the whole spectrum of their activities"?5 Richard A. Rosencrance states that 
interdependence suggest a relationship of interests such that if on nation's position 
changes, other states will be affected by that change. 26 
Interdependence, as defined by Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, means mutual 
dependence. They argue that interdependence in world politics refers to situations 
characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries.27 Dependence is "A state of being determined or significantly affected by 
external forces" .28 
Another definition suggest. that interdependence can be present when there is growing 
national sensitivity to external economic developments. Interdependence refers to the 
"sensitivity of economic transactions between two or more nations to economic 
developments within those nations"?9 This indicates that two states with extensiv{l 
mutual trade would experience a low degree of interdependence if the value of the tradf' 
was not sensitive to price and incoIDP growth in both states.30 Thus, two states would. be 
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highly interdependent if their transactions were highly sensitive to economic growth, 
even if their mutual trade was primarily at a low leVf~1.31 
Another way of defining interdependence is outlined by Klaus Knorr who asserted that 
"States are mutual1y dependent on one another for things valued by their population 
., .... Interdependence encompasses both conflictive and cooperative interactions among 
states".32 To Knorr dependence points to potential vulnerability to foreign events that 
can endanger the receipt of values or worsen the terms on which their receipt is 
conditiona1.33 
Sensitivity and vulnerability 
An understanding of sensitivity and vulnerability involves understanding the difference 
between mutual dependence and interconnection.34 Keohane and Nye state that 
"Sensitivity is an important concept not only because of its central role in many 
discussions on interdependence, but also because it is related to the considerations of 
the immediate economic and political significance of any pattern of economic 
interrelationship.,,35 They go on to explain that sensitivity interdependence involves 
degrees of responsiveness with a policy framework: e.g. how quickly does change in one 
country bring change in another and how costly are the effects-r6 
The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on the relative availability and 
costliness of the alternatives that various actors face. It has been defined by Robert O. 
Keohane and Joseph S. Nye as "An actor's ability to suffer costs imposed by external 
events even after policies have been altered" .37 
Increased interdependence 
Relations between actors which are characterised by increased interdependence become 
I d to d vulnerable to disruption, because of thf' more comp ex an some egree more 
expansion of the network of de~ndency relationships which is concomitant with 
7 
increased interdependence. 38 An event within one member of the network is more likely 
to effect other members of the network. 39 Thus mutual dependence between staiRs in a 
relationship of interdependence is not necessarily one of equality and there is the 
potential for asymmetrical interdependence.40 
Keohane and Nye argued against defining interdependence in terms of situations of 
"evenly balanced mutual dependence".41 They state that asymmetric interdependence 
often provides influence for those dealing with others.42 Those who are less dependent 
are often able to use the interdependent relationship to gain bargaining power and 
influence other issues.43 Influence is perhaps most simply defined by Peter J. Anderson 
as, "The ability to get someone to do something you want via simple persuasion rather 
than the implicit or explicit threat of or use of sanctions.,,44 
Major shifts in the 1970s, in the OPEC pricing revolution, the fall of the Shah of Iran 
and the Soviet Union's invasions of Mghanistan, all effected the environment of 
increased interdependence.45 Theoretical arguments could be made that increased 
interdependence is usually a destabilising fact in international relations.46 Its impact on 
peace and order will depend on how actors respond to it and how they try to operate 
within it.47 This implies that a key question for systems undergoing an increased 
amount of interdependence, particularly if accompanied by the other attributes of 
turbulence (e.g. an increase the number of effective actors and greater uncertainty 
about policy trade-otIs), is how to evolve a set of rules, procedures and averages which 
not only assist in the maintenance of order but do so in a way which most members of 
the system realise to be just and fair.48 It is not necessary to add that increased 
interdependence does not essentially promote peace, order or stability.49 For the reasons 
that have already been discussed, less vulnerable countries will attempt to use 
asymmetrical interdependence in individual groups of issues as a source of power. 50 
Asymmetrical interdependence and power 
Power is the tool for resolving any competing demands within and between different 
groups and countries.51 For John Stoessinger power in international relations is "The 
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capacity of a nation to use its tangible and intangible resources in such a way as to 
effect the behaviour of other nations". 52 
Military force has b(~en a conventional need. 53 Military force can persuade a state to do 
something or not, either by the credible threat of military force or by the use of the 
same. 54 States can also use their economic or political strength for the same purpose.55 
Keohane and Nye see power as the "ability of an actor to get others to do something 
they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor).,,56 Power can also 
be thought as control over outcomes. 57 Keohane and Nye pointed out that military 
power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means alone are likely to 
ineffective against the serious use of military force. 58 They asserted that asymmetrical 
interdependencies can be a source of power among actors, and that different types of 
interdependence lead to potential political influence under different restrictions.59 
Sensitivity interdependence can provide significant political influence only when the 
rules and norms in effect can be taken for granted or when it would be costly for 
dissatisfied states to change policies quickly.60 Manipulation of interdependence can be 
used as a tool ofpower.61 Realists assume that military force is dominant, but Keohane 
and Nye pointed out that military force is costly and may be irrelevant in a wide range 
of issues and its threat so difficult to make credible, that a military strategy is an act of 
desperation and which might disrupt other relationships.62 However, if the is..~ue 
becomes a matter of life and death - as oil might become - the use or threat of force will 
become an important tool again.63 
Although force remains a potential tool for state policy in other situations its use has 
become less frequent especially amongst the most powerful states.64 Third world 
countries in particular (unlike the most powerful states) continue to link issues to secure 
satisfactory overall bargains.65 For Knorr, power, influence and interdependence are 
inextricably related.66 Two countries can be in conflict over some is.."ues while 
co-operating on others, "When they co-operate they benefit from the creation of new 
values, material or non-material. When they are in conflict, they are interdependent.
n67 
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ConOict and co-operation as the consequences or interdependence 
Some researchers see interdependence as almost automatically producing co-operation, 
"Whenever the intermeshing of societies across nation - state lines occur without 
coercion, it is likely that disputes between the involved nations will be inhibited from 
escalating to war.,,68 In some contemporary literature other writers hope for a changed 
international system. Robert Hunter, for instance, argued that "the old symbiotic 
relationship between power and peace is changing" and that it might be possible to 
separate the demands of peace from "their dependence on a particular distribution of 
power among nations',.69 However he did admit that such an outcome could only 
happen "provided that armed conflict between major countries is avoided."70 
Global concerns over food, ecology and energy needs demand increased co-operation 
among the world community. Thus, Keohane and Nye asserted that an increasingly 
interdependent world is characterised by greater co-operation and less conflict. 71 They 
believe that there are multiple interstate issues in today's complex environment which 
are not dominated by concern for military security.72 States with high levels of trade are 
motivated to maintain good relations with their trading partners.7J The impact of the 
increase of East-West trade for conflict reduction between the U.S. and the Warsaw 
Pact states.74 E.g. The trade generated by a degree of interdependence between the U.S. 
and the Warsaw pact states provided the motivation to reduce their hostility towards 
each other.75 Indeed, the party who benefits the most has the greatest motivation to 
reduce hostilities.76 
But these theories have not received firm empirical confirmation and alternatives have 
been made: increasing interdependence may produce negative outcomes. Kenneth Waltz 
argued that the closer contact associated with growing interdependence increases the 
chances for, at least, occasional conflict.77 In another study, Keohane and Nye stated 
that asymmetrical economic interdependence provides a new form of power that can be 
used by less interdependent countries to gain concessions from others that are more 
interdependent?8 [t warns of a crisis of interdependence involving increased 
international tension because of the difficulties interdependence creates for policy 
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rna mg. Keohane and Nye assert that economic ties provide an opportunity to c,onduct 
war by other means. &0 
Vulnerability can be used as an economic weapon, allowing states that lack military 
force, or prefer not to use it, to compel their interacting partners.&] Besides the potential 
for states to exercise such force, vulnerability can be a source of increase international 
conflict.82 Klaus Knorr, argues that vulnerability can lead to unanticipated crises which 
could threaten national security.&3 
While interdependence can lead to increased conflict, it can also bring co-operation. 
Interdependence can therefore have mixed consequences.&4 The history of interstate 
relations demonstrate the presence of both conflict and co-operation.&5 The peace that 
the superpowers have preserved may have tensions and is frequently precarious, but 
competitors often experience periods of relative peace during which their implicit 
co-operation, although less visible, may be more important than their public 
disagreements. &6 
The paucity of studies on international co-operation compared to the numerous studies 
dealing with international conflict comes from the belief that the level of (X)nflict 
between two nations defines the co-operation that exists between them. 87 Thus, 
co-operation is viewed only as the absence of high levels of conflict.88 Most researchers 
would agree that co-operation and conflict are both present in mixed - interest situations 
and pay oITs of international relations. &9 Therefore, conflict is defined as "the aggregate 
level of hostility directed by one country towards another in all foreign policy issue 
areas. This term does not refer only to actions involving military power .... rather, 
actions such as diplomatic protests, hostile propaganda statements and the breaking of 
bilateral agreement<; can also embody conflict.,,90 Co-operation is defined as the 
aggregate level of friendly behaviour and actions directed by one country toward 
another in all foreign policy issue areas.91 This term refers to action such as, 
establishing international alliances, economic markets, joint military exercises as well 
as military assistance.92 
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2. The history of Saud i Arabia 
Although the present Kingdom of Saucli Arabia was not established until the early 
1930s, the land has a long history. In ancient times, Arab tribesmen roamed the 
deserts or lived in trading centres such as Mecca and Medina, which were settlements 
established along well-established caravan routes. In the 7th and 8th centuries, the 
prophet Mohammed and his followers united the Arabs and founded a great empire. 
Before the establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the peninsula had suffered 
for many years as tribes struggled for political power. The Bedouin of the peninsula 
were always contending with one another for control of the country, and the country 
was devastated by their fighting. No one tribe in Central Arabia had been able to prove 
its leadership, but tribes would alternately demand the support of other tribes when 
their leader was able to assert his authority over a larger area. The modern state of 
Saudi Arabia began to develop in Central Arabia (known as the Najd region) some two 
hundred years ago. From the start of the Islamic era to the middle of the eighteenth 
century, Arabian history is made up of the separate stories of a number of individual 
regions. The Hijaz (the Western province) - where Islam's holiest cities, Mecca and 
Medina are located - was the area of most importance to the outside world. In the 10th 
century, a descendant of the prophet Mohammed's family announced himself Sharif of 
Mecca. Sometimes the Sharif ruled independently and sometimes he was under outside 
control. Most frequently it was the ruler of Egypt who controlled the Sharifate, and 
when Egypt came under control of the Ottoman Empire, in 1517, the governor of Egypt 
held authority over the Hijaz on behalf of the Ottoman Empire.93 
The region of A1-Hasa (the Eastern province) came, at times under the powerful rulers 
of I raq, and sometimes existed as an independent entity. From the late 9th to the late 
11th century, A1-Hasa was centre of an Ismaili state which arose in Yemen from Shi'ite 
Islam, and became involved in Iraq and Syria. In the late 15th century, the Ottomans 
took AI-Hasa under their control, and between 1694 and 1709, they took over the 
emirate of Diriyab from the Al-Saud family. By the end of the 18th century, the Saucli 
rulers of Diriyah defeated the Banu Khalid (a local family) and installed their own 
nominee in Al-Hasa as the first step to taking control of the overall region.
94 
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The region of Najd (the CentraJ province) was important to Hajis (the pilgrims) because 
of the route which cros..~d it from the Gulf to Mecca, but the area remained generally 
independent. Its people were mostly nomadic. A number of independent emirates or 
principalities came into existence during the 15th century. Here the Saudi state has its 
.. 95 
orlgIDs. 
The Saudi family tracks its descent from Mani Ibn Rabia Al-Muraydi, who came from 
Al-Hasa to settle in Wadi Hanifah in the middle of the 15th century. By the early 17th 
century, his descendants had become rulers of a small town in Diriyah (a town in 
central Najd). Before 1720, Saud Ibn Mohammed, the father of the Saudi Royal family, 
became ruler. He died in 1725, and his son, Mohammed, succeeded him in 1725.96 
After this period, the history of Saudi Arabia can be divided into four time periods: from 
about 1745 to 1818, from 1819 to 1902, from 1903 to 1953 and from 1954 to the present. 
(See Table 1). 
The uprisingoCthe House oClbn Saud, 1745-1818 
The first period started when Mohammed Ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyah, offered 
safeguards to the religious reformer of Islam, Mohammed Abdulwahab and argued for 
his religious reforms. In an effort to diffuse the unitarian doctrine of Abdulwahab, 
Mohammed Ibn Saud, the ruler of Diriyah, subdued the tribes around Diriyah. About 
1810, the Unitarian doctrine retained sway in some form or other from Syria and Iraq to 
Yemen and from the Persian Gulf to the Red Sea. In 1806, Ibn Saud troops seized 
Mecca and Medina and kicked out the Ottoman Turks and their representatives.
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The occupation of Mecca and Medina urged the Ottoman military into action. Sultan 
Mahmud II ordered Mohammed Ali, his Egyptian Viceroy, to take the Holy Cities and to 
break Ibn Saud's authority. In 1816, an army from Egypt, directed by Mohammed Alils 
son, invaded Najd and in 1818, Diriyah was taken, catching Abdullah Ibn Saud, the 
fourth Saudi ruler after Mohammed Ibn Saud.
98 
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Table 1 
Rulers of the House of Saud 
Ruler Period 
First Saudi State 
Muhammad ibn Sa'ud 1745-176.1) 
'Abd aI-' Aziz ibn Muhammad 1765-180.1 
Sa'ud ibn 'Abd al- 'Aziz 1803-1814 
'Abdallah ibn Sa'ud 1814-1818 
Second Saudi State 
Turki ibn 'Abdallah ibn Muhammad 1824-18.14 
Faisal ibn Turki 1834-1838 
Khalid ibn Sa'ud 1838-1842 
'Abdallah ibn Tbunain 1842-184.1 
Faisal ibn Turki 1843-1865 
'Abdallah ibn Faisal 1866-1870 
Sa'ud ibn Faisal 1870-1875 
'Abdallah ibn Faisal 1875-1889 
'Abd al-Rahman ibn Faisal 1889-1891 
Third Saudi State 
'Abd aI'Aziz ibn 'Abd aI-Rahman 1902-195.1 
Source: Jacob Goldberg, The Foreign poliCY of Saudi Arabia, 
1986, Harvard University Press, p. 8. 
The struggle for domination in the Najd, 
1819-1902 
The second stage of Saudi Arabia's history started with the capture of Abdullah Ibn 
Saud. He was sent to Istanbul, where he was executed. It ends with the exile of the 
family of Saud to Kuwait. The Egyptians stayed in the Najd on and off for a further 20 
years. The struggle for freedom from Egyptian rule began in 1823, when Turki, the son 
of the executed Abdullah, seized Riyadh from Mohammed Ali. To avoid rebuilding 
Diriyah. Turki based himself in Riyadh making it the new capital of the Saudi state.
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Turki was assassinated on May 19, 1834. The new ruler was Faisal Ibn Turki. Faisal's 
rule in Riyadh was interrupted when Mohammed Ali again sent a military folU' to seize 
Najrl and nominated another member of the Saud family as ruler under the charge of 
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Mohammed Ali's representative in Riyadh. Faisal wa~ taken as a prisoner to Cairo, but 
escaped from jail and re-established his rule in 1845, and maintained the Saudi family's 
authority until his death in 1865. 100 
Faisal's death in 1865, was followed by a struggle for command between two ofrus sons, 
Abdullah and Saud. This fight empowered the Ottomans to take back AJ-Hasa and 
overcome Mohammed Ibn Rashid, the ruler of Hail (North Najd), which prevented him 
from expanding his power over the Saudi state. Abdullah died in 1889, and the Saudi 
state was no more than a province of an area which was ruled by the Rashids. The 
Rashids integrated their hold over the north-central part of Najd and ruled from town of 
Hail. In 1891, Abdullah's son and successor, Ab dulrahm an, was expelled from Riyadh 
to Kuwait with his family, including his young son Abdulaziz, who had been born in 
1880. Rashidi control of the Najd lasted for only a decade, before it was again 
demanded by the Saud family. 101 
Creating The Kingdom or Saudi Arabia. 
1902-1953 
A twenty two-year-old son of Abdulrahman named Abdulaziz, known as Ibn Saud, 
captured Riyadh on January 1, 1902, with the help of only 60 men. The Rashidi power 
had been weakened following the death of Mohammed Ibn Rashid in 1897. The ten 
years after the capture of Riyadh were spent in indecisive fighting against Ibn Rashid 
because the rest of the Najd was still in Ibn Rashid's control, who received support from 
the Ottomans. To seize the entire Najd, Abdulaziz had to get the support of the 
Bedouin tribes of the southern N ajd. 102 
The most difficult challenge to Abdulaziz's strategy came in 1904, when the sultan of 
the Turks sent eight battalions in support of Ibn Rashid. Abdulaziz, for the first time, 
was faced with a modern army. Abdulaziz could not subdue the Turks' modern army, 
however, he knew that Turks could not stand hot weather. Unprepared for survival in 
the desert, the Turkish troops sutTered in the heat (temperatures of up to 45°C or 50°C 
are common in July and the beginning of August). Many of the fighting men died and 
the rest of the soldiers could not use their artillery, the Turks broke and ran. The battle 
for control between Abdulaziz and Ibn Rashid came in April 1 H06, when Abdulaziz's 
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troops surpriHed the army of Ibn Rashid. In a short battle the Rashid army was 
defeated, and their leader killed. Abdulaziz had regained control of his family's 
domain. 103 
The defeat and death of Ibn Rashid did not end Abdulaziz's problems. Abdulaziz's 
problem during this period was to maintain the loyalty of the various tribes in the 
central Najd. Therefore, he had to unite all the tribes in support of his goals and keep 
their loyalty after the fighting had ended. 
Between 1906 and 1912, Abdulaziz faced several challenges. In the north, the Hou~ of 
Rashid still controlled the country. In the east, in Al-Hasa, the Turks still had control, 
and in the Hijaz the Turks had installed Hussain Ibn Ali. After Abdulaziz got the upper 
hand, he seized AI-Hofuf in April 1913, and eliminated Turkish authority in the Al-Hasa 
. 104 provmce. 
Abdulaziz arranged a settlement with the Turks. While conceding the eastern province 
to Abdulaziz, the Turks made an accord with the House of Rashid in Hail. They 
proposed to provide rifles to the Rashids to attack the Najd again. To oppose the 
Turkish initiative, Abdulaziz began negotiations with the British, which culminated in . 
the Anglo-Saudi treaty of 1915.105 To disable the rrurks, the British convinced Abdulaziz 
to attack the Rashids. Saudi and Rashidi troops met in a battle in January 1915. 
Neither side won, as usual in desert warfare the fight settled nothing. The House of 
Saud was still threatened by the Rashids. 106 
While the British dealt with Abdulaziz inside Arabia, they also negotiated with the 
Sharif of Mecca and the ruler of the Hijaz, Hussain Ibn Ali, a member of the Hashimite 
family (the family of the prophet Mohammed). He had been born in Mecca but had 
spent most of his life at the Turkish Sultan's court. He was appointed Sharif of Mecca 
by the Turks to consolidate Ottoman rule in the Hijaz. The British found a good chance 
to weaken Turkish authority by persuading Hussain to withdraw from the Ottoman 
Empire. In July 1916, Hus.r.;ain declared his independence, demanding the title of King 
h Ki fll "" 107 of Arabia, but the British recognise him only as t e ng 0 IJ3Z. 
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Arabia did not play any great part in the events of World War 1. At the end of World 
War I, the British faced an option between their two Arabian allies as to who to support. 
They chose Hussain in the belief that his better-trained and better armed army was 
more formidable than Abdulaziz's warrior force. With British support, Hussain 
launched an attack on the western edge of Abdulaziz' domain in May 1919. Hussain's 
force was met by Saudi soldiers of the AI-Khurma region. The soldiers of Abdulaziz 
killed most of the invading force. By the time, Abdulaziz came on the scene, the way to 
Mecca and the Hijaz lay open before him. However, he did not take the chance. He first 
turned to his northern enemy, the Rashids. In 1921 Abdulaziz seized Hail, ending the 
Rashid threat. 108 
In October 1924, Mecca was occupied fully by Abdulaziz's warriors and in December 
1925, Medina surrendered. Two weeks later, the port city of Jeddah fell and H ussain's 
eldest son, Ali, who had succeeded his father, left for Iraq. Saudi supremacy had been 
established from Al-Hasa in the east to the Hijaz in the west and from the Rub-al-khali 
in the south to the Nafud in the north. Abdulaziz became King of Hijaz and Najd. In 
1927, Great Britain recognised his state as an independent, sovereign state, and on 
September 22, 1932, the country was renamed the "Kingdom of Saudi Arabia". 109 
Abdulaziz was in constant financial difficulties, but with the seizure of Hijaz some 
financial relief was obtained from the taxation of the pilgrims. However, when the 
Great Depression of the early 1930s spread from the United States and Europe, the 
number of pilgrims decreased, and the King faced a financial crisis. Oil was discovered 
in the Dammam region of Al-Hasa in March 1938, and came to Abdulaziz's financial 
rescue. A year later, the first oil shipment left Saudi Arabia. The King's financial crisis 
had been solved temporarily but when World War II broke out, work in the oil field 
came almost to a total halt. The problem was compounded as the winter of 1939-40 was 
a very dry season, and animals and agriculture suffered badly. Saudi Arabia faced 
bankruptcy, and the King asked the British for aid. The British supplied Saudi Arabia 
with ['lOme food and cash loans. When Saudi Arabia needed more supplies, the parent 
oil companies convinced the U.S. government to become involved in Saudi Arabia 
through the Lend-Lease programme. In 1942, President Roosevelt arranged aid to the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. During the war, Saudi Arabia was neutral, but the King's 
sympathies were on the Allied side. I to 
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King Abdulaziz is not widely known in the Western world, yet he was one of the most 
important rulers in the modern Middle East. He unified the Arabian tribes and created 
the Saudi state. He established his family as rulers, and that tradition carries on today. 
He fathered 37 sons and passed the reins of power to them. 111 On November 13, 1953, 
Abdulaziz AI-Saud died. His eldest son, Saud Ibn Abdulaziz AI-Saud, succeeded to the 
throne. 
King Saud Ibn Abdulaziz was forced to resign by his brother Faisal in 1964. From 1964 
to 1975, Saudi Arabia was ruled by King Faisal. He reorganized the government and 
subdued the different factions within the royal family. He was assassinated by a 
nephew in March 1975. 
Table 2 
Provinces, provincial capitals and principal 
locali ties in Saudi Arabia 
Province Provincial Principal Towns, 
Capital Villa~es, Oases 
Easter Province Dammam AI-Hasa, Qatif, Hufuf, 
(al-Hasa) Khubar, Dhahran, Ras 
Tanura, 'Abqayq 
Central Province Riyadh 'Unayza, Burayda, 
(Najd) (Royal Capital) al-Majma'a, al-Kharj, 
al-Huta, al-Hariq, 
al-Dirayya, Sadus, Haradh 
Western Province Mecca Medina, Khaybar, 
(Hijaz) al-Musayijd, Tabuk, 
al-Hanakiya, Badr Hunayn, 
Ta'if, Khulays, Jidda, 
Bisha, Ranya 
Southwestern Province Abha Jizan, Najran, al-Shuqayq, 
('Asir) Mukayla, Khamis Mushayt 
Source: Emile A. Nakhleh, The United States and Saudi Arabia: A political Analysis, 
1975, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, p.4. 
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Map 1 
Source: The KinlWom of Saudi Arabia. 1978. 
Setacy International, London. U.K. p.242. 
Faisal's younger brother Khalid succeeded him, but owing to his poor health he allowed 
his younger brother, Prince Fahd, to exercise much authority. Khalid died on June 13, 
1982. The present ruler is King Fahd. He is a strong supporter of modernisation, and 
he has shaped Saudi Arabia's 'middle of the road' policies. 
Saudi Arabia is a vast country occupying the greater part of the Arabian peninsula and 
is largely desert. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has four administrative regions, the 
central province, the Eastern province, the Western province and the South-Western 
province. Table 2 summarizes the provincial capitals and principal localities in Saudi 
Arabia. The Eastern province is economically the most important for its oil, the Central 
is the capital of Saudi Arabia, the Western region holds the most important Muslim holy 
places of Mecca and Medina. (See map 1). 
3. U.S. policy in the Gulf 
U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia has been based on a combination of interests, including 
economic and commercial objectives, as well as political and military goals. Therefore, 
the U.S. has looked to Saudi Arabia as a leader of the countries of the Arabian 
Peninsula, and the policy has tended to be one of encouraging intra-Arab stability in the 
region under Saudi leadership. U.S. interests in the Persian Gulf have been laid down 
as: (1) continued access to Saudi petroleum for the U.S. and its allies; (2) reinvestment 
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of oil-generated Saudi foreign exchange surpluses; and (3) American participation In 
Saudi modernisation activities. 112 
Expanding U.S. oil interest", and concern about German and Japanese intentions in the 
Middle East before World War II contributed to the U.S. decision in 1939 to establish a 
full diplomatic presence in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 113 The Kingdom and iu; oil 
became increasingly important to the U.S. The U.S.'s political and strategic objectives 
in the region were : 
supporting stability and security in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea areas; 
co-operating with Saudi Arabia in moderating regional behaviour; 
encouraging Saudi initiatives in maintaining oil production and moderating oil 
pnces; 
encouraging Saudi effort", toward an Arab-Israeli settlement; 
maintenance of the territorial and political integrity of Saudi Arabia. 1l4 
Containment of Soviet expansion in the Middle East also occupied the U.S. from the 
late 1940s until 1989. -This was part of a world-wide policy of containment against the 
expansion of international communism. Washington's policy of containment in the 
1950s was to maintain a pro-Western Iran, Iraq, and Saudi Arabia, which was pursued 
by the U.S. in the context of regional collective security agreement." such as the 
Baghdad pact and through bilateral agreements with Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. 1 15 
With the 1958 revolution and the fall of the pro-Western monarchy, Iraq pulled out of 
the Baghdad pact and moved rapidly from a pro-Western stance to close friendship with 
the Soviet Union. Iran and Saudi Arabia became the only two pillars of stability in the 
Gulf in the opinion of U.S. and iu; Western allies. Il6 It was a signal for the Americans 
that what had happened in Egypt in 1952, and in Iraq in 1958, could also happen in 
Saudi Arabia. I 17 Because of these factors, the U.S. increased the importance it placed on 
being able to reinforce the internal security of Saudi Arabia and providing Riyadh with 
military hardware. 
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In 1972, Washington concluded a major review of its interests and policy options in the 
Persian Gulf. The review was influenced by particular factors: the British withdrawal 
from the region in 1971; the increasing dependence of the industrial world on Gulf oil; 
and the composition of newly independent small states in the lower Gulf. Another 
factor influencing the review was the Nixon doctrine, which declared the post-Vietnam 
desire on the part of the U.S. to have local governments participate in the defence of 
their security with U.S. support but without U.S. troops.l1S 
Developments such as the 1973 October war, and the rise in the pnce of oil often 
frustrated implementation of some of the principles. However, the principles remained; 
these principles have forced the U.S. to become more directly involved in the Gulf region 
- politically, economically and strategically.1l9 For the U.S., the case of France and 
Algeria was an outstanding example of how other consumer governments had tried to 
secure access to raw materials by establishing strong ties with a particular producing 
country. The U.S. government's response was a "special relationship" with Iran and 
Saudi Arabia. "Access" meant an adequate and long term source of supply of oil, at 
moderate prices not only for the United States but for a wider grouping of countries 
whose future would affect that of the U.S. I20 In 1974-75, joint commissions on the 
economic and security between the U.S., Iran, and Saudi Arabia, as well as closer 
Iranian-Saudi co-operation in the fields of economic development and security were 
established. The U.S. began to view the Arabian Peninsula/Persian Gulf area 
separately from the rest of the Middle East. This, indeed emphasised the importance of 
the Peninsula and the Gulf in Washington's long-term policy planning to establish peace 
d .. th . 121 an securIty In e regIOn. 
By the 1980s, the policy principles of the previous decade became obviously deficient. 
The fall of the Shah of Iran in early 1979; the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in late 
1979; and the Iran-Iraq war which broke out in 1980, all presented problems for the 
U.S. With these events, the new decade began. With President Carter's response to 
the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, opposing Soviet expansionism had become a main 
policy goal of the United States. In an addres.~ before the Council on Foreign Relations 
in March 1980, Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, identified the United States' 
interest.s in the Persian Gulf and the Levant as follows: to insure access to adequate oil 
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supplies; to resist Soviet expansion; to promote stability in the region; and to advance 
the Middle East peace process; whilst ensuring the continued security of Israel. 122 
National Security Adviser, Brezinski, accompanied by Deputy Secretary of State, 
Warren Christopher, was reported to have outlined U.S. policy toward the region during 
discussion in Saudi Arabia with Crown Prince Fahd in February 1980. The main points 
of which were: 
U.S. policy rested upon the President's determination to take concrete steps 
toward increasing security in the region, 
The U.S. would remain committed to obtaining a peaceful accommodation 
between the Arabs and Israel, with particular recognition of the importance of 
making progress on the Palestinian issue; 
The U.S. would undertake to establish a military presence in the region by 
acquiring regular access to military facilities and upgrading its military 
capabilities, and it was prepared to co-operate in military exercises in order to be 
ready for various contingencies; 
The U.S. desired to co-operate militarily with Saudi Arabia, and wanted to 
discuss in detail what was required to make such co-operation possible; and 
The U.S. was interested in maintaining a viable and united Iran where the 
Soviet Union would not be tempted to intervene, and once Iran had released its 
American hostages, the U.S. was willing to assist that nation with its economic 
and military problems. 123 
The issues concerning Western strategic relations with Gulf states acquired a far more 
pressing importance during the Iran-Iraq war in 1986, and 1987. The fighting in the 
war shifted to the point where an Iranian victory was likely and, thus, there was an 
Iranian threat to Gulf shipping. These pressures gradually drove the U.S. and several 
of its principal European allies, into more overt military interventions in the Gulf. 
Saudi Arabia and the smaller Gulf states found that a strong U.S. presence in the Gulf 
was necessary to prevent the growing threat from Iran and that the U.S. had to depend 
on its military relations with Saudi Arabia. 124 
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Therefore, the U.S. has had an interest in the Persian Gulf region since World War II 
and the U.S. has been involved in the Gee mainly through Saudi Arabia. The Kingdom 
of Saudi Arabia has played a significant role in regional and world affairs by virtue of its 
geographical location and its deposits of oil, as well as the instability elsewhere in the 
Persian Gulf region. 
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Chapter Two 
u.s. -Saudi Economic Relations until the 1990 Gulf Crisis 
From the very beginning, oil has been a driving force behind U.S. - Saudi relations. 
William Quandt, has stated, "Because Saudi Arabia sits atop the largest and most 
easily exploited reserves of petroleum in the world, it inevitably is being drawn into 
the rentre of international politics". Quandt continues, "For Americans the stakes 
involved in the U.S. - Saudi relationship are particularly great. No country has 
benefited more from relations with Saudi Arabia than the United States. 
American oil companies have made enormous profits. American businessmen have 
had a disproportionate share of the Saudi market".l Before going into detail about 
the U.S. - Saudi economic relations, it is useful to give an overview of the Saudi 
economy. 
The Saudi Arabian economy 
1. The oil sector 
The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia inherited a simple, tribal economy until the 
disoovery of oil in the 1930s. Saudi Arabia's economy had been small prior to this 
date. It was based on the Oasis, agriculture, pilgrimage traffic, and the tribe - each 
small unit functioning almost independently. 
Sinoo oil has become the main source of revenue for Saudi Arabia, providing the 
vast majority of the Saudi national income, Saudi Arabia has been moving rapidly 
along the road to modernity. The effect of the oil revenue and modern Western 
technology has been to change Saudi Arabia from a predominantly pastoral nation 
to one depending largely upon agriculture and related industries. Table 3 shows 
world oil production for 1989, with the Soviet Union as the largest producer, 
followod by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. Table 4 shows world oil reserves for early 
1990, with the largest oil reserve held by Saudi Arabia.2 Figure 1 shows the total 
world oil reserves in early 1994, with Saudi Arabia holding more than 25 per rent, 
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the world's largest national oil reserve. Figure 2 shows oil production in 1993, 
when Saudi Arabia's oil production averaged 8 million barrels/day, and how it 
compared to the OPEC and Gulf states oil production. Figure 3 shows that Saudi 
Arabia was the largest oil exporter in OPEC and the Gulf states during 1993. Map 
2 illustrates the Saudi core area. 
Table 3 
World oil production - top 10 countries 
1989 - million barrels per day. 
1. Soviet Union 
2. United States 
3. Saudi Arabia 
4. Mexico 
5. Iran 
6. Iraq 
7. China 
8. Venezuela 
9. United Kingdom 
10. Canada 
12.475 
9.175 
5.260 
2.875 
2.865 
2.825 
2.790 
1.980 
1905 
1.725 
Source: Malcolm Dando and Paul Rogers, A Violent Peace. Global Security After the Cold War. 
1992, Brassey's. U.K. p. 92. 
Table 4 
World oil reserves - top 10 countries 
January 1, 1990 - billion barrels 
1. Saudi Arabia 
2. Iraq 
3. Kuwait 
4. Iran 
( 255.0 
449.5 ( 100.0 
( 94.5 
92.9 
5. UAE - Abu Dhabi 92.2 
58.5 
58.4 
56.4 
34.1 
24.0 
6. Venezuela 
7. Soviet Union 
8. Mexico 
9. United States 
10. China 
Source: As table 3, p. 93. 
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Figure 1 
Proven crude oil reserves 
Share or world total (per cent); estimated at January 1, 1994 
Saudi Arabia 25.89% 
Iraq 10.01% 
Iran 9.29% 
UAE9.82% 
Other 33.83% 
m--- 8ahrain 0.01 % 
11'---- Qatar 0.37% 
\ L..-_ Yemen 0.40% 
Oman 0.47% 
Neutral Zone 0.50% 
Source: Saudi Arabia. Country Report. 1st quarter 1994, 
The Economist Intelligence Unit, P. 13. 
FilUre 2 
Estimated crude oil production, 1993 
000 barrelS/d'ay 
Saudi Arabia 
Iraq 
Iran 
UAf 
Kuwait 
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Figure 3 
Crude oil exports, 1993 
000 bid - bottom scale; per cent share or world total -
top scale 
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2. Saudi oil policy 
Eronomic resourees are a significant factor in a state's ability to achieve its foreign 
policy goals. Thus, Saudi Arabia's oil is the main economic instrument of its 
foreign policy. Oil for Saudi Arabia was not just a strategic economic commodity. 
but al~ a political instrument to be used to obtain political influence and security? 
Saudi Arabia used an oil embargo during the 1973 war with Israel as a political 
weapon to pressure the U.S. to gain a oomprehensive Arab-Israeli peace 
settlement.4 The oil embargo was carried out in such a way as to maximise both 
political interest and financial gains. The political purpose was a<mmplished 
through the conoorted efforts of 0 PEe and the economic objective was geared more 
closely with the interests of Arabs and non -Arab oil exporters. 
28 
The Saudi oil policy, which was to maximize political and economic profit through 
oil, started in 1959, when an Arab oil rongress was formed. The aim..c; of the 
congress, clarified in its second meeting in 1960, was in sharp conflict with the oil 
companies. The oil companies decided, without prior consultation with the host 
governments, to reduce the prices of Middle East oil by about 18 per cent a barrel.~ 
The governments of Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, issued a statement on May 13, 
1960, recommending that petroleum exporting countries should seek a common 
policy to protect their rightful interests. Therefore, the main petroleum producing 
countries (Saudi Arabia, Iran, Iraq, Venezuela and Kuwait) announced their 
intention to establish the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). 
AB a result, OPEC was founded in September 1960.6 
OPEC has worked to gain control of oil resources sinre it has emerged as a power 
centre. OPEC has had a universal outlook and its formation had the effect of 
disoonnecting Arab oil policy from large Arab political and economic interests. 
Sinre an Arab oil organisation could not be constructed, Saudi Arabia began to 
work within OPEC to work for the cause of the universal interests of all oil 
exporters, without regard to particular Arab interests. 
In the mid-1960s, Saudi's policy was to prevent such control and to act jointly with 
the oil rompanies. As an alternative to nationalisation, Saudi Arabia demanded 
participation agreements with oil companies. 
In 1967, after the Six-Day Arab-Israeli war, the Arab oil producing oountries 
formed a group, The Organisation of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries 
(OAPEC). The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia submitted a proposal to both Kuwait and 
Libya for establishing the organi~tion which without competing with OPEC, 
would be in a position to protect Arab interests. This offered a regional political 
forum on a ~ale not found in OPEC.1 Its objective is to promote greater 
co-operation between all Arab states. Arab petroleum exporting rountries, in 
which petroleum represents an important source of income, have joined OAPEC.' 
The OAPEC objectives are to carry out common projects that would achieve a 
diversified economic investment for the members and to develop and promote the 
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international petroleum industry by means of providing suitable circumstances for 
capital and experience to be invested in the member countries.9 
American support of the Israeli military efforts increa'3ed dramatically. This forred 
Saudi Arabia to take control of the oil companies and implement production 
cutbacks and use them to place an embargo on oil supplies to the U.S. Up to this 
point, OPEC had existed and functioned without much interest from the rest of the 
world, but the oil embargo of 1973, exposed the actual and potential influence of 
OPEC on the world eoonomy. 
Saudi Arabia believes that oil oonsumers and oil producers are linked by common 
interests and the oil producers can supply the industrialized nations with oil in 
return for the purchase of arms and goods available in the industrialized world. 
Saudi Arabia also looks to the United States for safe and productive u~s of its 
supply of oil money. Therefore, the Saudis are adopting the ooncept of linkage in 
their dealing with the United States. 
Saudi Arabia knows that it can not get advantage from economic confusion as a 
result of the energy crisis in the world. A'3 Ahmed Zaki Yamani, former Saudi Oil 
Minister, stated, "If there is a depression, we will never be safe - no matter how 
rich we are .... we can not industrialize if there is a sick eoonomy in the world".'o 
Again he stated at a special 1974 energy ~minar in Washington D.C. that Saudi 
policy planners recognise the need for international economic co-operation. He 
suggested that the United States and other ind\L'3trial nations should: 1 - "adjust 
themselves to the new economic reality that there is a transfer of wealth from the 
industrial world to a group of developing nations, the oil producing nations"; 2 - "sit 
down with the newly wealthy group of states in order to see how you can meet 
their requirements and how you can &lIve your problems"; and 3 - "establish a 
committee representing the oil producers, the industrial countries, and the 
developing oountries to jointly discuss the world's energy needs in a spirit of 
co-operation" .11 
Oil poLici('s influence the economies of the industrialized countries. If oil production 
is cut back, the price of oil may double, and development plans may be afTectcd.12 
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Saudi Arabia needs to produce oil revenues at a level appropriate to it.'5 total 
economic development goals while maintaining its international political and 
economic stabiIity.\3 An increase in the OPEC prices directly affects the U.S. 
balance of payments, often leading to a devaluation of the dollar, which in tum, 
affect.c;; the value of Saudi holdings in the United StateS.14 
Oil has assisted in the integration of the Saudi eoonomy into the Western eoonomy. 
Oil revenues have assisted the Saudis to import large numbers of consumer 
products from the industrialized countries, while Saudi investments of surplus oil 
income in Western countries and Saudi oil exports to industrialized countries have 
raised Saudi Arabia's position to an important international one.l~ Saudi Arabia 
was able to participate in international aid and development programmes.16 Saudi 
Arabia was invited to be a member of the board of directors of the International 
Monetary Fund (lMF) with voting power along with other industrialized powers.17 
International and regional economic stability and Islam are the major motives 
behind the Saudi aid programmes. IS Saudi aid has ai'-'O encouraged ~me Arab 
states like Egypt and North Yemen to move away from the Soviet Union's sphere 
of influence. 19 Saudl Arabia uses its aid programme in the same manner as the 
U.S. - to further its foreign policy. 
Saudi Arabia has established a development fund of $2.8 billion to lend to 
developing nations. Saudi Arabia, along with Kuwait and United Arab Emirates, 
has pledged more than $400 million to the Islamic Development Bank which was 
founded in 1974, in Saudi Arabia. They also declared non-Arab developing 
countries eligible for low interest loans. Saudi aid to developing countries grew 
from $835 million in 1974, to more than $3,000 million in 1978.20 As David Long 
has stated, Saudi Arabia fully intended to become one of the world's leading 
foreign-aid donors. 21 Figure 4 shows foreign aid from the top ten donors in the 
world for 1983, with Saudi Arabia ranked seoond after the United States. 
The Kingdom's oil revenue." and it.", desire for development programmes have 
reeeivpd large amounts of international publicity. But, Saudi Arabia ha.."i roa(Wy 
:31 
aocepted the obligation to share its wealth with developing 00 un tries. The U.N. 
recommends that 0.7 per cent of gross national income be given a~ aid. However, 
Saudi Arabia has given more than $70,600 billion between 1973 and 1993, which 
is 5.5 per cent of itc;; national production.22 David Long stated that Saudi Arabia 
sought to use its new economic status to increase co-operation, not confrontation, 
with the United States.23 Table 5 illlLc;;trates Saudi Arabia's contributions to Arab 
regional and international development institutions for 1988. 
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Foreign aid from top ten donors 
in the world for 1983 
Sources: King Fahd and Saudi Arabia's Great Evolution. 
1987, Nasser Ibrahim Rasbid and F..sber Ibrahim Shaheen. International Institute ofTedmology. Inc .. p . 147 . 
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Table 5 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's contributions to 
Arab regional and international development 
institutions for 1988. 
Institution 
Islamic Bank for Development 
Arab Fund for Economic and Social 
Devel~ment 
Arab Monetary Fund 
OPEC Fund for International 
Devel~ment 
Arab Bank for Economic Development 
in Africa 
African Development Bank 
World Bank 
International Development Agency 
International Finance Corporation 
Mutual Investment Guarantee Agency 
IMF 
African Development Fund 
International Fund for Agricultural 
Devel~ment 
Arab Corporation for Investment 
Guarantee 
Arab Gulf Programme for Support of 
the UN Development Organisation 
Arab Fund for Technical Aid to Arab 
and African Countries 
The Funds 
Established in 
Organisations 
Conference 
and Institutions 
the Frame of the 
of the Islamic 
Programme for Curing River 
Blindness 
Programme for Combating Drought in 
the Sahel Countries 
Capital The Kingdom's 
(U .s. Dollars) contribution 
2,118,800,000 536,440,000 
2,415,900,000 553,100,000 
1,294,000,000 187,300,000 
3,435,008,438 1,033,279,607 
1,048.825,000 255,584.153 
5,931.468,000 14.279,460 
96.600,000,000 3,032,764.000 
40,927.000,000 1,665,700,000 
1.300,000.000 17.911.000 
1,000,000,000 31,370.000 
116,983,815,000 4,163,120.000 
3.499,930,000 116,524,973 
2,340.924,675 333,778.000 
25,025.000 3.750,000 
197.000.000 150.000,000 
60,080,000 13,563.000 
214.662,000 
299.000,000 25.000.000 
240.000 .000 130.000.000 
C-ontribution as 
a percentage of 
the total capital 
25.3 
22.9 
14.5 
30.1 
24.2 
0.25 
3.32 
3.5 
1.37 
3.14 
3.6 
3.4 
14.25 
15 
76 
22.6 
8.36 
54 
Sources: Fouad Al-Farsy. Modernity and Tradition. The Saudi Equation. 
1990. Kegan Paillnternational.London. & l\~' York. P. 297-298. 
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3. Saudi inrrastructures 
During the period 1974 to ]981, Saudi Arabia produced an annual average of 15.2 
per cent of the total world production of oil with a peak contribution of 17.5 per 
cent in 1981 (an average of 9.8 million barrels a day). ~c; a proportion of total 
OPEC production it had an annual average contribution of 31% over the same 
period.24 Oil revenues (approximately 97.3 per cent of total national revenues in 
1973) have fuelled Saudi Arabia's economic development programmes and have 
impelled the present transition from a traditional tribal and feudal economy into a 
modern industrial country. The Saudi Arabian Ambassador to the United 
Kingdom, Dr Ghazi A. Algosaibi, has stated, "In the early 1970s the very 
substantial increase in oil revenues allowed us to raise our sights and accelerate 
the programme. But it wa" clearly not going to be easy. In 1977, I told a vic;iting 
American journalist: 1 know many eoonomists tell us we can not compress the 
century long proress of development industrialisation, infrastructure creation and 
manpower training - into a few decades. But sinre no nation with our resources 
5has ever tried to do so, no one really knows if it can be done. We shall try'. The 
first problem that was to be confronted was the creation of a full eronomlc 
infrastructure for the developed industrial state we were aspiring to. I wouJd 
argue that we have already come a long way towards achieving our ambitionsll.~ 
With the help of oil revenues, the government has built seaports, airports, 
refineries, hospitals, clinics, industries and schools. Education is the fIrst priority -
it is free at all levels, even healthcare, including surgical treatment and medicines 
in Saudi Arabia are free, not only for citizens, but also for all resident foreigners 
and visitors. 
Over the last few years, the greening of Saudi Arabia has meant the Kingdom has 
become almost self-sufficient in it..c; agricultural needs. In 1975, there was only 
about 150,000 acres of cultivated land; by 1985, it had reached more than 
2,300,000 acres.l' 
Tho largest industrial complex is SABIC (Saudi Basic Industries Corporation) 
which is a joint venture owned by the government and thC' private sect.or. This has 
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been described a" the biggest single industrial programme in history. It is a huge 
projecl, building two rompletely industrial cities, one at Yanbu on the Red Sea and 
the other at ~Juhail on the Gulf. The cities have been built, the heavy industrial 
projects - oil refineries, petro-chemical plants and steel works have been ~t up. 
SABIC costs 70 billion dollars and now naturally controlc; the heavy industrial and 
petrochemical sector and made profits of $523 million in 1992?7 
Transport and telerommunication in Saudi Arabia have taken mas.c;;ive steps 
forward. The Saudis began with two DC3 aircrafts in 1945 and now the Saudi 
national airline, has increased its fleet to over 100 jet aircraft. The fleet includes 
747s, Tristars and Airbuses. Within Saudi Arabia, there are three international 
airports, (Riyadh, Jeddah and Dhahran) and 20 domestic airports covering all 
parts of Saudi Arabia. They now carry some 21 million passengers a year through 
out Saudi Arabia. 2& 
In shipping important progress has been made. The government - owned National 
Shipping Company has more than 300 merchant ships. In the 1970s the harbours 
were so crowded that ships were queuing for up to six months outside Jeddah and 
Dammam. Today Saudi Arabia has seven major seaports and 14 minor ports.29 
In 1951, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia- had no asphalt roads. Tn 1970, Saudi 
Arabia had 8,600 kilometres (km) of roads. By 1990, this had increased to 33,000 
km including 6,000 km of freeways which had been built to connect all regions. 
Plans are under way to build 80,000 kIn of agricultural roads and by the end of 
1995, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia should have 150,000 km of asphalt road~. 
Saudi Arabia has the only railway system in the Arabian peninsula, connecting 
Riyadh and the port of Dammam in the Gulf. The 562 km single line track carries 
about 2 million tonnes of cargo and 25,000 passengers a year.30 
In 1970, Saudi Arabia had just 57,000 telephone linpnS, in 1994, theRe had 
increased to 1.5 million telephone lines. They will have increased to 2 million by 
1995. The Ministry of Posts, Telegraphs and Telephones invested more than S 15 
billion during the four, five year development plans covered in the period 19H5 to 
1990. The telephone ReNice operates in 4[>0 cities, towns and hamlets. 
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Telecommunications ~rvices are available throughout the oountry. It has more 
than 700 post offices.31 
Saudi Arabia ha" now entered a new era for using satellite comm unications. I t is 
the world's fifth largest user of satellite communications. The first two Arabsat 
satellites came into use about 10 years ago. 
Healthcare in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is free for all citizens. Throughout the 
country, Saudi Arabia has 257 hospitals and more than 3,000 health care centres. 
In 1993, the government has been built more than 500 clinics. The number of 
doctors has been increased from one doctor per 6,000 people in 1970, to one doctor 
per 544 people in 1993. Medical universities are running basic health re.~arch 
programmes. For instance, the research centre at King Saud University's School of 
Pharmacology ha~ developed a new drug that effectively steadies the blood sugar 
levels of diabetics.32 
King Saud University in Riyadh, the fIrst university in the country, was founded in 
1957. There are now seven universities and the number of students has risen from 
14,000 in 1970, to more than 160,000 in 1994. One of the universities is the King 
Fahd University of Petroleum and Minerals in Dhahran founded in 1963, and one 
of the very few of its kind in the world. I ts standards and achievements are 
internationally reoognised.33 The number of primary and ~oondary ~hools has 
increased from 3,600 in 1972, to more than 17,000 in 1994. During the same 
period the number of students has increased from 670,000 to more than 3 million 
in 1994.34 
4. The diversifying Saudi economy 
Sinoo the Saudi eoonomy is still ~nsitive to the volume and price of the Kingdom's 
oil exports, Hiyadh is detennined to diversify the Saudi Arabian economy, making 
it les." dependent on oil. Saudi officials have said about the diversification of the 
eronomy. "We have already made oonsiderable progress toward." this goal. Twenty 
years ago, petroleum provided more than 55 per cent of our gross domf'stic produd: 
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today it is responsible for only about 30 per cent" .3~ Dr Algosaibi stated, "But 
perhaps the most remarkable growth has been in the more traditional private 
manufacturing industry which accounted for over 11 per cent of GDP in 1992. 
There are industrial estates outside all the major cities. The number of rompanies 
has increased from 1,000 in 1978 to over 2,300 today. There are some 2,000 
working factories with up to 50 new units opening each year, producing paper and 
building products, detergent'), furniture, plastics, metals, textiles, and many other 
items".36 Figure 5 rompares the gross domestic product of the Middle Eastern 
countries in 1993, and clearly shows Saudi Arabia as the wealthiest country. 
In addition, Saudi Arabia is no longer as reliant on direct oil revenues as it was. 
For instance, agriculture's share of the gross national product (GNP) increased 
from 3 per cent in 1976, to 13 per cent in 1986. The sureess of these policies is 
reflected also in the manufacturing sector's contribution of a steadily growing 
share to the GNP in items such as textiles, cement, chemicals, plastics and 
building material, with increasing numbers of Saudi workers joining the industrial 
sector.37 The objective of industrial development is to expand and diversify the 
production base, develop non-oil income sources and give Saudi Arabia a degree of 
self-sufficiency.38 Table 6 illustrates the declining share of government revenues 
provided by oil. Oil revenues have been invested in developing Saudi agriculture, 
to make the Kingdom as self-reliant as possible, as well ac;; turning it into a food 
exporter. Since a great drive for self-sufficiency and food security was launched in 
the 1970s, the Kingdom has reduced its dependence on food imports from 87 per 
cent to about 50 per cent. Over the past decade, Saudi Arabia has berome a major 
economy in the world. Saudi Arabia is firmly established among the world's 25 
largest economies.39 
It is probably rather less well known that, Saudi Arabia became a major flower 
grower, and exports some of its produce. The fishing industry is making rapid 
progrp~"s and now export.." shrimps to Japan. Food imports into the Kingdom were 
reduced from 8.7 million tonnes in 1987, to 4 million tonnes in 1991.40 
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The amount of wheat grown rose from 26,000 tonnes in 1970, to 4,000,000 t,onnes 
in 1993. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is the world's sixth largest exporter of 
wheat. Saudi Arabia is also one of the world's leading growers of dates producing 
about 600,000 tonnes a year. Fruit and vegetable production reached a total of 2.6 
million tonnes.41 In 1985, Saudi Arabia achieved its self-sufficiency in the 
production of chickens for slaughter, eggs, milk and dairy products, as well as 
exporting part of its production to its neighbouring states.42 Table 7 shows the 
increased production of grains, vegetables and fruit from 1985 to 1990. 
Saudi Arabia has instituted. an ambitious programme of agriculture developments. 
It offers grants of both land and money to farmers and companies as well as 
interest free loans to aid the agricultural development programme. The 
government offers grants to the value of 50 per cent of the cost of agricultural 
machinery, as well as for seeds.43 
The continuous development of Saudi Arabia since it was declared a unified 
Kingdom has been one of the great national success stories of the history of the 
area. Saudi Arabia's ever-developing economy, established on oil, industry and 
agriculture, is founded on the investment of revenues; a free market economy; 
government adoption of many major products, diversification of the production 
base by encouraging the industrial and agricultural sectors; development of local 
manpower and of economic co-operation at all the required levels.44 Since the price 
of oil has fallen, Saudi Arabia has channelled the wealth generated into national 
developments and initiated a programme to speed up the growth of the industrial 
and agricultural sectors. 
The policies pursued in this regard control the expansion of crude oil refining in 
areordance with world and domestic demand and support industrial development. 
As part of this strategy, Saudi Arabia has been actively seeking to ensure that it 
has access to markets for its crude. In November 1988, Saudi Arabia obtained a 
50:50 joint venture with Texaco's refineries and ga~line stations in 26 states in 
the eastern and ~uthern United States, it cost Saudi Arabia about $800 million. 
The company had revenue of $6,823 million in 1992. The Company uses about 
600,000 bId of Saudi crude oi1.4~ 
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Furthermore, in 1991, Saudi Arameo bought 35 per rent of Sangyong Oil Refining 
Company of South Korea, which focu'led attention on one of the highest eoonomie 
growth areas in the world. The company has two refineries: one with capacity of 
175,000 bid and one with capacity of 90,000 b/d.46 
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Fieure 5 
Gross domestic product in the Middle East in 1993. 
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Table 7 
Agricultural Production 
('000 tonnes) 
1986 1986 1987 1988 
2.194 2.606 2.767 3.081 
2.135 2,544 2.467 2.800 
43 31 44 60 
4 5 10 11 
5 9 15 20 
3 13 136 186 
1.6&6 1,682 1.941 2.050 
331 370 435 465 
667 534 633 625 
80 72 109 112 
456 460 515 517 
134 138 149 155 
130 139 154 159 
186 196 236 248 
403 428 487 508 
• Estimat.es b Including reconstituted products 
Source: As figure 5 for 1991·92. p. 14.15. 
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1989 
3.633 
3.192 
75 
12 
35 
315 
2,226 
480 
700 
123 
528 
159 
164 
241 
555 
1990"' 
4.118 
3.570 
95 
13 
36 
400 
2,230 
500 
730 
135 
542 
163 
171 
265 
625 
In early 1994, Saudi Aramco has purchased 10 per rent of the Petron CA>rporation, 
the state owned oil company in the Philippines. Petron operates a 155,000 bId 
refinery along with 860 service stations which hold a 40 per rent share of the 
Philippine oil market. Mr Hisham Nazer, the Saudi Minister of Oil and Mineral 
Resources, stated that Saudi Aramco would supply 90 of the refinery's crude oil 
requirements. That was third Saudi Aramoo's overseas joint venture in refining.47 
The Minic;ter of Industry and Electricity, Abdulaziz al-Zamil, remarked that "While 
trade and investment are significant. There is a shift in the Saudi Arabian 
market. Having completed a large part of its physical infrastructure, Saudi Arabia 
is now concentrating on eoonomic diversification with the emphasis on industry, 
agriculture, financial and business services. The main opportunities for fOJ'{lign 
companies have, therefore, shifted from contracting and services toward 
investment" .43 
u.s. -Saudi oil relations 
Oil has been an essential element in U.S. - Saudi relations from the early stages in 
the development of their relations. The enormous oil reserve in Saudi Arabia alone 
make that country more important to American diplomacy than almost any other 
developing country. 
The Americans were not the first country to be interested in Saudi oil. In 1923, a 
New Zealander, Major Frank Holmes, a representative of a British group of 
investors, had obtained the first oil concession in Saudi Arabia from King 
Abdulaziz, a concession oovering more than 30,000 square miles in the Al-Hasa, 
the north-eastern part of the penin..c;ul a along the Persian Gulf region of eastern 
Saudi Arabia. 
Holmes failed to interest any British company in the exploitation of oil in the 
AJ.Hasa region and reased exploration in 1925. The concession was formally 
announced void in 1928.49 That was one of the world's gf'{latest lost opportunIties 
for British companies. 
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John Philby, an Englishman who became a close advisor to King Abdulaziz, 
suggested that Charles R. Crane, an American with a deep interest in Arabia and 
who was spon~ring development projects in Yemen, might be interested in 
developing the oil fields. In 1930, King Abdulaziz invited Crane to visit the 
Kingdom. In 1931, he arrived in Riyadh and finally he promised to send, at his 
own expense, an American mining engineer to make a survey of Saudi Arabia to 
evaluate the Kingdom's water, mineral and oil resources.so 
In 1931, Karl Twitchell, the mining engineer, arrived in Jeddah. Having made a 
more than 1,500 mile-long journey through the country, Twitchell found what he 
was looking for. He went home to the United States to find a company that was 
interested to win a oomprehensive concession from Abdulaziz. In 1933, Twitchell 
arrived in Jeddah with a representative of the Standard Oil Company of California 
(SO CAL), Lloyd Hamilton. In May 1933, Hamilton succeeded in negotiating a 
conoossion for exclusive rights to oil in the Eastern provinoo. The initial agreement 
established a conoossion for sixty six years, from 1933 to 1999. The original 
concession covered 360,000 square miles along the east coast of Saudi Arabia. The 
rest of Saudi Arabia remained unleased until 1939, when conoosslons were 
granted, which added 80,000 square miles to the original ooncession, thus, 
bringing the total to 440,000 square miles. At that time, the United States had no 
diplomatic relations with Saudi Arabia. These were soon established, however, in 
1940.~1 
The original concession called for an annual rental fee of 5,000 British pounds in 
gold until oil was disoovered; a 50,000 pound loan in gold to the Saudi government; 
a royalty payment of four shillings (former British coin, equal to 1120 of a pound) in 
gold per net tonne of crude oil produced after the di~very of oil; and the free 
supply to the government, of specific quantities of products from the refinery the 
company was to build after oil has been di~vered, that was equal to the amount 
extracted in one day in 1970.~2 (In 1933, the British pound was worth about U.S. 
$4.87). The company received exclusive rights to explore, produoo, and export oil, 
free of all Saudi taxes and duties. This generous lease agreement reflected the 
King's need for funds at that time.~3 
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The oompany was officially known as California Arabia Standard Oil (CASOC). 
On January 31, 1944, the name wa." changed to the Arabian American Oil 
Company (ARAMCO). Aramco is a oonsortium of four major American oil 
companies: Social 30 per cent, Texaco 30 per cent, Exxon 30 per cent and Mobil 10 
per cent. These four companies were the owners of Aramco until the 1970s.~ 
Oil wa.'i fIrst produced commercially in 1938, but World War II kept production at a 
relatively low level. Large scale production began in 1945, with over 58,000 
barrel" a day. Oil production had increased by almost 1,000 per cent in 1950, to 
over half a million barrels a day. Table 8 illustrates the steady increa.~ in oil 
production. 
The nature of Aramco was changing even as its activities were expanding. In 
1950, an agreement was signed, between Aramco and the Saudi government 
whereby the government taxed profits at 50 per cent. In December 1972, long 
negotiations were completed for the Saudi government to buy a 25 per cent stake 
in Aramco, effective from 1973. The negotiations of 1973, resulted in the Saudi 
stake increasing to 60 per cent. In 1980, arrangements for 100 per cent Saudi 
ownership of Aramco were reached and the payments to the four American 
companies were completed. American staff remained at work for Aramco. There 
were more than 3,400 Americans in 1980. By 1983, Aramco employed more than 
61,000 individuals, of which more than 33,000 were Saudi nationals.~~ 
Relations between Saudi Arabia and Aramoo have been marked by much stre~<;s 
and strain. Economic growth has primarily involved the American private sector 
more than the government. For many years, Aramco played a more important role 
in U.S. - Saudi relations than the United States government did. Socal and Texaco, 
the two partners in Casoc, were the only two private oompanies involved in Saudi 
il ~ o . 
The direct U.S. government involvement to aid the Saudi government was 
prot.ecting the Saudi's most valuable asset (oil) against the political risks in Saudi 
Arabia and ooncern about German and Japanese intentions in the Middl(> East and 
Table 8 
Annual crude oil production and oil revenues 
in Saudi Arabia from 1938 until 1993. 
Year Million Barrels Million 
per day IT .S. Dollars 
1938 1,357 
1939 10,000 3.2 
1940 13,000 
1941 11,000 
1942 12,000 
1943 13,000 
1944 21,000 
1945 58,386 
1946 164,000 10.4 
1947 246,169 
1948 390,309 
1949 476.736 
1950 546,703 56.7 
1951 761,000 
1952 827,000 
1953 844,000 
1954 961,000 
1955 976,000 340.8 
1956 1.000,000 
1957 1,020,000 
1958 1,060,000 
1959 1,150,000 315.0 
1960 1,320,000 333.7 
1961 1,480,000 377.6 
1962 1,640,000 409.7 
1963 1,790,000 607.7 
1964 1.900.000 523.2 
1965 2,024,000 664.l 
1966 2,392,000 789.0 
1967 2,597,000 903.6 
1968 2.829,000 926.4 
1969 2,992.000 949.2 
1970 3,548,000 1,214.0 
1971 4,497,000 1,884.9 
1972 5.733,000 2,744.6 
1973 7,334.000 4,340.0 
1974 8,048,000 22.573.5 
1975 7,080,000 25,676.2 
1976 8,580,000 30,754.9 
1977 9,200,000 36,540.1 
1978 8,315,000 32,000.0 
1979 9,555,000 48,443.1 
1980 9,990.000 104,200.0 
1981 9,985,000 113,300.0 
1982 6,695,000 76,000.0 
1983 5,225,000 46,000.0 
1984 4,760,000 43,700.0 
198.5 3,565,000 24,180.0 
1986 4,784,000 16,975.0 
1987 3,975,000 19,271.0 
1988 5,086.000 20,500.0 
1989 5,160,000 23,000,0 
1990 5,160,000 43,000.0 
1991 8.~,OOO 43,700.0 
1992 8,410,000 40.000.0 
1993 8,210,000 35,800,0 
Souroes: Saudi Arabia Rush to Development, 1982. Ragaei El Mallak, P. 55, p. 62 from year 1938 until 1977. Saudi 
Arabian Monetary A2enc')'. Statistical Abstract (Jeddah, Saudi Arabia. December 1972, pp. 52-53, from year 1965 
until 1972 (Revenue). Modernity and Tradition, The Saudi Eauation, Fouad Al-Farsay, 1990 from year 1978 until 
1987 (the revenues from 1978 until 1984) p. 140, p. 120. The ~tiddJe East Review 1991-1992. revenues from year 
1985 until 1988. p. 120. Saudi Arabia, 1993, Mardechai Abir. Revenues from 1988 until 1991. Saudi AraQ~ 
COJ!!1tn: re~or!, 1st quarter 1994. the years of 1992 and 1993. 
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the intentions of the British with regard to Saudi oil contributed to the U.S. 
decision in 1939 to establish a full diplomatic presence in Saudi Arabia.s7 By that, 
there were more than 325 Americans in Saudi Arabia. sa Direct involvement by the 
American government in Saudi Arabia was known to some as the policy of 
"solidification".s9 The U.S. involvement in Saudi Arabia was securing the 
continuation of a totally American enterprises there after World War 11.60 In 
addition, the Army Navy Petroleum Board introduced it report to President 
Roosevelt that serious shortage of oil was imminent, which would threaten 
military operations.61 The concerns of the military men gave a further push to the 
U.S. government in the direction of Saudi Arabia.62 
Supplying the U.S. with oil fonn Saudi Arabia has continued over the decades. 
Areording to the Department of Energy figures, during the first quarter of 1990, 
the United States imported 1.3 million barrels per day (mbd) of crude and related 
products from Saudi Arabia. Imports into the U.S. of crude oil alone were 1.16 
mbd. This represented 17 per cent of total U.S. imports of crude and related 
products. Broken down, it represented 19.4 per cent of crude imports and 8.5 per 
cent of related product imports. It is 15 per cent of total American imports and 
some·20 per cent of Saudi exports. 
U.S. - Saudi commercial relations 
Commercial relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia in the early 
1930s, were carried out almost entirely between the Saudi government and private 
U.S. firms, represented by Aramco. When oil was produced in commercial 
quantities in 1938, a new period of Saudi-American relations began. Following 
World War II, America had an insufficient supply of domestic crude oil production. 
Immediately, other U.S. companies established a presence in Saudi Arabia in 
association with Aramco. For instance, in the late 1940s, the engineering finn 
Bechtel participated in the construction of the Trans-Arabia Pipeline (Taphne) 
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from Saudi Arabia's Eastern province to Lebanon and also built the Jeddah and 
Riyadh airports. 
On January 17, 1951, a four point technical assistance agreement was signed in 
response to Saudi desires, and an American initiative was launched. Under the 
four point agreement, the United States sent a fmancial mission (in 1952) to 
reform the budgetary and administrative system of the Ministry of Finance. On 
the recommendations of the report of the mission, Saudi Arabia established the 
Saudi Arabia Monetary Agency (SAMA) to act as the Kingdom's central bank.63 In 
fact, from the late 1930s to 1960, oil revenues and fISCal systems remained 
inadequate to permit major advances in development.64 However, basic steps were 
taken to make Saudi Arabia a modem country.6~ 
The years preceding the oil boom (1960-1973) were a period of steady growth. 
Thus, commercial relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia improved.66 But, 
U.S. government technical assistance to Saudi Arabia during the 1960s, was 
generally focused in military areas (see Chapter 3) and in mineral exploration. In 
spite of the problems in the Middle East in the 1960s, U.S. - Saudi economic and 
commercial relations remained close until the world energy crisis in 1973. 
After the oil price boom of 1973, there was a period of great infrastructure building 
and the development of the Saudi welfare services. Following the energy crisis, the 
United States began to deal more seriously with Saudi Arabia as a crucial player 
in the Middle East as well as recognising its reliance on Saudi oi1.67 As a result, in 
January 1974, the American embassy in Jeddah gave the government of Saudi 
Arabia a proposal to make a joint commission to further economic co-operation 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It was ~n seen that the U.S. was 
trying to secure oil supplies from Saudi Arabia as well as trying to compensate the 
balance-of-payment deficit of growing U.S. oil imports by recycling Saudi 
petrodollars. On the other hand, Saudi Arabia wanted to ease the tension in U.S. -
Saudi relations created by the energy crisis 1973, and ~ it has consistently 
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demonstrated its preferenre for American technology and exper~ over the years, 
as both the quantity of its oil resources ha" become apparent and its strategic 
importance has increased.68 
From this starting point, the American and Saudi" began discussions that resulted 
in the formation of a 'U.S. - Saudi Arabian fJoint Commission on Eoonomic 
Cooperation'. During a visit of Prince Fabd to Washington, he and Secretary of 
State, Kigsinger, issued a joint statement on Saudi Arabian - U.S. Co-operation. 
On June 8, 1974, a joint commi&'tion was to be established and would be headed 
by the U.S. Secretary of the Treasury and the Saudi Minister of Finance and 
National Economy.69 This sign-posted the new conrept of U.S. Saudi "special 
relationship" . 
The term 'Joint Commission' implies co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia in pursuing aims that are of interest to both countries rather than the more 
traditional arrangement of earlier years when the U.S. had looked upon tho~ who 
received it<; technology as clients. 70 
It wa't in this context that consideration was given to the idea of establishing a 
more formal representation of the long-standing friendship between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia. 71 The Joint Commission agreed to promote programmes of 
co-operation between the two countries in the field of industrialisation, trade, 
manpower training, agriculture, science and technology, and a variety of the other 
governmen t services. T1. These projects were designed to perform the following 
objectives: (1) help Saudi Arabia achieve its national development goals by 
providing technical expertise in key areas; (2) strengthen eoonomic and political 
ties between the two oountries; and (3) enoourage closer relationships between the 
American and Saudi Arabian people.73 
Sinre then ministerial-level Joint Commission meetings have been held in 
Wa'thington and Riyadh alternately and are attended by Renior officials of both 
govnrnments.74 The most recent m~ting was the Eleventh SeSSIOn, which 
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occurred in 1994, in Washington.1~ In the early 1980s, the Joint CA)mmission had 
almost 400 U.S. government and contract personnel on assignment in Saudj 
Arabia. More recently there were more than 60 full-time advi~rs.76 
Under the Joint Commission, U.S. and Saum Arabia signed a Technical 
Co-operation agreement on February 13, 1975, valid for five years and renewed 
four times since November 1979. The agreement called for: 
The United States to provide professional and technical advisors for Saudi 
economic and human resources development; 
Both countries to adopt mutually acceptable organizational arrangements; 
The United States, on Saudi request, to prepare studies for specific 
development projects and to provide advi'30rs for them in accordance with 
agreed-upon rust estimates; the Saudi government to establish a dollar 
trust aocount in the U.S. Treasury and to provide in advance the full 
amount of fund" necessary to cover the oosts of studies and servioos; and, 
The United States to assign administrative support and staff to Saudi 
Arabia to carry out the purposes of the agreement; and Saudi Arabia to 
defray all rusts. T1 
After this commission, a further six Joint C'A)mmissions were established at about 
the same time on November 1982, eleven U.S. departments and agencies were 
being involved in twenty-four projects, at a total estimated co.."t of $716.] 7 million. 
At the same time, over 650 U.S. firms were represented in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia.1I 
The new concept of a U.s. - Saudi "special relationship" was ooined by rJohn 
Sawhill then head of the Federal Energy Administration, in hearings before the 
Senate Sub-rommittee on multinational corporations. "The U.S. aim of recycling 
petrodollars could better be served, commercial opporturuties for U.S. business 
could be enhanced, and expanded Saudi reliance on U.s. technical assistance in 
economic development oould encourage clo~r co-operation on broader political 
is..,-;ues of mutual interest".'79 Walter II. Donald~n, Under ~cretary of State for 
Security Affairs, expre."-.'1Od his view in March 1974, lilt is evid(lnt that t.he 
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international environment has dramatically changed... and that we must 
recognise that interdependenoo is a fact, not a choice".80 I ndeed after the ] 973 
October war and oil embargo defined Saudi Arabia's position as well as its 
relations with the U.S. 
Since 1974, the U.s. government through the U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission on 
Economic Co-operation, has supplied assistance with a broad range of 
development projects involving industrialisation, training, agriculture, manpower 
and trade. Thousands of Saudis have received training in the U.S. since the Joint 
Commissions started.g] The U.S. - Saudi special relationship continues today in 
the technical assistance and economic co-operation. Development of Saudi 
Arabian institutions and the skills of their employees will continue to be the 
predominant ooncern of the Joint Commission in the coming years.12 
For many years until now, the United States has been the first country in the list 
of countries supplying Saudi Arabia with goods and services. Saudi Arabia, for its 
part, is among America's top ten trading partners. Saudi Arabia is sixth among 
the top exporters to the United States. Table 9 shows U.S.-Saudi trade from 1975 
to 1994. There was a decrease in U.S.-Saudi trade from 1982 to 1990. A..~ the 
world oil prices dropped, this was a period of economic slow down. However, 
between 1990 and 1994 there was an increa~ in the U.S.-Saudi trade again. 
In 1988, there were 224 American-Saudi licensed joint business ventures. These 
ventures involved a total lioonsed capital of $3.3 billion. Saudi investors 
maintained 53 per cent of the capital, while Americans reserved 45.5 per cent and 
other nationals held 1.5 per cent. 
All U.S. capital involved in joint ventures is committed to the industrial sectors. 
Of the 224 joint ventures started in 1988, 68 were investmenL~ in industrial 
projects. Investment..~ reached a total of $3.1 billion. The remaining 156 lirensed 
joint ventures were in non-industrial fields, amounting to $ 23~l million.13 
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Year 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
1981 
1982 
1983 
1984 
1985 
1986 
1987 
1988 
1989 
1990 
1991 
1992 
1993 
1994 
Table 9 
u.s. -Saudi trade 1975-1994 
(in billion of dollars). 
Saudi exports 
to u.S. 
2,642.6 
5.212.9 
6,358.5 
5,307.1 
7,983.4 
12,598.8 
14,39l.3 
7,860.2 
3,840.3 
4,008.9 
2,026.8 
4.054.3 
4.886.5 
5.288.8 
7,326.4 
9.757.6 
10.925.1 
10,290.0 
7.810.0 
7,690.0 
Saudi imports 
from u.s. 
1,501.8 
2.774.1 
3,575.0 
4.370.0 
4.875.0 
5,768.5 
7,327.4 
9,026.0 
7.903.3 
5.564.4 
4.474.2 
3,448.8 
3.057.4 
3.529.9 
3.842.9 
4.438.3 
5.867.6 
7,0~.0 
6.5~.0 
6,010.0 
Source: as Table 10, p. 291. From year 1988 to 1991. see Economic Bulletin, GCC. Vol. X. 1995. p. 195·196. From 
year 1992 to 1994. see Middle East Insight, Vol.XI, No.6. 1995. p. 121. 
Summary 
The Americans and Saudis can not avoid a close connection with each other. For 
most of the past, the United States and Saudi Arabia have worked in a mutually 
beneficial relationship. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia may want to co-operate with 
the United States by turning the rapid developments in alternative energy to 
diversifying its economy from the increasingly vulnerable oil resource to other 
sources of revenue. For the United States, the higher prices of oil and the events 
that followed the 1973 oil embargo have substantially modified previous trends in 
energy consumption. The increase in oil prioos in 1971, 1973 and 1975, showed 
that the sensitivity of these economies was determined by the greater oosts of 
imported oil and the amount the oil that the countries had to import. Thus, the 
United States was sensitive to the oil price rises.14 In 1976, Saudi Arabia overtook 
Canada and Venezuela as the largest supplier of oil to the United States. About 20 
per oont of Saudi Arabia's exports went to the United States which was about 8 
per cen t of the U.S.' s total oil requinnents. I~ 
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The United States found in the Arab oil embargo an increasing danger to its 
economic growth and standard of living. For reasons of national security, the 
United States is alarmed by its growing dependence on imported oil which may 
again be subject to the manipulation of supply for the political purpose to exploit 
American vulnerability. A consensus is growing that the United States should 
launch a unified strict research and development effort into alternative energy 
sources to remove the dangerous degree of dependency on imported oil. The 
United States is developing nucosolar (Nuclear and solar) energy. 
According to the Atomic Energy Commission, more American electriCity will be 
generated from nuclear fission in future. The large-~ale use of nuclear power will 
release much needed oil and natural gas for other pressing uses particularly for 
automobiles, but still nuclear power is dangerous unlike oil. Solar power has been 
used in California and Florida. Because of the cost and difficulties of installing 
solar energy in existing homes and because of the slow rate of replacing housing, 
the technology of solar heating and cooling will take several decades before it could 
have any significant impact on energy use.&6 
Despite the development of alternative sources of energy, however, oil will surely 
maintain its favoured position as a source of primary energy during this decade 
and the decade after. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia recognises that they can not 
depend on oil because it is a non-renewable resource. The Saudis are now making a 
concerted effort to channel oil revenues into other productive enterprises that will 
provide income after the oil is depleted. 
Having relied on the United States to produce oil revenue, the Saudis have also 
turned to the same source for advice and assistance on how best to invest their 
assets, spend their money, and develop their country. Private American 
consultants have worked with Saudis on their successive five-year plans, including 
the 1981-85 plan to spend nearly $250 billion. American financial experts have 
advised the Saudis on how to invest their surplus revenues. The Americans want 
to ease the effect of their negative balance of payments by attracting surplus 
petro-dollars back to the U.S. economy. For example, in 1981, Saudi surpluses 
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stood at more than $100 billion. However, most of it was held in dollars and much 
of it was invested in the United States. 
The economic relationship is recognised as beneficial to both countries. Over the 
past few years, Saudi Arabia has become the seventh largest foreign market for 
U.S. goods, services and technology. It is the most rapidly expanding market for 
U.S. exports. At the same time, the United States has beoome the largest 
consuming country of Saudi Oil.87 This level of co-operation is generated from the 
increased interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia as indicated by 
their total trade.1lI The signing of the Joint Economic Commission in 1974, was to 
harmonise and ease bilateral trade relations. 
As interdependence increased the co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, 
conflict also appeared to increase. During the oil embargo of 1973, Saudi Arabia 
sought to use its leverage to press the United States on its policy towards Israel 
and its Arab neighbours. The United States, for its part, supplied Saudi Arabia 
with the assistance it sought and at the same time, directed threats to affect its 
production and price decisions. 
The realist school of thought recognised that, linkages were made between issues 
by strong oountries, to use their power (especially their military force) to compel 
other countries into taking a stance on the issue. This is a most effective 
instrument of state policy.89 Under conditions of complex interdependence, it is 
more difficult for strong countries to make such linkages because military force 
will, in these conditions, be ineffective.90 Nevertheless, linkages are frequently 
made by countries that lack substantial military power to secure satisfactory 
overall bargains.91 
In conditions of complex interdependence, the manipulation of the economIC 
factors of interdependence in the issue area and of international organisations and 
transnational actors are very important in achieving the state's objectives.92 The 
U.S. could manipulate the oil crisis in order to promote a balance of interests. The 
U.S.' policies take account of these areas of mutual interests and its need to 
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encourage Saudi Arabia to recycle its petrodollars in the U.S. Indeed Saudi 
Arabia places a substantial portion of its revenues in private banks (mainly in New 
York).93 These deposits became the base for the expansion of the international 
lending activities of private banks.94 The U.S. itself would suffer severely if Saudi's 
trade flow were disrupted. 
Trade can be used as an instrument of power.9~ Vulnerability can be used as an 
economic weapon, allowing states that lack military forre to compel their 
competitor.96 The oil embargo was lifted after the U.S. played its part as mediator 
in brokering the troop disengagement accord between Egypt and Israel. Changing 
power dimensions are viewed as affecting behaviour in the system, vulnerability 
can be a ~urce of increased international conflict.97 
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Chapter Three 
U.S.-Saudi Security and Military Relations until the 1990 Gulf Crisis 
U.S.-Saudi security relations 
U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia has been based on a combination of interests. 
Containment of Soviet expansion in the Middle East also occupied U.S. foreign policy for 
the late 1940s until 1989. Washington's policy of containment in the 1950s was to maintain 
a pro-Western Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia. This policy was pursued by the U.S. within the 
context of regional collective security agreements.1 With the 1958 revolution and the fall of 
the pro-Western monarchy, Iraq moved rapidly from a pro-Western stance to establishing a 
close relationship with the Soviet Union. Iran and Saudi Arabia became the only two pillars 
of stability in the Gulf in the opinion of the U.S. and its Western allies.2 
For that reason, developments in 1969, led the U.s. to gIve increased importance to 
strengthening the internal security of the Saudi monarchy. In June 1969, the Saudi 
government interrupted a group of people plotting to overthrow the King and establish a 
republic. Some two thousand individuals were arrested including many key officials in the 
Saudi air force. Because of this event, the U.S. increased the importance it plared on being 
able to reinforoo the internal security of Saudi Arabia and providing Riyadh with military 
hardware. It is true, that American military sales to Saudi Arabia increased under the Nixon 
administration.3 
In 1972, Washington concluded a major review of its interests and policy options in the 
Persian Gulf. The review resulted in the British withdrawal from the region in 1971; the 
increasing dependence of the industrial world on Gulf oil; and the Nixon doctrine, which 
declared the post-Vietnam desire on the part of the U.S. to have local governments 
participate in the defence of their security with U.S. support but without U.S. troops.4 
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Developments such as the 1973 October war, and the rise in the price of oil often frustrated 
implementation of some of the principles. However, the principles remained; these principles 
have forced the U.S. to become more directly involved in the Gulf region - politically, 
economically and strategically. ~ The U.S. government's response was a "special relationship" 
with Saudi Arabia. "Access" meant an adequate and long term ~urce of supply of oil, at 
moderate prices.6 In 1974-75, joint commissions on the eoonomic and security between the 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia, were as the consequences of oil embargo of 1973. This, indeed 
emphasised the importance of Saudi Arabia in Washington's long-term policy planning to 
establish peace and security in the Gulfregion.7 
The changes in the Persian Gulf in 1974, urgently pointed to the need for a clearer policy. 
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the sub-commitiee on the Near East and South 
Asia, diagnosed four examples of the changes that were quickly developing in the Gulf and 
raised ~me questions relating to the region: 
First, it is amply clear that increased Iranian Saudi Arabian co-operation in strategic, political 
and eronomic spheres is vital to maintaining our interests in this region in the future. Do our 
military supplies and other policies promote trust and confidence in regional co-operation? 
How are we encouraging Iran to co-operate with Saudi Arabia? 
Second, it is clear that U.S. oil companies in the region are being forced toward a new type of 
relationship with the producing states ... what role does the United States Government plan on 
playing in the future negotiations with producing states? What is the U.S. doing to try to 
bring the oil prices down? 
Third, an enormous amount of money is accumulating in the Persian Gulf ... what policies is 
our Government developing to deal with this new financial world? How are we trying to 
recycle petrodollars? What advice are we giving U.S. companies? 
Fourth, it is also clear that, while the challenge of evolving effective policies toward the large 
states of the region... will be a major policy dilemma for the coming years, the U.S. faces 
another type of challenge in developing policy strategies toward the smaller states of the area.8 
The five policy objectives of the U.S. in the Arabian peninsulalPersian Gulf area that were 
listed by Assistant Secretary of State, Atherton, in August 1974. were rephrased by Under 
Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Joseph J. Sisco, in a Congressional hearing on June 10, 
1975. Sisco stated that in view of these objectives, United States' policy toward the Gulf had 
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been designed to link arms sales to these COUll tries with the overall policy objectives of the 
United States. According to Sisco, the~ states had expressed conrems in political, eronomic, 
cultural and defence fields, and they had sought co-operation with the United States. Sisoo 
argued that "Given our mutuality of interests, it is reaoonable and sensible for us to support 
the policy goals of these friendly countries, where such goals parallel our own". This approach 
controlled U.S. policy towards the Persian Gulf for the rest of the 1970s.9 
In September 1980, Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs, 
Harold H. Saunders, stated in a Congressional hearing that U.S. interests in the Gulf sinre 
the early 1970s "Have changed little in nature but have grown in importance". He aloo 
stated that the United States takes notice of the following factors: 
• the area's strategic location and its significance to maintaining a global strategic balance: 
• the significance we place on the sovereignty and independenre of these oountries as part of a 
more stable world; 
• the world's vital need for the region's oil; and 
• the importanre of these states in international fmanre and development and as markets for 
our goods and technology .10 
Before this period, Saudi Arabia had continued to stress its desire to preserve the Gulf region 
free from the presence of any superpower. In November 1979, Saudi Second Deputy Prime 
Minister, Abdullah Ibn Abdulaziz, stated in an interview that Saudi Arabia's concern was "To 
prevent the Gulf region from becoming an area for rivalry among the foreign powers".l1 In 
addition, Saudi Interior Minister, Nayif Ibn Abdulaziz, stated in an interview in October 
1979, that Gulf security was the joint responsibility of all the region's countries; the exi<;ting 
and oontinuing oo-ordination between Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Arab states gave proof to 
the extent of the importanre attached to security.12 While the Saudis reportedly continued 
being supportive of, though not in public, a U.s. "over-the-horiwn" naval presen~, as an 
exercise of the U.S. world·wide strategic role, Saudis continued to be sensitive of any proposal 
of joint military co-operation or the basing of U.s. military forces on Saudi ~il.13 
The events during 1979, beginning with the fall of the Shah of Iran to Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan, has been explained by some Saudi official<; as being a clear evidence of 
incoherence, doubts and weakness in U.S. policy.14 Therefore, on January 4, 1980, the Saudi 
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Foreign Minister discus.'3ed with representatives of Arab and Islamic countries to obtain a 
clear-cut, united Muslim stand demanding for military and principled action and emphasising 
that the Soviet invasion represented a new strategy on the part of Moscow that had resulted 
from the incoherent and weak American policy. 1.5 
For the U.S., the Soviet invasion raised a number of serious questions and choices relating to 
the Gulf region. In particular, it cast doubt on the stability and the security of U.S. interests 
in the Persian Gulf. For the U.S., the situation demanded a reassessment of its role in 
international affairs. Instability in the Gulf region had exposed the vulnerability of Middle 
East oil resources vital to the Western world, and had underlined the geopolitical deficiencies 
of U.S. retrenchment policy that had begun with the Nixon doctrine and had been continued 
under the Ford and Carter administrations. To Americans, the invasion created a new 
national consensus that whatever world-wide role the U.S. might determine to play it could 
be supported by force. The first step toward signalling this change was taken in President 
Carter's State of the Union address on January 23, 1980, in which he said: "Any attempt by 
any outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on 
the vital interests of the United States. It will be repelled by any means neoossary, including 
military force" .16 
Reaction among Gulf Arab countries to President Carter's State of the Union address was 
critical as his commitment to safeguard Western interests in the region was interpreted as an 
excuse for U.S. interference in their domestic affairs, and justifying future U.S. military 
intervention in their countries.17 
On January 29, 1980, President Carter, speaking to a group of newspaper editors, explained 
that U.S. deterrence was conditional on both regional and allied oo-operation: "I don't think it 
would be a~urate for me to claim that at this time or in the future we expect to have enough 
military strength and enough military presence there to defend the region unilaterally". II In 
order to safeguard oil supplies, the U.S. was looking for military ties with Gulf states and al~ 
was co-ordinating its "efforts with nations who are not located in the region but are heavily 
dependent even more than we, on oil from that region" .19 
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It should be noted that sinoo 1977, the idea of appointing special military units for emergency 
operations in a non-NATO situation had been discussed with the Department of Defense. 
While planning for such emergencies was well underway by the time of the Iranian revolution 
of 1979, it had become clear that events in the Persian Gulf had added new impetus to this 
planning effort. Thus, by October 1, 1979, President Carter had announced he had requested 
the design of a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) and by late October, specific guidanoo had 
been given to the servioos for the establishment of a command StruCture.20 
President Carter in a news conferenoo on February 13, 1980, asserted that the U.S. retained 
its freedom of military action to oppose external expansion in the Gulf, when he stated: "We 
can't afford to let the Soviets choose either the terrain or the tactics to be used by any other 
country - a nation that might be invaded, their neighbours, our allies, or ourselves".21 On 
February 14, 1980, Defense Secretary, Brown, said in an interview that Soviet seizure of 
political control in the region would be equivalent to seizing territory in Western Europe or 
J apan becalh~ of their dependenoo upon Persian Gulf oil. 22 
Crown Prince Fahd, in March 1980, urged friendly countries to continue to provide Arab 
states of the Gulf with arms for self-defence. Fahd stressed that the definition of self-reliance 
supported the stability of the region as it would remove the area from superpower conflicts 
and would make it independent of foreign protection.23 They recognised this act as being 
confrontational and causing tension throughout the region. The Saudis condemned the 
Iranian regime for the taking of American diplomatic personnel as hostages in November 
1979. The Saudi concern over the use of military force in the area, however, grew after the 
U.S. failed to re~ue the hostages in Tehran in April 1980. The Saudi Foreign Ministry 
issued a statement expressing the extreme concern of the Saudi government over the action 
by the U.S. against the Islamic Republic of Iran, and expressed that the use of military force 
went beyond areepted limits of international conduct. Crown Prinoo Fahd reported that 
foreign intervention in the Gulf could spark a global war, and that the Saudi government's 
policy was to prevent foreign intervention in the Gulfregion.24 
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Border clashes between Iran and Iraq escalated to open conflict on September 22, 1980, when 
Iraq launched air raids on a number of military airfields in Iran. Both sides attacked each 
others' economic and population 00 ntre s, and fighting included air, ground and naval 
confrontations. The Gulf Arab states were conoomed that there would be a widening of the 
conflict. The Iranian General Staff issued a warning, at the start of open warfare, that any 
Gulf state allowing its airfields or ports to be used for attacks against Iranian territory would 
be liable to Iranian counterattacks.25 
The United States was reported to have given immediate attention to Saudi protection and 
deployed USAF AWACS aircraft to increase Saudi defenoos in the Gulf, especially near the oil 
fields and the oil terminals. In addition, there was a temporary deployment of 300 U.S. 
per~nnel including air crews and ground support technicians. On October 5, 1981, the 
Defense Department announced that ground radar and communications equipment, 
accompanied by 100 support personnel, were being sent to Saudi Arabia.26 
The Reagan administration's attitude toward the Persian Gulf during its first year in offioo 
was massively influenood by the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan and by the realisation of the 
Soviet threat throughout the region.27 Subsequently, on April 21, 1981, the White House 
announced that President Reagan had decided to sell five AWACS and seven KC-135 
refuelling tanker aircraft, in addition to fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia.2I 
On October, 1, 1981, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Secretary Alexander Haig, defended the sale of AWACS to Saudi Arabia by pointing out that 
the deal would serve U.S. interests. He explained the four principles of U.S. strategy in the 
Gulf region: 
to improve the military position in and near the region: 
to strengthen the defenoo capabilities of the U.S.' friends: 
to restore confidenoo in the United States as a reliable partner; and, 
to pursue a permanent peaoo in the region.29 
59 
In a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on September 17, 1981, 
Secretary of State, Haig, pointed out that the U.S. strategy in the Middle East must be to 
"Protect our vital interests in an unstable area exposed not only to historic Arab-Israeli 
rivalries but increasingly to threats from the Soviet Union and its proxies".3O In Haig's view, 
regional security could be preserved through a system of security agreements between the 
U.S. and the major states of the Middle East region (Egypt, Israel, and Saudi Arabia). Such 
an "arc of strategic consensus" is based on the premise that "intimate connections" exist 
between the Middle EasUPersian Gulf region and neighbouring areas in the region.31 
The concept of an American presence in the Gulf was rejected in that such a presence might 
well provoke the Soviet Union to enter the region. Statements by Saudi leaders asserted that 
Secretary Haig's principal task should be to reassert U.S. reliability as a partner, in the wake 
of developments in Iran and Mghanistan.32 The question of an increased American presence 
in or near the Gulf region remained a sensitive issue to the government of Saudi Arabia. The 
interventionist threats of former Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, and Defense Secretary, 
James Schlesinger, after the oil embargo of 1973 in the mid 1970s, caused a strong reaction 
throughout the Gulf states. In 1979, the Gulf Arab states rejected an Omani plan to invite 
American participation in the administration of security of the maritime transit routes, 
including the Straits of Honnuz.33 
The statements by Saudi spokesmen reflect an ambivalence toward the nature of the U.S. 
commitments to the security of Saudi Arabia. The American statements have revealed the 
appearance of two schools of thought. Firstly, there is the "activist" school, favouring military 
intervention either to support friendly governments or to secure areess to oil supplies. This 
school emerged to call for the development of an inclusive strategy that would deal with 
Soviet interference with oil supplies, as well as more limited contingencies which might lead 
to the disruption to oil production and deliveries. Secondly, the "cautious" school, favouring 
an "over-the-horizon" U.S. presence that would be capable of responding quickly to requests 
for help from friendly governments. This school was concerned about the risks of superpower 
confrontation and the possible harm to long-term U.S. diplomatic and economic interests if a 
60 
provocative military stance was adopted except at the considered request of the concerned 
regional government. 34 
Saudi and the Gulf Arab states had publicly stated their unwillingness to allow the 
establishment of a presence by any external power in the Gulf. V.S. ground and tactical 
forces would be unwelcome except, presumably, in the event of a major threat, which 
probably would include Soviet direct or indirect involvement. Saudi officials observed the 
V.S. as being unable or unwilling to respond to Soviet moves in Africa or the Middle East. 
They quoted as proof the U.S. refusal to support its regional allies, as demonstrated by arms 
embargoes against Turkey and Pakistan, and the refusal to give support to the Shah of Iran 
which Saudi Arabia saw as making his defeat inevitable.3~ 
The build up of Soviet, East German, and Cuban strength in weapons, communications, 
facilities and advisers in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and Ethiopia, had been a 
source of concern for American defence planners for several years. The Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan increased public awareness of the inadequacy of available V .S. fo~s to respond 
to a possible confrontation in the Gulf region, and demonstrated a general absence of support 
from the U.S.' Western allies.36 
The Americans saw that the fall of the Shah of Iran and the collapse of the Iranian military 
establishment had removed Iran from its role as the Gulf policeman. Throughout Saudi 
Arabia and the Arab states of the Gulf, the gap between defence supplies and forre levels, on 
the one hand.. and effective military abilities, on the other hand.. remained as big as ever 
despite massive defence expenditures and huge transfers of weapons.37 
The maintenance and enhancement of the U.S. - Saudi Arabian relationship was considered 
by both governments as supplying a base for re~lving political, security, economic, and 
energy issues. After 1978, the relationship experienced significant change in light of regional 
developments and policy responses on the part of the countries. With the continued 
importance of Saudi Arabia to the U.S., a report prepared for the sub-committee on Europe 
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and the Middle East of the Committee on Foreign Affairs in August 1981, made some number 
of mutual interests which would tend to enhance the relationship: 
preservation of the territorial integrity of Saudi Arabia; 
maintenance of stability and security in the Persian GulfIRed Sea region; 
prevention of the establishment by an external power, in particular the Soviet Union, 
of a predominant political and military presence in the region; 
the achievement by Saudi Arabia of a credible defence and a deterrence capability 
against political threats from regional states; 
maintenance and strengthening of economic and technological ties between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia, and continued mutual access to their respective markets for trade 
and investment; 
Saudi success in moderating OPEC oil-price deliberations and in the maintenance of 
current Saudi oil-production levels in order to sustain the economic and political 
health of the industrialized world; 
progress toward a comprehensive Arab-Israeli settlement, including a resolution of the 
Palestinian and East Jerusalem issues, in order to remove the principal obstruction in 
U.S.-Arab relations, and to reduce potential revolutionary activity in the Gulfregion.31 
In addition to that, the report mentioned that there did exist differences with respect to U.s. 
and Saudi interests that oould affect the relationship. These included the following: 
the desire by some elements in Saudi Arabia to reduce oil production to a level not 
exceeding that necessary to meet Saudis' reserve needs, on the premise that oil in the 
ground is a better long-term investment for a single-resource oountry than selling oil 
for inflated dollars; 
the desire to diversify Saudi diplomatic and eoonomic ties with external powers, 
including the Soviet bloc, in light of current perceptions that too close a relationship 
with the U.S. is a liability, both politically and militarily; 
the disagreement with U.S. initiatives, under the Carter administration's Camp David 
guidelines, towards achieving an Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and subsequent Saudi 
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support for the i~lation of the regime of Egyptian President Al-Sadat; by the majority 
of Arab states. 
differences with respect to basing or the use of military facilities by U.S. forces on 
Saudi territory.39 
In evaluating the importance of Saudi Arabia to U.S. interests in the Gulf region, the report 
made oortain judgements relating to the U.S.-Saudi relationship stand out as a consequenoo 
of developments in the late 1970s. These include the following: 
domestic pressures in Saudi Arabia for a more restrictive policy on oil production may 
complicate the U.S.-Saudi economic relationships over the medium or long term; 
Saudi concern over the Palestinian question and the issue of Arab Jerusalem will 
complicate the U.S.-Saudi relationship if the U.S. is not seen to be placing reasonable 
pressure on Israel to moderate its position; 
close relations would benefit from greater sensitivity on the part of the U.S. and other 
Western powers to Saudi Arabia's delicate political situation in the Middle East 
regIOn; 
the Saudis perceive the military relationship with the United States to be the principle 
test of U.S. reliability and political commitment to Saudi Arabia; 
there is no guarantee that the government of Saudi Arabia can oontrol the hazardous 
process of modernisation and maintain political and economic stability in Saudi 
Arabia; 
co-ordination and integration of competing priorities and persistent problems ill 
U.S.-Middle East policy threatens to oomplicate U.S.-Saudi relations, and; 
existing divisions within the Saudi government would seem to indicate that the 
U.s.-Saudi "special relationship" will likely be reassessed whenever a suocession in the 
national leadership occurs.40 
With the end of the "twin pillar" policy of the Nixon doctrine, the report indicated that 
planning for formulation of a new security arrangement in the Gulf raises a number of 
questions: 
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the security problems of protecting oilfields, loading terminals, and the oil transit 
routes; 
increa<;;ing opportunities for the Soviet Union to influence events in the Gulf region; 
problems of the prevention of readiness to respond effectively to sabotage and 
terrorism; 
regional and internal upheavals, including the disruption of oil supplies through strike 
actions by religious or nationalist movements; 
the possibility that U.S. military intervention might generate violent anti-U.S. 
activities in regional states and give rise to internal instability; 
tensions or overt conflict between oil-producing Gulf states; 
the problems of maintaining strong and visible security support for Western Europe 
and Japan in the face of differences over energy problems; 
the use of oil pricing or an oil embargo as a political weapon; 
the reluctance by Saudi Arabia to be identified as the remaining pillar of the U.S. 
"twin pillarJl policy; 
the fear of Saudi officials that their strategic and diplomatic position may be eroded by 
events over which they have no control; and 
the distinct limits on American's ability to influence event') in desired directions.41 
Sinoo Saudi Arabia was reluctant to allow America a military presence in Saudi Arabia, the 
U.S. expanded its military facilities in Oman's Masirah island and on Diego Garcia. America 
also increased its military assistance to Oman, Somalia, and Kenya. In addition to that., the 
U.S. raised the level of its support of Saudi Arabia's military capability through the sale of 
AWACS (in October 1981) and other elements of the military sale package.42 
The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Form (ROJTF) was the centrepiece of the United States' 
strategy to oppose the Soviet threat in the Persian Gulf. The RDJTF was traJL~formed from 
the Rapid Deployment Form (ROF) in 1979.43 President Carter and his assistant for National 
Security Affairs, Zhigniew Bnezinski, developed the national security policy in light of 
changes that were appearing in Soviet strategy.44 To deter direct Soviet moves, the U.S. 
sought to create a formal military force in 1977 (ROF). This policy recommended the strategy 
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of employing U.S. general purpose forces to oonfront any Soviet aggression in the Middle East 
and the Gulf region. Later, Soviet military threats to the Gulf region came from the Soviet 
invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979. Mter the Shah's fall in 1979, the U.S. 
transformed the RDF into a separate command area for a RDJTF.45 It removed the new RDF 
from the dual oommand, which meant that no single service or even a oombination of two 
services could take ~le responsibility for Southwest Asia.46 This was clearly evident when 
the U.S. created the RDJTF. 
In the early 1980s, due to regional conditions and changes in the Reagan administration's 
strategy the regional policy focused more on the use of sea power and permanent bases in the 
Gulf region. Thus, in 1983, the commander of the RDJTF became the CA>mmander-in-Chief 
of U.S. General Command (USCENTCOM) and was responsible for all planning, exercises, 
and operations in Southwest Asia. The new command is based at MacDill Air Forre Base in 
Florida, with a 20-man forward headquarters on a U.S. Navy ship in the Gulf.47 Secretary 
Weinberger stated that developments since 1979, "Have dramatically increa'5ed the Soviet 
Union's acr..ess to the Persian Gulf region". Secretary Weinberger oonceived the U.S. strategy 
for Southwest Asia in the 1980s, to oontain two principal goals: "00 improve our mobile forces 
and pre-position adequate equipment and supplies to deploy in support of an RDJTF of 
sufficient size to deter Soviet aggression; and to provide long-term support to sustain these 
forcesll •4I 
After several new developments in the Persian Gulf, particularly, the outhreak of Iran-Iraq 
war, Saudi Arabia officially announced the formation of the Gulf Co-operation Council (Gee) 
in January 1981. The Gee included six states of the Arabian Peninsula: Saudi Arabia, 
Kuwait, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Oman.49 The creation of the GeC 
gradually lead the states toward a more effective form of military co-operation. The Gee was 
made in large part as a reaction to the principal threat to Gulf security by the Iran-Iraq 
war.~ 
At the meeting of the Gee Supreme Council in Bahrain in November, 1982, the GCe did 
make a start towards collective defence. and agreed to support a $1 billion aid programme for 
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Bahrain, which was to pay for a modern air base and fighter aircraft. In July, 1983, the 
Supreme Council agreed to a $1.8 billion twelve-year aid programme for Oman, to improve its 
capability to defend the Straits of Hormuz. In the same year, at the meeting of the Defenre 
Ministers in Qatar in March 1983, agreement was reached in principle in response to, Saudi 
Defense Minister, Prince Sultan's call for a GCC defence industry to decrease the Gulfs 
dependence on arms imports. 51 
The GCC Supreme Council meeting in November, 1982, also led to the decision to hold the 
southern Gulfs first joint military exe reise , Peninsula Shield I, during October 7-16, 1983. 
Peninsula Shield II exereises were held in the north of Saudi Arabia during October 10-13, 
1984. These exereises brought fairly large forces together for the first time (10,000 men, 
3,200 armoured and other vehicles, mobile artillery and tanks, and air units using F -5 and 
F-15 fighters and C-130 transport planes). The GCC carried out further exercise in 1985, 
1986 and 1987, although the expansion of the Iran-Iraq war into the Gulf in 1987, shifted the 
focus of the key GCC states from exercises to actual operations. 52 
Despite all of these preparations, the GCC could not handle any major defence of the Gulf 
against a threat from Iran, Iraq or the USSR. 53 Therefore, in 1985, Saudi Arabia agreed that 
it would allow American military forces to use its bases in case of Soviet aggression or if it 
was unable to handle a Persian Gulf crisis on its own. The Saudis showed their willingness to 
defend themselves when they shot down two Iranian aircraft, on June 5, 1984, which 
threatened to attack Saudi oil fields. But the Saudis still refused to allow the U.S. to engage 
in joint planning for these contingencies.~ Saudi Arabia consulted U.S. defence planners and 
senior USCENTCOM officers regarding U.S. use of facilities in an emergency, and it made 
USCENTCOM, which is based on the British island of Diego Garcia, reinforcement abilities 
one of the backbones of its defence planning. ~~ 
In fact, after the Iran-Iraq war accelerated in 1985, USCENTCOM oould not function in its 
crisis oontingency role without Saudi co-operation and wartime areess to Saudi bases and 
facilities. While Diego Garcia, Turkey and Egypt provided useful contingency facilities on 
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outer boundary of the Gulf, they could not make up for the extent and reinforcement crisis 
the Americans would face in defending the critical oil facilities in the upper and central Gulf.~ 
The V.S. has contingency bases in Oman on the island of Masirah. Oman, however, is too far 
away to allow V.S. forces to efficiently defend most of the GCC oil fields. Both Bahrain and 
Kuwait, which are small states, can not support large air or land forces because their facilities 
are acutely limited. They can not supply suitable bases if the V.S. should have to deploy for a 
low-level war.57 
All of these factors made American access to Saudi Arabia critical in any major defence of the 
Gulf, as was shown in 1991, when Kuwait was liberated from Iraqi troops. Saudi Arabia's 
modem air facilities could provide bases for up to two wings of VSAF fighters, and give them 
full armament and service support. In addition, the U.S. has large numbers of oontract 
personnel servicing Saudi equipment in the air force, army, national guard and navy. Large 
numbers of Saudi military and civilian personnel have had V.S. training and can operate 
with, or support and service, U.S. military equipment.51 
Saudi Arabia has equally modem naval facilities and ground bases. These bases have 
extensive stocks of parts and armaments, and service and support equipment, which can be 
used by VSCENTCOM foroos. 59 Saudi· army and naval bases, have been described by 
Anthony H. Cordesman, as the most sophisticated infrastructure and service facilities in the 
world. and can both speed the deployment of V.S. forces and make them more effective once 
theyarrive.60 
In order to understand the events involved, it is necessary to know two key developments 
that happened during 1985, and early 1986. The secret V.S. arms sales to Iran, and the 
impact of Iran invasion of Iraq's Faw Peninsula.61 
The secret V.S. arms sales to Iran created a crisis in V.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and the 
other Gulf states. The anns deals, began in 1985, when the Reagan administration made a 
decision to trade arms for American hostages, eventually led to a massive scandal in 1987. 
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After the arms scandal and in an effort to restore U.S. credibility in the Gulf and to prevent 
the Soviet's from helping Kuwait to protect their tankers from Iranian attack as the Iran-Iraq 
war escalated, the U.S. moved quickly into an arrangement to re-flag and convoy Kuwaiti 
tankers through the Gulf.62 The Reagan administration initiated some of contacts with Iran 
at a time when it was unable to carry out arms deals with Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf 
stateS.63 
There are still a number of issues which have still not been fully explained concerning the 
U.S. arms sales to Iran. Several Israeli officials and U.S. consultants working outside the 
government persuaded senior officials of the U.S. and the Director of the Central Intelligence 
Agency, that it might be possible to rebuild U.S. political ties with "moderates" in the Iranian 
government, and to release Americans held hostage by pro-Iranians in Lebanon.64 
However, Eric Hooglund has a further perspective about U.S. arms sales to Iran. He has 
asserted, that the main interest of the Reagan staff regarding the Persian Gulf was not Iran 
or the war, but landlocked Mghanistan, which Soviet troops had entered in Derember 1979. 
That invasion confirmed the Reagan viewpoint of the Soviet Union as an aggressive, 
expansionist threat to America's "vital" interests. The revolution against the Shah was a 
strategic disaster that served only the Soviet Union. The problem for the Americans was how 
to restore Iran to American influence.65 
Within U.S. intelligence agencies a view developed that Washington needed to reach an 
a<mmmodation with Iran in order to forestall possible Soviet political gains there. This 
thinking eventually created a secret policy of selling arms to Iran in return for Iran's 
promised use of its influence to release American hostages held in Lebanon.66 
The second key development during the Iran-Iraq war was Iran's seizure of Iraq's Faw 
Peninsula. Iran's conquest posed a real threat to both Iraq and Kuwait, and threatened a 
major spread of the tanker war that increasingly involved Iranian strikes against 
international shipping through the Gulf, and particularly shipping to and from Kuwait and 
Saudi Arabia - the countries that were giving Iraq the most financial aid.67 
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The U.S. increased its force in the Indian Ocean to a full carrier group including eleven escort 
ships. The U.S. also deployed the carrier task force just east of Masirah, off the east of Oman. 
Further, the U.S. sent F-111s to exercise in Turkey. Britain and France increased their ship 
activity, and the British Squadron in the Indian Ocean began to spend half of their time in 
the Gulf.6I 
The U.S. became increasingly responsive to series of Kuwaiti requests to provide U.S. 
protection and re-flagging for the tankers Kuwait was using to shuttle oil to loading points 
outside the Gulf.69 Although, Kuwait had hosted a small U.S. military aircraft to operate out 
of Kuwait, it remained unwilling to offer any formal base for a U.S. combat unit because of 
pressure from its neighbours. 70 
Saudi Arabia and Bahrain did not agree to the kind of formal basing arrangements ~me 
U.S. officials wanted, but were willing to provide virtually all the other support the U.S. 
wanted. In 1987, Saudi Arabia agreed to expand the use of its four minesweepers, and these 
helped to find the presence of mines. Saudi Arabia quietly agreed to provide ship and aircraft 
fuel, and to provide emergency landing and fuelling support for U.S. carrier aircraft. 71 
Saudi Arabia's co-operation was guaranteed by Iranian attacks on Saudi shipping e.g. On 
August 13, 1987, a Saudi Coast Guard vessel was struck by a mine, and then a small supply 
boat blew up off one of the U.AE. ports on August 15, 1987. That same day, two massive 
explosions rocked an ARAMCO facility in Saudi Arabia.72 The cumulative total of Iranian 
attacks on shipping to Saudi Arabia was 100 ships from February 1987 through December 
1987.13 
April 1988, saw the opening of the final stage in the Iran-Iraq war when Iraq recaptured the 
Faw Peninsula. Following the total collapse of Iran's military, Iran was forced to acrept a 
cease-fire unconditionally. Saudi Arabia maintained friendly relations with Iraq and 
improved its relations with Iran. Since then apart from an occasional disagreement with the 
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U.S. over arm sales, Saudi Arabia has continued to nurture its relationship with Washington 
and to get additional sophisticated weapons.74 
Since the early 198Os, the U.S. involvement in the Gulf has become more visible and 
increased in size. The U.S. identified two primary objectives: assuring access to oil and 
keeping the Soviets out of the area. In the process, the U.S. adopted specific policies, such as 
the creation of the Rapid Deployment Force which later became the U.S. Central Command 
to reflect U.S. readiness to deal with any threat that might actively interfere with these two 
objectives.7s 
u.s. -Saudi military relations 
During the past few years, Saudi Arabia has shown increasing concern for its security, 
especially in the light of the Gulf war. Saudi Arabia has continued to sustain an 
extraordinary degree of dependence on the United States for the development of its modem 
armed forces. 
David Long has argued, that for many Americans the U.S. Congressional debate over the sale 
ofF-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia in 1981, was the first occasion on which they realised 
that there were U.S. - Saudi military relations. 76 In fact, the United States has been the 
natural associate in Saudi Arabia's military development since the midst of World War 11.77 
The establishment of U.S. -Saudi military relations. 
1943-1953 
In 1943, Admiral Leahy, on behalf of the American Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented a 
memorandum to President Roosevelt warning that America had an insufficient supply of 
domestic crude oil production7l, which would become a problem in the U.S. in the next 25 
years.19 On February 18, 1943, Saudi Arabia was declared eligible for U.S. Lend-Leasp 
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assL<.;tance.1O Thjs meant that the exi<.;ting American stake in Saudi oil represented by the 
exclusively U.S.-owned ARAMCO Company wa<.; secured.11 
Military relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States were formally initiated on 
February 18, 1943, as part of the Lend-L€ase programme. In the same year, a U.S. mission 
led by General Ralph Royce was sent to Saudi Arabia to determine Saudi military needs. 
This wa<.; followed by a few advisory missions led by Colonel Garret Shomber, who arrived in 
April 1944.12 
Beginning in 1945, Saudi Arabia and the United States reached an agreement to build an air 
base at Dhahran and an emergency air field at Lauqa and Hafr al-batin. The U.S. agreed to 
tum over the Dhahran air base to Saudi Arabia after three years. S3 The Dhahran base later 
became an important link in the U.S. global network of strategic ba~s directed against the 
Soviet bloc. '4 Thus, the Secretary of State for Defence, James Forrestal, notified Secretary of 
State, Marshall, in 1948, that the American Joint Chiefs of Staff had reoontly agreed on a 
series of steps ooncerning Saudi Arabia which should be taken to improve the strategic 
position of the United StateS.85 He ooncluded that America's defenoo capabilities would be 
greatly improved in the event of war against the Soviet Union if Dhahran air base could be 
used to conduct supported air operations.86 The Joint Chiefs recommended that the U.S. try 
and achieve this by significantly increa<.;ing the number of American military personnel on 
the base. '7 With the beginning of the Cold War in 1949, the Dhahran base kept it..<.; strategic 
importance. Oil security and containing the Soviet threat, became the basic elements of U.S. 
military relations with Saudi Arabia. In 1949, Saudi Arabia and the U.S. agreed the lease of 
Dhahran airfield for a five-year period." 
The di~u..qgi.on took long hard bargaining between Saudi Arabia and the U.S. However, King 
Abdullaziz stressed that he did not feel that the United States had satisfied Saudi Arabia's 
necessary requirements. 19 At the same time as these di~ussionsJ a U.S. military survey team 
was establi<.;bed at Saudi's request to make recommendations to the Kingdom for the design 
of a Saudi armed force. 90 
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Major Genera] Richard O'Keefe headed the military survey team and arrived in Saudi Arabia 
on September 1, 1949. Prior to his departure on October 22, he travelled forty-four thousand 
miles in Saudi Arabia.91 O'Keefe rerummended training and equipping, over a five-year 
period, a modern defensive force of some 43,000 men, composed of 28,000 rumbat troops and 
15,000 air force personnel, and rerummended that 490 American officers and enlisted men to 
be sent to assist training the Saudi Army, Navy and Air Force, at a cost of $107 million.92 
O'Keefe's recommendations became the first inclusive U.S. design to structure a modem 
Saudi armed foroo.93 
Following the O'Keefe recommendations for U.S. military assistance to the Kingdom, both 
countries had some major differences including levels of a5Sistanre, the total of U.S. grants 
compared to the amount that had to be repaid and issues of extraterritoriality and Saudi 
sovereignty.94 But the start of the Korean war in June 1950, increased Washington's 
receptivity to requests from anti-Communist nations such a') Saudi Arabia. On July 26, 
1950, the President of the U.S., Truman, signed an amendment to the mutual Defence Act of 
1950, which now gave him authority to transfer military equipment to oountries not linked in 
a defence agreement with the U.S. but whose self-defenoo was considered important to 
American security.9~ Thus, the U.S. included Saudi Arabia in the U.S. Point Four Programme 
of Technica] Assistance. On June 18, 1951, the two countries finally ooncluded the new 
agreement providing for U.S. use of Dhahran airfield for five years and a mutual Defense 
Assistance Agreement was signed at the same time, making Saudi Arabia the first Arab 
country to receive such American assistance. The United States transferred M-41 light 
tanks, a number ofB-26s bombers in 1951, and six Douglas C-47 transports in 1953.96 
The establishment of the U.S. Military Training Mission (USMTM) was the major military 
component of the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement. A U.S. Mutual Defense ~~stanre 
programme survey team arrived for duty in the Kingdom on July 17, 1951, and this led to the 
formal creation of USMTM in Saudi Arabia on June 27, 1953, by means of and exchange of 
notes between the U.S. Ambassador and Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, the Saudi Minister of Defenre 
and Aviation, thus implementing the Mutual Defense Assistance Agreement of 1951. The 
military training mission continues to operate and remains the major instrument of U.S. 
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military relations with Saudi Arabia. The U.s.-Saudi military relations from 1943 to 1953, 
involved a trade-ofIbetween the U.S. desire for acx;ess to forward strategic military bac;;es and 
the Saudi desire for reassurance of a U.S. commitment to protect the country from foreign 
threats.97 
U.S.-Saudi military relations during the reign of King Saud, 
1954-1964 
Within four months of the formal establishment of the U.S. Military Training Mission to 
Saudi Arabia, King Abdulaziz died on November 9, 1953. His ~n Saud was immediately 
proclaimed King. The reign of King Saud demonstrated a rough period for U.S.-Saudi 
military relations and for U.S.-Saudi relations in general as well. His reign came at the time 
of growing radicalism in the Arab world, spearheaded by Nasser's Egypt. 
When Egypt's President Nasser's Arab nationalist wave began sweeping across the whole of 
the Middle East, King Saud visited Cairo and agreed on fJune 11, 1954, a "unified command" 
with Egypt. In January 1955, an Egyptian military training mi~on arrived in Saudi Arabia, 
which temporarily overshadowed USMTM in its influence on the Saudi military.9I In the 
summer of 1954, King Saud asked the U.S. to close its technical assistanoo mission in Saudi 
Arabia and to withdraw its personnel. The need to prevent a further cooling in relations with 
Saudi Arabia was not lost in Washington. Not only was Saudi oil becoming increasingly 
important, but the agreement for the American use of the Dhahran base was up for renewal 
in June 1955.99 
Increased Arab-Israeli tensions had forred Saudi Arabia to beoome involved with an Arab 
"defensive alliance" in October 1955, leading to increased Jewish American protests about the 
sale of U.S. tanks to Saudi Arabia. However, the potential damage to U.S.-Saudi Arabia 
relations, if the sale had been stopped, meant that Washington agreed to send the tanks in 
]956.100 
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Negotiations for an extension to the Dhahran airfield agreement remained bogged down, but 
Saudi Arabia was oontinuing to receive arms from the U.S. Saudi Arabia requested a 
five-year military development plan with the help of USMTM, and the United States agreed 
in May 1956, to the sale of all items in the plan except M-47 medium tanks and F-86 fighter 
aircraft. In fact, the U.S. was willing to supply a financial assistanre package to Saudi 
Arabia, but it did not desire (for bargaining re~ns) to publicly link such assistance with a 
military acress agreement. IOI 
The radical and nationalist forces in the region in the mid-1950s might have pushed Saudi 
Arabia into Nasser's camp and damaged the government of Saudi Arabia if the United States 
had not persisted in trying to strengthen U.S. ties with Saudi Arabia.lIn Relations between 
Saudi Arabia and the U.S. began to improve by late 1956, as the U.S. showed its opposition to 
the Israeli-British-French military action against Egypt in the Suez crisis. Relations were 
further strengthened by the announcement of Eisenhower doctrine on January 1, 1957, and 
by the President's speech on January 5, that signalled that Saudi Arabia would be able to get 
arms from the United States without turning to the Soviet bloc.1OO In fact, the U.S.' new 
Middle East policy (the Eisenhower doctrine) wa" meant to check the Soviet's support of 
Nasser's nationalist forres. The U.s., therefore, invited King Saud to Washington, with the 
direct aim of building him up to counterbalance Na~r in the Arab world.104 Therefore, in 
February 1957, King Saud visited the U.S. and expressed his support for the Eisenhower 
doctrine which produced a hostile response from Nasser.los It can be seen that King Saud only 
renewed the Saudi connection with the U.S. in response to the threats to his nation's security 
from Nasser.106 
The new Dhahran airfield was finally completed on April 22, 1957, and it was agreed that the 
U.S. should have access to Dhahran for a further period of five years in which the two 
countries were to strengthen their military relations. I07 The U.S. agreed to sell Saudi Arabia 
the military equipment it required at a cost of $110 million and to provide $50 million in 
credit to authorise Saudi Arabia to start such purchases. The arms sales included a 
commitment to deliver to the Saudis 166 tanks, ten propeller-driven training aircraft. eight 
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1'-33 aircraft, twelve F-86 aircraft, and two naval ves~ls. Furthermore, the U.S. agreed to 
train Saudi forres including the army, navy and air forre.101 
U.s.-Saudi military relatiOlL'; steadied after the agreement of 1957, but their relations came 
under increasing critici,,'Ill from radical Arab states, making the airfield agreement a liability 
to the Saudis. Sinoo King Saud distanced himself from President N ~r, the Egyptians had 
become increasingly opposed to the Dhahran agreement, as did Syria, who joined with the 
Egyptians to form the United Arab Republic in 1958. Although Iraq became a competitor of 
Na~r in inter-Arab politics. Iraq agreed with the Egyptian president to oppose the U.S. 
military pre~nce at Dhahran, which also indicated a growing U.S. role in the Persian Gulf 
region a'3 a whole. 109 The value of the Dhahran airfield was also diminishing during the 
beginning of Kennedy administration. Robert McNamara, Secretary of Defense, argued that 
with the arrival of inten;ontinental ballistic mi'3Siles, overseas Strategic Air Command (SAS) 
bases were no longer cost effective.11o Therefore, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia reached an 
agreement, in early 1961, to end the U.S. u~ of the base at Dhahran without damaging 
Saudi-U.S. relations. 111 
The U.S. withdrawal left Saudi Arabia without an important military force of its own to 
protect its borders. and in less than six months, in 1962, Saudi Arabia faced a major external 
threat from the Egyptian pre~nce in Yemen dUring the Yemeni civil war. This crisis was 
a<nlmpanied by the collapse of King Saud's health and his forced resignation by his brother 
Faisal in 1964. 
In 1962, Abdullah Sallal staged his anti-monarchist ooup in Yemen and declared the country 
a republic. 112 Nasser then decided to intervene in support of the new republican regime. He 
sent in troops in October 1962, by which time a major civil war had started on Saudi Arabia's 
south eastern border. 113 At that time, Faisal was in New York attending the U.S. General 
Assembly. He rapidly arranged a meeting with Kennedy, and visited the White HOlL'3e on 
October 5, in order to secure for Saudi Arabia continuing U.S. assistance. 114 This was 
especially important as the U.S. had reoognised the Salla regime in an effort to reduce the 
Soviet military presence in Yemen.ll~ 
75 
Faisal supported the royalists in Yemen and provided them with light arms. Egyptian air 
raids attempted to suppress Saudi support for the rebels by bombing Saudi villages near the 
staging bases the Yemeni royalists were using in the surrounding area of Najran (close to the 
Saudi-Yemeni border). Repeated Egyptian air raids continued into 1963, which compelled 
Faisa] to ask for U.S. military assistance. In addition, Saudi Arabia agreed to permit the U.S. 
to use the Dhahran airfield. 
The U.S. then implemented an operation called "Hard Surface". In March 1963, the U.S. sent 
to Saudi Arabia eight F-l00s and small number of paratroopers. It was only after the 
Egyptian build-up and bombings, that Kennedy agreed to highly visible U.S. fighter flight 
over Riyadh and Jeddah. thlL'i. warning Nasser against further raids. It was followed up by 
sending Ambassador Ell'iworth Banker to try to secure a ooase-fire between Saudi Arabia and 
Egypt. Faisal had made considerable progress in reaching agreement with Nasser at the 
Arab summit meeting in 1964, to end the Yemeni civil war. This led Faisal to request that 
the U.S. call off Operation Hard Surfaoo.116 
Faisal gave a high priority to the reform and modernisation of the Saudi armed forces. He 
raised defence expenditures from 1961 to 1963 by about 58 per oont. In early 1963, the Saudi 
Defence Mini'itry, working closely wi th USMTM, developed a· comprehensive military 
reorganization plan known as the Armed Forces Defence Plan No.l.117 
u.s. -Saudi military relations. 1965-1973 
The growing contacts between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia led to formalising the long-standing 
arrangements between the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (COE) and Saudi Arabia. An 
Engineering Assistance Agreement was signed between Saudi Arabia and the Corps on June 
1965. This arrangement put the Corps in charge of planning and supervising the 
construction of major base facilities and installations that Saudi Arabia required to support 
military forees that could oontest with those being built in Iraq and Iran. 113 
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The agreement led to the building of three major military bases. The first, at Khamis 
Mushayt, was completed in 1971, at a cost of $81.4 million. The foeC(md, at Tabak, was 
completed in 1973, at a cost of $81 million. The third at Qaysumah, called Khalid Military 
City, is so large that it hou~s three brigades and has a population of over 70,000. It cost $7.8 
billion to build and was oompleted in 1985.119 (see Map 3). 
Two other COE-supervised projects involved the Saudi anny. The Defence Ministry of Saudi 
Arabia was interested in COE assistance in upgrading the Army's mobility and this resulted 
in an agreement on September 7, 1966. The agreement provided for COE to supervise a 
five-year, $120 million programme. It included the purehase of 4,276 general and special 
purpo~ vehicles, the provision of maintenance ~rvices, (including spare parts), an 
automated supply system, and the training of Saudi per~nnel in maintenanre, and supply 
skills. 120 
The strength of the army had been kept constant since the defeat of the Arabs by Israel in the 
June war of 1967, even though the Saudis did not participate as a belligerent in that war.121 
The 1967 war was too short to have ~rious effects on U.S. - Saudi relations. On October 17, 
1967, a $9.9 million programme called the Armaments Repair and Maintenance Programme 
was ooncluded between the Secretary of State, McNamara, and the Saudi Defence Minister, 
Prince Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz. It called for the development of a plan to supply, maintain and 
manage vehicles, small arms, tanks, and artillery .122 
Other Corps projects under the Engineering Assistanre Agreement included the construction 
of the $298 million Ministry of Defence and Aviation headquarters complex and the Royal 
Saudi Air Force headquarters in Riyadh, and the $1.7 billion King Abdullaziz Military 
Academy near Riyadh and the Airborne and Physical Training School at Tabuk. AlSJ, other 
projects, like the Army Engineer Centre and School, the Signal Centre and School, and the 
Field Artillery Centre and School were initiated. I23 
The importanre of Saudi Arabia to the U.S. for assuring the security of the Gulf after the 
British withdrawal made the military relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia even 
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more important. This followed the British announcement in January 1968, to withdraw 
troops from the Far East and the lower Gulf states by the end of 1971, involved America in 
taking up the British position to prevent Communist fIlling the gap.l24 
The large scale nature of the U.S. involvement in Vietnam prevented U.S. troops from 
replacing the British presenre. As a result, a Gulf policy was developed which was founded 
on the Nixon doctrine, which President Nixon announced in 1969. The Nixon doctrine called 
for the U.S. to assist in the build-up of strong regional allies that would eliminate the 
requirement for the deployment of U.S. forces abroad.m The Nixon doctrine, called the 
Two Pillar Policy, looked to Iran and Saudi Arabia as the regional powers that oould fIll the 
so-called power vacuum left by the departure of British forces. l26 
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In fact, Iran, with about seven times the population of Saudi Arabia, logically came to be ~en 
as the stronger pillar. t27 Iran thought that its military power oould secure the Gulf and check 
any spread of Soviet influence. Saudi Arabia shared with the U.S. strongly anti-Communist 
views and was the leading moderates on the Arab side on the Palestine question. Saudi 
Arabia, therefore, was capable of exerciqing authority and was strategically located in 
relation to the Arabian Peninsula. l2I 
Although the U.S. announced that it would rely on a "two-pillar" (or twin-pillar) policy in the 
Gulf and build up both Iran and Saudi Arabia into centres of strategic stability, it actually 
pursued a "one-pillar" strategy, as it relied more on Iran for military security and treated 
Saudi Arabia as a soun;e of oil and for its influence in Arab countries. l29 
Washington in this period, however, remained enthusiastic to assist in strengthening Saudi 
Arabia and to advance close political and economic ties. A request for a&sistance in 
modernising the Saudi National Guard led to an initial survey by mid-1972, which was 
completed by the fall of 1973. A general defence study requested in December 1973, was 
completed by September 1974. A study of a Naval expansion programme was agreed in 
1972.130 
u.s. -Saudi military relations. 1974-1978 
The energy crisis of 1973 promoted a further dimension to U.S. strategic concerns in the Gulf, 
particularly Saudi security. On the other hand, Saudi military development programmes 
expanded rapidly during this period. For many years, Saudi Arabia was looking to enhanre 
its military might and money was no longer limited! Therefore, the U.S. policy toward Saudi 
Arabia had to fare the fact that Saudi Arabia had a new fmancial position and was a major 
importer of American arms, military equipment, and technology.13I On that basis, U.S. 
interests in Saudi Arabia were centred around four main points: 1) support for indigenous 
regional oo-operation efforts and oollective security and the orderly economic progress of the 
area, 2) the encouragement of the peaceful resolution of territorial and other disputes among 
states and the widening of channels of communication and consultation between them, 3) thfl 
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expansion of the U.S. diplomatic, cultural, technical, commercial and fmancial presenre and 
activities, and 4) maintaining acce~ to the areals oil supplie..c;; at reaoonable prices. The 
implication of these statements is that the U.S.'s primary objoctive was that of keeping the 
area free of extensive Soviet influence.132 
In order to realise its long-term goals, the U.S. chose the following policies: 1) numerous 
bilateral agreements with Saudi Arabia in which the U.S. provided Saudi Arabia with 
.services, technology and equipment under the Saudi - U.S. Joint Commissions on Economic 
and Security Co-operation and 2) becoming a major SOU1'OO of anns for Saudi Arabia and 
supporting the moderate Saudi policy in the area.133 
The Joint Commission on Security Co-operation was initially headed by Prinoo Sultan and 
Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs, Robert Ellsworth. The 
Commission helped to expand the Saudi military. The U.S. foreign military sales agreements 
rose from $459 million in 1973, to $1,993 million in 1974, and Saudi Arabia ranked second 1D 
Iran in buying U.S. arms.134 Equally important, President Nixon visited Saudi Arabia on 
14-15 June 1974. It was the first visit of its kind undertaken by a U.S. President and he 
discussed with King Faisal the co-operation between the two oountries.135 
Saudi military development programmes expanded very fast after the energy crisic;; of 1973. 
One of the most notable fields of increased U.S. - Saudi military co-operation was in air 
defence. USMTM's planning efforts had been upgraded to an inclusive air defenoo 
development plan called Peaoo Hawk. At the same time, Saudi Arabia ordered thirty F-5Es 
and had one hundred more on order in 1975. In March 1976, the prime oontractor, Northrop, 
had also rereived a maintenanoo and servioo contract for the Peace Hawk programme worth 
$1.5 billion. Northrop's sales to Saudi Arabia averaged over $1.2 billion annually during 
1976-1980 and were 22-44 per oont of its total sales. 136 
The National Guard programme aL~ came into full operation during the mid 1970s. The 
Saudi government contracted with the Vinnell Corporation of California to a...'iSist in the 
modernisation of the National Guard. The original Vinnell contract, signed in 1975, at a oost 
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of $77 million, placed about 200 advisors in the 00 un try. In 1976, the U.S. supported the 
effort to expand the National Guard which included a National Guard Academy and to 
include the further training neoossary to make the Guard more equal in rank to the anny. 
The cost of Vinnell's part of the support programme had reached $215 million. Others came 
to include $12.4 million for 12 Vulcan AA guns, as well as funds for the Commando armoured 
cars, and the National Guard Headquarters, which eventually had a price tag of $158 
million.137 
The Saudi Navy programme, which was to modernise the navy, was originally to rust $150 
million. The cost had risen to over $2 billion by 1977. In fact, the expansion was scaled down 
to a less ambitious level. On the Saudi side, the problem was generally a shortage of 
manpower. On the U.S. side, the U.S. Navy had less experience in managing foreign military 
programmes than the other service branches and so implementation took somewhat longer. 
In May 1979, a U.S. firm HUH (a creation of Hughes Aircraft, Bendix Corporation, and 
Holmes and Nawer) won a $671 million operation and management runtract for the 
programme. At the same time, the Corps of Engineers supervised construction of the naval 
bases at Jeddah and (Jubayl, the headquarters at Riyadh, and the repair facility at 
Dammam.l3I In short, the U.S. Navy did not prove as successful as the other services in 
assisting the Saudi programme and managing their force expansion. As a result, this led to a 
shift in the Saudi Navy modernisation programme to the European countries like France.l39 
Over a period of time during the mid 19708, Saudi Arabia decided to organise its military into 
two major groups of rumbat units. This was due to the outbreak of the October 1973 war. 
Saudi Arabia was concerned by the possible Israeli threat to its security. The first group was 
to be equipped with French equipment, including MAX-30 tanks, and the serund group with 
U.S. equipment, including M-60 tanks. These units were to be organised initially into one 
modern armoured brigade. U.S. a..~stanoo to the Saudi Army took a lower profile during the 
1970s. This was in part because the air force became the prestige service, and because of the 
original Saudi decision to rely on two different countries. l40 The Saudis, however, turned to 
Britain as well and in 1975, purchased Fox annoured fighting vehicles, optically tracked 
versions of Rapier surface-to-air missiles, and ~me additional British armoured cars. These 
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purchases met the needs of the Saudi Army in the sense that they were high quaUty, but they 
added a third line of logistic, service, and combat support requirements for the Saudi Army.141 
In spite of the problems in Saudi defence structures, Saudi Arabia appeared rea~nably well 
positioned to deal with its national security problems by the mid-1970s. Saudi Arabia had 
acquired the foreign support it required to continue its defence modernisation, and its 
diplomatic and economic initiatives had oontributed to a rapprochement between Iran and 
Iraq. 
u.s. -Saudi military relations, 
1979-1981 
Once again, as the security situation in the area worsened in the late 1970s, 00 U.S. - Saudi 
military relations entered a new phase. This was due to some major crises: the faU of the 
Shah and the explosion of antagonism between Marxist South Yemen and North Yemen in 
early 1979; the Soviet invasion of Mghanistan in late 1979; and the Iran-Iraq war, which 
began in 1980.142 
During this period, two arms requests came to be considered by the Saudis as tests of 
American friend"hip. They were the F-15 request in 1978, and the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) aircraft in 1981. Both sales requests were granted to Saudi 
Arabia, but not without stiff Congressional opposition which itself had a negative effect on 
U.S. - Saudi military relations. 
In the Saudi programme of air force modernisation, the Saudi government oought to replare 
its ageing Lightning aircraft (sold by Britain in the mid-1960s) with sixty F-15s. The Ford 
admini"tration had approved the request, but in the face of strong Congressional opposition 
the number was cut below that which the Saudis had oought. That was the first round of 
Congressional concern over Saudi arms purchases. 143 
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After Sadat's trip to Jerusalem in November 1977, the Saudis were tense about the direction 
of American policy. ThU'i, when President Carter paid a visit to Saudi Arabia between visits 
to Iran and Egypt in early January 1978, the Saudis insisted on an early decision about sale 
of the advanced aircraft they felt they had been promised. Carter responded that he would 
remain bound by President Ford's commitments but that the particulars - number, delivery 
schedules, price - remained to be worked out.l44 
In submitting the Saudi request to Congress, Carter asked for sixty F -15s, with delivery in 
1981.14~ He sought to placate opponents by promising fifteen F-15s to Israel to oompensate 
for the Saudi sale. President Carter assured that the sale would not alter the strategic 
balanoo in the Middle Ea~t and the sale would not prevent him from achieving his goal of 
reducing the number of anns sales each year. He insured superiority of the Israeli F-15s over 
the Saudi designs by omitting critical avionics in the Saudi F-15s and by also eliminating 
"hard spots" in the air frame, making future use for offensive missions practically 
impossible. 146 
In spite of all these efforts, the administration could not be sure of Congressional support for 
the request unless some restrictions were placed on the F -15s. The Saudis found this 
extremely distasteful as long as their requests were legal and they paid for the planes with 
their own resourres. The specific restriction governing the sale included: the aircraft would 
not be based at Tabuk (125 miles from Israel), nor could the Saudis buy bomb racks that 
would improve the offensive capabilities of the F -15s or special auxiliary fuel tanks which 
would increase the range of the aircraft.147 They could not transfer their F -15s or "--fie them to 
train in other countries, and they could not buy other combat aircraft pending delivery of the 
F-15s.141 
To oounter r,,()ngre..~onal criticism and the opposition of the pro-Israel lobby factions, Saudi 
Arabia used the readiness of France to sell the F-I Mirage aircraft, with a fa'iter delivery date 
and with no restrictions governing their deployment or transfer, as a bargaining card to 
pressure Washington. The Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown, warned Congress that if the 
F -15 sale was not approved, Saudi Arabia would acquire its needs from France without the 
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controls guaranteeing I~Tael's safety. Thus, on May 15, 1978, under considerable pressure 
the Senate approved the sale of the sixty F-15s to Saudi Arabia by a vote of 54 to 44. 149 
For the Saudis, the sale gave them what they had been promised, but after a rather 
humiliating ordeal.l~ The Saudis saw in the request a test of the Saudi-U.s. relationship and 
a symbol of U.S. - Saudi ties. The postponement and the reduction of the request would 
indicate that Saudi Arabia was taken 1e.'3S seriously and treated as a second cla~ client. 
Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, observed: "As far as I am concerned, why should 
Saudi Arabia be the sole oountry to have conditions impo~d on it? We are as much 
threatened as anyone". lSI The Saudi government got the support of the Congre~ for the 
purchase of the F-15s by agreeing to restrictions and oonditions of use. However, the F-15s 
were also less advanood than the Israeli F-15s which placated the pro-Israel lobbyists in 
Con gre s.c;;. 
After a few months, Gulf stability had begun to decline. In January 1979, the Shah of Iran 
went into exile and in February, a new regime came to govern Iran under Ayatollah 
Khomeini. The government of Saudi Arabia was surprised by the faIl of the Shah and also by 
the U.S. for not doing enough to help the Shah. It was then that the value of U.S. assurances 
of its oommitment to support the regime came into open question by the Saudis. I.52 
Due to the sudden dissolution of the two pillar policy in 1979, the administration gave more 
special attention to Saudi Arabia. In February 1979, Secretary Brown visited Saudi Arabia 
and promised a more active U.S. policy in the region. His offer of an explicit defenre order 
was not aocepted partly owing to Saudi demands about the need to first review the U.S. policy 
on Camp David. I .53 But the U.S. did take on a ~mewhat expanded training and advi~ry 
function with the Saudi armed fol"OO, including field and oombat manoeuvres.l~ 
At about the same time, war between South Yemen (PDRY) and North Yemen in March 
1979, caused conoom in Riyadh and Washington. The Saudis argued that the South Yemen 
attack on North Yemen was a calculated attempt by the PDRY (with the Cuban-Soviet 
support) to overthrow the coa~rvative government in North Yemen. The United States sent 
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a squadron of F -15s to Saudi Arabia, and aircraft carriers were deployed in the surrounding 
area as a show of forre. In the meantime, the U.S. loaned Saudi Arabia two F-3A AW ACS as 
well. It was also agreed to speed up arms transfers, including F-5 aircraft, to North Yemen, 
as part of a package financed in large part by Saudi Arabia.t~~ 
During this period, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan (on December 27, 1979). In 
response to the deterioration of security in the region, the U.S. began to review what could be 
done in the Persian Gulf region. William Quandt, the principal of the National Security 
Council Staff with responsibility for the Middle East in 1977-79, de~ribed the impact of the 
Shah's fall as follows: 
One lesson of Iran is likely to be that the United States can't depend 00 regional surrogates 
and will have to rely more heavily on its own forces, on its own diplomacy, and on its own 
economic relations to protect its vital interests. 156 
Therefore, on January 23, 1980, President Carter announced that "An attempt by outside 
forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital 
interests of the U.S. and such an a..')S3ult will be repelled by any means necessary including 
military force" . t~7 
That statement ooupled to the adverse political reaction to the Camp David agreement, as 
well as the loss of U.S. power and influence made it practically impossible for most 
conservative Gulf states to allow the U.S. to base forces on their soil or even to be closely 
associated with it. t~1 In addition, most conservative Gulf states did not trust American policy. 
They perceived America's intentions as wanting to control the oil in the Arabian Peninsula. 
Prince Saud, the Saudi Foreign Minister, observed "Israeli aggression is not better than the 
Soviet aggression. .. if the United States desires to secure the stability and independence of 
the countries in the region, how could the U.S. allow Israel to keep the occupied lands of the 
Palestinians after the war of 1967".l~ The U.S. position led Saudi Arabia to re-evaluate its 
military relations with the U.S. in a way that saved its sovereignty and necessitated the 
search for immediate improvements in its collective security efforts with its southern Gulf 
neighbours. 160 
85 
Due to the American hostage crisis in Iran, the fall of the Shah, the Soviet invasion of 
Mghanistan, and the opposition to the establishment of U.S. bases in Gulf states, the U.S. 
saw for the first time, the possible need for a rapid deployment of U.S. forces which oould be 
sent to an area where the Soviet Union had major advantages.161 In order to implement this 
policy, the U.S. undertook an number of actions. These included preserving a permanent 
naval presence in the Indian Ocean and developing its ability to send forees into the region 
establishing a "Rapid Deployment Force" (RDF) and by improving the ability of the U.S. 
airlift forces to move the RDF more rapidly. Furthermore, the U.S. searched for areess to air 
and naval facilities in Oman - (Oman had not opposed the Camp David treaty) . Kenya. and 
Somalia and began to promote its facilities in Diego Garcia, in the mid-Indian Ocean, 2,500 
miles from the Straits of Hormuz.162 Bahrain was getting considerable support from the U.S. 
Middle East Force, although it was no longer officially headquartered in Bahrain, but 
continued to use the island's harbour facilities. 163 In addition, the U.S. continued to explore 
the possibility of achieving a permanent military presence in the Gulf states, especially Saudi 
Arabia. This policy contained establishing local security ties, and, if possible, equipment 
dumps to be prepared for emergencies. In July 1979, the U.S. declared its purpose to seek 
Congressional approval for a $1.2 billion sale for the oontinuation of the Saudi National 
Guard's modernisation programme. On December 12, Under Secretary of State, Lucy 
Ben~n, publicly stated the U.S. decision to sell F-15 armaments to Saudi Arabia, including 
Sidewinder and Maverick missiles, laser-guided bombs, and cluster bombs. She stated that 
the decision should be seen in the oontext of an "increasingly unstable" situation in the Gulf 
and that the State Department concurred with the Defense Department that the sale was 
militarily justifiable against a real threat. 164 
The Saudi reaction to the deteriorating situation was characteristically equivocal, made 
worse by strains over the Saudi rejection of the Camp David proress. The circumstances had 
shaken Saudi oonfidence not only in the U.S. commitments to support the Kingdom but al&> 
in the credibility of U.S. deterrence, specifically in the wake of the Russian invasion of 
Mghanistan. 16~ 
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In February 1980, National Security Council Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Deputy 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, visited Riyadh to discuss the security situation with 
Crown Prince Fahd and to search for ways of improving closer military relations. The Saudis 
desired co-operation in facing the growing regional instability, but as a consequenre to the 
general Arab opposition to the Camp David proooss, they could not admit to extensive direct 
co-operation with U.S. forres. The Saudis preferred that their support from the U.S. be 
over-the-horizon. In an effort to reas.'5ure Saudi public opinion of the U.s. commitment, and 
to prevent too close an involvement with the United States, the Saudi government responded 
to the Brzezinski-Christopher visit with a request for enhanood F-15s, and E-3A AWACS 
aircraft. This became the second round in the test of U.S.-Saudi friendship:66 
In mid-1980, Prince Sultan, the Saudi Defence Minister, met with Secretary of Defense 
Brown in Geneva to press the case for some additional items of military equipment. The 
request for air defence enhancement package included multiple bomb ejection racks to 
increase the number of bombs that the F-15s oould carry, ~phisticated Sidewinder AIM 9-L 
air-to-air missile, extra fuel tanks for F -15s, tanker planes to allow refuelling of the F -ISs and 
five AWACS aircraft. 167 Actually, part of the explanation for subsequent AWACS sale was to 
restore both U.S. credibility as a reliable security partner and Saudi confidenre in C.S. 
commitment to regional security.l61 
When the Saudi's request for enhanced F-15s became public, the response was similar to 
1978. Some Senators like Jackson, saw blackmail in the Saudi request. This expression was 
most commonly used by the pro-Israel lobby in the oongress:69 Jimmy Carter said "We will 
not agree to provide offensive capabilities for the planes that might be used against Israel and 
that obviously includes bomb racks". In July 1980, sixty eight senators opposed the sale. l70 
By that time, it was clear that Saudi Arabia had decided not to press further for a decision for 
its package before the elections which were now imminent.171 
In September 1980, the Iran-Iraq war broke out. At the same time, the Chairman of the U.S. 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General David Jones, was visiting Saudi Arabia. Together with 
Amba...~dor John West, he offered the Saudis emergency assistanre by offering to send on 
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loan four E-3A AWACS aircraa'i to Saudi Arabia "within 24 hours". Ground radar, 
communications equipment and about one hundred U.s. support personnel were also 
despatched in order to fill gaps in the Saudi air defenm in areas surrounding the oil fields. 
Naturally, the Saudis were pleased with the rapid U.S. respon.'3e.1n 
On October 30, 1980, Saudi Ambassador, Faisal Alhegelan, released a statement stating that 
President Carter's refusal to oonsider his country's request had oome as a SUTprk'>e to Saudi 
Arabia, especially sinm it came at a time when the subject was under attention and being 
discussed between the two countries positively and constructively.173 Also, he said that Saudi 
Arabia would wait until after the U.S. national elections in order to see what would be the 
final position of the U.S. government on the matter. Should the decision be negative, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia would consider all other possible sourees to acquire the necessary 
means to defend itself. Nobody had a monopoly on relations and friendship with the Kingdom 
of Saudi' Arabia was the Saudi government message to Washington. 114 
It is necessary to understand from the beginning that both the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were 
responding to a number of studies by the U.s. Department of Defense and its contractors on 
how Saudi Arabia oould best improve its air defences and protect its oil fields. While the~ 
studies reooived little publicity during the Congressional discussion over the AWACS sale, 
they established a "logic of arms" that explained many of the events in the previous years. 
Even before the Shah's fall, Saudi Arabia had asked the U.S. to promote the Saudi air defenre 
systems.m 
As a result, the U.S. restructured its regular annual study to inspect how to carry out this 
duty and then widened it even further to deal with the military implications of the Shah's fall. 
The USAF produced an inclusive four-volume survey of Saudi requirements for improved 
ground-based command, control, and communications facilities that became known as "Peam 
Hawk VII". This study did not address the obligation for airborne radar platforms, or U.S. 
capability to transfer over-the-horizon reinforcements. It is clear that the study's analysis of 
the weaknesses in the Saudi radar system helped form the initial Saudi requests for the 
AW ACS. Peace Hawk unavoidably raised the i~lle of how Saudi Arabia could make the 
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U.S.-recommended communications system work without an airborne sensor platform. As a 
result, the following Saudi-U.S. discussion of the study had the same practical impact as if 
the U.S. had recommended that Sauw Arabia buy AWACS. Furthermore, the ~le of the 
recommended system raised the issue of the size and extent of U.S. reinforcements to Saudi 
Arabia and led to discussions that agreed that the Saudi system should be structured to 
permit U.S. reinforcement by about one wing of 70 U.S. fighters per base. Equally important, 
the Peace Hawk VII study was written and discussed in a context in which previous U.S. 
plans had led Saudi Arabia to make massive purrha~s of air munitions and aircraft parts 
and support equipment.176 
The Saudi government believed that a change in its security environment required an 
aoceleration of its military build-up. It expressly refused two types of connection in exchange 
for U.S. arms: first, the provision of military facilities to the Americans on Saudi soil and 
second, support for the Camp David peace process. The Saudi press agency pointed out that 
if Saudi Arabia did not get a positive reply from Washington, it would knock on all doors to 
acquire the necessary requirements to realise the defence of the homeland.l77 
The basis of Israeli objections to the AWACS sale, was the spectre of Saudi-controlled 
AWAc...~ planes spying on Israel and co-ordinating F-15 attacks against its SOil.l'71 Israeli 
-
Prime Minister, Menachem Begin, spoke out against the sale and the American Israel Public 
Affairs Committee u~d a degree of energy opposing the sale. l79 
On November 1980, President Carter was defeated in the U.S. presidentiaJ elections by 
Ronald Reagan and Crown Prince Fahd expressed his hope that the new administration 
would be better able to bring about positive changes in the Middle Eastern situation. l80 Some 
promises had been made during the last month before Reagan took office in January 1981. 
After the November elections, the Carter administration had agreed to sell fuel tanks and 
AM-9L Sidewinder air-to-air missiles to Saudi Arabia They had also made a tentative offer 
to sell AWACS aircraft. However, the Reagan staff reported that they would have to review 
the matter on their own. 1I1 The Carter administration informed the Saudis that they would 
be hearing about the sale from the new administration.lll 
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The Reagan administration inherited an unsettled mixture in the area of Saudi-U.S. 
relations. For the Reagan administration, Saudi Arabia appeared to be far too involved with 
what the U.S. considered a strategic side-show. The Reagan administration believed that 
Saudi Arabia should join the U.S. in an implicit "strategic consensus" with Israel and Egypt. 
After the change of administration in Washington in January 1981, the Saudi Information 
Minister, Muhammad Abduh Yam ani, emphasised that Saudi Arabia's policy would not alJow 
the establishment of foreign bases on its territory and the United States should provide Saudi 
Arabia with the required weapons and equipment. He stated that Saudi Arabia required 
arms for defence, and that Saudi Arabia had no hostile intentions against anyone, in other 
words Israel. 113 
State Department Spokesman, William Dyess, asserted on February 23, 1981, that the new 
administration had reversed U.S. priorities in the Middle East: The chief priority would be 
that of supporting the declining position of the West vis-a-vis the Soviet Union in the area, 
rather than pressing ahead for a resolution of Egyptian-Israeli negotiations on Palestinian 
autonomy. This revised policy would be explained during the visit to the Middle East by 
Secretary of State, Alexander Haig, which began on April 4. Haig's trip to the Middle East 
which included Egypt, Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia, was reported to be an attempt to 
convince those governments to co-operate in its opposition to the Soviet Union.l14 
On March 6, 1981, the State Department announred that the Reagan administration would 
soon give notire to Congress of its intention to sell the missiles and the fuel tanks to Saudi 
Arabia. II!! However, the administration decided to link its decision to a broader Middle 
Eastern policy, a key element of which was the concept of "strategic oonsensus" .136 
The Saudi", were pleased about the administration's positive responses to their arms request 
but not about the connection that was made between them and the concept of "strategic 
consensus". When Haig visited Saudi Arabia on April 7, 1981, the Saudis went out of their 
way to emphasise their dis~ation from the conrept of strategic consensus. The Saudis were 
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con~rned about the Soviet threat but they were far more conremed about the threat from 
r srael. They went on to assert that the only threat to the area came from Israel. l17 The 
protective role of "strategic consensus" indicated the Reagan administration's willingness to 
approve the Saudi's request for arms. However, the concept of "strategic con.~nsus" was to 
the Saudi perspective a negative one. The Saudi,; rejected the ooncept and a~rted again 
and again that the main threat to the security of the region was Israel. They explained their 
interest in the long-term strategic consequences, as well as their hesitation to act jointly with 
the Unite d States. 
The United States-Saudi relationship would fare another test over the sale of the F-15 related 
equipment and AWACS aircraft to Saudi Arabia. From the beginning, the Saudis made it 
clear to Washington that the request would be an important test case of their relations. til 
Subsequently, on April 21, 1981, the White House announced that President Reagan had 
decided to sell five AWACS and seven KC-135 refuelling tanker aircraft, in addition to the 
fuel tanks and air-to-air missiles. This was justified on the basis that the United States had 
made a commitment to Saudi Arabia to move forward with the package of arms. White 
House spokesman, Larry Speakes, a~rted that President Reagan had made his decision 
because "He believes this step is essential to protect our interests in the region". l19 
President Reagan managed to secure enough votes in the Congress by obtaining aid from 
other political figures, such as Henry Kissinger and former Presidents Nixon and Ford. l90 
Just at the time of the Senate vote, the president sent a special letter to the Majority Leader, 
Senator Howard Baker, stating that prior to the transfer of the AWACS in 1985, he would 
certify to the Senate that he had obtained agreement from the Saudi government to prevent 
the possible use of the aircraft against Israel. Finally, in October 1981, the effort to block the 
sale in the Senate was defeated by 52-48 votes. 191 The $8.51 billion arms package went 
ahead.l92 
Anthony H. Cordesman has stated that the Reagan administration's endor~ment of the 
AWACS package had at least five major effects. First, it transformed the AWACS package 
into a tool for putting Saudi-U.S. military relations on a solid long-term basis. Second, it 
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provided a potential keystone on which to plan the upgrading of the Saudi military and help 
the U.S. defend its oil supplies. Third, it endorsed a substitute for a u.s. base or military 
presence in Saudi Arabia that met Saudi political needs. Fourth, it provided the groundwork 
for the first serious effort to directly defend the key oil fie]d~ in the ~uthem Gulf and to give 
Saudi Arabia 360 degree protection against the threats building up on its borders. And fifth, 
it inevitably made the sale of the AWACS package a test of whether the U.S. would provide 
balanood military support to both Israel and Saudi Arabia.'93 In addition, it intended to build 
an infrastructure for a regional military partnership that would e~ the pressure on L .S. 
forces in any intervention against the Soviet Union. Thus it was in the interest of both 
countries. 
Sinoo the United States attempted unsuccessfully to obtain bases in Saudi Arabia, the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia began to work out an over-the-horizon reinforrement arrangement that 
side stepped the problem of establishing U.S. military bases on Saudi &>il. l94 During the 
AWACS debate in late February 1981, Colonel Fabd Ibn Abdullah, the Saudi in charge of air 
operations, and Major General Charles Donnelly, the Chief of the U.S. Military Training 
Mission in Saudi Arabia, met in the U.S. to discuss and res:>]ve the problems associated with 
preserving Saudi sovereignty and the U.S. control over Saudi use of the AWACS. The 
discussions led to an informal understanding relating to the Saudi readiness to provide 
emergency capability to base U.S. over-the-horizon reinforcements. 
Saudi Arabia i~lf spent well over $5 billion in incremental expenditures to develop a U.S. 
reinforooment capability.1~ Therefore, the Saudi air defence enhanrement package was ~en 
as a part of this new strategic consensus policy. The proposed AWAc..." and F-15 
enhancement sale to Saudi Arabia, prepared for the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, 
1981, notes that some U.S. Air Force officers "Anticipated that the Saudis would go so far as 
tD allow U.S. pilots to fly Saudi F -15s to meet a threat" .196 
Nevertheless, a significant American military presence in Saudi Arabia was established in 
connection with the loan of AWACS aircraft and their support teams, as weU as in oonnection 
with the modernisation of Saudi air defence facilities. l97 This understanding was reached 
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verbally without the paperwork ne~s..c.;ary to satisfy the U.S. Congress.l91 According to 
implied understandings, the U.S. strategy would allow the United States Rapid Deployment 
Force to move over-the-horiwn to these forward bases and supplies if the Soviet Union or 
other hostile forces tried to capture the Persian Gulf oil fields. l99 In testifying in Congress on 
behalf of the AWACS sale on October 1, 1981, Under Secretary of State for Security 
Assistance, Science and Technology, James L. Buckley, underlined the fact that the AWACS 
were part of an ambitious strategy to protect the Gulf oil fields. He also emphasised that 
Saudi Arabia was the ~ntrepiece of this strategy and that Saudi co-operation was crucial.200 
In the course of the Senate debate, President Reagan made a statement regarding the U.S. 
commitment to Saudi Arabia, which was highly important. He countered an argument that 
advanced American arms might fall into enemy hands after a Saudi revolution by stating 
"We will not permit Saudi Arabia to become another Iran". Some observers insisted that 
Reagan's statement in effect extended the Carter doctrine to include internal threats or 
external attacks on established pro-Western regimes in the Gulf.lOl 
In short, the Saudi Air Defense enhancement package represented a victory for the Saudis 
over pro-Israel pressures in Washington; it offered Saudi Arabia the capability to defend its 
oil facilities in the Gulf against long-range attacks from the Soviet Union, the I ran- Iraq war 
and attacks from South Yemen. It side stepped the issues of Saudi Arabian sovereignty that 
prevented Saudi Arabia from reooiving U.S. forces or bases in pea~time, yet it allowed Saudi 
Arabia to make far better use of over-the-horizon U.S. reinfor~mentB if these should become 
necessary. Indeed, the package connected both countries tightly in a interactive way and was 
a potential solution to the previous years of problems in creating an effective military 
relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.202 
u.s. -Saudi military relations, 
1982-1986 
During the AWACS debates in October 1981, the U.S. re-declared itB pledge to defend Saudi 
Arabia in a fonnal statement to the Joint Eronomic Committee. In addition, it ~nt Secretary 
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of State, Caspar Weinberger, to Saudi Arabia in January 1982, with detailed proposals to 
strengthen U.S. - Saudi defence co-operation, and to establish a joint committee for military 
projects under the chairmanship of Prince Sultan and Secretary Weinberger. This committee 
worked out a series of unofficial agreements that set the groundwork for closer strategic 
co-operation.203 
At the same time, the U.S. improved its over-the-horizon presence, and the Reagan 
administration sought to upgrade the RDF (Rapid Deployment Forre). This became visible in 
USCENTCOM (U.S. Central Command). 204 
After the level of US CENT COM forces improved sharply in 1981, Saudi Arabia raised serious 
questions about the Saudi attempt to find security initiatives that did not include U.S. 
participation, such as Gulf security arrangements centring on the Gulf Co-operation Council 
(GCC).205 The observations of Joseph Malone explained Gulf Arabs thoughts that the RDF 
were behind the perceived open-ended U.S. support for Israel. Joseph Malone observed that 
it was the Gulf Arabs' view that "Despite avowals of support for conservative, 
anti-Communist regimes, the United States - and therefore the RDF - arouses suspicions 
about their hidden agendas.,,206 
In addition, the Iran-Iraq war and with the dangers of the Soviet Union's presence in South 
Yemen and the invasion of Mghanistan, brought the GCC states officially to establish the 
Gulf Co-operation Council in May 1981. In a separate final statement released at the end of 
the first GCC summit, the members established their organization's declaratory policy on 
military oo-operation with external powers. The U.S. encouraged the Gulf states to make 
such a security tie to protect themselves.207 
However, regional circumstances after 1981, created a series of crises in U.S.-Saudi relations. 
In June 1982, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon began a process of refocusing not only the 
concerns of U.S. Middle East policy but also the regional policies of the states within the 
region back on to the Arab-Israeli problem. This made the U.S. policy toward the Gulf, once 
again, less important. WI The continuing crisis in Lebanon that evolved from Israel's invasion 
94 
involved the U.S. in oomplex diplomatic acts with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and other Arab 
countries. The U.S. continuously threatened to oonnect iu,elf to Israel in ways that could 
seriously damage U.S.-Saudi military relations.209 For example: King Fahd contacted 
President Reagan to force Israel to quit its plan to enter Beirut.210 President Reagan, in his 
memoirs, refers to King Fahd's telephone call, stating that immediately after the 
conversation he called Israeli Prime Minister Begin and asked him not to enter Beirut.211 
Israeli forces stopped on the heights overlooking Beirut. Moreover, the United States voted, 
on June 6, 1982, with all other members of the U.N. Security Council for the withdrawaJ of 
Israeli forces from Lebanon?12 
At the end of 1982, Saudi Arabia made clear that it was actively interested in acquiring the 
M-1 tank and in standardising its forces with U.S. equipment. The U.S. - Saudi discussions 
came during a time when the U.S. was trying to convince Saudi Arabia to put pressure on 
King Hussein of Jordan, Syria and Lebanon to support President Reagan's peace initiative. 213 
The Reagan administration had to inform the Saudi government in early 1983, that it could 
not support any main new Saudi military modernisation efforts, because of its concern about 
pro-Israel lobbying in the Congress and the 1984 U.S. presidential elections.214 
Saudi Arabia immediately responded by turning to Western Europe for equally effective 
arms. The Saudis continued to be interested in purchasing tanks, they were involved in 
discussions with West Germany over the possible purchase of Leopard II tanks and other 
weapons. At the same time, October 1983, it was announced that Spain would supply the 
Saudi military with ~me tugboats, armoured vehicles, and a number of CN-235 transport 
aircraft. In Paris, in January 1984, it was declared that France and Saudi Arabia had 
signed a $4.5 billion agreement for a mobile anti-aircraft missile defence system to guard 
Saudi oil fields. Other countries which worked in Saudi Arabia on military oontracts in 1984, 
included Italy, the Netherlands, and the Republic of Korea (South Korea).215 
Shortly, after President Reagan was re-elected for the seoond time, both Saudi Arabia and 
the Reagan administration began to move towards a formal Saudi request for additional 
arms and toward dealing with the Congressional opposition.216 The request involved a $3,612 
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million deal which included the upgrading of Saudi Arabia's existing 60 F-15 C/Ds to more 
advanced versions of the aircraft, the purchase of 40 more F-15 CID multi-stage improvement 
programme plus eight additional fighters to be kept in the U.S. as an attrition reserve. Saudi 
Arabia al~ ~ught 1.620 more AIM-9lJP air-to-air missiles, 800 Stinger surface-to-air 
missiles, 100 Harpoon air-to-ship missiles and 12 unarmed Blackhawk UH-60 helicopters 
with an option to buy 12 more for the Saudi Army.217 
Nevertheless, on January 31,1985, the Reagan administration suspended all new arms sales 
to the Middle East while it reviewed the defence needs of Israel and the moderate Arab 
regimes. This announcement was made on January 31, 1985, by Whioo House spokesman, 
Larry Speakes. Several Senaoo Republicans had asked Reagan to slow down on the deal, and 
on January 31, 1985, 35 Democratic and 16 Republican Senators sent Reagan a letter 
opposing the Saudi sale. But at the same time, Secretary of Staoo, George Shultz, testifying 
before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, indicated that sales to Saudi Arabia would 
eventually be resumed.211 
The timing of the administration's announcement of the postponement in arms sales to Arab 
countries came just before King Fahd's visit to Washington in mid-February 1985. This 
almost led the King to cancel his visit, until he was quietly promised that Reagan would 
make a per~nal commitment to King Fahd to agree to the Saudi requests at a future date. 
The Saudis were confident enough in this promise that King Fahd visited the U.S. in 
February 1985. 219 
Indeed, selling U.S. arms to Saudi Arabia would improve and serve the U.S. interests in 
Saudi Arabia and in the Gulf in general. Also the sale of arms to Saudi Arabia would 
enhance Saudi self-defence which would reduce the direct risk of U.S. military involvement to 
defend its interests in the area. The Middle East Arms Sale Study ooncluded in the winter of 
1985, that Israel was so powerful militarily that it would not be endangered by such sales. It, 
thus, enoouraged the resumption of U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia. The study also said 
that while arms sales to Saudi Arabia could not guarantee the support of this country for 
American policies, a refusal to supply such arms could harm American interests in the area. 
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The study added that any large-scale American military operations in the Persian Gulf and 
Southwest Asia, would likely depend on Saudi co-operation and support.220 In addition, Saudi 
Arabia has never been a serious military threat to Israel and its role in the Arab-Israel 
conflict is limited to political and economic support of the Arab cause.221 
Israel and its supporters in Congress had stated their objection to the sale of arms to Saudi 
Arabia in the absenoo of new peaoo negotiations. The White House wanted the study to 
show that such sales were vital to American security interests.nz While Secretary of State, 
George Shultz, and Secretary of Defense, Caspar Wienberger, supported the sale and 
repeated pledges to Saudi Arabia, senior officials in the National Security Council and several 
of the president's senior domestic political advisors opposed the sale only because of their 
conoom from a public debate that might produce enough hostile reaction from Israel's 
supporters to weaken Republican chances for control of the Senate in the 1986, elections.223 
The Washington Post asserted on September 10, 1985, that the Reagan administration was 
expected to drop plans to include 40 additional F-15 combat aircraft in the new arms sales 
package for Saudi Arabia. The Saudis appeared to have concluded that they had no real hope 
of a future major U.S. sale until after the 1988 presidential elections, and then only after a 
new president had had time to settle into offioo. It practically forood Saudi Arabia to turn to 
another supplier. It was a further step in an extended U.S. history of disapproving or 
postponing Saudi arms requests that had already driven Saudi Arabia to turn to Europe for 
equipment and advice for its army and navy.224 Therefore, the Saudi move to Europe for arms 
indicated the frustration felt by Saudi Arabia and its desire to assert independence from the 
United States, which could effect its interests in the area. 
This long series of uncertain U.S. signals about the sale of equipment helped shape the Saudi 
decision to turn to the United Kingdom for military purchases. On September 26, 1985, 
Saudi Arabia signed a contract with the United Kingdom to supply Saudi Arabia with 48 
Tornado aircraft worth $8.5 billion. Saudi Arabia expanded its requirements in 1988, to 
include 50 air defenoo variants of the Tornado aircraft and mine vessels worth $17 billion. In 
fact, after the Gulf crisis, Saudi Arabia expanded the project for the third time in January 
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1993, with an estimated value of between $5.7-7.2 billion. The latest order will bring total 
Saudi orders for Tornadoes to 120 and 65 advanced jet trainers.2~ 
This factor explains the major shift of policy for the Saudi Air Force from dependenre on the 
U.S. to more diverse sources of supplies from such European powers as the United 
Kingdom.226 The Saudis decided not to wait any longer for the 48 American F-15 fighters that 
had been promised by Reagan. The deal with the United Kingdom was to underline the 
Saudi impatienre with the U.S. Congressional obstruction and to send the message that they 
could get combat aircraft without any technical restrictions and about where to base them on 
their own soil. 
The final stage in the arms sale crisis of 1985, was the Reagan administration's initiative to 
repair the damage caused by the failure of the F-15 arms package to its strategic relation 
with Saudi Arabia.227 On March 11, 1986, the Reagan administration notified Congress that 
it intended to sell Saudi Arabia advanced missiles worth $354 million.221 In fact, this new 
arms package was part of the original F-15 package which included two different types of 
air-to-air Sidewinder missiles, valued at $158 million; 200 shoulder-fired Stinger 
surfare-to-air missiles with 600 reload missiles, valued at $89 million; and 100 air-to-ship 
Harpoon missiles, valued at $107 million.229 The administration used the excu~ that there 
was a possibility of the Iran-Iraq conflict spilling over to Saudi Arabia and other Gee 
countries for this sale. 230 
At this stage, the Reagan administration adopted a strategy of supporting a high level of aid 
for Israel in return for limited opposition to the sale. Still, the administration faced a 
situation where 64 senators had signed a resolution against the sale and about 290 members 
of the House were ready to vote for it. There were enough votes in the Senate to stop the sale 
without a presidential veto and enough votes in the House to bypass the veto if the pl'Psident 
made it.231 Some supporters of Israel tried to block the sale because of the Saudi's fmancial 
support for the Pill and because of questions about the degree of Saudi support for U.S. 
peare efforts in the Middle East.232 
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President Reagan opened a personal campaign on May 13, 1986, to save his arms sale to 
Saudi Arabia. He told Congressional leaders that the credibility of the United States in the 
Middle East was at stake. The president also said "The consequence of our refusing this sale 
would, in my view, send a signal throughout the Middle East, to the clear detriment of our 
interests there for many years to corne".233 Some senators and House members said they 
voted against the arms deal only because the Stingers were included.234 Thus, the Reagan 
administration was forced to drop the Stinger surface-to-air missile from the package.23~ 
As a result, and through a oombination of intense lobbying and the withdrawal of Stinger 
missiles, the Republican oontrolled Senate refused by· a single vote on June 5, 1986, to back 
President Reagan's plan to sell $265 million of Sidewinder and Harpoon missiles to Saudi 
Arabia.236 The U.S. had reached a position where it was unable to maintain its strategic 
relations with Saudi Arabia. 
Congress also raised the spectre of a vote against the transfer of the first AWACS which 
were due to be shipped on June 30, 1986, (Saudi Arabia had bought these on October 28, 
1981). The Congress continued putting pressure on the Reagan administration to restrict 
arms sales to the Arab world. In July 1985, the Senate introduced legislation that forced the 
administration to report every major technical upgrade in the equipment it sold to foreign 
nations. This was clearly targeted towards Saudi Arabia since there had been some minor 
changes to the E-3A AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia.237 
In the statement of certification to Congress, Reagan said a detailed plan for the security of 
all surveillance equipment had been agreed to by the United States and Saudi Arabia.231 It 
included both on-site inspection by the United States and a pledge to share "oontinuously and 
completely" the information acquired by the AWACS planes.239 In addition, there were 
prohibitions on the transfer of data to third oountries, and limitation on its use in flights over 
Saudi territory.240 At the same time, the opponents of the transfer acknowledged that they 
had no plans to introduce legislation to block the transfer - a move that would likely fail 
because the Saudis had already paid for the package.241 
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The Reagan administration had reached the state of trying to maintain military relations 
through "mini-packages". Since the major sale went to the United Kingdom, the U.S. 
contingency capabilities in the area were effected and, thus, reduced the U.S.' ability to use 
facilities in both political and military terms.242 The U.S. had discovered the point beyond 
which it was unable to sustain full strategic relations with Saudi Arabia.243 
u.s. -Saudi military relations, 
1987 - August I. 1990 
The Iran-Iraq war escalated during the spring and summer of 1987. The Iranians attacked a 
Saudi coast guard vessel that had been hit by a mine on August 13, 1987, and then on 
August 15, 1987, two massive explosions rocked an Aramoo facility and fires were still 
burning twelve hours later.244 
The Reagan administration responded on August 18, 1987, by announcing that it would 
agree an arms sale to Saudi Arabia. Once again, the Reagan administration found itself 
unable to win Congressional support. The lobbying against the sale won the support of many 
key members of Congress. 24~ 
In mid-September 1987, President Reagan received a draft letter from Congress that opposed 
the sale and claimed to have 64 signatures - enough to block the President. Several of the 
Senators involved attacked Saudi Arabia again for failing to support the U.S.' effort to seek 
peaoo with Israel. Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzshak Shamir, attacked the sale in a speech on 
September 24, 1987, and by the end of September, ~me 217 members of the House had 
added their signatures to the 64 Senators. As a result, the Reagan administration started to 
work out a compromise whereby they dropped the request for 1,600 AGM-065D Maverick 
missiles from the sale, and informally promised not to sell Saudi Arabia the F -15Es at ~me 
later date. The Reagan administration's need to compromise again created political problems 
for the Kingdom. The U.S. president had been publicly forced to cut back on an arms sale 
because of pressure from Israel and the pro-Israel lobby.246 Since there was no sign of an 
arms sale, Saudi Arabia was actively attempting to create a coalition with the Arab League 
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to tighten sanctions on Iran. However, at the Arab League's meeting in Amman on 
November 8, Saudi Arabia had faced opposition from Algeria, Syria and Libya.247 
With the escalation of the Iran-Iraq war, the tensions between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia 
were accompanied by another arms crisis. This time not because the Saudi request for arms 
had been denied by U.S. Congress but because Saudi Arabia had bought strategic 
surface-to-surface missiles from China. The Chinese C-SS-2 are long-range surface-to-surface 
missiles. The missile package provided an undi~losed number at a cost of between $3 billion 
to $3.5 billion. They have a maximum range of about 2,200 miles which means they could 
reach any target in the Middle East, including any part of Israel.243 Saudi technicians had 
secretly been learning to operate the Chinese missiles for two years.249 
China had agreed to sell the missiles in July 1985, when Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan had 
negotiated the deal in Beijing.2~o The first missiles reached Saudi Arabia in 1987, and the 
rest arrived at the beginning of 1988.~1 Saudi Arabia turned to Beijing after Congress had 
refused to supply Saudi Arabia with F-15s and short-range missiles. The missiles offered 
Saudi Arabia a way to strike back at any neighbouring state without having to fear loss of 
any military aircraft.2~2 
Saudi Arabia had successfully hidden from U.S. intelligence agencies for more than two years 
its plans to acquire Chinese ballistic missiles. The U.S. did not directly confront the Saudi 
government with satellite evidence of the 66-foot-Iong missiles and their sites until March 6, 
1988, when Assistant Secretary of State, Richard W. Murphy, met with the Saudi 
Ambassador, Prince Ban dar, and demanded to know whether Riyadh had obtained nuclear 
missiles from China. ~3 
The United States asked Saudi Arabia about the Chinese missiles, since those deployed in 
China itself were all nuclear-armed missiles.~ King Fahd sent a letter on March 12, to 
President Reagan assuring the administration that there were no nuclear warheads on the 
missiles, and he al~ reaffirmed the Saudi intention to acquire the most modem weapons 
necessary for its defeO(~.~~ 
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U.S. intelligenoo sources had ooncluded that the Israeli air foroo's unusually intensive 
low-level bombing practice runs could be preparation for a strike on Saudi Arabia. Israel 
indicated that it might take action if the U.S. failed to deal with Saudi's new missiles. 
Reagan responded to the Israeli threat by warning Israel, on March 25, 1988, that the United 
States would be totally opposed to any Israeli attack on Saudi Arabia's new missiles.V(; The 
Reagan administration feared that if Israel attacked the missiles it would complicate U.S. -
Saudi relations even further and destroy any chance for Arab acooptance of the United States' 
new Middle East peace initiative.2j7 Saudi Arabia also sent a warning to Israel through the 
U.S. that it would retaliate with surviving missiles if Israel tried to bomb its missiles.2j, 
Tensions between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia increased when the U.S. had to recall its 
Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, Hume Horan, at the request of King Fahd. The King's request 
came during a meeting between King Fahd and Hume Horan, after Horan had requested to 
inspect the missile sites in Saudi Arabia.2j9 King Fahd became angry and he said to the U.S. 
Ambassador, that when any country sold arms, they always demanded from the buyer that 
they would not allow anyone oountry to inspect the arms. Saudi Arabia would keep its 
word.260 Immediately, President Reagan called King Fahd to reduce the tensions and he sent 
his representative, Philip Habib, to Riyadh to persuade King Fahd to not ask Horan leave 
Saudi Arabia. However, KiDg Fahd insisted that Horan leave, otherwise he would recall the 
Saudi Ambassador to Washington, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan. Consequently, the U.S. 
replaood Horan with Walter Cutler.261 This was the first time an American Ambassador had 
been withdrawn at Saudi request since the oountries established diplomatic relations in 
1933.262 The Saudis considered the U.S. request to inspect the missiles an intervention in 
their domestic affairs. In fact, the Saudis secret purchase of Chinese missiles showed the 
depth of their anger about U.S. policy. The Saudis thought the U.S. was responsible for the 
Saudi's purchase of arms from China, because they oould not get them from the United 
States. The end result for U.S. - Saudi military relations was increased tension. 
At the same time, the Reagan administration argued that the arms package, worth $450 
million, which included Bradley fighting vehicles. TOW missiles and ground-support 
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equipment for the Saudi AWACS was crucial for the protection of U.S. Naval forres in the 
Persian Gulf.263 The growing U.S. presence in the Gulf was there to protect Saudi and 
Kuwaiti oil tankers from the escalating Iran-Iraq war, Washington argued. 
The administration had planned to notify the Congress of the sale, but it decided to delay the 
sale because of a letter signed by 187 Representatives which called on the administration to 
halt the sale in light of Riyadh's secret purchase of the Chinese missiles.264 Saudi Arabia tried 
to ease Congressional concerns, by announcing on April 25, 1988, that they would sign the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. However, Congress remained opposed to the Saudi 
purchase of the Chinese missiles. 26~ 
Since there was no move from the U.S. to finalise the sale, Saudi Arabia signed a oontract 
again with the United Kingdom in July 1988. The contract included six mine vessels, 90 
helicopters, and about 50 Tornado fighters at a cost of $17 billion.266 In Washington, the 
Reagan administration said that U.S. national interests had been damaged by the deal.267 
The deal was de~ribed as the largest defence export package in British history.261 
In view of all this, the new Republican Bush administration decided to try and reach an 
understanding in principle with the Israelis so that they would not use their influence with 
Congress to try to block sales of arms to Saudi Arabia before the administration oould take up 
the issue with Congress and give it the required legal notification. The Bush administration 
told the Israeli government, on September 28, 1989, that it intended to sell Saudi Arabia 315 
U.S. anny battlefield tanks at a oost of $1 billion but it would also take steps to meet Israel's 
security concerns if Israel did not actively oppose the sale. In fact, Saudi Arabia had been 
considering buying M-I-Al tanks, the main battlefield tank of the U.S. armed force, since the 
early 1980s.269 
More than nine months later, the Pentagon announced on July 9, 1990, that Saudi Arabia 
had signed an agreement to purchase 315 of the U.S. Army's most advanced tanks in a deal 
worth more than $3 billion and the tanks were scheduled for delivery from 1993 through 
1995.270 
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In testifying to Congress in June 1990, Frederick Smith, Deputy Assistant Secretary for East 
and South Asian Affairs, asserted that the hold-up in finalising the sale was caused by the 
price having to be re-negotiated. Originally, when this sale was discussed, the price that 
America had quoted to the Saudis was based on an expected U.S. purchase of approximately 
2,000 of these tanks. However, the U.S. Army decided to buy only 62 of these tanks, and so 
the unit cost of each tank had been increased. This had caused the delay in discussions.m 
The Bush administration argued that if the United States did not make the sale, then other 
countries would, for instance, the Chinese.2n Equally important, the administration wanted 
to keep Saudi Arabia on a military par with Iraq.273 When a cease-fire between Iran and Iraq 
was declared on August 2, 1988, Iraq emerged from the war with enormous self-confidenre 
and power. The Iraqi president aspired to establish Iraq's hegemony in the Gulf, if not in the 
Arab world as a whole.274 
The military relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia also developed over this period 
During the meeting of June 19, 1990, of the Sub-committee on Arms Control, International 
Security and Science and Europe and the Middle East of the House Foreign Affairs 
Committee, it was recognised that the sales of arms to Saudi Arabia would yield substantial 
economic benefits, The cumulative value of the deal discussed on June 19, 1990, was 
approximately $4 billion, of which more than $3.1 billion would be spent in the U.S. The LA V 
(Light Armoured Vehicles) package would be assembled in Canada by GM of Canada. 
However, approximately 75% of the total package would be U.S. in content and would yield 
over 11,000 worker years of employment in at least 24 states. The AWACS modifications 
would generate additional employment in eight states. These were all cash sales that would 
involve no cost to the American taxpayer. The request consisted of three main elements.275 
The first proposal related to the upgrade of the existing fleets of Saudi AWACS E-3 and KE-3 
tanker aircraft at a cost of $600 million. The second proposal was a request to purchase 1.117 
light armoured vehicles, 2,000 TOW IIA anti-tank missiles, 116 TOW launchers and 27 M198 
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millimetre howitzers at a cost of $3.4 billion. Finally, a request to purcha~ additional 12 
M88Al Recovery vehicles at a cost of $26 million.276 
In testifying to Congress on June 19, 1990, the principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of the 
Bureau of Politco-military Affairs in the Department of Defense, William Rope, underscored 
the fact that the upgrade of the AWACS was essential to ensure the continued co-operation 
between U.S. and Saudi air forces. Co-operation was invaluable for the Americans during the 
Iran-Iraq war in their Persian Gulf operations in 1987, and 1988. It remains very important 
that Saudi aircraft be compatible with and able to operate with America aircraft. In addition, 
he added that sale would foster clo~r security relations with the Saudis, and enhance their 
ability to defend what amounted to one quarter of the world's proven oil reserves, a resourre 
in which Americans will have a major interest for a long time to come. 277 
William Rope underscored in the Congress the fact that the Iraqi army was 1 million 
combat-trained, well-equipped troops and Saudi Arabia's total forces were approximately 
one-tenth of that figure.271 He also concluded that Saudi Arabia had a legitimate need for 
equipment, that the sales would not have a negative impact on regional stability, that they 
will not present a risk to Israel's ~curity, and that they will serve a number of important 
interests of the V .S. 1:19 
Summary 
U.S. economic and political relations with Saudi Arabia are a complete part of V.S. strategic 
policy in the area. The Saudi alliance was an important ingredient in American policy 
planning for several areas and issues: the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea and Suez Canal, the 
Indian Ocean and Soviet naval strategy east of the Suez, the Arab-Israeli threats. Saudi 
Arabia has been involved in these areas and is important to American foreign policy because 
of its oil, size, location and newly found economic power. 
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The Shah's fall has made Saudi Arabia the only major country with which the United States 
can frame a strategic partnership in the Gulf area. The United States military links to Saudi 
Arabia are only one of the areas where the links to Saudi Arabia has improved and stronger 
economic and political links are equally important. However, it is the military relations 
which are the keystone for U.S. policy in the area. 
The diversification of sources of arms supply does not, and is not intended, to decrease the 
dependence of Saudi Arabia on the U.S. as an ultimate guarantor.2BO Issues and priorities 
have changed over the years, but more importantly, bilateral relations in specific areas have 
developed more or less independently of one another. The outcome has been that when two 
or more interests are concerned with a particular issue, policy decisions in one area are 
contradicted by decisions made in another area. For instance, the Saudi request for F-15s in 
1978 and for AWACS in 1981, had a high political content reflecting on the growing role of 
Saudi Arabia in the Arab-Israeli conflict, especially since 1973.211 
Israel had become concerned at the potential for Saudi oil power to impel a wedge between 
the U.S. and Israel. This concern provided an impetus to the supporters of Israel in the U.S. 
to oppose the major arms requests to Saudi Arabia.212 The task of demonstrating that the 
U.S. strategic connection with Saudi Arabia was compatible with U.s. ties to Israel has not 
been impossible when the White House has followed it with appropriate depth and 
consistency. The Saudis, on the other hand, were demanding independent military relations 
with the U.S. regardless of Israel. 
Dr Ghazi Algosaibi, the current Saudi Ambassador to the United Kingdom and previously 
Minister of Industry and Minister of Health, presented the Saudi case for the sale of the 
F-15s to Congress and to American public opinion in 1978. He said in an interview with the 
author on November 29, 1994, that the pro-Israeli lobby had a weak position in opposing the 
Saudi arms requests because their purpose was to destroy the growing U.S. - Saudi 
relationship. Dr Algosaibi al~ stated that they had confirmed to the Americans that they 
(the Saudis) did not want to buy from the U.S. any more than was needed for purely defence 
purposes. 
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Following the energy crisis of 1973-74, the Saudis decided to enhance their defence by 
spending on military oonstruction. The large figures began to draw U.S. Congressional 
criticism. This situation led to what were for the Saudis a series of crises of confidence in the 
U.S. commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia. The Saudi were aware of the military logic 
of their requests, based as they were on U.S. surveys and recommendations. The Saudi 
suspicions of U.S. intentions were also based in part on oontinuity. The Saudis did not mind 
expressing their need for U.S. co-operation, but the problem was they perceived a U.S. 
unwillingness to express that it needed Saudi co-operation as welI.2113 
The 1973-74 the Arab oil embargo, initiated and maintained by Saudi Arabia was essentially 
an economic response to a political issue. This reflected the growing economic strength of 
Saudi Arabia, and the willingness of an American president to give Saudis what they asked 
for, including arms.214 In testimony before the House sub-committee on the Near East and 
South Asia in August 1974, Richard R. Violette, director for sales negotiations at the Defense 
Security Assistance Agency, stated that the American military programme in Saudi Arabia 
covered "a fairly broad range". The U.S. had agreed to provide services for Saudi Arabia 
which included the sale of F-15 fighter jets.21~ In addition, the threat of reduced levels of oil 
production was mentioned if the deal of F-15 in 1978, should fall through.216 The linkage 
between the supply of oil and the F-15 deal raised considerable anxiety in the U.S. and 
renewed concern about Saudi blackmail. 
But, in the mid 198Os, American defence planners admitted that the Saudis had failed to tum 
their international oil and political power into a strong and deterring armed force.217 Despite 
the huge Saudi oil reserves, Saudi Arabia could not get the F-15s or other sophisticated 
weapons it needed in the mid-1980s. Saudi Arabia had not mentioned the oil threat as 
pressure since the RDF was founded. Saudi Arabia waited from the 1983 until 1986 to obtain 
approval from Congress about their arm requests. As we saw, when they knew that they 
would not get approval for their requests they turned to Europe, especially the United 
Kingdom to buy the Tornado. In fact, the European states were usually more forthooming in 
providing sophisticated equipment and less inhibited by hostile domestic interest groUpS.211 
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The problem of the arms crisis between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia laid in the Reagan 
administration and in its initial neglect in not testing Congressional opinion and then its 
neglect in not attempting to seriously prepare the Congress for the sale. The White House 
failed because it decided it oould wait until the last moment and then use the President's 
prestige to rush the sale through Congress. The administration did nothing effectively, which 
allowed the pro-Israel lobbying groups to be very efIective?19 
The administration did make one final attempt to get the sale to go through in May, 1986, 
however, this only made things worse. A senior administration official called Prince Bandar 
bin Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., while he was in the United Kingdom 
negotiating to buy the Tornado with the Thatcher government. The U.S. official stated that 
the U.S. would send the F-15 package forward to the Congress if the Saudi government 
agreed to support the Jordanian peace initiative, to support a parallel U.S. arms sale to 
Jordan and pay for the arms sold to Jordan.290 After oonsultation with King Fahd, the Saudis 
accepted the last two conditions. The first condition, threatened to pull the Saudis into the 
middle of political fighting between Jordan, the PW, and Syria at a time when the Iran-Iraq 
war was escalating, and was therefore rejected.291 
President Carter stated that the U.S. would not agree to provide Saudi Arabia with offensive 
capabilities that might be used against Israel. This included AWACS. But after Carter was 
defeated in the Presidential elections, he agreed to sell the AWACS to Saudi Arabia. The 
Times, on May 4, 1981, stated that "Carter waffied on the question of more arms for the 
Saudis until after he had been defeated. In Carter's last days in office his administration 
came down on the Saudi side and proposed to Reagan's transition team that the outgoing and 
incoming Presidents jointly announce a major arm sale".292 
Another factor that created tensions in U.S.-Saudi relations was the "Iran-Contra" affair. 
The Reagan administration approved a secret arms sale to Iran in 1985, which broke U.S. 
constitutional principles.293 This scandal required a series of investigations by the U.S. 
Congress and seriously embarrassed the U.S. in the Arab countries, particularly Saudi 
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Arabia.294 Thi'3 scandal cost the U.S. its credibility in Saudi Arabia. The Saudis felt that it 
had been betrayed by the United States. The arms sales to Iran warned the Saudis of the 
rising regional threat of the Iranian regime, which could encourage radicalism in the Middle 
East.29~ Thus, if the U.S. Congress had created the Saudi arms sale crisis of 1985·1986, it 
was the Reagan administration's by-passing of its own professionals that led to the Iran 
contra arms scandal. 
Prio~ to 1973, U.S.-Saudi military relations were harmonious. The strain in the relationship 
oreurred during the oil embargo of the U.S. for its support of Israel during the 1973 war. This 
made Saudi Arabia to steer a foreign policy course less closely bound to U.S. policy goals on 
arms sales. 
As interdependence increased, levels of co-operation and conflict between the two nations 
increased and decreased. For instance, the events of 1978 relating to the sale of the F-15s. 
Since the 1970s, each Saudi request for arms resulted in increased strains within the 
relationship because of the efforts of the strong pro-Israeli lobby.296 Congress perceives the 
granting or withholding of approval to sell arms to Saudi Arabia as part of a bargain on oil 
prices and production levels. It is seen as important to keep Saudi Arabia a moderate member 
on Arab - Israeli conflict. The U.S. also wanted to reduce Saudi Arabia's power to use oil to 
pressurise America for political ends. 
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Chapter Four 
U.S.- Saudi Political Relatio~s until the 1990 Gull Crisis 
Before talking about the U.S.-Saudi political relation, it will be important to 
understand the Saudi policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. This eventually 
resulted as tension in political relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. The 
Palestinian question and the existence of Israel frequently strained their 
relationship, and led to the serious clash of views during the 1967 war, and 1973 
war. 
Since Saudi Arabia is of considerable importance to American long-term policy in 
the Middle East in general and America also supports Israel, it is necessary to 
consider Saudi-American relations throughout the Arab-Israeli conflict as the next 
sUbject, because the Palestinian-Israeli dispute is central to the politics of the 
Middle East. 1 
The Arab -Israeli conOict and Saudi policy 
From the first meeting between King Abdulaziz and President Roosevelt on 
February 12, 1945, King Abdulaziz toOk the opportunity to tell President Roosevelt 
his concern over Palestine. At the end of the meeting, Roosevelt gave King 
Abdulaziz his assurance that he would do nothing that might be hostile to the 
Arabs. The U.S. government would make no change in its basic policy in Palestine 
without full and prior consultation with both Jews and Arabs. Immediately after 
Roosevelt's death, President Truman ignored these promises and the state of Israel 
was declared. 2 
Saudi Arabia did not send troops to participate in the Arab-Israel war in 1948, but 
co-operated in the boycott of Israel. King Abdullaziz became angered over the 
American recognition of Israel. 
In 1956, when Britain, France, and Israel attacked Egypt, Saudi Arabia ordered a 
general mobilisation and called on all Arabs to oppose the attack. Saudi Arabia 
also took a strong stand in favour of Arab nationalism and supported Egypt in her 
nationalisation of the Suez Canal.s 
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I n the period fo]]owing the 1 HG7 Arab-I srach war, t.he Arab states that eonfronu)d 
Israel were defeated, and the Israelis (x;cupicd the Golan Height';, t.he Sinai, the 
West Bank and Gaza. The occupation included the Islamie shrines in East 
,JerusaJem. The Saudis are guardians of Islam and the holy places in Mecca and 
Medina. The Saudis look to the AJ-Aqsa mosque in Jerusalem as the third most 
sacred place in Islam. Therefore, King FaisaJ insisted that Arab Jerusalem must 
be free of Israeli domination and his successors continue to focus on Jerusalem.4 
Before 1967, the Saudis had not been deeply involved with the Palestinian 
movement, because the Palestinians were followers of Egypt's NaS9?r who was 
anti-Saudi. However, after the 1967 war, Nasser had dropped his regime's 
anti-Saudi rhetoric. At the Khartoum Arab conference in August 1967, King Faisal 
took the lead in organise financial support for Egypt, Syria, Jordan and the PLO to 
increase the concern felt in the Muslim world over the Israeli ~upatioll of 
JerusaJem; and to 0PPORe pressures from Arab nationalists to adopt a radical 
attitude in its dealings with the West, especially with the United States. At the 
same time, Saudi Arabia supported the U.N. Security Council re~lution 2-12 of 
November 22, 1967, whieh demanded the withdrawal of Israel from territories 
occupied during the war of 1967.5 
The anti-C..ommunist. element. in Saudi foreign policy affected Saudi relations with 
Egypt. King Faisal encouraged President Sadat in 1971-1972, to decrease his 
dependence on the Soviet Union. That was the first major effort by Saudi Arabia 
to encourage an Egyptian-United States diaJogue. He explained that Egypt must 
deal with U.S. concerns about the Arab-Israeli oonflicL This proress was 
interrupted by the October 1973 war and the following oil embargo, however.6 
Despite King Fai~]'S pro-Amprican attitude, he took the lead in the u~ of the oil 
weapon to support President Sadat's war in 197:1. The October war in 1973, 
brought Saudi Arabia directly into the oonflict arena and was the first major 
confrontation between the U.s. and Saudi Arabia.7 
An OPEC m(~ting on Oet.otwr 17, 1 !)7:1, was designml to u~ t.he oil embargo to 
force Israel to withdraw from Arab oceupied lanel,; and to oJmpel t.he U.s. t.o r('ali.~ 
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the consequences of its unlimited support for Israel.8 Emile Nakhleh has suggested 
that war and oil as tool of diplomacy achieved several goals: 1. it erased the 
humiliation of 1967 defeat; 2. it equalised the balance of power between Israel and 
the Arabs; 3. it increased the need for negotiations between Egypt and Israel; 4. it 
forced the U.S. to enter the negotiation process as a full partner.9 
These new policies, which included strong efforts by the U.S., generated three 
disengagement agreements: two were in the Sinai between Israel and Egypt 
(January 15, 1974 and September 1, 1975) and one was on the Golan Heights 
between Israel and Syria on May 31, 1974. Saudi Arabia played an active role in 
easing Kissinger's negotiations, and encouraging American initiative.lO 
Riyadh supported the elevation of the PLO during 1974-1977, as the legitimate 
representative of the Palestinian people. The Saudis maintained that the 
Arab-Israel conflict was not just a conflict between Israel and the Palestinian 
people and any future peace negotiations must involve Palestinian representatives 
of a future Palestinian state. Thus, for the first time, the Palestinians would be 
recognised as a party to the conflict when they were invited to speak to the U.N. 
General Assembly on October 14, 1974.11 
Syria was not pleased with the results of the Sinai II agreement which caused a 
break in the Arab ranks, placing Egypt and Syria at odds. The Syrians sought to 
bring the Saudis and other Arab parties against the agreement on the formal 
grounds that it violated the resolution of the Rabat Arab summit of October 1974. 
This resolution had enjoined the confronting countries against any separate 
political agreement and had called upon them to seek only a comprehensive 
settlement based on return of all the occupied Arab territories and satisfaction of 
the Palestinian's national rights. 12 President Sadat agreed to his participation in 
the Kissinger offer and called for a linking of any Egyptian-Israeli accord with a 
similar one between Syria and Israel. 1s However, Saudi Arabia failed to get the 
leaders of Egypt, Syria, Jordan and PLO to meet to coordinate policies. 14 In fact, 
the Saudis wanted to keep their connection at the policy level because they 
believed that this served their Arab policy better. 16 They possessed re~urres to 
deal with the other problems that they faood. The Saudis were not pleased with the 
result of Kissinger's efforts, particularly the Sinai II agreement of September 1975. 
112 
The agrnement eaw.;('d a gap in Arab ranks placing Egypt and Syria at od(i~ with 
eaeh other. To ease the ciifTenmees between Egypt and Syria, Saudi Arahia inviwd 
Pre~;1dent Sadat and President A'-;sad to Riyadh in I\ovember 1976. Egypt and 
Syria called ofT their public dispute and agreed to co-operate in any new Middle 
Ea,-;t peace initiative. Arab ranks were to be closed in preparation for deahng with 
the newly elected Democratic administration of (Jimmy Carter.'6 
The Carter admjnistration re~;ponded positively to these Saudi moves. President 
Carter sent a personal friend, (John West, former Governor of South Carolina, to 
Saudi Arabia as ambassador, to secure for the Saudis a direct line of acres.<.; to the 
White House. During the early months of the Carter administration, the Saudis 
were consulted on and informed of the plan of working for a comprehen..~ive 
Arab-Israeli peace. l7 
In June 1977, the Saudis worked to get the Palestine Liberation Organi"iation 
(PLO) to moderate its views so that Palestirnans oould join in the negotiation.~ of 
the peace process. In August of that year, Prince Fahd submitted to Secretary of 
State, Vanee, in Riyadh his proposal for authorising the PID to take part in the 
general peace negotiations. Prince Fahd could convince President Carter to 
recognise the Pill officially in exchange for the Pill's recognition of re~~lution 
242.'8 
In August 1977, the United States agreed that they would begin official talks with 
PLO representatives, if the PLO aocepted U.N. resolution 242. The Saudis were 
pleased at this point, but the PLO under mas.5ive Syrian pressure, wa5 reluctant to 
acr,ept U.N. resolution 242. Prince Fahd believed that the Palestinian leadership 
had lost an historic opportunity that would not be repeated.'~ Then, the U.S. 
initiative came to stop and the gap between the Syrians and the F.gyptians grew 
fast. In November 1977, Sadat announced that he intended to visit Jerusalem to 
meet Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin. This caught Saudi Arabia by 
surpn~. Sadat had neither oonsultcd nor even informed the Saudis of his 
intentions. From the Saudi perspective, a separate Egyptian-Israeli peaCR 
agreement would again split Arab ranks and redure the stability of the rogion. 
Sadat's journey to ,Jerusalem, caused thf~ Saudi. ... to rctrpat to the sic)('linps and 
they fi)Unci thpm~Jves eloser to t.he views of Syria, ,Jordan, and th(' PLO than to 
J ~ . ~, ... gypt.. 
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The Saudi posit.ion toward Sadat's initiative was similar to the position they had 
taken toward hi", previous moves at Sinai II. The Saudi~ wantpel a "just. anrl 
lasting solution in the area". Any Middle East settlement must be based on th(> 
return of all Arab lands and fulfilment of the legitimatR righL~ of the Palestinian 
people.21 Indeed the Saudi government issued a statement expressing their 
surprise at Sadat's move and stated that any Middle East peace initiative "Must 
emanate from a unified Arab stand".22 Their primary fear waq that Sadat had 
already reoognised the exi')tence of Israel he had nothing left with which to 
negotiate a significant settlement.23 The Saudi') felt that Sadal's move had 
shattered the Arab near-consensus. This had hardly been repaired when the 
events of Sinai II had smashed once again the consensus cultivated at the 
Riyadh-Cairo-Damascus meeting. 
When Saudi Arabia was caught in the middle, the Saudis did not immediately join 
in with Sadat's critics which was composed of most of the Arab eountries. Nor did 
Saudis attend the rejectiomst Arab summit held in Libya on Derember 5, 1977, 
following Sadat's visit to Israel. The Saudis continued to hope that Sadat would 
turn his initiative back toward a comprehensive Middle East peace.21 While the 
Saudis did not join in with Sadat's critics, they became less active in trying to form 
an Arab consensus.25 
In September 1978, the Camp David summit meeting produced two unn~lated 
agreements. One dealt with the Sinai and the other dealt in generalities with the 
Palestinian question.26 It did not deal with the problems associated with attaining 
autonomy for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, nor for the Israeli 
withdrawal from the ~upied territories.27 No specific provisions were made for the 
Pa]estiman refugees still in camps.28 As was to be expected, the Saudis were not 
pleased with the Camp David result and they expressed their disappointment in 
private.29 
Therefore. an Arab summit mooting was scheduled for Baghdad in Novemt~r 
1978. The official bulletin of the summit condemned Sadat. Cart.er. and Camp 
David. Prince Fahd did manage to prevent a eomplpw Arab break of eoonomic and 
ciiplomatie relations with Egypt, how(wer.:itl 
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The Arab League states mnt again on March 27, ]979, to consider what actions to 
takn against Egypt for iL~ separate peace agreempnt with Israe1. The summit 
members dncided to expel Egypt from the Arab League and to move the 
headquarters of the Arab League from Egypt to TuniK They also agreed to end 
chplomatic and eoonomic relations with Egypt. But the Saudis did not agree to a 
total ban on contact.,,:; with Egypt. Nor did they cancel previous aid commjtment.~. 
The Saudi,,:; did not expel Egyptian workers from Saudi Arabia or suspend air1ine 
. 31 Rel"Vlces. 
The Saudis were willing to continue fmancing Egypt's purcha';e of fifty F-5E 
aircraft worth $525 million to persuade Sadat to join the all Arab strategy.32 
However, on May 7, 1979, Sadat made a speech in which he attacked Saudi Arabia 
accusing it of trying to "Bribe (Egypt] with money"; this led the Saudi~ to cancel 
their financial aid.33 
In an interview with The Washington Post on May 25, 1980, Crown Prince Fahd 
and Prince Abdullah, Chief of the Saudi National Guard, stated their willingnes.~ to 
a(~pt the existence of Israel if it would end its occupation of the land~ ~upied 
since 1967 and recogllise the principle of self-determination for the Palestinian 
people.34 
By early summer 1981, Saudi Arabia decided to offer its own peace proposal. It 
was the first major Saudi initiative following the Sadat imtiative. On Augu~1. 7, 
1981, with no preceding consultation with the U.S., Crown Prince Fahd announced 
an eight-point plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. 
The points were: 
1. Israeli withdrawal from all Arab territory ocx:upied in 1967, including East 
Jerusalem. 
2. The removal of Israeli settlements on Arab land established after 1967. 
3. Guaranteed freedom ofworsIDp for all religions in th~ Holy Plares. 
1. Affirmation of the right of the Palestinian people to return to their homes 
and compensation to tho~ who decided not to cio ffi. 
5. U.N. (:ontl'Ol of the West Bank and Gaza Strip for a transitional ()('riod not 
exceeding a few months. 
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6. The establishment of an independent Palestinian state with Jerusalpm as 
i L'i capital. 
7. Affirmation of the right of all states in the region to live in peaee. 
8. The U.N. or some of its members to guarantee and implement thcS(' 
principles.35 
The Saudi initiative was known as the Fahd plan. Prince Fahd had been earefuJ to 
negotiate a con.~nsus from the Arab countries, including the PLO which played a 
role in drafting the plan, before proposing the plan. After Prince Fahd made his 
statement. Yassir Arafat, confirmed his support for Fahd's plan to the New York 
Times. It was "a good beginning for a lasting peace in the Middle Ea~t".:'; Sadat 
rejected the plan. At about the same time, on October 6, 1981, President Sadat 
was a~sassinated and Egypt's new president, Hosni Mubarak, asserted a positive 
view of the plan, stating that it could be used as the basis of some future 
discussion. However, Mubarak did not reject the Camp David accords in favour of 
the Fahd plan. In contrast. Israel rejected the plan.37 Prince Fahd stated that the 
plan was negotiable but that it was proposed as a rational and balanood 
alternative to the Camp David agreements.38 
The Saudis declared their intention to put forward the Fahd plan for oonsideration 
at the Arab League summit, which wa" arranged for Fez, Morocco on November 
25, ] 981. Riyadh then set about winning Arab acceptance for the plan. Iraq and 
Syria, the two most hard-line amongst the Arabs, were heavily in Saudi Arabia's 
debt, politically as well as financially. Since Iraq depended on Saudi Arabia 
fmancially during it.~ war with Iran, Saudi Arabia had hoped that this would mean 
that Iraq oould be persuaded not to oppose the plan. However, at the presummit 
Arab Foreign Ministers' meeting on November 22, both Syria and Iraq came out 
against the plan. Syria also pushed the Pill to oppose the plan. At the Arab 
summit, King Hassan of Morocoo, who was chairman, adjourned the meeting after 
four hours of di..~us.~ion of the Fahd plan in order to prevent the breaking up of 
Arab ranks. 39 
At the same time, the Saudi~ were frustrated at Syria's inflexibility over Lebanon, 
as well as over it.~ support of Iran in the lran-Iraq war. The Saudis tripd t() bring 
Syria hack into thp Arab conS('nsus and did nothing furthpr to separat.f' Syria or to 
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push Syria closer to the Soviet Union. It was inevitahle that Saudi Arabia took for 
iL"elfthe role of moderate Arab mediator. 
A few days after President Reagan's statement,; the Arab League summit meeting 
in Fez, Mo roc.co , November 25, ] ~)81, an eight-point plan was adopted demanding: 
1. Israeli withdrawal from aU occupied Arab territories including East 
fJerusalem. 
2. Dismantling of Israeli settlements in the Arab territories. 
3. Guarantees for freedom of worship for aU religions. 
4. AffIrmation of Palestinian rights of self-determination and exercise of those 
rights under their sole representative the PLO. 
5. A transition period of a few months for the West Bank and Gaza supervi~d 
by the U.N. 
6. Establishment of a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital. 
7. Guarantee of the peace and security of aU states in the region, including a 
Palestinian state, by the United Nations Security Council. 
8. Guarantee of the implementation of these principles by the Security 
C il 40 --,ounc . 
The Fahd plan was the basi.,; of the 1981 Fez proposal. It had Arab League 
con~nsus, including an indirect reoognition of the existence of Israel in point 
seven. Therefore, the Saudis saw their efforts bear fruit albeit a year later than 
expected. Unfortunately, by that time the Lebanese crisis so occupied the Middle 
East security and political agenda that ooncentrated attention oould not be given to 
the Jleace process. A,; the U.S. became more bogged down in Lebanon in 1983, 
communications with Syria became strained. 
A.." a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia maintained the consensus and joined an all Arab 
strategy. The Saudis u~d their oil as a politicaJ weapon during the 1973 war to 
pres.~ure the U.S. into obtaining a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace ~ttlement. 
However, the Saudis in the late 1970s were reluctant to use their oil as political 
weapon again. I n particular, they would not put their nationaJ re!oiOU~ (oil) and 
thp S(\Curity of Saudi Arahia at risk just in th(l namp of Arab strategy. President 
Sadat's unilateral initiative had destn)yed the Saudi effi)rts using th(~ oil ('mbargo 
of 1!)7:l, to achieve a Middl(l East p('a(~ initiative from a unified Arab posit.ion. 
117 
Since there was no guarantee of maintaining a unified stand from the Arab front 
line states, the Saudis would not contemplate imposing an oil embargo again and 
face the negative consequence of an oil embargo alone. 
Finally, for all its differences with the U.S. over American support for Israel, Saudi 
Arabia played an important role in convincing President Sadat to make his initial 
break with the Soviet Union and in giving Egypt the financial and military support 
it needed to reach the Sinai accords. In 1975, Saudi Arabia helped convince Syria 
to approve Egypt's second disengagement agreement with Israel by using Saudi 
aid to Syria as a bargaining chip.41 
u.s. -Saudi political relations 
The United States officially recognised the regime of King Abdulaziz in May 1931, 
when Charles R. Crane (an American minister) made the most important contract 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. It was not until after this that 
Abdulaziz formally created the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in September 1932. 
Saudi Arabia is closer to the United States than with any other Western nation. 
The special relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United States commenced 
in the 19308, and has been maintained with the freedom to follow policies not 
always compatible with each other's objectives.42 
History of U.S. - Saudi relations 
American individuals have been dealing with Saudis since the 1890s. The story of 
Saudi relations with the United States is one of spreading contacts through private 
American individuals and oompanies. The oldest steady unofficial American 
contract with Arabia was in 1890, when the Dutch Reformed Church spon~)J'ed 
missionaries through the Persian Gulf. From their three centres at Kuwait, 
Muscat (in Oman) and Bahrain less than two dozen missionaries exerted an 
influence far beyond their numbers. Not that they made many converts, for their 
800re approached zero, but through their mal work they afforded the ~iation 
of thousands of oommon folk and their rulers with Americans. The medical 
missionaries established relations with King Abdulaziz from their bases in 
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Bahrain. They visited Saudi Arabia freqmmtly to treat the ailing King and oLh('r 
palinol,;, but they were nol aJlowed to continun their cvangeli.,;tic operatioll.,-;:n 
Following Abdulaziz's victories in the Arabian peninsula, he nCf>ded cash to 
maintain his hold over the tribes. Thus, be looked enthusiastically to disc-Over oil. 
In 1922, Major llolmes, representing the Eastern and General Syndicate 
('.,ompanies, got the exploration rights for an area of more than 30,000 square miles 
of the Al-llasa. Major Holmes failed to interest any British companies in 
undertaking the development of oil deposits aod ceased exploration in 1925. The 
conces.sion was officially announced void in 1928. 44 In fact, negotiations between 
the Kingdom of Hijaz and Najd and the U.S. with a view towards estabhshing 
diplomatic relations began in September 1928. 
Harry St flohn Bridger Philby, a former official in the Indian Civil Service, had set 
himself up a.'; a merchant in ~Jeddah and bad attached himself to the King as 
sometimes adviser. Philby suggested Charles Crane, an American with deep 
interest in Arabia, who was sponfiOring development projects in Yemen be given 
the exploration rights. 
u.s. -Saudi relations, 1931-1953 
On February 25, 1931, Crane arrived in Saudi Arabia to discuss eoonomlC 
co-operation wit.h King Abdulaziz. Crane went. back to the United States and sent 
Karl S. Twitchell, an American engineer. Twitchell's report on oil was optimistic. 
I Ie returned to the United Stat.es for the purpose of promoting capital investments 
in Saudi Arabia. On May 31, 1932, Standard Oil of California made its oil 
disoovery in Bahrain. 45 
Private American oil investments were the starting point of the modern 
Saudi-Amprican relations, when Standard Oil of California (SO CAL) got th(' 
eonoossion in May, 193a. Before the concession was signed, SOCAL bad raised with 
th{l State Department the question of diplomatic repre~ntation. The L:nited 
States and Saudi Arabia signed a provisional ah-rreement on November 7, 19~:J, th(' 
first formal act of diplomatic relations in regard to diplomatic rppr(':-;(>ntat.ion, 
judicial protection, commerc.(l and navigation. 4!; 
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In March 1938, test drillings in an area of the Al-Hasa confirmed the presence of 
oil in commercial quantities. In 1939, the first oil shipment left Saudi Arabia.47 
From here on the Kingdom's financial crisis had been overcome and $3.2 million 
dollars in revenues was collected.48 By the late 1930s, the oil industry in the Gulf 
was booming. 
By late 1939, the United states had started to re-evaluate its position in Saudi 
Arabia. The Germans officially approved their envoy in Iraq to be a non-resident 
ambassador to Saudi Arabia. 49 Both Japan and Germany expressed their interest 
in an oil conoossion.50 Eventually, the U.S. Minister to Egypt, Bert Fish, was 
confinned as non-resident minister to Saudi Arabia on August 3, 1939.51 He 
presented his credentials to King Abdulaziz on February 4, 1940.62 Relations 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia continued to develop during the 
World War II. The United States opened a legation in Jeddah on May 1, 1942.63 
The U.S. Minister to Egypt, Alexander Kirk, continued to be non-resident envoy to 
Saudi Arabia, and James Moose was appointed resident U.S. Minister in 1943. 64 
From May to December 1942, a U.S. agricultural mission journeyed more than ten 
thousand miles throughout the Kingdom providing an agricultural evaluation. 
Karl Twitchell, the engineer who had reported on Saudi w~ter resources, as well as 
oil, in the 1930s, led the mission. The mission was an early instance of the growing 
American desire to be responsive to Abdulaziz who was the only independent ruler 
in the Middle East friendly to the allies. By areepting American financial 
assistance, Saudi Arabia compromised its neutrality and so had to turn 
increasingly to the United States for help in modernising the rountry. ARAMCO 
had carried out vast operations without direct official backing by the U.S. 
government. An ARAMCO representative met with President Roosevelt in April 
1941, and tried to obtain his approval for a government loan to Saudi Arabia. The 
United States made funds available to Saudi Arabia.55 
American oil men were concerned by the growing British presence in Riyadh. The 
Americans were concerned about the strategic significanoo of the Gulf and the 
importance of areess to the oil in the Persian Gulf. The Roosevelt administration 
sought more active government involvement in the oil conoossions, because of the 
direct competition between the United States and Britain to obtain thp Saudi oil 
conoossions. So, on February 18, 1943, President Roosevelt declared Saudi Arabia 
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eligible for direct lend-lease assistance, which amounted to $17.5 million.56 In 
addition, 22.3 million ounces of silver were lend-leased. These were needed to mint 
Riyal coins (the Saudi currency). The U.S. government's fmancial support made it 
possible for Saudi Arabia to avoid bankruptcy, which looked almost inevitable 
when the oil operations stopped during the World War II, and the war caused a 
sharp decline in the number of persons arriving for the Haj.67 
Prince Faisal (later King Faisal) visited the U.S. in 1943, and again in 1944. He 
was received in a royal way to emphasise the growing importanre of U.S. - Saudi 
relations.58 The Americans approached the Saudis for approval to build an air base 
at Dhahran, on the Gulf coast. They struggled to capitalise the U.s's leading role 
in the progress of the oil industry in Saudi Arabia.59 The British were also 
pursuing an agreement to build a base and made the most of their long established 
political position in the Peninsula.so 
The United States and Great Britain were competing for rights concerning oil 
distribution. Lord Beaverbrook, the newspaper magnate who was serving as Lord 
Privy Seal, told Churchill: "Oil is the single greatest post-war asset remaining to 
us. We should refuse to divide our last asset with the Americans" .61 On February 
18, 1944, Lord Halifax, the British Ambassador in Washington, debated with 
Under-Secretary of State, Summer Wells, on oil and how to pl"()reed. Later. Halifax 
telegraphed London that "The Americans were treating us shockingly".62 Next. 
Halifax asked for a personal meeting with the President. Roosevelt met Halifax. 
and showed the ambassador a rough summary of the plans that he had made for 
the Middle East.63 The president told the ambassador "Persian oil is yours. We 
share the oil of Iraq and Kuwait. As for Saudi Arabian oil, it is ours". 64 
On February 20, 1944, Churchill sent a message to Roosevelt in which he said that 
he had been watching "With increasing misgivings" the telegrams about oil.65 "A 
wrangle about oil would be a poor prelude for the tremendous joint enterprise and 
sacrifice to which we have bound ourselves", he declared. "There is apprehension 
in some quarters here that the United States has a desire to deprive us of our oil 
assets in the Middle East on which, among other things, the whole supply of our 
Navy depends".es To put it bluntly. he said, some felt ''That we are being 
hustled".67 Roosevelt replied that he, in turn, had received reports that Great 
Britain was "Eyeing and trying to horn in on the American companies' concession 
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In Saudi Arabia".'~ In rp~l)()n~ to another sharp tdegram from ChurehiJl, 
Roosevelt added, "Please do aecept my assurances that we are not making sh(~p's 
eyes at your oil fields in I raq or Iran". Churchill cabled back, "Iet me reciprocate by 
giving you fullest assuranec that we have no thought on trying to horn in upon 
your interests or property in Saudi Arabia".69 But, while Britain did not seck 
territorial advantage, "She will not be deprived of anything which rightly belongs 
to her after having given her best serviees to the good eause at least not so long as 
your humble servant is entrusted with the conduct of her affairs".10 Nevertheless , 
the importance of the Saudi concession to the U.S. was enough reaoon to invite a 
U.S. move because the British already had a praetical monopoly to exploit oil in 
1ran.71 
During the final year of the World War II, the United States moved to secure it.s 
commereial and political influence in Saudi Arabia. President Roosevelt invited 
King AbduJaziz to a meeting on an Ameriean warship in Egypt's Great Bitter 
Lake. They met on February 12, 1945, Abdulaziz was frequently referred to by 
Roosevelt in terms of highest praise, and he was given as a gift a luxurious 
airplane. However, the genial relations were marred by one problem - The 
Palestinian's problem with the fJews. Roosevelt confirmed to Abdulaziz that the 
U.S. would never do anything that might prove hostile to the Arabs and that the 
U.S. would not ad on the PaJestine problem without consulting the Arabs and 
Jews. 72 This promise was given again in a letter to the King in April, one of the 
last letters Roosevelt ever wrote before he died in April 1945. Furthermore, 
Roosevelt's interests were in oil and the post-war configuration of the Middle East. 
Abdulaziz wanted t.o assure oontinuing American interest in Saudi Arabia afu'r the 
war to counterbalance what had been for him a threat from British influence in thp 
region.13 
The strategic interests that had been the main determinanL" of politieaJ rolations 
throughout World War II started to subside in the post-war period.74 There WPI"(' 
t.wo developmenL" that were to become the determinants of CB.-Saudi politieal 
relations and the original eau.w of ambivalence in tho.~ relations. Thc~ were' the 
Cold War and the existence of the State of Israel. 7f> 
The po."t-war Soviet threat in the Middle East g('n('rawd a eommon l: .S. - Sawh 
security eoneem and this ha" been the pillar of political relations for almost finy 
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years. In March 1917, t.he Truman doctrine was formulated. This wouJd be t.he 
basis through which the United States would maintain ~~urity in the Middlf> 
Ea,;t.
76 
The U.s. started a long-tenn world-wide poUcy to contain communi~m 
which had mostly coincided with Saudi ~eurity concx'ms.77 The~ common S(lCurity 
con~ms aJ]owed both countries to overcome clissimilarities and opposing interests 
and to preserve close relations over the years.78 
The mam differences at this time between the two states were over the 
Arab-Israeli oonllict and problems a';.'3OCiated with the creation of Israel in 1948.79 
Despite the fact that Roosevelt had promised to find a ~lution to the Palestine 
problem acceptable to the Arabs, President Truman took less account of Arab 
interests, " I am sorry, gentlemen, but I have to answer to hundreds of thousands 
who are anxiOlL'; for the success of Zionism. I do not have hundreds of thousands of 
Arabs among my constituent."I1.80 
The Saudis felt that President Truman had betrayed the pledges made to them by 
President Roosevelt, especially when the United States voted in the United 
Nations for partition of Palestine in 1947.81 The Foreign Minister, Princ,'e Faisal, 
felt specifically bitter, because he had been assured by the Slate Department. 
during a visit to Washington in 1946, that Roosevelt's assurance wa'i still in 
effect.82 Later Faisal urged hi" father to stop relationships with the United States.83 
On Derember 3, 1947, Abdulaziz met with the American minister in ,Jeddah to 
express his view of the situation. Abdulaziz told the mini,;ter that the talk about 
cancelling the concession was an example of the increased pressure, which was 
being put on him in order to damage his relations with the United StateS.84 The 
United States responded immediat.Ply that it was difficult to supply him with arms 
given the embargo.B.,) Later in Abdulaziz's request for arms, he mentioned th(' 
danger of Commurusm.86 In fact, the U.S. had been a strong external forre for JX'ace 
and security in the Middle FAIst, ~ in addition to economic and political tips 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, a component of their relationship was military 
supply. 
Despite Saudi bitterness over the C.S. role in the creation of Israel, U.8.- Sawli 
relations continued to develop. In 1948, the United States ['\avy ('ntRrPd thp 
Persian Culffor th(' first time and paid a court(lsy call on f)ammam.~7 In 1!)49. th(l 
United St.ates I()gation at ,leddah was rdised to embas..,,'Y level.AA Th(' Lnit.('d Stat,('s 
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and Saudi Arabia moved closer, on ,June JH, J~)51, by signing a defen<X' agn'<'ment 
under which Saudi Arabia extended American usage rights at the Dhahran air 
base for five years.BB The Dhahran ba~ later became an important link in thf' UB. 
global network of strategic bases directed again.,-;t the Soviet bl()(:?; 
The U.S. not only helped militarily but was al~ important in the implementation 
of Abdulaziz's plans to develop Saudi Arabia domestically. Saudi Arabia's revenue 
increa~d to about $90 million in 1950.91 Thi'3 revenue was u~'Cd by AbduJaziz to 
develop Saudi Arabia. He put special stress on transportation, hospitals, education, 
communication, and water supplies. With American assistance, the Saudi 
government launched an irrigation network. Maky Corporation built a powerful 
radio station in ,Jeddah. Under a contract with Trans World Airlines (TWA), Saudi 
Arabian air service, linking the Red Sea with the Persian Gulf, was established. 
Huge piers were built in Jeddah and new piers were developed at Dammam and a 
rail link between Dammam with Riyadh was built. Roads were constructed 
between Jeddab, Mecca and Medina with American instruction.92 
u.s. -Saudi relations. 1953- 1973 
After the death of King Abdulaziz in 1953, the relations between Saudi Arabia and 
the United States becaine more (,'Omplicated. From the beginning, EL~nhower's 
administration was involved more deeply with the Arab world affairs than his 
predece&~rs had been.93 Eisenhower played a critical role in the creation of the 
Baghdad pact in 1955, during the mediation of the Suez crisis in 1956, and in 
formulating the Eisenhower doctrine of 1957.94 This involvement, inspired a mixed 
reaction in the Arab countries, especially Saudi Arabia. This was due to different 
conrepts of mutual interest.'i. Preventing oommunist expansion was the fIrst U.S. 
political goal in the Middle East, and U.S. government's insensitivity to local and 
regional political L'-;sues was to complicate it..'i relations with the Arab world. ,¥.' 
The United States was ooncerned with the oommunist threat, and ~ was ~king 
!oI(lCurity arrangements in the MjdcDe East including the lL~ of Dhahran ba~.9f) 
The U.s. focuspd on the Northern Tier States: i.e. Turkey and Iran, especially, that 
part bordering thp Soviet Union.~n The United States wanted to ~'Cur(' thp Ardb 
states, together with the Northenl Tier States, in a defenre pact to t~ (:ailed the 
Middlf> East. Defpn(:(\ Organisation (MEUO).~1tl In Dccembpr 195:t King Saud 
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expn~ssed his opposition to :v1EIX) and be w('nt to Cairo in March 1 ~)f)'1, to seck 
President Nasser's support.'~ They refw·;ed to becom{> party to any agreement that 
by definjtion benefited Western interests. ](X) The Ameri(~n.,; dropPf'd the proposal, 
but the British felt the need for a multilateral pact to replace their bilateral defence 
pact with Iraq.lOl On February 24, 1954, Turkey and Iraq signed a bilateral 
security agreement - the Baghdad paet. H)2 Great Britain signed the pact in April 
1954, Pakistan in September 1955, and Iran in October 1955YJ3 The Cnited 
States did not become a full member of the Baghdad pact, but played an important 
role, providing military assistance. 104 The Baghdad pact split the Arab world and 
threatened U.S. - Sau(fj political relations. 105 The United States, despite increased 
tensions in its relations with Saudi Arabia, still independently sought Saudi 
friendship. 106 On January 30, 1957, King Saud vi"ited Wasrungton and agreed to a 
five-year renewal of the air base agreement in exchange for continued UB. arms. IOO 
The U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, George Wadswoth, stated in support of the 
Eisenhower doctrine: "We are recognising that Saum Arabia i" a stabilizing force in 
the area, and we state in those terms for the first time to my knowledge that it is 
our policy to continue to oontribute to the strengthening of the Kingdom; we want 
to build up something strong which will resist thi" nebulous force of aggression 
which we sense building up". H~ Eisenhower, himself, put emphasis on building up 
King Saud as a strong conservative counter to President Nasser and as a major 
figure in the Middle Eastern area. log But King Saud lost control of the government 
in 1960, F~~ became Prime Minister, ending any hopes the Eisenhower 
admini"tration had for making Saud a champion of Arab conservatives. lI0 In 
October 1962, Faisal gained total control of the government. In 1964, he became 
King when King Saud was forced to resign. 11 1 
The next development in Saudi Arabian policy came as a result of internal political 
change. Faisal was a strong and able administrator. lIe believed that the 
monothei~tic West wa~ a les.c.;cr threat to the Islamic World that he hoped to 
preserve than the atheistic Soviet bloc. 
When the Yemeni civil war started in the fall of 1962, military and ~urity 
matters became the major considerations in U.S.-Saudi rclations. 1I2 Americans 
saw the' Yemeni civil war a~ a threat to its relations with both Saudi Arabia, who 
suppor"Wd the Yemeni loyalists, and the Egyptians, who supportf'd lh(' 
r('publieHn.~.'I;' The Egyptian air force bombed t.he Saudi border t.owns in I~ml)('r 
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1962, and in responS(' to this bombing, King Faisal ordered a genera] 
mobilisation. 114 In rpspon~ to the growing erisi.", the United StaiRs sent 
Amba"sador Ellsworth Bunker to Saudi Arabia in March 1963, to try to negotiaiR 
a Saudi - United Arab lU:>publie djsengagement in YeIDen. 115 (rhe CAR - was 
formed by the merger of Egypt and Syria in ] 958). In April, Bunker reached an 
agreement with the U AR an d Saudi Arabi a. 116 The Bunker agreement providf'd a 
mi.c.;~10n of United Nation." observers which would be jointly funded by Saudi 
Arabia and the UAR.117 The mission came to Yemen in ,July 1963, and stayed until 
September 1964."8 At that time, with no UAR withdrawals and with continuing 
hostilities, Faisal repumated the Bunker agreemenL Ilg The Saudi-Egyptian 
confrontation continued until Egypt wac.; forced to pull out its military forces from 
Yemen as a consequence of the June 1967 Arab-Israeli war.l~ 
Despite the failure of the Bunker agreement, U.S. responsiveness to Saudi military 
needc.; and restored Saudi internal stability following the accession of King Faisal 
led to a significant improvement in Saum political relations with the U.S. 121 King 
Frusal visited Washington on (June 21-23, 1966. 122 The U.S. announced its support 
for the integrity of Saudi Arabia and the Pentagon renewed its training of the 
Saudi armed fore..es. 123 
The United States considered Saudi Arabia a voice of moderation in the area. 
Thus, the United State..c.; wanted to protect the integrity of oil, and on the other 
hand, the Sauilis expressed their willingness to base their relations with the 
Ullited States on the need for U.S. technological and military assistance. Saudi 
conoorn was stimulated by the growing supply of Soviet arms to ~uthem Yemen 
and Iraq. The United States wac.; developing a modern air foroo and navy for Saudi 
Arabia, and indicated a willingness to assist with sales of equipment and private 
training programmes due to the apparent threat.." to Saudi security. 
The years between 1967 and 1973, were poljtically a period of transition in the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. The Nasserist threat ended completely with thf' 
settlement of the Yemeni civil war.l24 In May 1967, Nas..~r ordered the CnitRd 
Nations (U.N.) ob~rvers. who had been on duty sinoo the end of thf' Suez crisi.~. 
out of Egypt. lIe started a blockade of Israeli shipping in thf' Gulf of Aqaba, 
cutting ofT iL~ southern port and threatening to interrupt the importation oil, and 
h t L' t' t t k t t.h c· . 1'~) ()Il .Jun(' !), 1967. thc third e ~m, r"gyp ,Ian .roops )ac 0 e L~lIlaJ. - , ' 
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Arab-Israoli war, the Six-Day War, had started.l~ The Egyptian forc()s in Sinai 
eo])ap!o;ed. By .June 8, the I sraeli troops had erossed the Sinai. 1:!7 On .June 6, Arab 
Oil Ministers formally called for an oil embargo agrunst (X)untrip-s helping h,Tael. I:.'" 
Saudi Arabia as.~iated it.<.;elf with the Arab effort to withhold oil only aft.er 
extensive pressure from Nasser, but lifted the embargo soon after it.", imposition.l~1 
The 1967 war signalled a turning point in Saudi Arabia's position as well as in its 
relations with the United States. The war put the Soviets in a favourable position 
in the Arab region. l30 Nasser's partnership with the Soviets put Saudi Arabia in a 
bad light for maintaining close relations with the U.S., Israel's friend and 
protector. 131 
The oil embargo of 1973 
The period of transition from 1967 to 1973, came to an end in October 1973, with 
the Arab-Israeli war and Saudi Arabia's support of the Arab oil embargo.l')~ Saudi 
Arabia's position on oil production plaood Saudi Arabia in a good position to playa 
decisive role in the use of oil as a political weapon. l33 The Arab-Israeli war of 
October 1973, however, catapulted the Kingdom to the rentre of Arab political 
arena. l34 King Fai~J had tried to notify the West, especially the United States, 
that the Arabs would have to use the oil weapon if the United States did not put 
more pressure on Israel to abandon the occupied Arab territories. The United 
States was the only country that could forre Israel into the necessary concessions 
for a truly jlL<;t peace scttlement. l35 But Washington did not take Faisal's warnings 
scrio lL<;ly . 136 
On August 23, 1973, President Sadat of Egypt made an undeclared trip to Riyadh 
to meet King Fai~1.137 lie told the King that he was considering going to war 
against Israel and he wanted Saudi Arabia's support and co-operation. l38 The 
consequenre of Sadat's trip was quite evident. On August 27, Ahmed Zaki 
Yamani, Oil Minist.er of Saudi Arabia, told an Aramco executive that the King had 
suddenly taken to asking for detailed and regular reports on Aramco's production, 
its expansion, and the result of shortening its production on consuming countries -
in particular, on the UnitRd States. 1:nf In thp U.S., there W()r(3 doubt.~ about Saudi 
intentions. For that reason, King Faisal had t.ecn giving intRrvi(>ws and making 
public statement." desi~ned to eliminatR any mi.~trust. that might ari~. lie was 
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interviewed on September 1, )973, by the Washington Post. the Christian Science 
Monitor, Newsweek. and NRC Telrwision. llis message was that "W(' have no wish 
to r(~strict our oil exports to the United States in any way, but America's completR 
support of Israel and stance against the Arabs make it extremely difficult for u.~ to 
c'ontinue to supply the Uillted States with oil, or even to remain friendc;; with the 
United StateS",I4{l The King himself met with Aramco executives and American oil 
men and told them that the United States should do something to change the 
direction of events taking place in the Middle East. The King told the oil men 
"Time is running out with respect to U.s. interests in Middle Ea"t, Saudi Arabia is 
in danger of being ic;;olated among its Arab friend~, because of the failure of the 
U.S. government to give Saudi Arabia positive SUpport". 141 "You will lo.~ 
everything" the King went on further. 142 
A week later, the Aramco executives were in Washington, at the White House and 
the Defense and State Departments. They requested urgent action. l43 Three of the 
companies - Texaco, Chevron and Mobil - all publicly asked for a balanced policy in 
the Middle East,'44 Even though, there were special and long-term ties with the 
United States, Saudi Arabia became dismayed by the American policy in the 
Middle East and seriously considered the imposition of restraints on its oil 
production. 145 Apparently, Saum Arabia wanted to use oil as a weapon in the 
summer of 1973, to bring pressure on the Unit.ed States to temper its policy in the 
Middle East. l46 
The precemng sprmg, there had been some worry in Washington about the 
possibility of warfare. 147 In late September, the National Security Agency reported 
that military signals suggested that war might be imminent in the Middle East. l4!) 
The Soviets suddenly airlifted dependants out of EgyJ)t and Syria. '49 On October 6, 
1973, the Arab-Israeli war began when Syrian aircraft launched an attack on 
lsrael's northern border and Egyptian guns opened fire along the entire front. 1 f,e' 
The war was the most intcnHe of the Arab-Israeli wars. Arms and equipment on 
both side~~ had been supplied by the superpowers. 151 On~ of the most powprful 
weapons was unique to the Middle East. I t was the oil weapon. In the words of 
the U,S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, this weapon "Altered irr~vocably the 
world as it had grown up in the po~1,-war period". lfi2 Thp Israpli'\ viewed Saudi oil 
power as potentially a greater thrnat than the combined capability of all the Arab 
armed forres. 153 
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The Soviet Union began long-range redelivery of arms to Syria and Egypt.. 1M Th(> 
United States reali~d that the Israeli troops w(~re in trouble and Israel eould lo.~ 
the war without resupply.l55 On October 19, 197:1, P ·d t "'.. k d res) en 1\ Ixon as e 
Congress to supply Israel with $2.2 bi}]jon in miLtary assistancc. l56 
King Faisal was unwilling to take any action against the United States without 
greater contact with Washington. For this reason, he sent a letter to Nixon on 
October 16, warning that if American support for Israel continued, Saudi-American 
relations would become only lukewarm. 157 On October 17, four Arab Foreign 
Ministers led by the Saudi, Omar Saggaf, met Kissinger and Nixon. l58 Nixon had 
promised to try hard for a workable cease-fire within the structure of resolution 
242, the United Nation." resolution that would return Israel to its 1967 borders. 169 
After the meeting, Kissinger told his staff that he was surpri~d that then' had 
been no reference to the oil, and that it was unlikely that Arabs would use their oil 
weapon. loo But in response to Nixon's proposal of a $2.2 billion milit.ary aid 
package to Israel, Radio Riyadh announced on October 18, 1973, that King Faisal's 
decision to reduce oil production by 10 per cent. 161 The King later imposed a t.otal 
embargo on the U.S. and reduced oil production by 26 per cent. !h~ On October 20, 
Saudi Arabia cut off all shipments of oil to the United States until the Arab 
objectives were met. 163 The 1973 October war sparked a new development in the oil 
market. For the first time, oil was used as a political weapon. This embargo was 
an eoonomic weapon used by the Arab oil producing states, to use oil against 
Israel. 
The potentially dramatic effect of the oil embargo can be seen by the foUowing 
statistics. In the fall, of 1973, the Arab oountries were producing 19.1 miUion 
barrels of oil a day.I64 The United States consumed 17.2 million barrel", a day, of 
which 1.8 million barrels a day or more than 10 per eRnt of iL", total rollsumption 
was imported from the Arab countries. 15-,) In Europe and ~Japan the situation was 
diITerellt. Western Europe received 65 per cent of its oil from Arab eountrips: 
Japan received 50 per cent of its oil needs from Arab countries. 166 
On October 22, 1973, a U.N. resolution called for a cea~-fi~ that was aoc(lpt.abl(> 
to alJ parties.1f>7 IIowever, Israel continued to attac:k thf' I'~gyptjan Thircl Army. 
which was i~lated in the Sinai. The Soviet Union would not allow thp Third Army 
1:.!9 
to be dnstroy(~d. HiS The Soviet Union asked for joint American - Sovipt action to 
separate the two sides.1f)~ The Soviet Cnion deman(wd American eo-op('ration and 
stated that the Soviet Union would not intervem~ unilaterally.J7O The Sovipt's 
threatened involvement wa", taken very seriously by thp Americans. 171 I twas 
known to the United States that Soviet forces were on the alert. On October 25 
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American military forces were put on a hjgher state of aJert.172 The Soviet Lnion 
and the United States were squaring ofT against each other. In Miscalculations 
could lead to a nuclear oonfrontation. 174 But the following day, the war was 
stopped and the representatives of both sides, the Egyptian and Israeli military, 
met for direct talks for the fIrst time in a quarter of a century!75 The victory of 
Egyptian and Syrian forces did much to remove the memory of the Arab's 1967 
defeat. 
While Secretary of State, Kissinger, was arranging an agreement between Egypt 
and Israel, he stopped in Riyadh on November 8, 1973, to meet with King Faisal. 17f'> 
Ki&"inger called on Faisal to remove the embargo, but King Faisal refused until he 
saw the beginning of actual Israeli withdrawal from the occupied Arab territories 
and that the national rights of the PaJestinians were restored,177 
On December 25, 1973, the Arab produ~rs cancelled the scheduled 5 per cent 
reduction for January and pledged a 10 per cent increase in production. 178 The day 
before, the Gulf produrers, including Iran, increased the oil price to $11.65 per 
barrel ~1,arting on ,January I, 1974. 179 
On tJalluary 7, 1974, Egypt and Israel signed an agreement mediated by Kic.;singer, 
that Israel wouJd withdraw from territories occupied in 1967, and started an 
approach to peace.1~ The Syrian - Israeli agreement was completed in May, after 
Kissinger had mediated a settlement of introductory issues between both sides on 
February 27, 1971"~i The Arab produ~rs official1y announced at a meeting in 
Vienna on March 1 R, that the oil embargo had been lifted. 182 
In fact, the internationaJ energy situation started to change quickly in the party 
19708. The combination of the Arab-Israeli wars in 1967, and especially. in 197:~, 
had a historical f'(Teet on the Saudi relationship with t.hf' United Stau~s. ISo, For 
practically the first time, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia found thf'mS('lves on °PPOSI(.(l 
sides of a major int~rnational CriSi8.1~.1 For thp U.s., th(' pmprg(,O('.(l of Saudi Arabia 
as ') m a . ( . J .] 97') . d . 
• ( . J Jr 01 power In • t>, mcrca"ie the Importance of pursuing a sJX'ciaJ 
relationship.I8.Ii After thp Octoher 1 ~)73 war and the oil embargo, llw L .S. ~i;JrtRd 
to consider Saudi Arabia's crueiaJ role in the Middlp Ec.l'-;t. I~f; The design of thf' 
U.S.-Saudi Economic (Joint Commi"sion in 1974, was expressive in it~lf (~ 
chapter 2). The Economic (Joint Commission sought to perform set goal" that werf' 
in the interest of both countries rather than the more classieal agreement of 
preVIOUS years when the U.S. had seen those who ac~pted its technoloh'Y as 
clients. 187 
The Saudis also desired a special relationship, to alleviate their concern over their 
security. The two biggest externaJ threats were communism and Zioni~m.1S8 
Communism was observed as an ideology that threatened the Muslim worlel and 
Zioni~"IIl a" a threat in the mid"t of the Arab world. l89 The Saudjs believed that thf' 
U.S. was the only country that could contain Soviet-supported and inspired radical 
expansionism; and could force J srae] into peace settlement.l~j() 
Post-oil embargo relations 
1974 - 1975 
The October war forced the United States to confront a new reality in the Middl(l 
Ea';t. Saudi Arabia felt that the United States was working for the Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied land and Saudi Arabia returned to its pre-1973 
production of 7,334 million barrels a day, promi"ing to meet America's oil n(.)('(L,-;.1:11 
The Saudi-American relation.",hip after the oil embargo transformed itself greatly, 
both in character and in the warmth of their relations. The earlier relationship 
gave way to a more complex relationship of interdependence, and involved shared 
as well as diverse interests between them. There was, therefore, a potential for 
antagoni",t hargaining a,; weB as agreement, antagoni~m a" well as co-operation. U''': 
The United States wanted Saudi co-operation with the supply of oil and the 
recycling of petrodollars. 193 The Saudis also turned t.o the L'nited States for 
continuing assistcmce on S(~curity and the dpv(llopment of the country. U4 
On April 5, 1974, a few days after the lifting of thp oil (lmbargo, both govprllmpnts 
held t.alks t.o enlargp pconomie and military rplations. u¥.' On April ] 1, Pnnc,.(' 
Abdullah Ibn AbduJaziz, Presi(i<'nt of the National (~uard. ami U.s. Amhas..~ador, 
131 
James Akins, signed an introductory agreement on a projf>Ct to modprni~ the 
National Guard, at a cost of S:laf> miliion.IIt" The American Defensc\ I)()partmcnt 
mission was in Saudi Arabia from April until fJune 1971, to study Saudi defpnCf' 
need" in order to make recommendations. U7 
Before President Nixon was scheduled to visit Saudi Arabia, Saudi Deputy Prim(> 
Minister and Minister of Interior, F'ahd Ibn Abdulaziz, (the prcS<'nt King) visited 
Washington on fJune 6, and on June 8, signed a wide-ranging agreement for 
American-Saudi military and eoonomic co-operation. l98 The accord provided for the 
establishment of the Joint Economic ('A}-operation Commission and Joint Security 
Co-operation Commission. l99 Ac;; part of the initiative, the United States gold 
various squadrons of F-5E and F-5F jet fighters in a $756 million package deal to 
Saudi Arabia, in exchange for Saudi co-operation in meeting the energy n(>(>cis of 
the United States and its Western alli(~s.~ The agreement was signed from 
America by Secretary of State Kissinger and he de~ribed the agreement as "A 
milestone in U.S. relations with Saudi Arabia and Arab countries in general". :''01 
On June 14, and 15, 1974, President Nixon visited Saudi Arabia and said to King 
Faisal that "Our friendship now develops into an active partnership".:2O:; As part of 
this new partnership programme, the president promi~d to sell weapons to Saudi 
Arabia. The Prosident said, "If Saudi Arabia is strong and secure ... it will enhance 
the chances for peaoo".203 
The soaring price of oil remained a source of conflict between Saudi Arabia and the 
United StateS.204 Saudi Arabia, who had initiated the oil embargo, now pres~d 
other OPEC members to lower their oil prires.!)J6 King Faisal decided on 
September 9, 1971, to reduce oil prires.2(~ But the decision was oppo~d by some 
Arab oil produeers and Iran. President Ford stated on September 2:1, 1974, that 
"Continued high oil prires involved the risk of a world depres.."ion and breakdown of 
world order and safety".ID7 Secretary of State, Kissinger, stated that th(> Lniu:'d 
Staws might hn forced to change its policies of assisting the prorlU(~rs div('rsify 
their eeonomies and channp) their rp~urces.all He al~ stated that thf'Y oould not 
rul(> out completely the use of military forre agaiIl."t oil producing countrips if fared 
with "Some' aetual strangulation of the indust.rializpd world".~~"· 
King FaisaJ was interviewed by !\ewsweek's Arnand de Borchgrav(' in S<->pfRmtK>r 
1974: "We do not want to do anything that will hurt Americans. Rut if our nf'W 
special relationship is to remain viable, the U.S. must not do anything that will 
hurt the Arab World" .210 King Faisal told Kissinger in Riyadh, t.hat Saudi Arabia 
would oontinue the effort to push down the prlce of oil in C-C)ll(:ert with other 
petroleum exporting nations. King PaisaJ was worried that a world-wide 
depression might hurt American and Western economies, and which would 
improve the relative position of the largely oil ~If-sufficient communist nations. 
The Soviet Union welcomed the oil price increase.211 On December 1 a, 1971, 
following Saudi Arabia's initiative, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirate joined 
Saudi's effort and OPEC reduced the oil price to $10.12 per barrel for the next nine 
months, though, this was les.~ than the reduction oought by the United States. 21 :! 
King Faisal even wrote a personal letter to the Shah of Iran to join Saudi Arabia in 
lowering oil prices, but the Shah refu.~d.213 
Thus, the United States signed a $750 million contract with Saudi Arabia for the 
sale of 60F - 5EIF fighters. 214 On February 9, 1975, Vinnell Corporation of Los 
Angeles, made a eontrad worth about $77 million that would employ 1,000 
Vietnam War Veterans to train Saudi National Guard F'oTC-eS.;!15 In the sam(' year, 
the United States concluded with Saudi Arabia military agreement.'> estimated at 
$1,993 million, more than with any other country except Iran. ::1<; 
Saudi and U.S. interests recogni~d their mutual desire for a peace sett]pment.:!17 
U.S. Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, in a spirit of friend~hip, kept the Saudis 
informed of the U.s. diplomatic contacts with Tel Aviv, Cairo and Damascus.218 
King FaisaJ set out to build a strong Arab opinion for peace. I Ie believed that by 
agreeing with the Arabs, the front line states would enter a peace ~ttlemf'nt and 
obtain recognition of Palestinian righL~.219 Ki~ger had visited King Faisal on 
February 15, 1975, t.o di~uss a second Egyptian- Israeli disengagement agrecm('nt. 
'rhis was to be his last meeting with King FaisaJ before the king was as.~ssinawd 
in March 1975?.}1 
u.s. -Saudi relations, 1975-1979 
A~r King Faisa1 was af.\sassinatcd, King Khalid was pn:mouIla'o Kin~ and Fahel 
(thn pn:'HPnt King) was llronouneeo Crown Prince. King Khalid (k'legatRd mueh of 
his authority to Crown PrincR Fahd, the acting Prime !\1inistcr. but thp final 
authority remained in the hand~ of thp. King. Prin~ Fahd lik(> King Fai.~l fi'lt 
confident to pursue a ~l)eciaJ N'lationship with the UnitRd StateS.!!:1 Oil supply 
and the Saudi involvement in the Arab-Israeli negotiation.~, hecame significant 
concerns of Prince Fabd's government after the death of King Fai~l. 
With American help, the Saudis built up their defence capabilities through the 
construction of extensive military infrastructures, (which the United States u.c;ed in 
1990 during the Gulf crisis), the importation of weapons and the training of Saudi 
peroonnel. In 1976, the United States Army Corps of Engineers wa~ contracted to 
plan and design military construction projects valued at about $20 billion. U.S. 
technology had assisted in making the Saudi industrial revolution possible. Saudi 
Arabia's trade with the U.s. grew from $2.6 billion in ]971 to $8.6 billion in 1976, 
to $10.2 billion in 1978. 
Replacing the past client relationship, new roles and responsibilities were a~sumed 
by the Kingdom as a consequence of the transformation of its financial and 
strategic position. A situation fujI of possibilities for both antagonism and 
eo-operation was generated.222 The Saudis in the earJy 1970s, had stayed 
com paratively aloof from the Arab- Israeli contlict. The October 1973 war brough t 
the Saudis directly into the arena as they took the lead in the oil embargo. After 
that, the Saudis remained on the sidelines of Kissinger's "shuttle diplomacy". Thp 
Saudi aim was to sustain the peace process initiated by the United StateS.223 
During the early months of the Carter admini5tration, the Saudis were con.~uJted 
and informed of the policy of working for a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace.224 
Crown Priore Fahd visited the United States in late May 1977. He discussed two 
major issues with Pl'P~~ident Carter: the supply of oil to the West and its pri(X', and 
American pohcy towarcl" a settlement of the Arab-Israeli ronflict. 225 
A serious setback to Prinre Fabel's policy occurred when Sadat declared h(' would 
visit ~JerusaJem to dipcuss Middle Bast peace with Isranli Prime MinistRr, 
Menachem Begin. The Amerieans requested that the Saudi~ support Sadat's J)('(lC(' 
initiativ(l.~ The Crown Prince dissociated himself from Sadat's pea<Xl initialivp 
and I'Ptim:pci the profile of Saudi relations with Lh(l United States. The Saudis saw 
a S(lparat.e J){'aC(l with Egypt as a ploy by Isra(ll to split t.h(l Arab world (U)(I to dflny 
to the Arabs Egyptian milit.ary support, potentially the only significant milItary 
thrpat to ISrc:wl.:.!::!7 
However, they feared that under L.S. pressure and faced with Israel, Sadat would 
settle merely for the return of the Sinai. In the meantime American-Saudi 
relations worsened again and the Saudi order to buy sixty F-J5 jet fighters was 
delayed.228 Up to that time, the Carter administration had been committed to 
decreasing arms sales to non-allies, but Congress fmally approved the sale in May 
1978, in order to get political credit with Saudi Arabia.2'29 
The Camp David Accords, signed on September, 17, 1978, confirmed the Saudi's 
worst fears.230 Two unrelated agreements appeared: one dealt in detail with the 
Sinai. The other one dealt in generalities with the Palestinian question concpming 
a vaguely defined "autonomy" for the residents of the West Bank and Gaza, not 
Israeli withdrawal from the ~upied territories.~·)1 
It wa,-; commonly known that the Saudis expressed their disappointment in private 
and that they were caught between their friencl"hip with Washington and their 
Arab commitmentA'" BefoI"(> the Arab summit meeting scheduled for Baghdad in 
November 1978, which was to discuss Camp David, the Americans eXJJressed their 
desire to the Saudi" that the Saudis prevent a denunciation of Sadat or the 
aocord". The~ matters were sure to be raised at the meeting.2.12 The Carter 
admini~tration wanted Riyadh to support Camp David and tl.,*, its influence to 
bring Jordan and the Palestinians into the peace process.2S3 In fact, Dr Ghazi 
AJgosaibi ha" confirmed that at this stage the Americans were very insistent that 
Saudi Arabia would accept the Camp David results, which wac;; an initial step 
toward" gaining a favourable response from the rest of the Arab states. For 
instance, on September 22-24, 1978, Secretary of State, Vanre, vi",ited Riyadh to 
~'('k Saudi support for the agreements.234 
American officials werP angry at the Saudis, when the ronsequenC<'s of the 
Baghdad summit became known.~ The Baghdad summit condemned thf' acoords 
and it.s architects, Prpsidents Carter and Sc)(jaL~lf In their defenre, thp Saudis 
argued that the resulL" of thp Baghdad summit would havp been much WOf"S(' 
without SCludi innuen(~ and t.hey rould moderate but not oppo.'-;(\ thp Arah 
("onciemnation of t.he Camp David Acoords.237 
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u.s. -Saudi relations went through a rough period between the Baghdad summit 
in November 1978, and the conclusion of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement in 
March 1979. This happened at the same time as the departure of the Shah from 
Iran on ~January 2:1, ]979, and the finaJ collapse of his regime in February.:'::"" The 
Saudis believed that the United States would give help to the Shah. But President 
Carter shattered the~ hopes when he publicly stated his view that it might be too 
late for the Shah's regime. He then denied any American intention to interfere in 
the c'Ountry's politics.239 As the Saudis watched the United States do little to rescue 
the Shah, doubts were raised in Saudi minds about the value of their American 
connection. 240 In an effort to improve relations during this rough period, the United 
States invited Crown Prince Fahd to Washington.24I The timing of t.he visit 
coincided with the signing of the Egypt-Israel peace agreement on March 26, 1979, 
but Prin~ Fahd changed his mind about the visit, not wanting it to seem as an 
expression support for the agreement.242 Thus, the U.S. - Saudi "special 
relationship" was in confu."ion. 
The Camp David agreements were seen by the Saudis a" not taking into account 
Saudi fundamental interests in the status of tJerusalem. Becau.'1C of its status as a 
Guardian of Islam, the Saudi government could not afford to be seen by Arabs and 
Muslims to abandon the objective of restoring the third holiest shrine in Islam to 
Arab sovereignty. The Saudiq contended that the Camp David framework was 
insufficiently, specific with respect t.o such basic Arab positions as the complete 
Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories, the status of Jerusalem, and 
Pale.qtinian self-determination. 
Saudi Arabia was also alarmed by developments further afield. AflRr the Soviet 
Union's invasion of Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia was very conrerned with the 
communist threat to the Middle East. The collapse of the Shah's regime in 1979, 
jncrea.~d the importance of UB.- Saudi political relations as it conCX'rIlpd Saudi 
~~urity. When the Shah's regime appeared to be losing control, on ~January 10, 
1979, t.he U.S. announecd that it wouJd send F-15s to visit to Saudi Arabia. 243 The 
Saudis were looking for u.s. help and RO they co-operated with the Americans on 
the sub~d. of oil supply.:M4 AI;, Iranian oil production dpcl'{lased. bec(lU~ of t.he 
<lestabilisation caused by th(' revolution, the Saudis increa~d their productIOn 
from 7.2 mbd in August, ] 97!), to ] 0.3 mbd ill November and to ] 0.1 mbd In 
December. 24f, 
Saudi-American relations during this period, indicate di,;pleasure with each other's 
policies and yet it wa,; a time when co-operation was needed more than at any 
other time. President Carter announced on January 26, that Crown Prince Fabd 
would visit the United States on March l. On February 10, Harold Brown, 
Defense Secretary of the U.S. came to Saudi Arabia to introduce American plans 
for security co-operation including American's creation of the Rapid Deployment 
Force and Fabd's arranged vi'iit to Washington (see Chapter 3). The visit coincided 
with Khomeinj's return to Iran. But Fabd's visit to Washington was postponed to 
give the two countries more time to make an inclusive study of the i&~ues 
surrounding mutual co-operation. On March 5, 1979, President Carter allowed the 
sale of F-15s, this time armed and equipped, and two Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS) to help monitor and defend Saudi airspace, especially in 
the area near the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (pDRy) because of its 
strong ties with the Soviet Union.246 The American moves were sought to influence 
thp Saudis by showing its readiness to protect their security_ 247 
The American moves were not only to show willingness to help the Saudis to 
protect their security, but also to get credit with the Saudi", so that they would 
support the Egyptian-Israeli peace?~ President Carter made a diplomatic shuttle 
between Egypt and lsrael to reach an agreement on terms of a peace treaty.~· On 
March 17 and ] 8, 1979, National Security adviser, Zhigniew Brzezinski, visited 
Riyadh to obtain the Saudi's support for the treaty or at least to test Saudi and 
Arab reactions. 2FA1 The Saudis expre~~d to Brzezinski that they would not support 
damaging sanctions against. Egypt if it signed the peace treaty with 1 srael.25 I The 
New York Times commented that the United States and Saudi Arabia had agreed 
to keep their sharp differences over the Egyptian-Israeli peare treaty from 
interu'ring with their c1o.'ie l'(llations in other field". 
In fJuly H)79, after the Saudi decision to increase oil production, the Carter 
administration increased indirect oommunications with the (11) with a v1PW to 
getting agreement on a formula to amend resolution 212 and thf'n open thp road 
for the PI"() to take part in thp peac:.e proc:~ess_~2 In thp pn'vious fJune, Crown 
Prince Fahd had urged the United SUites to begin an immNliate discussion with 
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the PLO. That diseussion could guide the 1'1..0 to accept resolution 212, formalJy 
admit bTacl's right to mast, and then OJXln the track to peace talks on a Lroack>r 
basis than that provided Ly thp Camp David agroempnts.:!:';) PrinCf> [·'ahd added 
that, if Israel withdrew from the occupied lands and returned to it", pre-1967 
border, Saudi AraLia itself would be prepared to make peace with it/>4 But the 
American initiative was defeated by the combined Arab opposition and from the 
PU) itself. The spokesman of the Palestinian Central CA)uIlcil refu.'-'Cd to acc-cpt 
any U.N. resolution that did not recognise the Palestinians' right to an 
independent state.255 
In an interview published in the Wa'lhington Post on May 27, 1980, Crown Prince 
Fahd declared that: 
We are trying t.o portray Saudi Arabia as a supporter of the 
negotiations of the current peace process or as if it were prepared to 
propose lts own di<.;gui<.;ed initiatives in thL';; matter. What is cert.ain i..", 
that the attitude of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to the Middle E~t 
problem and the issue of Palestine is firm, clear and known. It derives 
from the Arab's unanimous attitude that the issue of Palestine L<'; the core 
of the Middle East problem, and that a just and comprehensive solution 
can not be achieved unless Israel withdraws from all the Arab territories 
occupied in 19()7, including, first and foremost, Holy Jerusalem, to the 
Palestinian people's legitimate right to return and to self-determination, 
including the sett.ing up of an independent state of their territory. I n all 
this, Saudi Arabia pursues a unanimous Arab attit.ude, to which it I~ 
committed and which it supports. 
The slgIllng of the Camp David agreements made the U.s. place a massIve 
premium on Saudi support.<!f,.c The Saudis could not expect to preserve their lines 
of communication to both Egypt and Syria, as they had when Sadat made his 
connection with Sinai 11.2[,7 What worried the Saudi.~ most was that the Syrians 
and the Palestinians, left only with a military option for recovering Israeli-occupied 
territories, would become increasingly dependent on the Soviet Union.258 In 
addition, they could not show indifJerenCR to the Palestinian cause without being 
a~u.~}d of co1lahorating with Israel's allies.259 Furthennore, the troubles of the 
Shah's regime and the un~ttled conditions in the Yemens made the American 
strategic connection more necessary.~,o 
u.s. -Saudi relations in the 19808 
Wh('n the war start(\d bptween I raq and I ran in 1980, Saudi AraLia N'a'ivpd an 
American military pN's('oee. To this degree. Americans and Saudi rplatlons 
appeared to be cordial, despite their differences on the Egypt-Israeli peace tn'aty. 
'rhe American mili Lary supplies made Saudi Arabia a powflrful balanep to Iraq anci 
Iran in regional defence matters. The Soviet invasion of Afghani.~tan in f)eceml-wr 
1979, and the Soviet ties with South Yemen (PDl{y) provided threats to both 
American and Saudi interests. These factors made strategic cD-operation between 
the two countries most important. 
Relating to the events in the MidcUe Eagt, the Saudis felt that it was vital to the 
United States and Saudi Arabia to co-operate on mutual political and economic 
interests as well as security interests. While Saudi Arabia looked to the United 
States for assistance in performing its domestic and foreign policy goals, the Saudi 
leadership felt that the United States had not been forceful enough with Israel to 
promote a resolution of the conflict. Therefore, Crown Prince Fahd began 
indicating, on August 7, 1981, how the co-operation should be consummated by 
announcing an eight-part plan for a Bettlement of the Arab-Israeli problem. (sec 
Arab-Israeli conflict until the 1990 Gulf crisis) 
Prince Fahd stated that the plan wa" negotiable and was an alternative to the 
Camp David accords, which had reached a dead end. ~~' On October 5, 1981, in an 
interview on Saudi radio, Prince Fahd stated that Saudi Arabia took his plan to be 
an Arab proposal based on U.N. resolution.~ and that thp United States had 
responded favourably to the plan. He also stateci that Saudi Arabia relied on 
American support to make the plan successful?;::! 
The most controversial item was number seven, "affll'lDation of all states in the 
region to live in peac,e". which recognised the reality of Israel's existence. Isrewl 
and its supporters que_~tioned why the Saudis refused to consider the recognition 
question explicitly. The Prime Minister of Israel denounred it as an attempt "to 
liquidate Israel in stages" and castigated the U.S. for its cautious interest in the 
Fahd plan. In a letter to President Reagan on October 30, Begin condemned the 
whole Fahd plan and warned that any U.s. expressions of interest in it would be 
seen by the Arabs as a weak{'ning of U.s, support for the Camp David agreem(lnt..~, 
making it harder for Israel and Egypt to agree on Palestiman autonomy?;'; 
'rho U.S. was (~ught in thp middlp. Thp Saudis had clearly lost hope that lh(' 
Am(>ricans would put enough pressure 011 Israel for it to make lh(' n('c('~'Sary 
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conecssiom~ for a ~;ettlement and had thu.o;.; decided to ~pk a peaC(' initiative on 
their own. Although, Washington remained eommitted to the> Camp David 
Agreements, they did not want to discourage the Saudis completely. On OctolK>r 
29, 1981, President Reagan stated that the most significant point of the plan was 
the implicit Saudi recognition of the existence of "Israe>l a~ a nation to be 
negotiated with".264 The same day, Secretary of State, Alexander Haig. remarked 
that there were some points of the plan which the U.S. found encouraging. On 
October 80, 1981, the State Department reflected the mixed feelings of the U.S. 
expressing that while it welcomed some aspect of the Fabd plan, "certain other 
points in the plan were better left to negotiations".~ 
Difficulties in the political relations between the U.s. and Saudi Arabia were 
exacerbated by Israel's invasion of Lebanon in June 6, 1982. The Lebanese crisis 
occupied Middle East security and political life, so that little consideration could be 
given to the final settlemf~nt of the conflict. 2fj6 Israel invaded Lebanon wjth the 
purpose of excluding the PLO as a political force, to install a friendly regime in 
Beirut and to smash Saudi Arabia's peace proposals of 1981 which wac;; supported 
partly by the U.S. 
Israel's invasion of Lebanon did have the effect of persuading the U.s. for the first 
time, to be more specific in its attitude to an overall Arab-Israeli settlement. On 
September 1, 1982, President Reagan stated that the UB. had always sought to 
play the role of a mediator. He said "That ffime clearer sense of America's position 
on key issues is necessary to encourage wider support for the peace process". 
Reagan reasserted U.S. support for the five-year transition period outlined in the 
Camp David accordc;;, "during whjeh the Palestinian inhabitanL" of the West Bank 
and Gaza will have full autonomy over their own affairs". ALo;;o, he said, "The U.S. 
will not support the use of any additional land for the purpose of settlements 
during the transitional period. Indeed, the immediate adoption of a settlement 
freeze by Israel, more than any other action, could create the confidencR nN'lied for 
wider participation in those talks". ~7 
President H.eagan said that the U.s. would support neither the Israeli ann('xation 
nor the permanent control of the West Bank and Gaza nor a Palestinian state. 
"But it is the' firm vlew of the U.S. that self-govenlment hy the Pale~1,inians of the 
West Bank and Caza in association with ~Jordan offi'rs thC' h('st ehanc(\ for a 
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durable, just and lasting peace". President Reagan also called for an undivided 
Jerusalem, the governance of which should be determined by negotiation. The 
Reagan plan was immediately rejected by Israeli Prime Minister, Begin, and was 
then rejected by the Knesset on September 8, 1982.~ 
Saudi Arabia had long been involved diplomatically in Lebanon. Saudi 
involvement in Lebanon brought Riyadh into conflict with all the parties involved 
in the peace process. Saudi anger with the PLO, the Lebanese, and the Syrians, 
however, did not neutralize its frustration with the United States. Frustrations 
increased when Israeli Prime Minister, Shamir, visited the U.S. in December 1983. 
U.S. policy changed from an effort to playa mediator's role to one of oonfrontation 
with Syria and closer support for Israel. Thus, the Saudis made their declaration 
to tum to the French for a $4.5 billion purchase of air defence missiles, which was 
announced in January 1984. This was, at least in part, a message to the U.S. to 
change its policy towards Israel. 269 
While the Fez proposal (the Fahd plan) and the Reagan plan remained on the 
table, King Fahd urged President Reagan to make a new effort to bring peare to 
the Middle East by exerting pressure on Israel to oompromise over the Palestinian 
issue. Saudi Arabia hoped that President Reagan's re-election date might give his 
administration more leverage. So, Saudi Arabia pressed for American reoognition 
of Palestinian demands for self-determination. 270 
Therefore, King Fahd scheduled a visit to Washington to test the willingness of 
President Reagan to become more deeply involved in the drive for peare in the 
Middle East. Preparing for the visit, King Fahd met Yasser Arafat, and sent 
senior envoys to Syria, Jordan and other key Arab countries. 271 
King Fahd arrived in the U.S. on February 10, 1985. He told President Reagan 
upon his arrival at the White House that the Palestinian question was the single 
problem of paramount concern to the whole Arab nation and that it affected the 
relations of its people and states with the outside world. 272 
President Reagan responded to the King's concern by indicating that the U.S. 
would not push for a specific peace formula - even his own . before the Israelis and 
Arabs had entered direct negotiations based on the U.N. resolution 242, which 
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called for Arab recognition of Israel sovereignty in exchange for Israeli withdrawal 
from occupied Arab territories.273 
In the final days of the Reagan presidency, Secretary of State, George Shultz tried 
but failed to get a two-stage negotiation going, based on interim self-rule for the 
Palestinians and an end to Israeli military occupation. President Bush appointed 
James Baker to succeed Shultz as Secretary of State. Baker attempted to clarify 
matters and started a U.S.-PLO dialogue, but the peace process was broken ofT 
many times. Israel's government was at odds with itself regarding who should 
make up the Palestinian delegation. The Palestinians themselves were split by a 
nationalist struggle. However, the peace process was totally broken off as a 
consequence of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait and the PLO 's ambivalent position on 
the invasion.274 (see Chapter Five). 
The primary Saudi political need from the U.S. was to effect a final settlement of 
the Arab-Israeli problem. Realistically, at that time, Saudi Arabia did not have 
much hope that the U.S. had the will to oompel Israel into a just peace. It could be 
expected to accept whatever the parties agreed upon.276 In the words of Prince 
Saud AI-Faisal, the Saudi Foreign Minister, the Saudi position, "Is based on the 
right of the Palestinians themselves to determine whether they want an 
independent state or an entity with links to another country, or another 
solution" .276 
William B. Quandt, the fonner National Security Council official in charge of the 
Middle East, stated "The Saudis very much want to be out of the position of being 
under pressure from the Arabs to use oil as a political weapon and under pressure 
from us not to do so. The only way out, as they see it, is for the Palestinian issue to 
be on its way to a resolution, even though they seem to be fairly realistic about how 
long that may take. What they can not tolerate over any long period of time is the 
impression that the U.S. has given up entirely on this issue. So some degree of 
credible movement toward a solution of that issue is important to them, at least as 
they see regional politics today". 277 
Saudi Arabia opposed the Camp David areords on the grounds that they made no 
proviso either for Palestinian sovereignty on the West Bank and Gaza, or for the 
creation of a peace settlement that would support Jordanian, Syrian and Lebanese 
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stability. Saudi Arabia has consistently pursued iUJ own peace strategy ever since. 
I t took a leading role in trying to bring peace to Lebanon after the Israeli inva"ion 
of June 1982, and operated closely with the U.S. when it was trying to reach a joint 
arrangement with Israel and Syria. It supported the agreement that the U.S. 
worked out between Israel and Lebanon in the Spring of 1983.278 
Saudi Arabia supported President Reagan's peace proposal in September 1982. It 
supported the call for peace negotiations at the subsequent Arab summit meeting 
at Fez. However, Saudi Arabia disagreed with some aspects of the u.S. policy 
towards a peace settlement with Israel. Saudi Arabia could not formally oonnect 
itself to King Hussein's new peace initiative in 1985, because of the risk of 
triggering new radical pressure from Syria and from radical Palestinian elements 
in the Gulf. 279 
More generally, Saudi Arabia supported U.N. resolutions that recognised Israel's 
right to exist and the need for Arab peace negotiations with Israel. However, its 
objections to U.N. resolution 242 was that it treated the Palestinians exclusively as 
a "refugee problem" and not with its call for peace for all nations in the region.280 
Aside from that security oontacUJ between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were 
accelerated in 1981. The United States and Saudi Arabia consulted each other 
over other security matters, including the Afghan's war against the Soviet Union. 
Even though, the United Stated had had no direct involvement in the Gulf 
Co-operation Council (GCC), since its creation in 1981, it recommended Saudi 
Arabia and the other members to expand security oo-operation in response to the 
threats from the Iran-Iraq war, and Soviet presence in South Yemen. 
In 1981, when Saudi Arabia requested that the United States sell it arms 
including AWACS, the developing "special relationship" between Saudi Arabia and 
the United States was described in a report prepared for the House of 
Representatives Committee on Foreign Affairs as follows: 
The United States and Saudi Arabia have established a special 
relationship, which had its genesis in the major role of U.S. companies in 
the development of Saudi petroleum resources in the 1930s. More 
recently. the relationship has been fostered by government to government 
assistance and ro-operation. It has become apparent that officials in the 
governments of both countries consider that the preservation and 
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en~~ncement ?f this relationship could provide a basis for resolving 
politlcal, ~ecun~, eronomic, and energy issues facing the United States 
and ~audi ~abIa. From the U.S. perspective, decisions on the part of the 
Saudi ArabIan Government potentially affect the U.S. balance of 
payments, the future of the dollar, the U.S. and world energy equation. 
the rate of world economic recovery, U.S. interests in the Middle East and 
the Persian Gulf region, and the objective of an overall resolution of the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 281 
The deteriorating situation in the Gulf (caused by the Iran-Iraq war), made the 
Saudis conoorned that the fighting would increase and eventually involve them. 
The Saudis sought American assistance in establishing a Gulf arms industry from 
Secretary of Defence, Caspar Weinberger, who was visiting Saudi Arabia on 
February 5, 1982. This would help them develop the defence capabilities of the 
GCC. 
At a press conference, President Reagan commented "There is no way that we 
could stand by and see Saudi Arabia taken over by anyone that would shut ofT the 
oil". 282 The United States made it clear to both Iran and Iraq that they must keep 
their fighting out of the Gulf countries and that the open flow of oil from the Gulf is 
very important to the whole international community and U.S. commitment to 
freedom of commerce and navigation in the international waters of the Gulf. 
Subsequent press conferenoos and interviews with administration officials made 
evident the Reagan administration's commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia, a 
pledge that became known as the Reagan corollary, to the Carter doctrine.283 In 
the midst of the developments, King Khaled died (June 13, 1982) and Crown Price 
Fahd was declared King. 
In the meanwhile, the Iran-Iraq war began to intensify and there were strikes 
against the shipping of the Gulf Arab states. This development ~n began to have 
an impact on Kuwait and Saudi Arabia's shipping became the target of Iran's 
"retaliatory" attacks in May and July 1984. Iran asserted that Saudi Arabia was 
providing financial aid to Iraq.284 The United States responded to the spillover of 
the war into the Persian Gulf and supported a United Nations Security Council 
resolution (552) condemning Iranian attacks on ships on June 1,1984.286 
Saudi Arabia rejected the presence of any superpower in the Persian Gulf, thus, 
avoiding confrontations with its neighbors. However, Saudi Arabia asked America 
to maintain a strong presen~, over-the-horizon, in case of an emergency.286 As a 
144 
result, Riyadh made &>me requests to United States to purchase arms to expand 
its defence cap ab ilities. 287 
In July 1985, President Reagan's letter came, the President was against the sale 
because of pressure from Senior Republican members of the Senate, including the 
Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.288 They were worried that 
any major sale to an Arab state would lead to a major fight with every supporter of 
Israel. 289 
Thus, the Saudi government started negotiating for alternative arms suppliers in 
July 1985, when the Saudis were confident that they would never get full U.S. 
SUpport.290 It was believed that a Saudi shift to another arms supplier would 
reduce the U.S.' ability to use Saudi facilities both politically and militarily.291 
Britain and France were the two major recipients of Saudi contracts for arms. 
Saudi Arabia even sought supplies from further afield. The Saudi Ambassador to 
the U.S. visited Beijing and made a deal to purchase missiles in 1986.292 In July 
1987, Saudi Arabia bought missiles from the People's Republic of China (pRC). 
This was in response to the possible threat of Iranian attacks on Saudi Arabia 
becoming steadily more real and to a desire to assert Saudi independence and 
decrease dependence on a single supplier. 293 
The crisis in U.S. and Saudi military relations was accompanied by the e~alation 
of the Iran-Iraq war. 1986 was a critical year in the Gulf. As a result of the oil 
glut of the early and mid-1980s, Saudi oil revenues declined from 108 billion 
dollars in 1982 to 17.8 billion dollars in 1987. The Americans, at the same time, 
required high prices to defend their own oil industry. There then came the surprise 
Saudi-Iranian agreement on low production in August-September 1986, and the 
gradual rise to the eighteen-to-twenty dollar per barrel rate of 1987.294 It became 
essential for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states to end the war as soon as 
possible. 
The U.S. was less concerned to see the immediate ending of the Iran - Iraq war. Its 
main policy concern was with the Gee states. This policy represented the 
backbone of U.S. security interests in the Persian Gulf region. The Gee states 
were major oil producers, and their oil production legitimised their extended and 
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advantageous dealings with private American businesses, including defence, oil 
and construction firms. The Reagan administration decided to safeguard the flow 
of oil by reflagging Kuwaiti tankers. Later, Washington was shocked to know that 
the Kuwaitis had asked Russia for protection against Iranian attacks. Mosoow's 
involvement would have spread Soviet influence in the Gulf, something the 
Americans had prevented for more than four decades, and the British for no less 
that 165 years. That was part of the twin tracks of American policy. The second 
track was diplomatic. On June 30, 1987, the United States called on the United 
Nations to take action to force Iran and Iraq to agree to a cease-fire.296 On July 20, 
the U.N. Security Council issued resolution 598 demanding that Iran and Iraq 
observe an immediate cease-fire, di~ntinue all military actions on land, at sea 
and in the air, and withdraw all forces to the internationally recognised boundaries 
without delay. 296 
The Reagan administration decided to accelerate the military build-up in the 
region. On August 21, 1987, the United States established a new oommand - Joint 
Task Force Middle East (JTFME).297 The Reagan administration also worked to 
get international support for the lately gained American role in the Persian Gulf.:93 
Actually, all of the Gulf Arab states granted the United States temporary support. 
By the end of 1987, most Allied Ships (United Kingdom, Belgium, Italy, France 
and West Germany) operated in the GUlf.299 The capability to mobilise such 
international support could force Iraq and Iran to end the war.300 
Relations between the United States and Saudi Arabia deteriorated at the 
beginning of 1988, as a consequence of the U.S.' special relationship with Israel, 
(by allowing Israel's Prime Minister, Yitzhak Shamir, to attack arms sales to Saudi 
Arabia in a speech on September 24, 1987) and the American refusal to sell Saudi 
Arabia additional F-15s and other sophisticated weapons. 001 Washington. at the 
same time, was angry about Saudi Arabia's purchase of missiles from China 
without consulting the U.S. 
On another front, the presence of American ships in the Gulf led to a major 
confrontation with Iran. On July 3, 1988, the U.S. Navy cruiser Vincennes, 
engaged in an exchange with Iranian warships, mistakenly shot down an Iranian 
comme~ial airlin~ believing it was a war plan~ and killed 290 passengers.:m To 
the Iranian leadership, it was not a mistake, it was a sign that the United States 
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was preparing to engage with Iran In a military confrontation to destroy the 
regime in Tehran. 303 
Iran could no longer afford to go against the United States.304 Tehran informed 
the United Nation Security General on 18 July, of its willingness to a~pt a 
cease-fire. 005 Another four weeks and much negotiation passed before Iraq agreed. 
Later, President Hussein agreed to the cease-fire.306 Finally, a cease-fIre was 
declared on August 20, 1988.307 
Following the resolution of the Iran-Iraq war, the situation in the Gulfretumed to 
normal. Still, co-operation rather than confrontation continued to dominate 
U.S.-Saudi relations.OO8 Washington's quickly growing dependence on imported oil 
strengthened the U.S. policy of safeguarding the GUlf.309 Moreover, with urgent 
need for oil beginning to rise and prices temporarily increasing, it emerged that 
Saudi Arabia was starting to move out of the sharp recession which had begun in 
the mid-1980s. 
From the Saudi point of view, the problems of the Iran-Iraq war had been replaced 
by a more romp lex world in which possible threats to Saudi Arabia could rome 
from several directions. When the Arab Co-operation Council was formed in 
February 1989, between Iraq, Egypt, Jordan and North Yemen, Saudi Arabia was 
not pleased. King Fahd visited Egypt and Iraq and signed a "non-aggression pact" 
with Iraq. Relations between Tehran and Riyadh slowly improved and Iran was 
invited to attend an Islamic ronference. The Saudis wanted to protect all their 
flanks. Equally important, King Fahd continued rontacts with Washington and 
the West to obtain more sophisticated weapons.310 For instance, some French 
rompanies which were widely reported in Defence News in June 1990, were 
involved in rebuilding the Saudi navy involving certain types of missiles and in the 
same month, Saudi Arabia asked to pu~hase and upgrade major defence 
equipment to a total value exceeding $4 billion from the U.S. This request 
included orders for AWACS E_3s. 311 
Saudi Arabia decided to enhance its defence forces in the wake of the Iran-Iraq 
war. The Saudis were increasingly tending the ronnections with Beijing and 
Moscow, which had begun in 1990. The Saudis developed their network not onJy 
for their supply of arms but also their international ties as well. That has given 
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the Saudis a new independence of diplomatic initiatives and carries the message to 
Washington that Saudi political interests should not be ignored. However the 
United States and Saudi Arabia have had a 50 year-old security relationship. The 
United States has always continued to be the most supportive power of Saudi 
Arabia in the face of attacks as was shown during the 1990 Gulf crisis when Iraq 
invaded Kuwait. 
Summary 
To conclude this chapter, it is important to mention that the United States ~upies 
a crucial place in Saudi foreign policy. Certainly, the present Saudi government 
places a high premium on maintaining friendly relations with the United States as 
the ~urce of military equipment and advice and as the ultimate guarantor of the 
Saudi polity against external and internal opposition. On the other hand, the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia has appeared as the most important foreign source of 
American petroleum. The vast petroleum reserves in Saudi Arabia have made the 
United States more dependent upon continued Saudi independence and upon good 
relations between Saudi Arabia and the United States. 
This fact was reflected in President Reagan's declaration on October 1, 1981, that 
the United States would not permit Saudi Arabia to fall into the hand of any 
group, foreign or domestic, that would cut off the flow of Saudi oil to the West. In 
addition, the United States did not have many options in dealing with the complex 
mixture of strategic capabilities, and vulnerabilities in the Gulf. The Shah's fall 
had made Saudi Arabia the only major country with which the United States could 
build a strategic partnership in the Gulf area.812 There was no other Gulf state 
that could sustain a military relationship with the United States without the 
implicit support of Saudi Arabia.818 
The revolution in 1979, overthrew the Shah. This changed the strategic equation of 
the region. The real second pillar of U.S. strategy in the region was Israel, but 
Israel's political liabilities severely limited its usefulness in the Gulf. The Iranian 
revolution, coupled with crises such as the Soviet intervention in Mghanistan in 
December 1979, and the armed conflict between North and South Yemen, obliged 
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the United States to invent once again more costly strategies of direct U.S. military 
intervention. e.g. The Americans sought a base in the Gulf region. 
The Carter administration reacted to the Shah's fall and the Soviet invasion of 
Afghanistan by attempting to build up new U.S. power projection capabilities that 
could offset the Soviet advantages in the region.314 He sought to make a Rapid 
Deployment Foroo (RDF) that could deploy to the Gulf to prevent any Soviet 
aggression in the region.316 The Reagan administration thereafter focused more on 
formal military ties and direct military intervention capabilities. It is significant 
that the U.S. military that has shown more sensitivity to the fact that it must work 
informally with its regional allies (see chapter 3).316 
Although political and economic links between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia are 
important, the most important area in which the United States seeks to enhance 
its ties to Saudi Arabia is in the military area. However, stronger political and 
economic links will be equally important. Military relations are a crucial area for 
U.S. policy. They are an area on which the United States can base its relations 
with Saudi Arabia on its unique ability to supply goods and services. American 
commitment to Saudi security will strengthen their political ties with Saudi 
Arabia, which will advance U.S. interests. The Saudis have helped shift the Arab 
consensus from the "reductionism" of the 1970s to a search for a "Just settlement" 
which included the recognition of "the right of all states in the region to live in 
peace" (outlined in the 1981 King Fahd plan). Saudi Arabia worked to achieve 
Egypt's return to the Arab ranks while maintaining its ties with Israel. Saudi 
Arabia played an important part in encouraging the PLO to make statements 
recognising Israel's right to exist whilst areepting United Nations resolutions 242 
and 338. 
The Pentagon searched for airfield port, and support facilities to host a U.S. 
interventionary forces. Egypt, Oman, and Bahrain allowed U.S. air and naval 
foroos limited use of military facilities. Other bases were more distant. The key 
was Saudi Arabia itself. The Iran-Iraq war in the 19808 and Saudi Arabian fears 
of an expanded war, gave the United States leverage to extract more intimate 
Saudi collaboration with U.S. military plans. The centrepiece of this effort was the 
sale of five AWACS planes and a system of bases with stocks of fuel. parts, and 
munitions. Anthony Cordesman, a military analyst, has argued that "No 
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conceivable improvement in U.S. aircraft or USAF rapid deployment and 
bare-basing capability could come close to giving the U.S. this rapid and effective 
reinforcement capability". 317 An additional advantage was that Saudi Arabia paid 
for it all. 
The Saudi leadership considered that Saudi security presently needed the 
stabilization of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, even at the cost of Arab concessions. 
The connection between the stability in the Gulf region and the Arab-Israeli 
conflict remained as strong as ever. The U.S. continued to maintain the role of 
being the only mediator in the conflict who could apply pressure on the Israelis to 
make progress towards an overall settlement. What worried the Saudis most 
about the lack of progress in resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict was the possibility 
that the Soviets and other radical forces would be able to exploit the situation. 
The questions of U.S. credibility and Soviet influence in the Arab world would, to 
some extent, be affected by the positions taken by the United States in continuing 
the peace negotiations over the Arab-Israeli conflict and the stability in the Gulf 
region. The Reagan administration was worried by the U.S.S.R.'s promise to send 
Soviet forces to protect Kuwait and Saudi Arabia from Iranian attacks. Saudi was 
contacted in 1987, and the Gulf states suggested that they might be willing to 
provide the Soviet Union with base rights under special circumstances. The 
Reagan administration's decision to re-flag Kuwaiti tankers and respond to 
regional provocation was stimulated by the perception that circumstances had 
been arranged by an aggressor, close to the Soviet Union. 
Studying U.S.-Saudi relations has exposed the continuity that has characterised 
their relationship. Despite the Arab-Israeli conflict, a major cause of U.S. 
difficulties as it tried to balance its pledges to Israel with its promises to Saudi 
Arabia, U.S.-Saudi relations can be characterised as cooperative and tense. In 
contrast, oo-operation to prevent potential military threats in the Gulf has been a 
vital interest to the United States. Specifically, the security threat made by the 
Iran-Iraq war has remained the prime motivation for continued close U.S.-Saudi 
co-operation. Despite this closeness, the United States and Saudi Arabia have both 
shown ambivalence in their bilateral relations because of Israel. 
The two countries engage in increased co-operation despite the increase in tension 
over the issue of arms sales and the Arab-Israeli oonflict. In fact, the Arab- Israeli 
150 
conflict lay behind the arms tensions and the oil embargo of 1973. The Arab-Israeli 
conflict was able to use a certain amount of power against the harmonious 
relationship between the U.S. and Sudi Arabia by reminding them that it might 
well be able to turn a dangerous situations against them. 
The linkage of oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict raised significant concerns in the 
U.S. about Arab blackmail. The sensitivity of the interdependence involves 
degrees of responsiveness within a policy framework: e.g. how quickly does change 
in one country bring change in another, and how costly are the effects? The way 
the United States was affected by the increased oil prices in 1973, and 1975.318 
The sensitivity of this economy during these times was a function of the greater 
costs of foreign oil and the amount of petroleum it imported.319 The United States 
and Saudi Arabia shared diverse interests. The manoeuvring between the two 
sometimes took on an antagonistic character with attempts by both countries to 
gain the most advantageous terms. Saudi Arabia, for example, while using its 
central position in 0 PEe to restrain price increases, used its leverage to get arms 
and influence U.S. policy towards Israel. 320 
The relationship was also strained by Saudi irritation over the U.S.'s refusal to 
supply Saudi Arabia with arms. This made it inevitable that Saudi Arabia to turn 
to other arms suppliers. The vulnerability dimension of interdependence rests on 
the relative availability and costliness of the alternatives that various actors 
face. 321 The Saudis are anxious to demonstrate a degree of independence from the 
United States in their dealing with other industrialised powers. The Europeans 
and Japanese have been anxious participants in the Saudi economic boom. In 
1978, the European and Japanese share of Saudi imports amounted to nearly 60 
per cent of the total, with the U.S. share remaining fairly steady at just over 20 per 
cent. 322 
European and Japanese competition in the Saudi commercial market explains the 
Saudi propensity, in the 198Os, to turn to European ~:)Urres for arms. The French, 
for example, in 1980, provided tanks for two armoured brigades and some French 
companies, widely reported in Defenoo News in June 1990, were involved in 
rebuilding the Saudi navy and equipping it with certain types of missiles. 
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The Europeans and Japanese are generally predisposed to adopt a more pro-Arab 
position on the Palestinian question than Washington. It is not lost on the Saudi 
leaders that a large arms purchase from France will carry the message to 
Washington that Saudi political interests should not be ignored. However, the 
Saudis are specifically interested in American weaponry for several reasons. The 
U.S. and Saudi Arabia have a security relationship that is over 50 years old. The 
Saudis are interested in buying U.S. equipment because America not only produce 
the best equipment, but also American companies provide the best support and 
training for the arms buyers. So, Saudi Arabia, on June 5, 1990, requested United 
States companies to upgrade its major defence equipment. The total value of these 
sales exceeded $4 billion, and included the AWACS E_3.323 
The relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can be characterised by both 
increase oo-operation and conflict as related to the increased interdependence 
between the countries. The issue which has affected their relationship most is the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. 
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Chapter Five 
The Gulf Crisis of 1990-1991 
During the summer of 1990, the world was still elated over the end of the Cold 
War.1 The East-West confrontation was over and the communist regimes in 
Eastern Europe had collapsed.2 Oil remained high on the agenda.3 Some analysts 
declared in the spring of 1990, that there was no possibility of an oil crisis during 
the next few years.4 However, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and 
the war which followed, threw the region and much of the world into the most 
intensive conflict since the latter stages of the World War II.6 To understand the 
Gulf crisis of 1990·1991, it is important to give an overview of Iraqi historical 
claims over Kuwait and their border dispute with the country. 
Historical overview 
Initially, the borders between Saudi Arabia, Iraq and Kuwait were ratified and 
areepted by the three countries under the AJ-Uquoir treaty of 1922. However, Iraq 
laid claim to Kuwait during the 1930s and periodically these claims were restated.6 
Saddam Hussein's oonviction was that many Iraqis believed Kuwait to· be an 
integral part of Iraq, split from it by British imperialism.7 However, the AJ-Sabah 
family (the rulers) and Kuwait itself could trace their origins back to 1757 when it 
had been part of the Ottoman Empire.8 This was well before Iraq became a unified 
political entity in 1920, comprising of the three provinces (Mosul, Baghdad, and 
Basra) which had also been part of the Ottoman Empire.9 The British·Kuwait 
agreement, ooncluded on January 23, 1899, made London responsible for Kuwait's 
defell(~ and foreign affairS.lO The Ottoman Sultan pronounced Kuwait part of the 
province of Basra and nominated the ruler of Kuwait as district officer. ll 
Sinre Iraq had beoome an independent state in 1932, Iraq had challenged the 
right to the ~vereign existenre of Kuwait. 12 To justify their demands, the Iraqis 
said that the British had drawn their border with Kuwait to deny the Iraqis a~ss 
to the Gulf and access to its oil. 13 Kuwait has at least three times the length of 
coastline, (about 120 miles) than Iraq (about 35 miles). This angered the Iraqis 
and made them determined to alter this reality. 14 Actually, the border adopted at 
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the 1922 conference, deprived Kuwait of two-thirds of its previously held 
territory .16 In addition, in 1922, experts held that there was no oil in Kuwait. 16 
The same demands were repeated, with greater intensity, by the radical ruler 
Abdul-Karim Qassem, who in July 1958, overthrew the Iraqi monarchy.17 When, in 
June 1961, Kuwait declared its independence, Qassem claimed that Kuwait had 
always been part of Basra and threatened to take Kuwait by force. IS The Kuwaitis 
rapidly asked the British for military support, which arrived on July 1, 1961. 19 
Arab support followed in September 1961.lll The Arab League agreed to a Kuwaiti 
request for assistance and sent a multinational force including troops from Saudi 
Arabia, Egypt, Jordan and Sudan.21 Arab troops remained until February 1963, 
when Qassem was overthrown by the Ba'ath party, Iraq's current ruling party.22 
The regime recognised Kuwait's independence in October 1963, in return for a 
large payment from Kuwait to Iraq. 23 
In 1969, Iraq requested Kuwait for permission to station Iraqi forces on the 
Kuwaiti side of their common border.24 Iraq wanted to protect the Iraqi ooastline 
against a possible attack from Iran.26 Despite Kuwait's refusal, the Iraqis deployed 
troops along a narrow strip beside the border and Iraqi troops briefly occupied a 
Kuwaiti border post in 1973.26 These troops remained on the Kuwaiti border for 
nearly a decade against Kuwait's wishes.27 When Kuwait wanted to reach an 
agreement to end the situation on its border with Iraq, Iraq made it clear that it 
would recognise the original borders only if the islands of Warba and Bubiyan (see 
Map 4) were either included within Iraq or leased to it.28 In its search for a sea 
port in the Gulf, Iraq had asked Kuwait in the early 1970s if it oould take oontrol of 
the two islands.29 These two islands overlook Umm Qasr, one of Iraq's two ports on 
the Gulf.30 The Kuwaitis refused the Iraqi requests because they were afraid that 
by granting the islands to Iraqi control they would encourage Iraqi demands for 
further territories.31 If Kuwait's independent presence angered the Iraqis, 
Kuwait's independent foreign policy and its improved relations with both Iran and 
Syria, by the end of 1989 annoyed Saddam Hussein even further. 32 The Iraqis 
asked again for the two islands in February 1989, when the Kuwaiti Crown Prince 
visited Baghdad in the hope of resolving the border dispute. He had hoped that it 
would be settled out of gratitude for Kuwait's wartime support, but the Crown 
Prince perceived that Iraq still demanded the islands.33 
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After the Iran-Iraq war 
The eight year long Iran-Iraq war had undermined Iraq's resources. The Iraqi 
estimate cost of the war was $208 billion.34 At this time, Iraq was mainly 
motivated by regional concerns: Iraq needed oil exports which oould be translated 
into money (power) and deep water access to the Gulf.35 After Iraq liberated the 
Faw Peninsula in April 1988, and regained limited access to the Gul( an Iraqi 
brigade invaded Bubiyan Island in October 1988. 00 This was achieved without 
publicity but they were removed just as quietly after Kuwaiti objections.37 That 
was the time when Iraq began planning a limited invasion to get control of 
Kuwait's oil and deep water access to the Gulf. 38 
Iraq apparently emerged from the war against Iran a stronger military power in 
the region and sought the leadership of the Arab world.39 The end of the Iran-Iraq 
war had the effect of increasing Iraq's power and changing the military balance of 
the Gulf region in favour of the Iraqi regime, due to the Gee assisting Iraq 
financially and transfer arms.40 Iraq was well-equipped, and its troops had battle 
experience. Iraq's armed forces stood at 1.2 million in 1988 with 500 fighter planes 
and 4,500 tanks. It was the largest force in the Arab world and the fourth largest 
army in the world.41 
During the Iran-Iraq war, Iraq's regional and international status was reduced. 
Regionally, the war had stopped Saddam's aspirations of gaining oontrol over the 
Gulf.42 During the war, Iraq had became more reliant politically and eoonomically 
on Saudi Arabia.48 Internationally, Iraq failed to hold its leadership of the 
non-aligned movement.44 The leadership shifted from Iraq to India.45 
The formation of the Arab Co-operation Council 
The oollapse of communism in 1989 ended the Soviet-American Cold War, and 
Saddam believed that the vacuum left by the Soviet Union's involvement in the 
region oould be filled by Iraq itself, the only country with ambitions to lead the 
Arab world and a strong military.46 Iraq became a founder member of the Arab 
155 
Co-operation Council (ACe) on February 16, 1989. The ACC was a regional 
alliance of Iraq, Jordan, Egypt to which North Yemen was added later.47 In fact, 
the ACC had been formed late in 1988, but the leaders of ACC stressed that it was 
an economic grouping. 48 
It was clear that the ACC was to some extent competitive with the Saudi-led 
GCC.49 It was also clear that the inclusion of Yemen was a purposeful snub to 
Saudi Arabia, which regularly left it out of any dealings concerning the Gulf region 
or the Arabian peninsula.oo The ACC showed Iraq's new leading regional role and 
the Egyptian resignation to the status quO.51 
Saudi Arabia gave the ACC the Kingdom's blessing as long as it did not dabble in 
military matters. 52 At the same time, Riyadh disliked the sense of being 
surrounded, geographically, by the members of a grouping to which it did not 
belong.63 The general opinion of the GCC members about the ACC was that it was 
a blend of diverse elements that had no 'raison d'etre.64 The GCC, for instance, had 
been established on the basis of geographical unity and similarities in political 
systems, customs and heritages.65 Likewise, the Arab Maghreb Union had been 
created on the basis of a degree of social and geographical proximity.56 In spite of 
Saudi Arabia's blessings on the ACC, Saudi Arabia was not pleased with the 
inclusion of its former regional rivals Iraq and North Yemen, who had a long series 
of border problems with Saudi Arabia. 57 Iraq and North Yemen were close allies, 
and the Iraqis would have been able to generate border incidents along the Yemeni 
border to put pressure on Saudi Arabia. 68 
Actually, the ACC was established without King Fahd being informed.59 On the 
day before its establishment was declared, King Hussein of Jordan called on King 
Fahd in Dhahran, but King Hussein did not even mention the ACC before he went 
on ro Baghdad.oo On February 25, 1989, Taha Yassin Ramadhan, the first Deputy 
Premier, went to Saudi Arabia to explain to the King the idea and objectives of the 
ACC.61 
On the level of broader regional politics, Iraq had hoped that the ACC would 
decrease Saudi regional influence, destabilise the Saudi-Egyptian-Syrian 
rapprochement, and isolate Syria politically.62 True, Egypt returned to the Arab 
institutions, after the Arab League summit late in 1987.63 Saudi-Egyptian 
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relation..') soon became close.64 Syria had been relatively i~lated in Arab politics 
due, in some degree, to its alliance with Iran during the Iran-Iraq war. However, 
the Syrian government was becoming increasingly interested in co-operating with 
the key Arab states.65 Syria was getting closer to Saudi Arabia and both countries 
were working to stop the civil war in Lebanon.as The Iraqi leaders tried to weaken 
the Taif agreement, a Saudi-sponsored peace plan addressed to Lebanese delegates 
who met in Taif in Saudi Arabia, in September and October 1989, to agree a new 
order for Lebanon.67 Actually, Saudi Arabia was a member of the Arab League -
and a member of the tripartite committee on Lebanon, which included Morocco and 
Algeria.68 The Arab League tripartite committee and the Taif agreements 
recognised the special function of Syria and of the Syrian army in Lebanon.69 The 
Iraqi regime intervened in Lebanon, delivering arms to Michel Awn's anti-Syrian 
Christian factions, which resisted the Taif agreement and challenged the President 
of Lebanon Ilias Hrawi.70 The Iraqi purpose in Lebanon was not only to undennine 
the Saudi peace plan in Lebanon but also to punish Syria for its support of Iran 
during the Iran-Iraq war.71 
On a more official level, Iraqi leaders tried to weaken the Saudi regional status by 
limiting the Saudis into a mutual security pact with the Iraqis.72 During King 
Fahd's visit to Iraq at the end of March 1989, Saddam Hussein asked the King to 
sign a non-aggression pact.73 This came as a surprise to the King, for he had 
imagined the relationship between the Kingdom and Iraq, and between himself 
and Saddam Hussein, went far beyond non-aggression.74 However, the King found 
it very hard to reject his host's desire.75 Therefore, believing that such a pact would 
increase security in the Gulf region, King Fahd signed a non-aggression pact with 
Iraq on March 27, 1989.76 The agreement spelled out the principles of 
non-interference in the domestic affairs of the two countries and the non-use of 
force between the two countries.77 Iraq refused a Kuwait request for a similar 
non-aggression pact, however, arguing problems between them first had to be 
settled.78 
After King Fahd visited Iraq, he paid a visit to Egypt. 79 He was encouraged by a 
desire to secure good relations with Cairo in an effort to cut across any covert ACC 
ag(lnda.tl.l As a matter of fact, Saudi Arabia was still suspicious that there were 
other motives involved in the creation of the ACC.81 
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Certainly, Saudi concern about the ACC grew when Iraq attempted to promote 
military co-operation within the ACC.82 The Yemeni military consisted of many 
Iraqi-trained officers; and several thousand Iraqi advisors were believed to be in 
Yemen.83 Egypt, however, rejected as incompatible with Arab League 
commitments the calls for closer military co-operation.84 
The Iraqi attack on the Gulf states 
Saddam Hussein's actions throughout the countdown to the crisis in 1990, clearly 
increased the threatening nature of the environment for the GCC.86 At the summit 
meeting of the ACC in Amman in February 1990, which celebrated the 
organisation's first anniversary,86 Saddam condemned the presence of the U.S. 
Navy in the Gulf and he stated that the U.S. supported Israel and sought to 
weaken the ArabS.87 He tried to represent Iraq as having hegemony in the 
region.88 The most important event which happened at the summit meeting, was 
that Saddam asked King Hussein of Jordan and President Hosni Mubarak of 
Egypt to put pressure on the Gulf states not only to announce a moratorium on all 
wartime loan repayment plans to Iraq, but also to make an urgent grant of $30 
billion.89 Saddam Hussein added "Let the Gulf states know that if they do not give 
this money to me, I would know how to get it".'iXJ This threat was accompanied by 
Iraqi military manoeuvres in the neutral zone of the Kuwait border.91 Saddam's 
explanation as to why the Gulf states should give him the money was that the 
Iranians would have invaded the Gulf states if Iraq had fallen in the war.92 
Saddam's message was carried by the Jordanian King to Saudi Arabia.93 
In response to Saddam's claim that he had protected the Gulf states against the 
Iranian threat, King Fahd said after the invasion of Kuwait 94 "In turn, we wish to 
ask you (Saddam) some questions. Who authorised you to involve the Iraqi army 
and people in a bloody and futile war with Iran? Who authorised you to put an end 
to the lives of a million Iraqi and Iranian Muslim citizens?"9£> 
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When the lran- Iraq war started, the Gulf states found themselves in the same 
ditch as Iraq, and it became evident to them that the defeat of Iraq would mean 
Iranian hegemony over the Gulf, which would threaten all of the Gulf states.B6 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia gave Iraq $25 billion in financial assistanre and a 
further $10 billion was received from Kuwait, $1 billion from Qatar and $2-4 
billion from the United Arab Emirates.97 Iraq al~ received $14 billion in oil.98 
Iraq's total debt to Saudi Arabia amounted to approximately $34 billion, and to 
Kuwait about $15 billion.99 When the Iran-Iraq war stopped, both Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait supplied more limited aid. 1oo The Arab Monetary Fund agreed in 
December 1988, to give Iraq a $112 million loan in January 1989. The 
Co-ordination Secretariat agreed to provide a loan for ~me $1 billion over five 
years. 101 The Islamic Development Bank also gave further smaller loans. 102 
The Kingdom's support for Iraq during its war against Iran was never in doubt. I03 
But after the war stopped, Saddam Hussein pointed out his disappointment that 
the assistance from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait had diminished. 104 Saudi Arabia 
made it plain to the Iraqis that it would not assist further Iraqi military purchases 
subsequent to the declaration of a rease-fire, because there had been a substantial 
drop in the oil production level and a decline in the prire of oil. 106 However, Iraq 
wanted previous levels of aid to oontinue in view of the oountry's need to rebuild. lOG 
At the same time, in February 1990, Iraq singled out Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates for greater pressure, this time over the level of oil production. The Iraqi 
Oil Minister, Issam Abdulrahim Al-Shalabi, visited Kuwait and pressured Kuwait 
to stick by the new oil quota set by OPEC earlier in 1990.107 The visit to Kuwait 
was en route to Saudi Arabia to deliver a personal message from Saddam Hussein 
to King Fahd. 1<X1 The message was that the Saudis must persuade the rest of the 
GCC states not to go beyond their oil quotaS. 109 The Iraqi justification was that 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates were exreeding their quotas, which forred 
the price of oil down as they flooded the market. 110 The Iraqis wanted to gain 
market share for their oil production and force the prire of oil to rise. Ill Iraq 
oonrentrated its pressures on Kuwait. Saddam accused Kuwait of stealing Iraqi oil 
from the Rumaila oilfield, and asked for compensation of $2.4 billion. The Rumaila 
oilfield straddles the Iraq-Kuwait border and mainly exists in Iraqi territory (~e 
Map 4).112 The Kuwaitis denied the Iraqi claims and refused to discuss oil 
production levels or to waive any wartime debts to Iraq.II3 
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Meanwhile, Iraqi relations with the West were deteriorating. On March 15, 1990, 
the London Observer's journalist Fanad Bazoft, was sentenced to death in Iraq for 
spying.114 He had made a report about an explosion at a secret military base at 
Hilleh (near Baghdad) for The Observer.115 The West oondemned the Iraqi trial 
and execution of Farzad Bazoft. 116 On March 26, 1990, Iraq oondemned the 
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protests over Bazoft's death as interference in Iraq's domestic affairs by Britain 
and other European Community countries. 117 At the same time, Dr Gerald Bull. a 
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Canadian scientist, had helped Iraq to develop its "supergun" which was capable of 
launching non -conventional weapons many thousands of miles. 118 Dr Bull was 
murdered in Brussels on March 22, 1990. 119 He had received death threats from 
the Israeli secret service, Mossad, because of his assistance to Iraq's military 
machine. 1l() Soon, British Customs confiscated eight long steel tubes, which were 
intended to go to Iraq, and which were considered to be part of Bull's "supergun" 
project. 121 On March 29, 1990, Britain and the U.S. Customs found 40 electrical 
capacitors, used to trigger nuclear explosions. l22 Iraq declared that they had been 
imported legally from the U.S. in 1988, and that Iraq did not want to use the 
capacitors for nuclear purposes, only for scientific research. l23 Saddam explained 
that these disclosures were part of a public relations campaign against Iraq.l24 
On April 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein threatened "Let them (Western nations) cease 
their attempts to give Israel a pretext to strike ... I swear by God we will let out fire 
consume half of Israel if it tries any action against Iraq" .125 He made it clear that 
chemical weapons were available in Iraq.l26 He also compared the condemnation 
over the execution of Farzad Bazoft with the West's silence over the assassination 
of Gerald Bull. 127 
All of the statements were aimed at the Arab world which sided with Saddam. l28 
King Hussein of Jordan and PLO leadership were enthusiastically in support of 
Saddam and encouraged him.l29 After a few days, Iraqi spokesman began to 
announce that Iraq would use "all its might" against Israel if it should attack any 
Arab state, not just Iraq.lro In the middle of April 1990, Saddam also pledged 
Arafat that he would soon beat Israel and free Jerusalem. 131 
Both the U.S. and Israel appeared to take the threats by Saddam seriously. 
President George Bush publicly regretted Saddam's statement of April 2, and 
Israel implied that any Iraqi chemical strike would trigger an immediate and 
probably nuclear riposte. 132 However, Saddam had been attempting to distract 
public attention from troubles at home. l33 In a message that was delivered by a 
senior Arab official, Saddam Hussein declared that "Tell the United States that our 
statement was for internal consumption only". 134 Saddam received some Arab 
support mainly from the PLO and Jordan, and he was looking forward to the Arab 
summit in Baghdad at the end of May 1990. 130 Saddam needed the summit as an 
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all Arab recognition of Iraq's leadership which he could then turn into pressure on 
the GCC states, especially, Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. l36 
Meanwhile, most OPEC producers came to agree that some restrictions were 
needed in order to control over production. The Geneva agreement of May 3, 1990, 
compelled a three month reduction, which demanded that Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates return to their 1.5 million bId production leve}.i37 OPEC producers 
had agreed to limit production to 22 million bId, but total production remained at 
about 24 million b/d. l38 Together Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates accounted 
for about 75 per cent of the overproduction. l39 Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates refused to follow the regulations and continued overproduction of their 
quota during that month, pumping over 2 million bId, each. 140 
In Baghdad, at the Arab summit, Saddam addressed a closed session and he 
referred to the OPEC quotas. He told the conference that "For every dollar drop in 
the price of a barrel of oil, Iraq's loss amounted to one billion dollars per year". 141 
He al~ noted that: 
I wish to tell our brothers who do not seek war, and those who do not intend to 
wage war on Iraq, that we can not tolerate this type of economic warfare... God 
willing, the situation will tum out well But I say that we have reached a state of 
affairs where we can not take the pressure. 142 
According to Iraqi opposition sources, Saddam renewed his demands in which he 
asked the Arab summit to put pressure on the GCC states to waive its war debts 
and to provide Iraq with an additional S30 billion. 143 He accused Kuwait of 
stealing oil from the Rumaila oilfield and asked that Kuwait surrender the two 
strategic islands, Warbh and Bubiyan, to Iraqi authority or possession. l44 The 
summit re~lutions als> condemned the immigration of Soviet Jews to Israel and 
the campaign by the West to stop Iraq's technological development. 146 
The summit ended and Saddam Hussein was unable to direct the attention of the 
Kuwait Emir, Shaikh Jabber Al-Sabah, to the issue of borders and debts. l46 
Desperate for income to reconstruct his war-destroyed economy, unable to increaSf! 
revenue and burdened by billions of dollars in foreign loans. Saddam may have 
observed the drop of the oil price as leading him to demand an end to the 0 PEC 
overproduction, whilst demanding that Iraq be allowed to increase its oil 
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production and that the price rise to at least $25 a barrel of oil. 147 Indeed, oil prices 
had dropped by ~me 30 per cent from $21 a barrel in January 1990, to $19.60 in 
February, $15.60 in June and to $14 a barrel just before the invasion. l48 
Thus, in the last week of June 1990, Saddam Hussein sent urgent messages to 
Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar. l49 Iraq's Deputy 
Prime Minister, Sa'doun Hammadi, who was delivering Saddam's messages, 
publicly criticised both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates by name for their 
overproduction and blamed them for the fall in the price of oil.lOO Sa'doun 
Hammadi met Skaikh Jabber in June 26, 1990, and repeated Iraq's demand that 
Kuwait reduce oil production, waive wartime debts to Iraq and donate $10 billion 
to Iraq.151 For the third demand, the Emir of Kuwait responded angrily "That is 
absurd. Kuwait does not have such a large amount available" .152 The Emir of 
Kuwait rejected Iraq's request to reduce oil production or waive Iraq's debts. l63 
The Emir of Kuwait was ready to contribute $500 million but he made it clear to 
the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister that he might negotiate further. "Let us agree 
about our borders and then we can talk about other things". 154 Saddam Hussein 
refused to accept the Kuwaiti offer of $500 million. He felt that it had been offered 
to humiliate him. l56 Saddam Hussein also attacked Kuwait as being ill a 
"oonspiracy against the region's economy which serves Israel directly". 156 
The increasing Iraqi attack on Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates over oil was 
a challenge to the basis of the GCe states, which demanded that a Saudi 
diplomatic response was urgently required. 167 A formal meeting was held on July 
10-11, 1990, in Jeddah between representatives of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the 
United Arab Emirates. l68 Both Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates pledged to 
abide by the OPEC quotas of 1.5 million bId each. l59 King Fahd pers>nally 
exercised extensive pressure to achieve this outcome. loo In spite of the pledges by 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates, Iraqi threats increased. On July 15, 1990, 
Saddam Hussein sent three divisions of the elite Republican Guards to the 
south-east of Iraq, just north of Kuwait. 161 
Along with military build-up, a parallel diplomatic offensive started. 162 On July 16, 
1990, Tariq Aziz, the Iraqi Foreign Minister delivered a memorandum to the 
Secretary General of the Arab League in which Iraq made a list of indictments: 
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Kuwait with the United Arab Emirates had glutted the oil market with an amount 
of oil that exceeded their OPEC quotas. 163 This had led to a decrease in oil prices 
between 1981 and 1990 and, therefore, a loss of $500 billion by the Arab states. of 
which Iraq had suffered $89 billion. 164 
Kuwait had stolen from the Iraqi treasury $2.4 billion by pumping oil from Iraqi 
Rumaila oilfield 165 
The Arab states of the Gulf had supported Iraq financially, but their loans to Iraq 
were not financed solely from their treasuries, but from the increase in their oil 
revenues which was a consequence of the decrease of Iraqi exports during the war 
years. l66 Iraq had also protected them from Iran. 167 
While Iraq had been distracted by the war with Iran. Kuwait had advanced into 
Iraqi territory, and established police posts, oil installations and farms. 168 
The Kuwaiti's had refused to settle the issue of the borders. l69 
The list of indictments were interpreted as "military aggression" by the Iraqis. 170 
The memorandum finished with several demands: the increase of the price of oil to 
over $25 a barrel; Kuwait to pay Iraq $2.4 billion as compensation for Kuwait 
stealing oil from Iraqi's Rumaila oilfield; the creation of a plan similar to the 
Marshall Plan, to rebuild Iraq and recompense for some of its losses during the 
war. 171 The next day, July 17, 1990, Saddam Hussein addressed the nation on the 
twenty-seoond anniversary of the Ba'ath Revolution. He accused Kuwait and 
United Arab Emirates of co-operating with "world imperialism and Zionism" to 
damage Iraq through overproduction. 172 He al~ said that Iraq could not ignore 
such actions forever, and he warned of dire consequences unless the two states 
stopped. "If words fail to afford us protection, then we will have no choice but to 
take effective action to put things right and ensure the restitution of our rights". [73 
Shortly afterwards, on July 18, 1990, 30,000 Iraqi troops were moved to the 
Kuwaiti border. 174 
Kuwait rejected the Iraqi indictments in a reply to the Secretary General of the 
Arab League on July 19, 1990, and expressed strong anger.[76 "This was not the 
way to treat a sister state". 176 Kuwait underlined the following items: 
The oil produced from the Rumaila field was from wells an adequate distance from 
the international boundary to conform with the international standards. 177 
Kuwait had suffered economic and material harm during the war when it was 
d ... ~-l."d' , 178 expose to atWOL.S mSl e Its temtory. 
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Kuwait refused to take responsibility for the drop in oil consumption in both OPEC 
and non-OPEC countries. 179 
Kuwait had been helpful to the Arab countries and Kuwait's assistance to Iraq was 
indubitable and documented. ISO 
Kuwait stated that it was Iraq who had avoided settling the issues over their 
common borders. 181 
Iraq's memorandum to the Arab League and Saddam's speech of July 17, caused 
the Kuwaitis to feel that it was Kuwait rather the United Arab Emirates which 
was Iraq's target. 182 The Kuwaiti leadership oontinued to be oonfident explaining 
Saddam's claims as being a bargaining position rather than implying a threat. ISS 
They thought that the Iraqis would not take military action but that even if they 
did it would be limited to disputed zones such as the Rumaila oilfield and the two 
islands, Warbah and Bubiyan. l84 Hence, Kuwaiti troops had been put on alert 
when the first Iraqi troops massed several miles north of the border with 
Kuwait. 185 The Emir of Kuwait ordered his troops back to their stations, on July 
19, 1990, however, so as not to "provoke" Saddam. Certainly the Kuwaiti troops 
could not have prevented an invasion (Iraq's forces totalled more than one million 
against Kuwait's 17,0(0).186 Therefore, the Kuwaiti leadership decided to seek help 
from their allies. The Kuwaiti's Foreign Minister started an emergency journey of 
GCC states, beginning in Riyadh. 187 In addition, Kuwait sent a letter to the 
President of the United Nations Security Council and UN Secretary General, 
Javier Perez de Cuelar. The Arab League selected Saudi Arabia and Egypt as 
mediators. 188 
This escalation was serious enough for the U.S. to issue a statement on July 18, 
1990, reminding Iraq that the U.S. had to; secure the free move of oil through the 
Straits of Hormuz; protect the principle of freedom of navigation; and to "support 
the individual and collective self-defence of our friends in the Gulf, with whom we 
have deep and long-standing ties".I89 The U.S. al~ stressed "That disputes be 
settled peacefully and not by threats or intimidation" .190 These statements were 
issued against a background of reports from the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 
which showed that Iraqi troop movements posed a serious threat to Kuwait. 191 On 
July 25, 1990, Saddam Hussein met with the U.S. Ambassador in Baghdad, April 
Glaspie. l92 Saddam gave her a message to deliver to President Bush. She was 
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then to return to Baghdad with the President's response. l93 Saddam's message 
went &>mewhat like this: 
As you know, I sureessfully fought Iran, but, instead of rewarding me. the British 
and the Kuwaitis are driving me into a comer. Please note that my record on oil is 
absolutely clean. I have never acted irresponsibly over oil, and never will. I want 
our dialogue to continue. I am the man with who you should do business in this 
region. 194 
Saddam Hussein talked to her about Iraq-U.S. relations and the problems with 
Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates. Among other things he said: 
I say to you clearly that Iraq's rights, which are mentioned in the memorandum, 
we will take one by one. That might not happen now or after a month or after one 
year, but we will take it all We are not the kind of people who will relinquish 
their rights. There is no historic right, or legitimacy, or need for the United Arab 
Emirates and Kuwait to deprive us of our rights. If they are needy. we too are 
needy. The U.S. must have a better understanding of the situation and declare 
who it wants to have relations with and who its enemies are. But it should not 
. make enemies simply because others have different points of view regarding the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. We clearly understand America's statement that it wants an 
easy flow of oil We understand America saying that it seeks friendship with the 
states in the region and to encourage some parties to harm Iraq's interests. The 
U.S. wants to secure the flow of oil. This is understandable but it must not deploy 
methods which the U.S. says it disapproves, of flexing muscles and using pressure. 
If you use pressure, we will use pressure and deploy force. 195 
She told Saddam, among other things, "But we have no opinion on the Arab 
conflicts, like your border disagreement with Kuwait". 196 The text of that meeting 
was released by the Iraqi government. 197 At the same time the U.S. State 
Department described the transcript as "essentially correct" .198 Equally important, 
Saddam Hussein had met John Kelly, Assistant Secretary of State, and exchanged 
views with him. l99 John Kelly later admitted that the U.S. had no defence treaties 
with the Gulf states.!m He admitted that during a meeting of a U.S. House of 
Representatives Middle East subcommittee, which the BBC World Service reported 
on July 31, 1990?)l 
Since Saddam Hussein had escalated the situation, the joint U.S.-United Arab 
Emirates naval exercises were announced in July 24, 1990.lm The United Arab 
Emirates asked the U.S. for some practical support.9J3 The United Arab Emirates 
had gained experience of Iraq's tactics during the Iran-Iraq war. In 1986, Saddam 
believed that he was not receiving enough fmancial support for fighting against 
Iran, hence, he sent his aircraft over 600 miles to bomb two of the United Arab 
Emirates' oil wells.:»l The United Arab Emirates were oonsequently looking out for 
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a repeat bombing.!U> Immediately, Iraq complained about the United Arab 
Emirates for asking the U.S. for practical support and about Kuwait for contacting 
the U.N. Baghdad accused them of seeking to internationali~ the dispute by 
inviting foreign troops into the Gulf. Saddam threatened with the words: 
Foreigners will not be able to protect those who conspire against the Arab nation 
and undermine its fundamental interests. The Arab people know how to deal with 
that kind of case. Everybody knows very well its destiny.206 
Thus, King Fahd oontacted Saddam and received personal assurances from 
Saddam that he would not take any military action against Kuwait.'X:J7 King Fahd 
sent a letter to the Emir of Kuwait in the hope of persuading him to be more 
compromising in the forthooming negotiations. ~ 
OPEC Oil Ministers met in Geneva on 26-27 July, 1990.200 They decided that the 
price of oil would be increased from $18 to $21 a barrel until the end of 1990, and 
they set a new production level of 22.491 million barrels a day for OPEC 
members.210 Iraq had argued for a price of $25 a barrel, while Iran had wanted the 
price to be $23, but Saudi Arabia had persuaded the members to adopt the price of 
$21 a barre1.211 Iraq's Oil Minister, Issam Al-Shalabi, said that he was happy with 
the agreement, however, there was one country exceeding its agreed OPEC limit.212 
That country was Iraq starting from the middle of July 1990.213 
Meanwhile, the number of Iraqi troops on the north of the Kuwaiti border reached 
100,000.214 Moreover, on July 28, 1990, the U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency 
(DIA) reported that Iraqi military in the south had been mobilised and that 
Saddam "intends to use it".215 King Fahd and President Mubarak also asked 
Washington to adopt a low profile so as not to jeopardise the expected successful 
result of the Jeddah meeting between Kuwait and Iraq.216 On July 31, 1990, the 
two delegations met at Jeddah.217 Izzat Ibrahim, the Vice President of Iraq, read 
all the charges against Kuwait.218 The Iraqis asked for $10 billion in compensation 
for the use of the Rum ail a oilfield, possession of some disputed territories, the 
rights for Iraq to pump oil from inside Kuwait, and waiving of the Iraqi debt 
incurred during Iran-Iraq war.219 The Kuwaitis refused to accept these demands. 
and argued that they did not have such huge amounts of money at present, but 
they agreed to write off debts in return for the settlement of the border dispute.ZJJ 
The I raqis did not like the Kuwaitis reply. and lzzat Ibrahim finished the meeting 
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saying they should continue in Baghdad on August 4, 1990.221 On August 1, the 
Iraqi government announced that: 
Further progress in the negotiation will not proceed until Kuwait accedes to Iraq's 
demands and rights and until the Kuwaitis admit the Iraqi charges against 
them.222 
Then, the three Iraqi armoured divisions near Kuwait moved closer to the 
Kuwaiti's border, just three miles away.22S The tanks and artillery took up 
offensive positions and along with some eighty helicopters.224 In response to a 
Kuwaiti request for information on the Iraqi mobilisation, the U.S. sent a briefcase 
of top-secret photos.225 On the afternoon of July 31, 1990, the U.S. Defense 
Intelligence Agency and other American agencies informed Washington that the 
invasion of Kuwait by Iraq had appeared to have taken place. 226 In fact, the 
apparent invasion was Iraqi troops mobilising.227 The U.S. State Department held 
meetings to follow events in Iraq and to assess U.S. options.228 Much of the 
meeting looked at Saddam's likely action if he crossed the border of Kuwait. Would 
he aim only to take the disputed northern border with Kuwait as well as the two 
islands? This would not present a threat to the U.S. and the Western world.229 
The Iraqi invasion oCKuwait and the U.S.' response 
On August 2, 1990, Iraqi troops crossed the border of Kuwait at 2 am local time 
and rapidly took oontrol of the whole country. They reached the capital at 7am.2.'JJ 
The Emir of Kuwait and most of his family escaped to Saudi Arabia.231 As soon as 
the Iraqis crossed the Kuwaiti border, Crown Prince, Sa'd Al-sabah made a request 
for aid from the American emhassy.232 However, there were no military options 
available to the U.S. It was too late for the Kuwaitis to ask for effective military 
assistance.233 Casualties during the fighting were estimated between 200 and 1000 
killed.234 40 Kuwaiti aireraft, ~me coastal vessels and an army brigade withdrew 
to Saudi Arabia.235 Iraq claimed that it had been invited to help Kuwaiti 
revolutionaries attempt to overthrow the Emir.236 
Saddam was persuaded at this time that there was no purpose in merely seizing 
two islands and the oilfields.237 If the Kuwaiti ruling family remained in power 
they oould tum Kuwait into an American military base.238 Without the Al-Sabah 
family, there would be no one who could demand loyalty or be a symbol of the 
state's legitimacy.289 Saddam believed that if he wanted to take Kuwait he had to 
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get rid of the ruling family. 240 Saddam intended to kill or capture the Al-Sabah 
family, but the Emir of Kuwait and most of his family escaped before the Iraqi 
forces surrounded the Emir's palace in Kuwait city.241 In fact, the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait had less to do with legal or historical claims than with the wealth of 
Kuwait. 242 The Iraqi demands were illegitimate and unacceptable by the 
standards of international law.243 If Kuwait had completely agreed to the Iraqi 
demands on July 31, 1990, Saddam might have found it hard to justify the 
invasion of Kuwait, but he would still have found an excuse to invade Kuwait. U4 
Saddam Hussein thought that in case of invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. would limit 
signs of disapproval to a boycott or at most send warships to the area. He also 
thought that King Fahd would not allow the U.S. to use Saudi bases as he had 
always rejected an American military presence in his country.245 
As soon as Iraqi troops crossed into Kuwait, the National Security Council's 
Situation Room in the White House and the Crisis Situation Room in the Pentagon 
became active.246 At 5 am on August 2, 1990, President Bush instructed his 
National Security Advisor, Brent Scrowcroft, to make sure that Arab countries 
would condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.247 Later that morning, President 
Bush condemned Iraq's invasion of Kuwait as "naked aggression" and signed an 
order to freeze all Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and banning all commerce with Iraq 
including the 588,000 barrels of Iraqi oil purchased daily by the United States.248 
President Bush was concerned about the impact of the invasion on U.S. oil 
supplies, noting that 50 per cent of American energy demands came from the 
Middle East, about 3.5 per cent from Iraq.249 It was also noted, that President 
Saddam Hussein had already won his goal of pushing up the price of Oil.200 Holding 
on to Kuwait, Saddam would control 20 per cent of OPEC production and 20 per 
cent of world oil reserves (10 per cent from Kuwait).251 Iraq and Kuwait produced 
about 4.5 million barrels of oil a day, which would increase Iraq's annual revenue 
from oil exports - enough to build an empire in the Gulf. 262 The U.S. imported more 
than $3 billion annually from Iraq; 97 per cent of the total was Oil.253 The U.S. 
exported, mainly agricultural merchandise to Iraq, totalling Sl.17 billion in 
1989.254 
The U.S. National Security Council met on the morning of August 2, 1990, and the 
options that could be taken against Iraq were discussed with General Norman 
Schwarzkopf, Commander of Central Command (CENTCOM). He defmed two 
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military options: the fIrst, to strike against Iraqi targets, using U.S. naval aircraft; 
and the second, operating plan 90-1002, to defend Saudi Arabia.255 On the same 
day, President Bush called King Fahd, assuring him of American support. 
President Bush agreed that the invasion of Kuwait was definitely una~ptable, 
but no firm plans were made between the two leaders.256 
The response of the international community was uncommonly fast and decisive. 267 
Only hours after invasion, at 4 am on August 2, 1990, an emergency meeting of 
the UN Security Council had passed resolution 660.258 The resolution condemned 
Iraq's invasion and demanded that it "withdraw immediately and unconditionally 
all its forces to the positions in which they were located on August 1, 1992".269 The 
resolution was adopted by 14 countries, only Yemen abstained. a;o The end of 
East-West Cold War had generated more co-operation.261 Secretary of State, 
James Baker, along with his Soviet counterpart, Edward Shevardnadze, issued an 
unusual joint U.S.-Soviet statement in which they condemned the Iraqi invasion 
and asked for a stop to arms deliveries to Iraq.262 
In military terms, on August 2, 1990, the u.s. had to move one carrier task force; 
led by USS Eisenhower, to the Eastern Mediterranean, while another, led by USS 
Independence, was moved from the Indian Ocean to the Straits of Hormuz.263 In 
the Gulf itself an eight-ship battle fleet had already been deployed.~ The u.S. 
also alerted NATO in Brussels that it was to put together the task force to respond 
if Iraqi troops drove further Kuwaiti territory.266 House Speaker, Thomas Foley, 
said to NBC "If there is an intention on the part of Iraq to overrun Saudi Arabia, 
then I think this would call for a direct military response by the United States, 
Western Europe, and maybe even the Soviet Union".'lH> President Bush stated on 
August 2, 1992, "We remain committed to take whatever actions are neressary to 
defend our long-standing, vital interests in the Persian Gulf" .267 
The impact of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on U.S.-Saudi Arabia relations 
In Saudi Arabia, Iraq's invasion of Kuwait took Riyadh totally by surprise, 
especially as Iraq's delegates had started discussions with the Kuwaitis in Jeddah 
a day earlier.268 They were al~ shocked because Saddam Hussein had given his 
word to the King that he would not invade Kuwait.269 King Fahd did not heli(lv(l 
that the Iraqis had invaded Kuwait when he was first told about it at 2 am on 
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August 2, 1990.270 Reports came in confirming the invasion, but King Fahd 
remained incredulous. 271 Eventually, King Fahd put through a call to Saddam 
H~in.272 King Fahd asked Saddam Hussein about the report.273 Saddam 
Hussein told King Fahd that he was going to send Izzat Ibrahim to explain 
everything.274 On August 3, 1990, Izzat Ibrahim arrived in Jeddah.275 King Fahd 
was extremely angry and surprised when Izzat Ibrahim merely relayed Saddam's 
assurance that Saudi Arabia was safe and had nothing to fear from Iraq.276 King 
Fahd told him that he wanted to discuss Kuwait not the security of Saudi 
Arabia. 277 Izzat Ibrahim replied that there was no way to turn back the clock and 
that Kuwait was past history. 278 
Up to this time, the Saudis were persuaded that an Arab solution to the problem 
was the best option.279 An emergency meeting of the Arab League was held in 
Cairo on August 3, 1990.280 The meeting concluded with fourteen of the twenty-one 
Arab members present.281 The meeting issues a resolution demanding that the 
Iraqi troops be withdrawn from Kuwait immediately and unconditionally.282 The 
Saudis still wanted to give an Arab solution a chance, and that as ~n as Iraqi 
troops withdrew, Kuwait could be squeezed for more concessions.283 Saudi leaders 
worked with other Arab countries to persuade the Iraqi leader to attend a 
mini-summit in Jeddah on August 5, sponsored by Saudi-Egyptian leadership.284 
Sad dam replied that he would not have the Al-Sabah family attend the proposed 
summit.285 This attitude was unacceptable to the Arab leaders. If Saddam's 
conditions were agreed to, it would show a Saudi approval of the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait and a denial the legitimacy of Kuwait's government.286 
President Bush became convinced that Saudi Arabia was vulnerable.287 In the long 
term, an Iraqi threat to the whole region appeared almost unavoidable, since Iraq 
was close to the Saudi oilfields and a conflict with Israel was a strong possihility.288 
By August 3, 1990, the Bush administration had decided to reverse the Iraqi 
invasion.289 However, the first block to that goal was Saudi Arabia, without whose 
assistance the task would be difficult.290 Bush set about persuading Saudi Arabia 
that it should host American troops before it was late.291 Therefore, the Bush 
administration accused Iraq of planning to invade Saudi Arabia. 292 The U.S. 
National Security Council decided at their meeting of August 2, to support 
Operation Plan 90-1002, which involved sending troops to Saudi Arabia.293 
171 
William Crowe, the retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, told ABC on 
August 2, 1990, that the U.S. military oould not playa significant role unless 
invited by Saudi Arabia and given access to Saudi military facilities.294 The Saudi 
Arabian military was generally well equipped but lacked battle experienre and 
was extremely small compared to Iraqi forces. The ratio of Saudi forces to Iraqi 
forces was one to fifteen; while the ratio of all GCC forces to Iraqi forces was one to 
seven, (see Table 10).296 Thus, Saudi Arabia could not defeat Iraqi aggression 
without the help of the U.S. and the U.S. oould not easily take steps to defend its 
interests in Saudi Arabia and the gulf without the public a~ptance of the 
Saudis.296 
President Bush talked about main~g the American way of life which meant he 
had to fight to protect the oil reserves and the price of the oil, ~7 "Our jobs, our way 
of life, our own freedom and the freedom of friendly countries around the world 
(would) all suffer if control of the World's great oil reserves fell into the hands of 
Saddam Hussein".298 
Therefore, the top officials of the Bush administration conrentrated on persuading 
the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, that Iraq planned to 
invade Saudi Arabia and that the U.S. would do what was necessary to defend 
Saudi Arabia. ~ President Bush met with Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan on August 3, 
1990. The Saudis were still reluctant to accept America's help.300 
To show that the U.S. was serious, Richard Cheney, U.S. Secretary of Defense and 
General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, showed top secret 
satellite photographs to Bandar Ibn Sultan to oonvince him that one of the three 
Iraqi annoured divisions was moving through Kuwait to the Saudi border. oo1 They 
then indicated to him that operation plan 90-1002, rested on sending American 
troops to Saudi Arabia. 302 When Bandar Ibn Sultan asked what this would mean 
in numbers, they told him about 100,000-200,000 men. The Ambassador 
expressed his opinion that this did indeed demonstrate seriousness. &)3 Bandar Ibn 
Sultan called King Fahd on the evening of August 3, and told him about his 
meeting and the satellite pictures. 004 
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Table 10 
Iragi forces compared with Gee forces, 1990-1991 
Weapons Iraq Bahrain Oman Qatar 
Total Armed ACTIVE 1.000,000 6,000 29,500 7.500 
Forces RESERVE 850,000 
Main Battle Tanks 5,500 54 39 24 (MET) 
Light Tanks 100 36 
Infantry Fighting 1,500 2 30 
Vebides (AFV) 
Armored Personnel 6,000 103 6 160 
Carriers (APC) 
Self-propelled Artillery 500 12 6 
(SF) 
Towed Artillery 3,000 14 63 8 
Multiple Rocket 200 24 57 18 
Launchers (MRL) 
Combat Aircraft (CBT 689 12 20 
AC) 
Attack Helicopter (AH) 159 
Source: Khaled Bin Sultan. Desert Warrior, 1995, Harper Collins publishers, 
p. 20, from The Military Balance 1990-1991, IISS. 
Saudi Arabia 
UAE 
Armed National 
Forces Guard 
44,000 67,500 55,000 
131 550 
76 
30 500 
510 1.100 1.100 
20 275 
77 200 68 
58 14 
91 189 
19 
For the Saudis to invite American troops into Saudi Arabia was a big step. The 
government of Saudi Arabia was doubtful about the Americans seriousness. They 
worried that the Americans might send over ~me aircraft, as a gesture, but not 
follow it through, leaving Saudi Arabia to face the outcome alone.306 Also, sinre the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia have never been oolonised by foreign power, there was 
oommonly held fear that foreign troops once established would never leave, a 
common enough occurrence in Middle Eastern history. 006 
On August 4, 1990, President Bush met his advi9)rs at Camp David to review 
military options.307 General Norman Schwarzkopf introduood Operation Plan 
90-1002 in two parts; defensive and offensive.308 To implement the oomplete plan 
would involve 200,000-250,000 men and would take four months.m With the U.S. 
navy in the region, along with the size of ground foroo in Saudi Arabia close to 
Kuwait acooss to Saudi bases was needed.310 When the di~ussion turned to using 
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only air power, Powell and Cheney argued that air attacks from their aircraft 
carriers were not enough to do the work, and that the ground foroos were the key 
to . th . 311 Th succes.~ m e operatIon. ey stressed that there was no choioo to having 
U.S. troops based on Saudi territory.312 Powell worried that even if the Iraqis 
pulled back from Kuwait, it would not be the same situation and the region would 
have changed irreversibly.sls President Bush concluded "That is why our defence of 
Saudi Arabia has to be our focus". 314 
Les Aspin, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, said "The Saudis 
are key to the whole thing". 315 For the American, Saudi Arabia, which held large 
supplies of Americans military equipment and through which Iraqi oil flowed via a 
pipeline across Saudi Arabia to the Red Sea port ofYanbu, was the key to any U.S. 
military action against Iraq.316 Therefore, to encourage King Fahd to ask for help, 
President Bush stated publicly on August 4, 1990, "I would be inclined to help in 
any way we possibly can, if the Saudis requested U.S. assistanoo".317 Senior Bush 
administration officials described that as "Making clear publicly that Saudi Arabia 
is prepared to call for outside help ifthreatened".318 
On August 4, 1990, the CIA's spy-satellite took ~me photographs of Iraqi troops in 
the Kuwait-Saudi Neutral Zone.319 President Bush called King Fahd and told him 
that the Iraqi troops were massing along the Saudi border and that he should 
accept American help.320 Bandar had suggested that King Fahd should have an 
American briefing team. 821 Thus, King Fahd told President Bush that he would 
like this briefing first. 322 Presently, the credibility of President Bush was 
dependent on these spy-satellite photographs.s23 At the same time, the Saudi 
defenoo military had sent army ~uts to di~ver if there were any Iraqi troops in 
the Neutral1A>ne or if any Iraqi troops were heading towards Saudi territory. The 
soouts did not find any Iraqi troops and they did not see any evidence of the 
imminent invasion of Saudi Arabia.824 Other satellite photographs produood 
photographs which were less convincing.825 However, it appeared unlikely that 
Iraq had an imminent plan to invade Saudi Arabia since the Iraqis had not 
developed the political pretext for an invasion of Saudi Arabia. 326 During this 
tension, the Saudis used the hotline between Riyadh and Baghdad and the Iraqi 
Chief of staff said that it had been a mistake and that he would cut off the arm of 
any Iraqi ~lider who put his finger over the Saudi border. In the first days after 
the invasion, the I raqis treated Saudis in Kuwait with great respect. 327 The Iraqi 
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Ambassador to the U.S. claimed that Iraq had no intention of invading Saudi 
Arabia. However, the next day the Saudi government mobilised the National 
Guard.328 
Douglas Kelner, the author of the book The Persian Gulf: TV War, stressed that 
the U.S. had exaggerated the Iraqi threat to Saudi Arabia in an attempt to 
legitimise a U.S. military intervention in the Gulf.329 He singled out the 
American's claim that Iraq was preparing to invade Saudi Arabia which served to 
frighten the Saudis into permitting U.S. troop deployment on the Saudi territory 
and to convince the world at large that serious interests like the flow of oil were 
being threatened.330 Dilip Hiro, asserted in his book, Desert Shield to Desert 
Storm. that the U.S. satellite pictures merely showed an Iraqi patrol aocidentally 
straying into the Kuwaiti-Saudi Neutral Zone, which President Bush used as 
evidence of Sad dam's plan to invade Saudi Arabia.331 
The Saudis could not know Saddam's plans in detail, but what he had done was 
threatening enough.332 Iraq was led by an unpredictable leader who had 
demonstrated that he did not keep his word.333 The Saudis saw the invasion of 
Kuwait as a declaration of war against all the Gee countries.334 As a leading 
member of this alliance, Saudi Arabia was pledged to defend Kuwait's legitimate 
government.336 Saudi Arabia sought to resolve the invasion diplomatically within 
an Arab framework, however, this was interpreted by Baghdad as a sign of 
weakness. 336 Even resolutions by the Arab League and the UN failed to compel 
Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait. 337 Therefore, King Fahd decided to go for 
military action against Iraq as this was the only option left.338 King Fahd believed 
that at this time an Arab solution could not be counted on.339 Thus, King Fahd, 
perooived that he had no option but to acoopt the American offer.340 In addition to 
the achieving the liberation of Kuwait, a war against Iraq would bring a number of 
benefits to Saudi Arabia: (1) it would improve the security of Saudi Arabia; (2) it 
would eliminate the Iraqi military and assure a stable Persian Gulf; (3) it would 
correct the military imbalance between Iraq and Saudi Arabia; and (4) it would 
increase Saudi Arabia's regional influence in the Gulf area and inside OPEC.s.u 
King Fahd decided to invite in the American troopS.342 The King's decision was an 
outcome of an agreement between members of the royal family, which had been 
arrived at reinforced over the years, that if their security and the integrity of their 
territory was threatened, then they would not hesitate to ask for aid from any 
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friendly nation with which they had common interests, including the United 
States. 343 However, before taking his decision to invite in the American troops, 
King Fahd had to be confident that he could count on the U.S. and aOO on 
Britain.344 That is why the King spent several hours in the early days of the 
invasion talking on the phone to President Bush and Mrs Thatcher.345 The 
Lieutenant General Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, the Saudi Commander of the 
Coalition Forces during the Gulf war, stated in his book, Desert Warrior, that King 
Fahd had for many years seen that there was no need for a formal alliance with 
the United States.346 King Fahd frequently expressed his view that, if at any time 
Saudi Arabia faced a problem that formed a threat to both Saudi Arabia and the 
U.S., Saudis and Americans would fight together without a formal alliance.347 
However, if American interests were not risked, no formal alliance would oblige 
them to help Saudi Arabia.348 
Sensibly, King Fahd had already defined what kind of action would take place 
before the American briefing mission arrived in Saudi Arabia.349 King Fahd 
declared that: 
How can we believe that Saddam Hussein does not plan an aggression against the 
Kingdom when he has already invaded Kuwait despite guarantees and promises 
made to me. 350 
Thus, the action planned required the removal of Saddam Hussein from Kuwait. 
On August 6, 1990, the American briefing team arrived in Jeddah led by Richard 
Cheney.361 They met King Fahd that evening.352 Cheney'S team included 
Schwarzkopf, Robert Gates of the National Security Council, Paul Wolfowitz, 
Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, and the U.S. Ambassador to Saudi Arabia, 
Charles Freeman363• King Fahd attended with him, Crown Prince, Abdullah, 
Prince Abdulbraman, the Deputy of Defense Minister, Saud Al-Faisal, the Foreign 
Minister and Bandar Ibn Sultan, translated for the King. 364 The Saudi Defense 
Minister, Prince Sultan was abroad rerovering from surgery. but he was oonsulted 
by phone at every stage of the crisis. and he flew back to Saudi Arabia as ~n as 
Cheyney's team arrived and met with Cheney the next day. 366 
General Schwarzkopf highlighted how crucial the Kingdom was to any U.S. 
military options in the Kuwaiti crisis. 366 He displaYE'd pictures of Iraqi troops and 
tanks at the border and said that it was unclear whether or not Iraq would invade 
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Saudi Arabia.357 He then summarised the steps the American troops would take to 
defend Saudi Arabia. 358 Next, a personal message from President Bush was 
relayed by Cheyney: 
Weare prepared to deploy these forces to defend the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia H 
you ask us, we will rome. We will seek no permanent bases. And when you ask us 
to go home we will leave. 359 
Immediately, King Fahd responded "OK".360 In fact, the Cheyney team did not 
believe that King Fahd would make a decision while they were meeting him,361 or 
that he would give them an immediate answer.362 The King's decision changed the 
Saudi foreign policy. 368 The decision was as courageous as Schwarzkopf de~ribed 
it. 364 It was made without the support of the Arab League.365 
Cheyney called President Bush at 10 pm local time (2 pm in Washington) on 
August 6, 1990, from Jeddah to say that he had obtained the Saudi invitation for 
U.S. forces to be stationed on Saudi territory, but on three conditions: 1. that the 
U.S. foroos would withdraw at the King's request; 2. the U.S. forces would acquire 
Saudi permission before launching any offensive military action against Iraq; and 
3. Washington would not make the invitation public until the first U.S. troops were 
landed on Saudi territory.366 Two hours later, President Bush ordered direct 
military assistance to Saudi Arabia which was later called "Operation Desert 
Shield".367 On the same day, August 6, 1990, the UN Security Council issued 
resolution 661. 13 member oountries were in favour, to none against, but Yemen 
and Cuba abstained.368 The resolution called for eoonomic sanctions to be imposed 
on Iraq.369 As a result, Saudi Arabia closed down the Iraqi pipeline as 15,000 U.S. 
troops arrived in Saudi Arabia on August 7, 1990.370 The pipeline crossed Saudi 
Arabia to the Red Sea port at Yanbu, and oould carry 800,000 bpd.371 Turkey also 
closed down the pipeline from Iraq to the Mediterranean Sea. Both pipelines 
shipped 90 per cent of Iraqi oil each year. 372 
President Bush began to feel more secure that the political, eoonomic and military 
phases of his plan were beginning to ge1.373 In contrast, Saddam Hussein began to 
be concerned at the Americans response to the invasion. On August 6, 1990, 
Saddam Hussein called Joseph Wilson, the U.S. Charge d'Affaires in Baghdad, to 
meet him in his office and to take an urgent letter to President Bush.s74 In his 
letter, Saddam made three points. 1. "Kuwait was a state without borders, and 
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whatever happened with the entry of the Iraqi forres can not be measured in the 
framework of the relationship between the states in the Arab world". 376 2. Saddam 
Hussein was worried that his relationship with Saudi Arabia was being damaged. 
Iraq had "an excellent relationship" with Saudi Arabia since 1975, and he 
mentioned Iraq's non-aggression pact with Saudi Arabia in 1989.376 Saddam 
Hussein said "We do not understand the meaning of your (Bush's) declarations that 
you are afraid of Iraq's intentions with respect to Saudi Arabia and that after 
Kuwait will come Saudi Arabia".377 He also said "Your worries are unfounded, but 
if you are merely pretending that worry in order to make Saudi Arabia worry, that 
is something else ... we are ready to give them (our Saudi brothers) any guarantees 
they want, to remove that worry".378 The third and final point dealt with Saddam 
Hussein's pledge to some Arab leaders that he would not use force against Kuwait. 
Saddam Hussein claimed that he had not given that promise to any Arab.379 
Saddam Hussein stated that, "What happened is that some Arab leaders were 
talking to me about the massing of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border, and they 
were telling me that the Kuwaitis were afraid and worried. I told them that I 
promised that I would not take any military action before the meeting in Jeddah 
that we had agreed upon. There was no military action before the (Jeddah) 
meeting. We were waiting for the return of the Vice President, Izzat Ibrahim from 
Jeddah to take a decision".38) Saddam Hussein justified the speed of the invasion 
with the words "The possibility arose before the Jeddah meeting, and in a<n>rdance 
with the first patriotic movement in Kuwait. But it was not the first priority on 
the list. We were putting more effort into asserting our rights through 
negotiations. ,,38 I The Iraqi president then addressed the general issue of 
Baghdad-Washington relations.382 He asked, "Why do you want to be our enemies? 
In our view, you could look after your interests better through building a 
relationship with a strong nationalistic and realistic regime in the area like Iraq 
rather than through the Saudis". 383 
American aircraft started arriving at the military air bases in Saudi Arabia on 
August 18, 1990.384 The army units sent to Saudi Arabia, were the 82nd and 101st 
Airborne divisions and the 24th Infantry Mechanised Division.386 On the first day 
of deployment, at least 5,000 ground troops were sent.386 Another 4,000 Marines 
were deployed near the Saudi-Kuwait border. 387 As Saudi Arabia's oil fjplds were 
along the Gulf coast and within two hundred miles of Kuwait, preredence was to be 
given to fighter aircraft to be based at the military air base at Dhahran where the 
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oilfields are concentrated.388 122 F-15s and F-16s were dispatched in a week. 389 
The build up was by CENTCOM following the plan 90-1002, which ordered 
250,000 troops to Saudi Arabia by Deoomber 1, 1990.390 In addition, Saudi Arabia 
allowed access to its impressive network of air bases, posts and army facilities to 
the U.S. and other foreign forces. 391 It also allowed them to use the huge airfields 
and their vast underground hangers at Dhahran and Riyadh, as well as the 
heavily fortified base at King Khalid Military City in the north of Saudi Arabia. 392 
The American and allied deployment in Saudi Arabia went smoothly. This was 
helped by the fact that the Saudi military had been equipped by Western powers 
and Western advisers had designed and oonstructed a military organisation for 
Saudi Arabia. American officials oommented on the Saudi military construction as 
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense during Carter's Presidency, said in late 1979 
"A number of countries in the area can maintain bases which, in an emergency in 
which they asked our help, we could then come in and use".398 Caspar Weinberger, 
Secretary of Defense during Reagan's Presidency, made evident in his classified 
1984-1988 Defense Guidanoo report that U.S. and not Saudi Forces, would be the 
first line forces in any crisis.394 He said, "Whatever the circumstances, we should 
be prepared to introduce American forces directly into the region should it appear 
that the security of access to Persian Gulf oil is threatened".396 A classified State 
Department Study prepared for Congressional leaders by Richard Murphy, 
Assistant Secretary of State, was leaked to The New York Times on September 5, 
1985.896 In it was stated that, "Although the Saudis have steadfastly resisted 
formal access agreements", they have al~ indicated that "Access will be 
forthooming for United States forres as neoossary to oounter Soviet aggression or in 
regional crises they can not manage on their own" .397 
On August 8, 1990, Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, reminded reporters of the 
political ties between the U.S. and King Fahd and his country.~ He explained 
that Iraq's naked aggression, linked with Bush's pem>nal diplomacy and Saudi 
Arabia's historic ties to the United States, had persuaded King Fahd to ask for U.S. 
military assistanoo.399 Cheney de~ribed the di~ussion with King Fahd as a 
significant moment and the U.S. deployment as a major oommitment of U.S. 
forres.400 He al~ said "We do not know how events will unfold over the next few 
months, but obviously, the President has made it very clear ... this is a part of the 
world that is of absolute strategic significanoo to the United States and we are 
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prepared to use U.S. military force, if necessary, to protect our interests and those 
of our friends in the area" .401 In addition, the Pentagon told the reporters that the 
U.S. rapid deployment was a message to deter further aggression by Iraqis.402 
The Bush administration perceived that it would not be possible to carry on a war 
in the Gulf without the consent, if not the support, of the American people. 
Therefore, on August 8, 1990, President Bush addressed Americans on 
television.403 He explained, "At my direction, elements of the 82nd Airborne 
Division as well as key units of the United States Air Force are arriving today to 
take up defensive positions in Saudi Arabia". 404 President Bush declared four 
principle objectives of U.S. policy: "First, Iraq's immediate, unconditional and 
complete withdrawal from Kuwait. Second, achieving the security and stability of 
the Persian Gulf. Third, the restoration of Kuwait's legitimate government. And 
fourth, the safeguarding of American lives". 406 He said "Iraq has amassed an 
enormous war machine on the Saudi border, capable of initiating hostilities with 
little or no additional preparations ... The sovereign independenre of Saudi Arabia 
is of vital interest to the U .S."400 President Bush said that "U.S. forees will work 
together with those of Saudi Arabia and other nations to preserve the integrity of 
Saudi Arabia and to deter aggression by Iraq".407 He made clear that "The mission 
of our troops is wholly defensive". Equally important, he said, "Our country now 
imports nearly half the oil it consumes and could face a major threat to its 
economic independence".~ Most interesting of all in this context was the oil issue. 
This was a main element of prospective danger for the administration in this 
particular conflict and one to which the President Bush was especially sensitive. In 
fact, President Bush was linked in the public mind with two things: Arabs and oil 
as an oil man for several years.409 Ironically, he had worked for the first American 
company to have drilled wells in Kuwait. President Bush could not tolerate the 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.410 Undoubtedly, President Bush observed that basic 
American interests at stake. He went to the Gulf crisis with his own experiences 
and concerns. Iraq's control over a substantial part of the world's oil reserves could 
have threatened America's standard of living and the economy, due to U.S. 
dependence on foreign oil. It was a oonfrontation which the U.S. could not afford to 
lose. 
American military deployment terrified Saddam H~in.411 On August 9, 1990, 
Saddam started deploying a number of anti·air craft guns, artillery and 
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rocket-launchers in Kuwait City and along the coast.412 He ordered the borders of 
Iraq and Kuwait closed, trapping thousands of Westerners and other foreigners.413 
He also ordered all foreign embassies in Kuwait to cease functioning within two 
weeks. Since the state of Kuwait has been the 19th province of Iraq by Saddam's 
decree of August 8, 1990, he expected all matters of foreign relations to be carried 
out by embassies in Baghdad.414 
On August 7, 1990, to counter the Iraqi invasion, a special meeting of the GCC 
issued a strongly-worded re&Jlution, condemning Iraq and demanding an 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal from Kuwait.415 On August 9, 1990, 
King Fahd addressed his country, his most important speech since the invasion. 416 
King Fahd described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as "The most horrible aggression 
the Arab nation has known in its recent history".417 He articulated the Saudi policy 
to contain the problem between Iraq and Kuwait.418 He reasserted the Kingdom's 
demand that things return to the situation that was in existence before the Iraqi 
invasion and for the return of the Kuwaiti ruling family under Shaikh Jabir 
Al-Sabah.419 King Fahd explained the aim of the government's decision to invite 
foreign troops into Saudi Arabia. He stated that the presence of these troops in 
Saudi Arabia would be temporary and that they would leave when requested to do 
so. W He also informed the Saudi people that the policy that he had taken was 
defensive and not directed against anyone:421 
In the aftermath of this regrettable event, Iraq massed huge forms on the borders 
of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In the view of these bitter realities and of the 
eagerness of the Kingdom to safeguard its territory and to protect its vital interests 
and its economic potentials. and its wish to bolster its defence capability and to 
raise the level of training of its armed force - in addition to the keenness of the 
government of the Kingdom to resort to peace and non-recourse to force to solve 
disputes - the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia expressed its wish for the participation of 
fraternal Arab forces and other friendly forces. 422 
King Fahd's speech was reinforced by a fatwa from Saudi Ulema.423 The 
conservative religious elite in Saudi ~iety was sensitive to the West. The elite 
disapproved of Western lifestyles behaviour and the very presence of Westerners in 
the Kingdom.424 The Saudi government also understood the sensitivity of Arab 
world toward a western, especially, American presence in the region.42li Therefore, 
the Saudi government searched for the approval of the leading jurists on this 
subject. l ;):"\ The Saudi Ulema approved the Western presence stating that "Fighting 
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an aggressor who is engaged in the killing of Mu..<;lims and the destruction of their 
possessions is a religious duty and must be battled and deterred by any means 
including asking the help of the people of the book, until he (the aggressor) adheres 
to the principles of Islam" .427 
On August 10, 1990, one day after King Fahd had delivered the speech, he went to 
Cairo to attend an emergency Arab summit.428 The Arab summit would prove 
decisive for Saudi Arabia, because it was the last chance for the Saudis to persuade 
Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait.429 In addition, King Fahd gave his 
permission for the U.S. deployment in Saudi Arabia before he went to the Arab 
summit. He wanted to have a bargaining card to put pressure on Arabs to 
persuade Saddam to withdraw from Kuwait and to reinforce the Saudi stand 
against Iraqi invasion. In fact, the summit had been ~heduled to meet on August 
9, 1990, but had been delayed to give Saddam Hussein a final opportunity to 
withdraw from Kuwait, or if not, withdraw them, to give some time to persuade 
Saddam to attend the summit.430 However, Saddam Hussein again refused to 
attend as long as the Emir of Kuwait was present.431 Iraq was represented by its 
First Deputy Premier, Taha Yasin Ramadan, and its Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, 
but they did not sit at the same table as the Kuwaiti rulers, since they regarded 
Kuwait as being an integral part of Iraq.432 At the summit, the Arab League 
supported Saudi Arabia's right to self-defence under Article 51 of the UN Charter 
giving approval for Western military intervention.433 The summit rejected Iraq's 
annexation of Kuwait, supported UN sanctions and called on Iraq to withdraw 
immediately.434 The Arab League also called for Arab countries to send troops to 
Saudi Arabia.435 The resolutions were passed by only twelve of the twenty 
countries represented, Tunisia's representative did not arrive, Iraq and Libya voted 
against the re~lutions and the PLO, Yemen, and Algeria abstained. 436 Sudan, 
Jordan and Mauritania all expressed reservations while voting for the 
resolutions.437 The Saudis viewed the abstentions, reservations and absences as 
canting fence-sitting which did nothing to end the hostility.4~ Immediately after 
the summit, troops from Egypt, Syria and MoJ."O<m were rommitted to the 
multinational force. 439 
Arab support for the U.S. actions became public, the principle of committing troops 
to safeguard Saudi Arabia had heen agreed and an anti-Iraq Arab coalition was 
started.440 In fact, the U.S. put pressun? on Egypt, the most powerful military statR 
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in the Arab world, to take a strong stand on the Iraqi invasion.441 An urgent 
message from W a.~hington to the Egyptian Foreign Minister on August 3, 1990, 
warned him that if they did not take a strong position on the Iraqi invasion they 
would no longer be able to count on further supplies of U.S. military hardware.442 
Following a pledge from President Bush to write off its $6.75 billion military loans 
to Egypt, and to continue providing more than $2 billion a year in aid Egypt 
agreed to the U.S. requests. 443 Therefore, President Mubarak reversed his joint 
decision he had taken with King Hussein of Jordan to refrain from an immediate 
condemnation of Iraq. This came as a bitter disappointment to Saddam.444 The 
American pressure made him agree to lobby the meeting of the Arab League on 
August 3, and the Arab summit on August 10, 1990, to pass a re~lution against 
Iraq, and to send his troops to Saudi Arabia. 445 Saudi Arabia al~ cancelled $4.2 
billion worth of debts to Egypt and provided further aid worth ~me $4.5 billion.446 
For Syria, the advantage of participating in the coalition against Iraq was to defeat 
its long-standing historical rival, the Iraqi Ba'ath regime. This would increase 
Syria's position in the Arab world.447 Syria also looked to Saudi Arabia to provide 
more financial aid.448 Therefore, the Syrian President was given immediately aid 
worth $500 million by Saudi Arabia, with a pledge of a further $500 million, if he 
sent his troops to Saudi Arabia.449 In addition, Syria received a total of $5 billion in 
grants from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait alone during the Gulf crisis. 450 
Certainly, Iraq's invasion showed Saudi Arabia who were their friends and who 
were their enemies.451 The Saudis believed that Jordan, the PLO and Yemen had 
arranged to take control of the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia.452 The Saudis 
believed that these countries shared a common displeasure with the GCC states for 
having oil while they had none.453 Saddam Hussein was supported by them in 
exchange for a share of the booty.454 The Saudi Defenre Minister, Prinre Sultan 
rbn Abdulaziz, claimed that he had evidence suggesting that Iraq had intended to 
extend "The circle of aggression to include the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states". 456 Further evidence is given by General H. Nonnan Schwankopf that 
an Iraqi defector escaped to Egypt carrying a blueprint for an invasion into the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.456 According to the Saudi press, the invasion of Saudi 
Arabia would be achieved by Iraqi troops advancing from the North and Yemeni 
forces invading from the ~uth of Saudi Arabia.45i The Eastern province of Saudi 
Arabia woulrl be under Iraqi control, the Western province would be granted to 
Jordan, and the Southern Province to Yemen.468 Another important piece of 
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evidence is that after the May 1990, union of the two Yemens into the Republic of 
Yemen, an official Yemeni newspaper issued a map showing Yemeni territory 
extending far into the Hijazi province of Saudi Arabia. 459 For the Palestinians, 
since they were present in Kuwait in large numbers, they would establish a 
temporary homeland there under Saddam's sponsorship.4&) 
Both Jordan and Yemen received large amounts of Saudi foreign aid.461 However, 
the people in Jordan saw only a little portion of the Saudi aid as the political elite 
used most of this aid for its own interesu,.462 Yemen enjoyed extensive Saudi 
support politically, economically and militarily. 463 But, the border problems 
between Yemen and Saudi Arabia were given inflated importance by the 
Yemenis.464 The Saudi government could not understand the Yemeni attitude, and 
their refusal to recognise the borders that had been agreed officially in the Ta'if 
treaty signed between the two countries in 1934.465 
As the Gulf crisis continued the Saudi foreign policy grew stronger.466 On 
September 19, 1990, Saudi Arabia expelled Jordanian, Palestinian, Yemeni and 
Iraqi diplomau" charging them with activities "incompatible with their status 
which had endangered security" .467 The same day Saudi Arabia cut all oil supplies 
to Jordan (33,000 bd worth $1 million), referring to non-payment of bills and also 
Saudi Arabia cut off all imports of Jordanian produce.468 Jordanian losses in the 
fIrst year of the crisis have been estimated at some 50 percent of GDP.469 In 
addition, Saudi Arabia declared new visa regulations for the Yemenis (more than 
1.5 million), which compelled them to leave Saudi Arabia. 470 
Given the situation, the Iraqi President Saddam Hussein felt that he was i~lated 
from the key Arab countries. He decided to try to split the Arab coalition by 
appealing to the Arab people. During the Arab summit on August 10, 1990, he 
asked all Arabs to: "Save Mecca and the tomb of the prophet Mohammed in 
Medina from ~upation... this is the day for you to stand up to defend Mecca, 
which is captive of the spears of the Americans and Zionisu,... imperialism 
attended to its interests in oil ... when it established these dwarf oil states. Thus, it 
prevented the majority of sons of the people and the Arab nation from benefiting 
from their own wealth".471 
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In response to Saddam's call to protect the Islamic holy places from occupation by 
Americans, the Muslim World League, based in Mecca, made it clear that the 
conflict wne was far away from the two holy places and that the military forces 
were located along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border more than 900 miles away.472 In 
several interviews with American television networks on August 10, 1990, Prince 
Bandar Ibn Sultan, the Saudi Ambassador to the U.S., stated that the holy places 
are in safe hands.473 He commented on the American deployment with the words 
"These forres are in place because of the crisis which has resulted from Iraqi 
aggression" .474 The Prince commented on the Iraqi President's attack on Saudi 
Arabia over the fact that it was seeking the assistance of the United States. He 
contrasted it with the Iraqi position during the Iran-Iraq war, when Saddam 
Hussein had asked for Saudi support to get help from the U.S. 476 At this time, 
Saddam considered seeking U.S. support a patriotic act. 476 Prince Bandar stated 
that Saddam Hussein had often received help from the U.S. but only now Saddam 
talked of American assistance as coming from "imperialists". 477 In general, Prince 
Bandar described the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait as "Very serious and resulting 
purely from the aggression of Iraq against Kuwait". 478 
Thereafter, Saddam Hussein recognised that he was still on the defensive.479 
Therefore, he tried another manoeuvre.480 On August 12, 1990, Saddam Hussein 
presented a three point initiative as a pre-oondition to the withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops from Kuwait. First, an immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Israeli 
forces from the occupied Arab territories in West Bank, Jerusalem, and Gaza Strip, 
and also a similar withdrawal of Syria from Lebanon. 481 Seoond, an immediate 
withdrawal of American troops and other forces from Saudi Arabia. These forces 
would be replaced by Arab troops whose size, nationality, duty and deployment 
would be defined by the UN Security Council.482 Third, all boycott and siege 
decisions against Iraq should be frozen immediately.483 
Throughout the crisis by linking Kuwait to the Palestinian question. Saddam 
Hu~in desired to represent himself as the champion of the Arab cause and the 
winner of the majority of the Arab people.484 Immediately, Saddam Hussein's 
linkage was welcomed by Palestinians and the Jordanian press. People on the 
streets of Jordan, mounted pro-Saddam demonstrations. 485 The~ was an ab~lute 
th I that Saddam had made the right links."''*' The con~nsus among ese peop e 
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response to Saddam's proposal, by the Arab members of the coalition and the U.S. 
was to reject it and not even di'3CUSS it (see Chapter six).487 
Saddam Hussein recognised that the U.S. and Saudi Arabia were preparing for 
war more rapidly and with far greater resolve than he had expected.488 Thus, on 
August 15, 1990, Saddam Hussein sent a letter to the Iranian President, Ali Akbar 
Hashemi Rafsanjani, suggesting a peace with Iran.48fj The Iraqi leader agreed to 
share ~vereignty over the Shatt AI-Arab waterway, one of the main causes of the 
eight year war with Iran.4oo Saddam Hus~in al~ pledged a withdrawal of Iraqi 
troops from all remaining areas of Iran which had been occupied during the war, as 
well as exchange of pri~ners of war. 491 In short, this meant a return to the 
situation that existed before the Iran-Iraq war, which was ba~d on the 1975 
Algiers agreement.492 The Iraqi letter took the Iranian leadership by complete 
surprise, but it became obvious within the next day that Iraq no longer wished to 
concern itself over Iran on its eastern side.493 However, Iran was concerned over 
the occupation of Kuwait, and publicly declared support for the U.S. and Saudi 
Arabia. 494 Actually, the Iranian leadership described the American deployment as a 
"safeguard to Saudi Arabia in the face of Iraqi threats". 495 
On the international level, the strongest support for the U.S. was from Britain. 496 
Having been in the u.s. when Iraq invaded Kuwait, Prime Minister, Margaret 
Thatcher, was closely a~iated with the development of the American strategy 
from the beginning.497 Britain ~nt to Saudi Arabia and the Gulf, strike aircraft 
interceptors. naval forces and an armoured brigade. It was third only to the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia in the number of forces in the area.498 
By now, the Gulf cnsIS had moved into a dramatic struggle between two 
opponents, George Bush and Saddam Hussein.499 The Director of the Washington 
Institute for Near East Policy, Martin Indyk, described the situation in the Gulf as 
a battle shaping up between Iraq and the United States over Saudi Arabia.5OJ 
While, Galen Carpenter, Foreign Policy Director of the Cato Institute, said "As 
Washington rushed into the conflict it seemed almost grateful for the opportunity 
to demonstrate America's continuing global leadership in a post-Cold War 
setting". f()} Indeed, Presidflnt Bush talked to the Pentagon staff on August 15, 
1990, which he stressed that there was "No substitute for American leadership, 
which could not be effective in the absence of American strength".1iO"2 He repea~d 
186 
the American objectives in the Gulf with the words "The free flow of oil, was 
necessary to protect our jobs, our way of life, our own freedom and the freedom of 
friendly countries around the world, which would all suffer if control of the world's 
oil reserves fell into the hands of Sad dam Hussein".503 
President Bush's speech to the American nation and to the Pentagon staff declared 
that the U.S. must make a stand not simply to protect resources, but to protect the 
freedom of nations. rot President Bush said the defence of Saudi Arabia was of "vital 
interest" to the United States, which explained his decision to send U.S. troops to 
Saudi Arabia.505 But President Bush's top objective did not clarify how the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait touched the lives of Americans or affected their future. 50S For 
many Americans, the connection was not clear.507 The rapid increase in oil prices, 
from $16 barrel to $30 on August 18, led many Americans to wonder "why should 
we be involved? We could get oil from Mexico".~ Even former u.S. President 
Carter said "It would be a mistake to send U.S. troops to the Middle East unless 
Iraq al~ invades Saudi Arabia".OO9 
Thomas L. Friedman explained that the reason that the Bush administration did 
not clearly articulate what was at stake was that the true political and economic 
interests involved were not as morally superior as some of the principles used by 
President Bush to justify the deployment of troops to Saudi Arabia.510 Friedman 
stressed that the United States did not send troops to help Saudi Arabia to resist 
Iraqi aggression from Kuwait.611 It was about oil, supporting the OPEC countries 
that were more likely to supply Washington's interests and punishing those that 
are not, and about who will set the prioo of oil.512 
In other words, the interests of the Bush administration could be divided into three 
categories: (1) the prioo of oil, (2) who controls the oil, and (3) the requirement to 
defend the integrity of national boundaries.513 The oil price debate goes as follows: 
if Iraq was able to get away with the annexation of Kuwait, Iraq would control 20 
per cent of the world's oil reserves.514 If Iraq could then intimidate or invade Saudi 
Arabia, the Iraqis would have authority over 45 per cent of the world's oil 
reserves.515 Undoubtedly, this would be unsatisfactory for the U.S., because Iraq 
would be able to control the oil price set by OPEC.516 In the OPEC meeting b~fore 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Iraq was pressing 0 PEC countries to increase th~ oil 
price from about $15 a barrel to $25.517 As has been noted, Saudi Arabia oonvin~d 
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Iraq and other members of OPEC to adopt the price of $21 a barrel.518 The 
difference for Americans between $21 a barrel and $25 a barrel was about 5 cents 
a gallon at the gas station pump.519 In the other words, according to the price 
argument, one reason that the Bush administration rushed into Saudi Arabia was 
to get petrol 5 cents a gallon cheaper than it would otherwise.5?JJ But some 
American officials argued that there was more at stake than a 5 cent increase at 
the gasoline station pump.521 They said, Saddam Hussein was only asking for $25 a 
barrel because at that time, he did not oontrol OPEC enough to ask more.522 If Iraq 
could, directly or indirectly dominate 45 per cent of the world's oil reserves, 
American officials argued, who knows what price Saddam would seek; $40 a barrel 
or maybe $50 a barre1.523 That would force all Western economies into recession.524 
On the other hand, it was not all clear that Saddam Hussein would have any more 
interest in increasing oil prices to $50 a barrel than Saudi Arabia did when it 
controlled 0 PEC. 525 The U.S. with 2 per cent of the world's population and about 4 
per cent of its oil reserves, oonsumes a quarter of the world's oil, but only produces 
about one-seventh of the world's supply.526 The U.S. is in fact, the world's largest oil 
importer. 527 
The second category is who oontrols the oil. The debate goes, that it is in the U.S. 
interest that the oontrol of oil be divided among many 00 un tries, but that the 
greatest influence to be in Saudi hands.528 The reason is that, unlike Iraq, Saudi 
Arabia had been historically more responsive to U.S. interests since it was 
anti-Soviet Union.529 In the past, when the U.S. was opposing the Soviet Union and 
contesting with Moscow for influence in the Middle East, whose allies dominated 
the oil reserves had a military and strategic dimension. 530 Yet, with the Soviet 
Union's co-operation during the Gulf crisis, that debate has to be dismissed.531 
The third category is the requirement to defend the integrity of national 
boundaries so that dictatorial regional powers would not easily invade their 
neighbours.532 American officials discussed the stability of the post-Cold War 
world.533 Surely, they argued, it is necessary for future world security that the U.S. 
and the Soviet Union steadfastly and together present a clear sign that the Iraqi 
invasion and others of that type would not be areepted.534 The sovereignty of 
nations must be supported as Secretary of State, James Baker. said in a speech to 
NATO in the fIrst week of the Iraqi invasion, "If might is to make right, then the 
world will be plunged into a new dark age". 535 
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Undoubtedly, the vital interests to which President Bush referred are both genuine 
and important, given the U.S. great dependence on imported oil.536 The Bush 
administration had a complete set of assumptions about the significance of the 
Persian Gulf, particularly Saudi Arabia.537 However, it did not always spell out 
effectively to the American public what was at stake.538 In the second week of the 
Iraqi invasion, General Colin Powell said to General H. Norman Schwankopf"1 
don't see us going to war over Kuwait. Saudi Arabia, yes, if we had to; but not 
Kuwait" .539 The failure of the American people to understand the justification of 
their troops deployment in Saudi Arabia can be understood because of the failure of 
President Bush and his staff to explain their foreign policy about the Gulf crisis to 
the American people in terms they could understand.540 
The American people could not be blamed for not understanding their 
government's foreign policy. However, the same can not be said for American 
officials and members of the press, since they lived in world of the U.S. foreign 
policy and they should have understood the factors necessitating sending U.S. 
troops to Saudi Arabia. For instance, Representative Robert Doman, a 
conservative Republican from California, said with heavy sarca';m "American don't 
die for Princes, Sultans and Emirs". 541 Each day the questioning about whether 
American blood was worth shedding for cheap oil grew 10uder.542 Even the New 
York Times wrote on its front page during the fIrst month of the Iraqi invasion, 
"Surely, it is not American policy to make the world safe for federalism" .543 If not, 
then why was the U.S. government so concerned about the Iraqi oreupation? 
The 1990 oil crisis 
Equally important, one significant question stood out, since the price of oil had 
nearly doubled from $16 a barrel pre- the Iraqi invasion to S30 a barrel by August 
8, 1990.544 Would the U.S. use its Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) , to protect 
the economies of oil consuming nations? The SPR was established in the middle 
1970s and was now holding more than 600 million barrels of oil in reserve.545 The 
SPR was accumulated to prevent economic disruption caused by increases in the 
price of oil.546 From the beginning of the Gulf crisis, there was an important 
argument.547 Was the SPR to be used only in the event of an oil shortage caused by 
the Iraqi invasion and the UN sanctions against Iraq, or was it also to be used to 
prevent a major oil price that would greatly hurt the U.S. eoonomy?f>48 Some 
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analysts pointed out that a doubling of the oil price would deal a massive blow to 
the entire economy.549 In the event of a crisis, the rule of "early release" had been 
advanced by the Reagan administration, and the SPR might well have been used 
to flood the oil market, thus, stopping a major oil price rise, which had happened in 
1973 and 1979 to such a disastrous effect.550 
On August 19, 1990, after the price of oil had risen to $30 a barrel, Saudi Arabia 
announced that it was willing to increase its own oil production to fill the gap in 
world oil production of ~me 3 million bId. The shortfall was caused by the loss of 
Iraqi and Kuwaiti oil supplies.551 King Fahd stated that "Saudi Arabia wishes 
there to be sufficient oil supplies available on the world market at normal prices, so 
that no countries, be they developing or developed are harmed as a result of the 
Iraqi aggression".552 This has been described, as one of Saudi Arabia's most 
important economic contributions to the stability of the oil market during the Gulf 
crisis and significantly moderated its global effects. 563 At the end of August 1990, 
Saudi production had been increased by 2 million bId, to 7.4 million bid. It reached 
over 8 million bId by November 1990, and the American debate over SPR was 
settled.554 
In spite of the rise in oil production, oil price did not stop increasing, but the 
pressure on the price of oil was moderated.555 From nearly $40 per barrel in early 
October 1990, prices fell to below $30 per barrel later in that month and to $20 in 
December.566 By the end of 1990, the oil supply requirement was improved, as the 
U.S. and other countries headed into economic recession.557 
Furthermore, in the middle of August 1990, there was no evidence of any oil 
producers preparing to meet the oil gap left by Iraq and Kuwait.558 Saudi Arabia 
alone could fill about two-thirds of the oil gap, as long as its security was 
guaranteed.569 Since, the U.S. had committed itself to help Saudi Arabia and to 
protect the country from Iraq, then Saudi Arabia was obligated to moderate the 
effects of the crisis on the world markets. Therefore, on August 19, 1990, the Saudi 
Oil Minister, Hisham Nazar, announced that his country would increase 
production by 2 million bId. However, within two days at an emergency meeting of 
OPEC to authorise the increases in production, some of the other OPEC members 
did not agree. 560 Not surprisingly, Iraq declared any such increase in production 
would be an "act of aggression". Iraq was still hoping that oil pressures would 
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undermine the bond of the coalition.5131 Libya supported Iraq.562 Iran was pleased at 
the general direction of the price of oil. 563 These three countries argued that there 
was already sufficient oil to meet demand without new efforts.564 Others, including 
Indonesia, Algeria and Nigeria's supported a modest rise. f65 They did not see it as 
the Cartel's mis.'3ion to save the West from its economic crisis.566 They believed if 
the matters were that serious then the West should free some of its strategic 
reserves.567 In contrast, the countries who sided with Saudi Arabia were the UAE, 
Venezuela, Kuwait and Qatar.568 
In the end, the majority of OPEC were still convinced that the Saudi direction had 
to be followed if OPEC itself was to have any hope of surviving the crisis.569 On 
August 28, 1990, an agreement was reached which called for a temporary 
suspension of OPEC quotas to allow for higher oil production.570 It called also for a 
return to the regular OPEC quotas when the oil crisis was considered to be over.571 
To pass this re&>lution, the OPEC Ministers went into formal sessions, and issued 
invitations to the Iraqis and the Libyans to attend before they did &>.572 The two 
did not come, but with ten of the OPEC's thirteen members supporting the 
resolution to suspend quotas the re&>lution was passed.573 As a result, Venezuela 
and the UAE fIlled the rest of the oil gap, as well as, to a lesser extent, Nigeria.574 
As a result of the rise in the price of oil and their increase in oil production, Saudi 
Arabia made $13 billion in oil revenues by the end of 1990.575 But the costs to 
Saudi Arabia of the Kuwait crisis were great and they were growing.576 Saudi 
Arabia had to pay Saudi hotels and homes for the accommodation, of 360,000 
Kuwaitis who had escaped the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 577 In addition, in early 
September 1990, King Fahd ordered that U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia would be 
supplied with all food fuel, water, areommodation, local transport and other 
facilities that they needed at Saudi expense.578 Saudi Arabia al&> paid over $5.5 
billion as aid to poor Asian and African countries that were affected by the crisis.579 
Even the Soviet Union prepared itself to ask for money, despite the extra $2 billion 
which Moscow had gained from the increase in oil prices.58J The Soviet Union 
claimed to be a super power with its own viewpoint and the option to support 
Iraq.581 Thus, Saudi Arabia paid Moscow $4 billion to ensure its loyalty.582 In 
general, Saudi Arabia's estimated expenditure directly related to the Kuwait crisis 
was about $64 billion and the U.S. got alone more than £13.5 billion.583 
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Bangladesh and Pakistan were the only two Muslim countries in Asia to agree to 
send troops to Saudi Arabia, in the hope of receiving aid. 584 Pakistan sent 5,000 
men and asked initially that Saudi Arabia pay $1 billion to compensate its 
economy for losses caused by the crisis.585 Malaysia and Indonesia declined to send 
troops, despite the aid which they had received from Saudi Arabia for many 
years.586 For instance, Indonesia received more than $234 million and had more 
than 300,000 males and females working in Saudi Arabia.587 
Undoubtedly, the strongest help apart from that received from the U.S. and the 
U.K. came to Saudi Arabia from the Western countries; France, Belgium, 
Australia, Canada and others.588 With all these countries coming to assist, 
President Bush wanted time to integrate the coalition, build up military strength 
in Saudi Arabia and to allow the economic sanctions to work.589 If President Bush 
had moved quickly to take early and risky action it might have failed and left 
Saddam with permanent profits, from his original aggression.590 Thus, President 
Bush continued his efforts to obtain a U.N. re&>lution on the implementation of the 
anti-Iraq embargo by military means. UN resolution 665 called on the states 
co-operating with the government of Kuwait, to stop all navigational shipping to 
or from Iraq by force if necessary.591 The re&>lution was passed on August 25, 
1995, by 13 to 0 with Yemen and Cuba abstaining.592 The resolution was the first 
in the crisis to sanction the option of force. 593 It also displayed that the initiative 
still lay with the U.S. and its allies. 594 
On August 30, 1990, the Washington Post reported that the Bush administration 
had put together an eoonomic action plan to cover the mst of the deployment of 
U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia and to aid the countries harmed by the trade embargo 
against Iraq. 596 Of the $25 billion to be collected half would go to funding "Desert 
Shield", it was estimated, which would cost $6 billion through to the end of 1990 
and a further $1 billion a month after that on average.596 Saudi Arabia would pay 
$4 billion immediately and another $500 million a month to cover food, water and 
transportation and other costs for the foreign troops on Saudi territory; Kuwait $5 
billion and another $400 million every month; and the UAE $1 billion and another 
$100 million a month. 597 This presented a total from the three GCC states of S 1 0 
billion immediately and $1 billion each month.598 Other contributions came from 
rJapan $4 billion; the European Community; and West Germany $1.8 billion.599 
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Arab efforts to find a solution 
Some Arab leaders sided with Iraq and called for an alternative "Arab ~lution" to 
the Gulf crisis. For instance, on August 28, 1990, King Hussein of Jordan and 
Vasser Arafat suggested that: 1) the joint withdrawal of Iraqi troops from Kuwait 
and foreign troops from Saudi Arabia, the Iraqi troops in Kuwait to be replaced by 
an Arab peacekeeping force; 2) an election in Kuwait to choose a new Kuwaiti 
government and a new parliament, with the new government signing an 
agreement giving Iraq oortain rights over Kuwait.Em The idea was to tum Kuwait 
into another Monaco, independent in name but in reality dependent on its 
neighbour.601 
Other Arab leaders supported Saudi Arabia's call for an "Arab solution". On 
November 13, 1990, King Hassan II of Morocco called for an emergency Arab 
summit to work out an Arab solution to the Gulf crisis and avoid war over Iraq's 
refusal to quit Kuwait.Em Actually, King Hassan's proposal came after Iraqi's First 
Deputy Prime Minister, Taha Yassin Ramadan, returned to Baghdad after a 
meeting with King Hassan.603 The official Iraqi News Agency said President 
Saddam would consider attending the Arab summit if he was consulted on the time 
and the place and if the Palestinian problem was on the agenda.604 Ramadan also 
said that an Arab summit should "Erase the infamous Cairo summit resolution, 
which created divisions in the Arab stance toward the dangers (facing it) and the 
collusion against the Arab nation created by its enemies, led by the U.S. and its 
allies" .606 
Saudi Arabia for its part rejected all the Arab proposals including King Hassan's 
proposal. The government of Saudi Arabia said that it would not take part in any 
proposed Arab summit until Iraq promised to pullout of Kuwait.60S The Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Saud AI-Faisal, said that any Arab meetings will bear no fruit or 
results unless Iraq promises to follow the resolutions of the emergency Arab 
summit and of the United Nations.607 Therefore, Saddam Hussein tried to meflt 
with Kind Fahd personally.~ All of the messages sent by Saddam Hu.~~in to 
King Fahd through indirect channels stressed that the crisis would be resolved if 
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this meeting took place.609 But, King Fahd always rejected to meet with him 
unless Sad dam H us..'3ein officially announced his re~lution to withdraw from 
Kuwait.610 
The U.S.-Saudi offensive option 
Iraq had no choice but to endure the impact of the UN embargo on its economy. 
Saddam Hussein thought that the longer the crisis went on, the greater the 
chances were that Iraq would be able to claim a victory.6ll The economic embargo 
caused Iraq to loose about $80 million in oil revenue alone.612 By December 1990, 
it has been reported that the embargo had produced a 50 per cent drop in Iraq's 
GNP.613 However, the Iraqi people could live with the embargo because Iraq had 
already had been through an economic recession during its eight-year war with 
Iran.614 During the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein had asked Iraqi women to feed 
their families half their usual food.615 Thus, it was not hard for the Iraqis to 
manage with the new sanctions. Despite the fact that Jordan and Yemen helped to 
break the sanctions, the sanctions placed on Iraq were still effective.616 
In fact, sanctions alone did not force Saddam Hussein out of Kuwait.617 The United 
Nations Security Council had already determined that sanctions alone would 
simply not be enough.6Is What was suggested was that an embargo should be 
implemented for a period of time, alongside the build-up a military of force. The 
force would be used when the embargo was considered to be failing to achieve 
Washington's and Riyadh's goals.619 
Saudi Arabia was convinced that sanctions and the requests of the international 
community would not compel Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.6~ Once the Saudis 
had reached that conclusion, they had no choice other than to prepare for war. To 
the Saudis it seemed that war was the only way to reach a satisfactory end to the 
Kuwait crisis and the way that would bring the most benefit to Saudi Arabia and 
create the most secure situation in the Gulf.621 King Fahd stated that Saudi's aim 
in the war was to force Iraq to withdraw to within its borders and to restore the 
rule of AJ-Sabah family in Kuwait and to remove the threat to the Kingdom's 
security.622 The Saudis had no dispute with the Iraqi people.1323 The problem was 
not just Iraq's power, but Saddam's ambition.624 That ambition, expres.wd in 
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repeated aggression, must be defeated decisively to bring the situation to a 
conclusion as quickly as possible.625 Because of regional and domestic 
consideration, the government of Saudi Arabia did not want the break-up of 
Iraq.626 At the same time, the U.S. and Saudi Arabia would still continue to need 
Iraq as a regional counterbalance to Iran.627 For this purpose, it was adequate to 
silence Saddam and to destroy his capability to command a force against the 
alliance troops in Saudi Arabia.628 Therefore, to destroy Iraq's chemical, biological 
and other weapons of mass destruction were at the top of the list of alliance 
objectives.629 The CIA issued a report that Iraq was only two years away from 
making nuclear weapon.630 
Nevertheless, when the U.S. and Saudi Arabia agreed that the U.S. would deploy 
troops in Saudi Arabia, there were no formal instruments and detailed guidelines 
laid down.631 Thus, in early September 1990, strains appeared between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia. The strain was related to the control of the military command 
of the coalition and who controlled decisions about offensive operations. The Saudi 
Commander, Lieutenant General Prince Khaled Bin Sultan, argued that American 
troops could not serve under Saudi command; and likewise, Saudi and other Arab 
troops could not serve under American command.632 
Lieutenant General Khaled Bin Sultan al&> stressed that it was necessary for 
Saudi Arabia to exercise control over the foreign troops on its territory.633 From the 
start of the Gulf crisis, on August 10, 1990, King Fahd had appointed Lt. General 
Khaled Bin Sultan as a Joint Forces Commander with wide responsibilities for the 
defence of Saudi Arabia.634 In addition, from the beginning, King Fahd, Crown 
Prince Abdullah and the Saudi Defence Minister Prince Sultan were agreed that 
Saudi troops were not to serve under any command but their own.635 The need to 
defend the sovereignty of Saudi Arabia was of vital importance, &> it was 
determined that the Saudis must stay in the front of the American, and that if the 
Iraqis attacked, the Saudis would be the fIrst to shed blood.636 The~fo~, the 
Saudis pushed their troops all the way up to the border of Kuwait.637 
The second strain in U.s.-Saudi military relations was over who controlled the 
decision to conduct offensive operations. On August 28, 1990, Lt. Gen, Khaled Bin 
Sultan said to the journalists that any action from Saudi Arabia would have to be 
discussed between King Fahd and President Bush.638 The U.S. Military 
195 
Commander in Saudi Arabia, Gen. Norman Schwarzkopf, objected strongly to the 
Saudi position and sent his objections to the White House.6a1 Gen. Schwarzkopf 
wanted a totally free hand for the U.s. in military matters.640 He stated in his book 
"I would need fifty percent of the Iraqi occupying forces destroyed before launching 
whatever ground offensive we might eventually plan" .641 On August 28, 1990, Gen. 
Schwarzkopf said to the Saudi Defence Minister, Prinre Sultan, "If Saddam 
attacks, I promise you he will suffer the greatest losses in the history ofwarfare".642 
But Prince Sultan replied "That is not what I want to see. I have no wish to 
damage Iraq. But if Saddam persists in being stubborn, if he persists in being a 
disgrace to Islam, then we will do everything in our power to stop him".643 Prince 
Sultan further stated at a news conference on September 1, 1990, that the U.S. 
troops would not be allowed to launch hostage rescue operations from Saudi 
territory, and that "Our Kingdom will not serve as a theatre for action that is not 
defensive" . 644 
To reach agreement about who would decide when to take and whether to take 
offensive action, took quite a time. President Bush met with the Saudi 
Ambassador, Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan and explained his fears that the Saudi 
condition that prior permission be obtained from King Fahd before the Saudi-based 
American force could mount any operations against Iraq could leave U.S. troops 
"hamstrung in certain situations".645 Prince Bandar replied that U.S. forces had 
been invited to Saudi Arabia on the clear understanding that their role was to be 
defensive.646 He stressed that the original agreement between King Fahd and U.S. 
Defense Secretary, Richard Cheney, was that "U.S. forces were invited into the 
Kingdom to defend it from attack from Iraq and by implication, would need Saudi 
permission for anything but defensive operations". 647 In other words, any use of 
Saudi bases to launch a strike against Iraq, which might draw retaliation against 
Saudi Arabia must not be made without King Fahd's approval.648 The issue was 
left unre~lved, until one month later, Washington accepted Riyadh's point of 
view.649 On November 5, 1990, the Saudi-American understanding on oommand 
and control was fmally reached during a long talk between King Fahd, the Saudi 
Foreign Minister, Prince Saudi AI-Faisal, and Secretary of State, James Baker.660 
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia signed an agreement that formally establishpd for the 
first time in history of the Saudi-American relations, a U.S.-Saudi joint military 
command.651 The two sides agreed that any offensive action taken against Iraqi 
troops in Kuwait or against Iraq and begun from Saudi territory, would be 
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undertaken only after Pre~"ident Bush and King Fahd had both gIVen their 
permission.662 
Undoubtedly, the U.S.-Saudi joint military command enhanced the credibility of 
the mounting threat of force that Washington and Riyadh had been making to 
convince Saddam Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.663 Secretary 
of State, James Baker, told the reporters "This crisis is entering a new phase".664 
He also said that Washington and Riyadh still wanted to try to work through the 
United Nations.666 He said that both countries agreed in principle to work together 
in the near future to attempt to convince the Security Council to adopt a resolution 
permitting the use of force if it is considered to be the only way to move Iraq from 
Kuwait.666 
In September, on the ground there were two Saudi armoured brigades, one 
mechanized brigade and one airborne brigade, camped near Hafar Ai Batin (north 
of Saudi Arabia) and at AI Khafji. This formed the fIrst line of defence.667 Two 
mechanized brigades of the GCC Rapid Deployment Forre, one brigade of 
Egyptians, 3000 Syrian Commandos, 2000 Pakistani infantrymen, and 1200 
Bangladeshi soldiers together composed the second line of defence.658 Then, a 100 
miles south of Kuwait border, a third line of defence in the shape of an arc, 
consisting of 70,000 Americans, (including 40,000 American marines), British 
troops and other friendly forces was deployed.6OO The final defence plan was formed 
at the end of September 1990 (see Map 5).6fIJ In addition, Saudi Arabia deployed 
two mechanized brigades an infantry brigade along the coastline of the Gulf 
leading to AI Jubayl, and another brigade was created mostly of fighting units 
from other GCC countries, along the way to King Khaled Military City, near Hafar 
AI Batin.661 These forces had been ordered to defend their position to the death. 
Gen. Schwarzkopf told his staff that in any ground war against Iraq, "Arab forres 
must be the ones to liberate Kuwait City" .662 
The political, military and economic motivations to remain inside the coalition were 
just too strong for Iraq to break and key coalition members, especially the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia, worked hard to keep it that way.663 Thus, on September 23, 1990. 
Iraq declared that it was Iraqi policy to attack Israel and Saudi Arabia in the event 
ofwar.~ Somewhere, there would be an opportunity to play the "Israel Card", and 
so put pressure on Arab countries to leave the coalition.666 If Iraq attacked Israel 
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and the Israelis retaliated this would test the unity of the ooalition.€W36 The Iraqi 
regime believed that the coalition could not survive the political impact of a 
widened war.fR>7 Egypt expressed hostility to Israeli involvement. President 
Muharak said, "We do not and would not allow Israel to intervene ... We do not 
accept Israel's military interference in the Gulf crisis. Should this happen, we 
would have to take a different stand".668 Syria said that if Israel responds and sent 
missiles and planes over Syria to attack Iraq, Syria would oonsider it an act of war 
against Syria.fR>9 The Saudis were concerned with the necessity to protect Saudi 
Arabia and preserve the ooalition. King Fahd told James Baker that it would be 
better for everyone if Israel stayed out and that under no cireumstances would 
Arab forces allow themselves to be perceived as allied with Israelis.670 
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Pre ident Bush had to reach a strategic agrt'ement with Israel which would mean 
that the I raelis would not strike again t lraq.671 The U.S. pre ured Israel to 
adopt this policy of re riction to permit the coalition to oontinue.672 The I aell 
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recognised that the u.s. might destroy or at least weaken a dangerous enemy.673 
So, Israel agreed to the extremely reasonable role of staying out of the Gulf crisis 
and contributed directly to the unity of the Gulf multinational coalition.674 Israel's 
determination not to retaliate again.')t Iraqi attacks helped maintain the unity of 
the Arab countries within the coalition structure.675 
President Bush saw that the longer the crisis went on without resolution, the more 
the pressure inside the coalition would increase.676 After the first batch of 
American forces, 200,000 men, were in place, President Bush planned to double the 
U.S. deployment and move from a defensive to an offensive game plan.677 On 
November 5, 1990, Secretary of State, James Baker, got King Fahd's permission to 
increase the number of American forces in Saudi Arabia.678 King Fahd said to the 
Secretary of State, James Baker, "I have never set a limit on troop strength".679 He 
also said "While we all still want peace, if we must go to war, Saudi Arabia's armed 
forces will fight side by side with yours". 680 King Fahd's objectives moved from 
defensive to offensive goals to roll back Iraqi might, remove the threat to Saudi 
security, and to restore the status quo in Kuwait and the Gulf.681 King Fahd 
wanted to ensure that the coalition had enough offensive military capability and 
intended to ensure that the war against Iraq would be short and complete and 
guaranteed by large numbers of troops. Thus, on November 8, 1990, President 
Bush announced the doubling of the U.S. force in Saudi Arabia by sending another 
230,000 men.682 Then, President Bush began to clear the way diplomatically for a 
new UN Security Council resolution, authorising military action to free Kuwait if 
Iraq did not withdraw.683 On November 29, 1990, UN Security Council resolution 
678 gave Iraq a chance to pull out of Kuwait before January 15, 1990.684 After the 
deadline, the resolution authorised the allies to use all necessary means to force 
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.685 Twelve members of the Security Council voted in 
favour, two (Yemen and Cuba) voted against, and one (China) abstained.686 
On the contrary, the U.S. military action objectives, in the Saudis' view, were to 
defend U.S. access to Arabian oil; protect Israel's security; remove Saddam's threat 
to the political order in the Gulf; and affirm America as a global superpower.687 
Alexander Haig, U.S. former Secretary of State, testified to the Committee that he 
supported President Bush's stated position: no negotiation, no conditions, no 
reward.688 He said "Surely we did not undertake this costly mission simply to split 
the differences" .68\< Mr Haig aL~ stated that American forres would simply not 
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make Saddam a pearemaker or a force for Middle East stability nor should they 
give Iraq a seat at the table to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. ",8(, 
Secretary of State, James Baker, testified on December 5, 1990, that if there was a 
withdrawal from Kuwait, then the U.S. had no further argument with the Iraqi 
regime.691 He also stressed that there were significant costs if the U.s. waited too 
long.692 On November 13, 1990, Mr Baker said: 
The economic lifeline of the industrial world runs from the Gulf and we can not 
permit a dictator such as this to sit astride that economic lifeline. To bring it down 
to the level of the average American citizen, let me say that means jobs. If you 
want to sum it up in one word, it is jobs. 693 
Surely, another economic and military reason for the war was to advance U.S. 
arms sales to the region.694 One of the U.S. defence department's first acts during 
the fIrst month of the invasion was to secure a multi-million dollar arms contract 
with Saudi Arabia.695 Saudi Arabia submitted an arms shopping list worth $21 
billion to the U.S. administration.6OO However, reacting to pressure from the U.S. 
Congress as well as the Israeli government, the White House redured the sale 
down to $6.7 billion, with a promise to Riyadh to complete the rest of the sale in 
January 1991.697 A 1991 Congressional report asserted that U.S. weapons sales to 
the Third World, more than doubled in 1990, reaching $18 billion. This included 
$14.5 billion in sales to Saudi Arabia.698 
In addition, there were other economic reasons for a U.S. military intervention in 
the Gulf related with the control and prire of oil.699 A U.S. military presenre in the 
Gulf would let the U.S. influence the prire of oil and production quotas. It would, 
therefore, increase the U.S.'s leverage over its Japanese and European competitors 
who were more dependent on the Gulf oil.7°O Furthermore, it would give the U.S. 
increased authority over Japan and Western Europe, whose economies were doing 
much better than that of the U.S. and would thus reverse the U.S. economic 
decline.701 As a matter of fact, some economists were postulating that a sucressful 
war could move the U.S. out of recession, improve the budget deficit a~ well as 
improve the country's economic position in comparison with fJapan and WestRrn 
Europe.7o~ 
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Another motivational factor for the U.S. intervention in the Gulf and later war was 
that staff of the Bush administration wanted to affmn the U.S. as the number one 
superpower after the collapse of the Soviet empire.703 This affirmation proved the 
ability use of U.S. military power to effectively defend "national interests".704 As 
Gabriele Kola commented, since the end of World War II, the U.S. military had 
been extremely concerned with its "credibility". 706 The U.S. evidently wanted its 
"enemies" to accept that it would use military power when U.S. interests were at 
stake and feared that its defeat in Vietnam had given the impression that the U.S. 
was unable to use its military power effectively.706 
In testifying to Congress on January 8, 1991, Alexander Haig, former Secretary of 
State, stated his belief that Iraq would possess a nuclear weapons within two years 
(The CIA had also put out a report that Iraq was only two years from having a 
nuclear weapon). Such an assessment should be looked at carefully because U.S. 
assessments in 1981 were that Iraq was about 2 years away from achieving an 
independent nuclear weapon just as the Israelis took action. 707 At that time, Mr 
Haig asserted that Israel had done the right thing and not something which they 
had to be condemned for.7~ On November 15, 1990, President Bush said that in 
addition to forcing an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait, the U.S. wanted to get rid of 
Iraq's arsenal.709 On December 10, 1990, U.s. Secretary of State, James Baker, 
went somewhat further in saying that even a peaceful solution to the Gulf crisis 
would be pursued by continued pressure on Iraq to restrain its military power.7lO 
At the same time, Senator Sam Nun, Chair of Senate Armed Services Committee, 
asked in the four-day televised hearings on November 27, 1990, whether the 
destruction of Iraq's military capability been added to the original list of the U.S. 
objectives?711 Public opinion polls displayed a drop in confidence over President 
Bush's handling of the Gulf crisis.712 The polls also pointed out that many 
Americans assumed that their troops were supposed to be protecting oilfields 
rather than America's friends. 713 The public's responses as to what might be a good 
enough reason to go to war were instructive. 714 They showed that the Americans 
were unimpressed by arguments of economics and principle, but they could well 
understand an argument grounded on the threat of an Iraqi nuclear capability, 
which could be turned into a threat to their safety. 716 This perception was soon 
followed by a campaign to emphasise the nuclear risk. 716 In a statement to U.s. 
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forces in Dhahran on November 22, 1990, President Bush concluded the speech 
with a reference to the nuclear threat from Iraq: 
Every day that passes brings Saddam Hussein one day closer to his goal of a 
nuclear weapons arsenal And that is another reason, frankly, why more and 
more our mission is marked by a real sense of urgency ... He has never possessed a 
weapon that he has not used 717 
Still, many Democrats, and some Republican, lawmakers were unhappy at the way 
President Bush was dealing with the Gulf crisis.718 To them, President Bush was 
driving the U.S. towards a war with Iraq without seeking permission for war from 
Congress.719 Consequently, President Bush surprised the world on November 30, 
1990, by his unexpected change of direction.72o He announced that he would go an 
"extra mile for peace" and proposed direct talks between the U.S. and Iraq on a 
peaceful resolution to the Gulf crisis. 721 President Bush suggested sending 
Secretary Baker to Baghdad and to admit Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, to 
Washington, to meet himself and representatives of the international coalition.722 
The whole operation was created largely to reassure the Americans and the 
Congress that no ways were being left unexplored. 723 As Baker said "If force ends 
up being used we owe it to the American people and to others to show that we left 
no stone unturned in the search for peace".724 However, President Bush 
emphasised that the U.S. would reject anything less than Iraq's complete 
withdrawal from Kuwait and the release of all hostages. 725 
The U.S. proposal for talks, made Saddam excited. From the very beginning of the 
Gulf crisis he had pushed for direct dialogue with the United States.7~ Now 
possibilities opened up for Saddam if the Americans would only sit down with the 
Iraqis. In the past all such proposals had been refused.727 Still trying to put 
themselves as equal partners of the United States in managing the crisis, the 
Iraqis did their best to avoid accidental air and navy clashes that might spark ofT 
the war.728 
When Saddam's position was at its weakest, the U.S. suddenly expressed a wish to 
negotiate.729 Saddam explained the Bush proposal a" the beginning of his fall -
caused by his clear troubles at home.730 Pos.."ibly, Saddam convinced himself the 
U.S. did not have "the stomach" for a costly war. 731 Certainly, he gave that 
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impression to Ambassador Glaspie, during their oonversation in July 1990. 
Maybe, the U.S. would wish to reach a oompromise that would let him save face 
over the crisis and ensure his political survival. 732 The BBC's tJohn Simp~n 
reported from Baghdad "There is no mistaking the feeling here that President 
Saddam Hussein has got the Americans on the run".733 
On December 2, 1990, Saddam Hussein was interviewed by a French television.734 
He put the chances of war and peace at fifty-fifty, pointing out that this would 
depend on whether the U.S.-Iraq meeting was to be "a real dialogue" or only: 
a formal session to give the American Congress, the American people, and 
international public opinion a good conscience and to allow them to say they tried 
to talk with Iraq and that Iraq refused to give up its position, then in that case we 
are closer to war. 735 
However, the Bush initiative caused the Saudis to react strongly.7$ President 
Bush had failed to inform King Fahd and the other key Arab in the coalition.737 
They were upset about being ignored on such a basic matter.738 President Bush 
had gone beyond the UN Security Council resolutions and increased Saddam 
Hussein's popularity in the Arab world which was going to weaken the coalition.738 
King Fahd and the other key Arab in the coalition thought that President Bush 
had lost his desire to fight.740 Therefore, King Fahd responded positively to the 
Arab heads of states who were engaged in oonsultations to end the crisis.741 In 
early December 1990, President Chadil Ben Jadid of Algeria arrived in Baghdad to 
lay the ground for an Arab summit and finalise an agreement between Kuwait and 
Iraq.742 He found the Iraqis in a good mood, (due to President Bush's proposal of 
talks), however, they were unwilling to move on the question of Kuwait. 743 The 
Iraqi Minister of Information had moved fast to prevent any ideas of Iraqi 
concessions "Kuwait is Iraqi - past, present and future - and not an inch of it will be 
given Up".744 In Jordan and Oman, the Algerian initiatives were warmly acrepted, 
but there was little excitement in either Syria and Egypt. 745 President Ben Jadid 
never made it to Saudi Arabia because in these circumstances, President Bush had 
to move fast to the region to control the crisis. 746 He wanted to prevent any 
movement with a series of countries, opening up negotiations with Iraq and 
dividing the coalition. i47 In a phone conversation with King Fahd President Bush 
promised that there would be no concession to Saddam.748 President Bush had yet 
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to set the dates for Mr Baker and Mr Aziz to meet to prove to King Fahd and 
others his lack of interest in serious negotiation with Iraq.749 
After Bush's "extra mile" speech, Saddam Hussein announced the release of all 
foreign hostages on December 6, 1990.750 The release of the foreign hostages 
started on December 9, 1990, and by December 13, all the American hostages had 
gone. 751 At that time, there were in Iraq and Kuwait more than 2,700 Western and 
Japanese hostages, including approximately 500 at strategic sites. 1168, more 
than a third of the total hostages were British and about 700 were American!.752 As 
they finally got out of the country, President Bush noted that he now had one less 
thing to worry about.753 Saddam Hussein, thought that this move would tip 
balance in favour of the "peace camp". 754 He wanted to show goodwill to convince 
the American people that being flexible on the hostages suggested that he could be 
flexible on Kuwait as well. 755 
The Iraqis noted that President Bush had suggested a willingness to invite some of 
the coalition ambassadors to Washington to attend the talks with Mr Aziz.756 
Saddam Hussein then suggested that would invite a Pill delegation to his meeting 
with Mr Baker in Baghdad.757 The Iraqis wanted to talk about Saddam's peace 
initiative of August 12. The Americans had no plan to di&;uss the Palestinian 
question and wanted to avoid its linkage with the Gulf crisis.758 Aziz also wanted 
to meet Congressional Ie aders. 759 Therefore, President Bush dropped the idea of 
receiving foreign ministers. 7OO On January 3, 1991, President Bush proposed a talk 
between Baker and Aziz in Geneva between January 7 and 9.761 Then President 
Bush briefed Congressional leaders on January 3, 1991, telling them that this was 
the last set of initiatives he would make.762 In turn, they accepted that no 
resolution would be sent to Congress before the Baker and Aziz meeting. 763 
The Arab members of the coalition warned the White House against reaching "Any 
settlement based on a partial withdrawal from Kuwait or on rewarding an 
aggression in the forthroming meeting in Geneva". 764 President Bush quickly 
reassured them that he had no intention of letting Saddam ofT the hook.765 The 
only design of the Geneva meeting, he asserted, was to insure that the Iraqis 
understood the peril of their situation, and that overwhelming forre might be used 
against them if necessary.700 The White House decided to ~nrl Saddam Hussein a 
letter from President Bush.767 The purpose was to carry a sevel'{l but not hostilfl 
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message, ill straightforward and simple language to exclude doubts that the 
Americans were not serioUS. 768 The whole line of argumentation in the letter 
followed a familiar standard: the only way to prevent a fight was to follow 
resolution 678, and this reflected the view of the complete international community 
and not just that of the United States.769 There could be no reward for aggression 
for negotiations over possible withdrawal. 770 The benefits to Iraq after obeying the 
UN resolutions, were that it would be given the "opportunity to rejoin the 
international community" and for "the Iraqi military establishment" to e~ape 
destruction; the disadvantages accompanying rejection would involve much more 
than the loss of Kuwait. 771 Thus, the first item on the agenda of the Geneva 
meeting was Bush's letter, which Baker wished to deliver to Saddam Hussein. 772 
Secretary of State, James Baker, met Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz on 
January 9, 1991.773 Mr A7Jz refused to accept the letter, because it was "Full of 
threats and it has a language which is not normally used in dialogue between 
heads of states". 774 In the meeting, Baker did not move beyond the UN resolutions 
and Aziz remained consistent with Saddam's statement of August 12, 1990.775 Mr 
Baker promised that Iraq would not be attacked if there was a positive response to 
the Security of Council resolutions.776 He stated that the U.S. had no intention of 
maintaining its present level of m-ilitary force once Iraqi forces had withdrawn, 
especially those equipped with offensive capabilities, and that the U.S. supported 
the idea of settling differences between Iraq and Kuwait peacefully as provided for 
by resolution 660.777 Mr Baker reminded Mr Aziz that Iraq had miscalculated the 
international response to the invasion.778 He hoped that Iraq would not 
miscalculate again. 779 He asserted that the coalition had deployed forces to the 
Gulf in support of the UN Security Council resolutions and they had both the 
might and the will to throw Iraq out of Kuwait.780 
Mr Aziz replied that if the war broke out, Iraq would win.78l There was no fear in 
I raq of the imminent war.782 He pointed out that Iraq came out of the war with 
Iran "With huge military power" .783 Therefore, the Geneva meeting failed after six 
hours of talks between Baker and Aziz.7B4 James Baker reported that he heard 
nothing which indicated any Iraqi flexibility whatsoever. 786 He said "The 
conclusion is clear, Saddam Hu~in continues to reject a diplomatic solution".i8t3 
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make" .801 Thus, when he met Saddam Hussein he could not go beyond the 
mandate of the UN resolutions.fm Saddam Hussein stated his conviction that 
there was an American-Israeli conspiracy to destroy Iraq as a powerful military 
force in the region.803 He mistrusted the American promise that the withdrawing 
Iraqis would not be attacked.804 Nevertheless, the Secretary-general reassured him 
that the U.S. would not attack Iraq or its anned forces if Iraq withdrew from 
Kuwait and the situation was returned to what it had been prior to August 2, 
1990.806 Furthermore, as reported by an Iraqi source, the Secretary-general 
promised that, if Iraq withdrew, the UN would prevent any violation of Iraqi soil 
by placing its own troops in the area.BOO He also promised to work toward the 
elimination of Israel's weapons of mass destruction.807 Indeed if Saddam really 
was ready to de-escalate the crisis, he would have found it easier to do so with the 
UN·s Secretary-general than the United States.80S However, Saddam presented 
him with a tough line in which he a~rted that Kuwait was seen by all as Iraq's 
nineteenth province; Iraq would never withdraw in the face of threats, and thus. 
there would be no withdrawal.809 
Clearly, Saddam Hussein's moves were based on a massive miscalculation.810 It 
seemed to Saddam that President Bush had suggested the Geneva meeting as a 
result of Congressional pressure, and that he would offer Iraq nothing more than 
an unconditional withdrawa1.811 Saddam Hussein was convinced that the U.S. did 
not have the power to prevent him continuing his occupation of Kuwait.S12 
Ironically, many top U.S. military personnel shared his conviction.Sl3 Saddam 
Hussein believed that the U.S. could not afford the heavy casualties that they 
suffered during the Vietnam war.814 As he asserted to the American Ambassador 
to Baghdad, April Glaspie, at the end of July 1990, "Yours is a mety which can 
not accept 10,000 dead in one battle".816 On another occasion, Saddam Hussein 
said in early September 1990, " The Vietnamese people were the last to confront 
this (American) sophisticated capability (and to withstand it)" .816 
The Iraqis did not completely understand the massive qualitative gap between 
their field commanders, tank crews and tanks and those of the Allied forces. 817 
Saddam Hussein and his generals failed to recognise the differences between air 
superiority over the Vietnamese jungles and the Gulf desert.8ls They did not 
predict that in the Gulf desert the U.S. could make such an effective air campaign 
that avoided the high casualties which the Iraqis had assumed.819 Furthermore, 
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the Iraqis believed, that as a result of Vietnam, the American public would avoid 
deaths in a long war.8~ 
If Saddam withdrew from Kuwait, then other actors in the area-including Kuwait 
would require a remaining Western presence and he would set himself to be at 
continual risk.821 A strategy of concentrated defence, was Saddam's best tactic to 
perform his political objective of holding on to as much of Kuwait as pos."ible.822 
Following the invasion, the Iraqi people were confident that the West had a secret 
agenda: they were not actually interested in freeing Kuwait, they wanted to 
destroy Iraq.823 This propaganda prepared the Iraqis to see even a withdrawal 
from Kuwait as a qualified victory for the Iraqi regime, as long as the latter hold on 
to power in Iraq.824 
As well as strengthening their forward defence, the Iraqis moved major units of 
mobile reserve armour, including four divisions of the elite Republican Guard, to 
Southern Iraq close to the Kuwaiti border.825 According to the Pentagon, Baghdad 
had deployed 590,000 troops in Kuwait and southern Iraq; and the total Iraqi 
hardware amounted to 700 warplanes, 5,750 tanks, 3,100 pieces of artillery and 15 
warships.826 They were facing total allied forces over 750,000; and their military 
hardware amounted to 1,746 warplanes, 3,673 tanks and 149 warships.827 
The new American strategy was to assure victory by applying heavy, 
overwhelming combat power against Iraq, in the air, at sea and on the ground, at 
night and during the day.828 President Bush was urged to pay attention to what 
the military considered to be the main lesson of Vietnam: do not apply military 
force in a slow increasing manner, but use it to perform the highest impact so as to 
disable the enemy and catch him off balance.829 Air power was the only certain 
advantage that was available to the allies, to deal with Iraq's massive land army 
and tank forces, and the only way to avoid a drawn out ground war that would 
likely destroy Kuwait and cause more casualties.BOO General Colin Powell pointed 
out that the war would begin with a decisive air campaign and that the land war 
would not be simultaneous but would follow the air campaign.831 The U.S. had to 
prove both its resolve to fight and its capability to wreak horrible damage on the 
Iraqi armed forces.832 
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In spite of that, no one thought that victory over Iraq would be easy to achieve.833 
There was always the fear that Saddam, if defeated, would use chemical and 
biological weapons and cause large numbers of casualties. 8M In fact, Iraq prepared 
190 biological weapons, ready to use in case of war.835 25 cruise missiles had 
biological warheads and they were aimed at Saudi Arabia, 165 biological weapons 
were fitted into sky bombs.8:J3 In addition, since Iraq was only two years away from 
making its own nuclear weapons, Baghdad could advance its nuclear weapons 
programmes and in just six months it would be able to manufacture nuclear 
weapons.837 However, President Bush warned Baghdad not to use weapons of 
mass destruction because the U.s. response would be definitely overwhelming and 
devastating.838 Later, the Iraqis interpreted President Bush's warning as a nuclear 
threats.839 
After all this, Saudi Arabia still continued its search for a peaceful end to the Gulf 
crisis. King Fahd issued a last-minute, emotional appeal to Saddam: 
The proof that we seek and whole world demands and requires that you declare 
your immediate withdrawal from Kuwait in word and deed ... I renew and confirm 
our just demand that you take the bold decision and prove to the whole world that 
you are up to the level of responsibility you shoulder in governing Iraq. By doing 
so you will have made an eternal stand which history will record for you as you 
will spare bloodshed, preserve innocent lives, conserve the fortunes of the Arab 
and Islamic nations and fulfil all their hopes.84o 
Saddam Hussein did not respond, just as he did not respond to the French efforts 
to make a last-minute initiative on January 15-16, 1991.841 Therefore, Iraqi 
warmongers cleared the way for an outbreak ofwar.842 
War in the Gulf 
On January 15, 1991, President Bush signed a national security decree giving 
Defense Secretary, Cheney, an executive order to start the war.843 Operation 
Desert Storm began the day after the deadline passed, at 18.39 Washington time 
on January 16, and at 03.39 Riyadh time on January 17, 1991.844 Desert Storm 
began with air and missile attacks from the coalition forces against I raqi military 
target in Kuwait and Iraq.845 Within just one day of the start of the war, 
Washington reported that Iraqi military capabilities were being destroyed.f'4t3 
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On the second day of the war, the Iraqis responded to the air attacks by launching 
their Soviet Scud missiles against Israel and Saudi Arabia.847 The Iraqis hoped 
that an attack on Israel would provoke Israel into a response. This would divide 
the Arab members of the coalition and create an indefensible situations for Saudi 
Arabia.848 Forty missiles were fired at Tel Aviv and Haifa, while forty six were 
fired at Riyadh and Dhahran.849 The casualties in Saudi Arabia included 
twenty-eight dead, unfortunately all of them Americans (see Table 11 and 13).8f;j 
In fact, on February 25, 1991, an Iraqi missile hit a U.S. barracks in Dhahran.851 
It injured 100 Americans which was the heaviest blow Iraq managed to inflict on 
the coalition during the whole confliCt.852 
In addition to eliminating Iraqi Scud missiles, the U.S. Patriot air defence missiles 
blocked and destroyed more than 95 per cent of the Scud missiles fired at Saudi 
Arabia and Israel before they reached the ground. 80S Not surprisingly, the Iraqi 
Scud missiles made the Saudis think of deterring further Iraqi Scud attacks by 
using their strategic missile force, which Saudi Arabia had bought them in the late 
1980s.854 For the Saudis, Desert Storm was the right time to launch the 
Chinese-built surface-to-surface missiles.855 Prince Sultan, Saudi Defense Minister, 
consulted King Fahd and ~ught an order to fire them.856 However, King Fahd 
decided not to e~alate the war and to reserve the missiles as a weapon of last 
resource.857 
Moreover, Scud attacks from Iraq made Israel reconsider its policy of restraint. On 
January 19, 1991, Israel expressed its willingness to launch their own massive 
counter-strike into Iraq.858 Later General Colin Powell reported that Prince 
Bandar, at Washington's request, had called for the Israeli strike.859 However, 
King Fahd had rapidly replied "No way".86(J President Bush argued with his staff 
that the continuing allied attack had more aircraft and more firepower than the 
Israelis could muster.SSI General Norman Schwankopf cogently asked "How can 
anybody think the Israelis have better target information than our Air Forcelt~:2 
Nevertheless, President Bush agreed before the start of Desert Storm to share U.S. 
intelligence summaries with Israel. They installed a hot line, rode named 
"Hammer Rick", between the Pentagon's Crisis Situation Room and the Israeli 
Defence Ministry in Tel Aviv. This enabled the Pentagon to send instantaneous 
warnings to Israel of any Iraqi missile launch monitored by U.S. sateIlites.81:>3 
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Table 11 
Iraqi Scud attacks on Saudi Arabia. January/February 1991 
Hits Misses· Inter- Cn- Total Dead Injured 
cepted known 
Missiles fired 10 16 13 1 40 4 185 
against Israel 
Missiles fired 3 12 24 7 46 28 100 
against Saudi 
Arabia 
Total 13 28 37 8 86 32 285 
• A miss is defined as a missile doing neither injury nor damage 
Source: John Pimlott and Stephen Badsey, The Gulf War Assessed, p. 176, adq>ted from a F.S. 
briefing graphic from Bruce Waston (ed), Military Lessons of the Gulf War. Greenhill Book, London, 
1991 p. 224-5, see also Khaled Bin Sultan, p. 352. 
To deter further Iraqi Scud attacks, the U.S. deployed ~me of its forces in Israel 
with two Patriot air defence missiles.864 The announcement of the deployment was 
made on January 19, 1991, and four Patriot batteries rapidly arrived in Israel from 
Europe.865 The U.S. forces fell under the operational responsibility of the u.s. 
European Command (EUCOM) and not CENTCOM.866 The U.S. continued Quietly 
urging Israel to stay out of war while promising to give "full ronsideration" to its 
request for an additional $13 billion in aid, $3 billion in rompensation for war 
damages and $10 billion to help resettle immigrant Soviet Jews. The U .S. al~ 
reassured Israel that it would continue to maintain its military dominance in the 
region; as well as that the Arab-Israel peace process would be strengthened once 
the Gulf crisis was over.867 During the war, General Colin Powell claimed that the 
Iraqi air defence radar was 95 per cent destroyed and all but five of the 66 air 
bases were badly damaged, although only 41 planes were confirmed destroyed.868 
On January 24, 1991, three Iraqi Mirage F-l strike aircraft. loaded with Exocet 
anti-ship missiles, headed north along the Saudi roast.BOO The three Iraqi jets were 
attempting to launch an attack on coalition shipping in the northern Gulf.870 Thp 
three jets were intercepted and two were shot down within less than one minute in 
a single engagement by one of the Saudi F_15s.871 The third jet escaped and landed 
harmlessly in the sea.S7 :2 
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To protect the rest of the Iraqi aircraft, Saddam Hussein surprised the coalition by 
sending 135 aircraft to Iran.873 About 80 aircraft were sent on January 26, 1991, 
and over the next three days. This was followed by another exodus between 
February 6, and 10, 1991.874 After the war, Tehran made it clear to Baghdad that 
Iran had no intention of returning the aircraft.875 
On January 29, 1991, an Iraqi battle group occupied the undefended small coastal 
town of AI-Khafji, some eight miles inside Saudi Arabia.876 The residents of 
AI· Khafji had been evacuated before Desert Storm had started, because of its 
vulnerability to Iraqi artillery .877 AI-Khafji was retaken on February 2, after heavy 
fighting.878 Saudi armed forces, supported by Qatari and U.S. forces freed the 
town after the loss of 12 U.S. marines, 15 Saudi troops and 30 Iraqi soldiers.879 Up 
to 500 Iraqi soldiers were captured and fifteen Iraqi tanks were blown Up.880 On 
January 30, 1991, during the liberation of AI·Khafji, General Schwarzkopf stated, 
that the air attack had cut off 90 per cent of the supplies to the Iraqi forces in 
Kuwait.881 American, British, French, Kuwaiti and Saudi air forces participated in 
the air attack as well as other countries in the coalition. Table 12 illustrates how 
the coalition countries shared in the air attack. Of the 108,043 sorties flown 
during Desert Stonn, 83.6 per cent were flown by the U.S. Air Force, Navy and 
Marine Corps; 6.5 per cent by the Royal Saudi Air Force; 5.1 per cent by Britain's 
Royal Air Force; 2.1 per cent by French.882 Several other countries contributed in 
one way or another to the campaign.883 
At sea, there were a number of small naval actions, mostly involving coalition 
planes and attack helicopter against Iraqi patrols.884 By early February 1991, 
almost all the Iraqi navy units had been destroyed.885 Coalition warships 
continued to fire Tomahawk cruise missiles in the latter stages of the air 
campaign.886 The coalition reported that 750 tanks, 600 armoured vehicles and 650 
artillery pieces were destroyed.887 On February 10, 1991, Secretary of Defense. 
Cheney, and General Powell arrived in Saudi Arabia on behalf of President Bush 
to di~uss with the Saudi government the timing of the launch of the ground 
war.8&!! On the eastern end of the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, the U.S. Marines and 
Saudis were looking for orders to attack the Iraqis. However, Secretary of Defency. 
Cheney, and General Powell advised President Bush on February 11, that their 
attack should wait.889 
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Table 12 
Countries Air to Air to Dual Attack Support Totals 
Sharing in Air Air Ground 
Accurnula ted 
Campaign 
Helicopter ~lissions 
Bahrain 0 0 24 0 16 40 294 
Canada 0 0 24 0 0 24 1.308 
France 12 24 18 60 83 197 2.326 
Italy 0 0 9 0 0 9 240 
Kuwait 0 24 15 12 16 67 802 
New Zealand 0 0 0 0 2 2 32 
Qatar 0 9 12 0 29 50 63 
Saudi Arabia 106 54 87 9 187 443 7.018 
UAE 14 51 25 0 97 187 102 
UK 18 4S 0 0 31 97 ;),546 
USA 196 500 423 385 2.134 3.637 90.312 
Totals 345 710 637 466 2,595 4.753 108.043 
Source: General Khaled Bin Sultan. Desert Warrior, 1995. Harper Collins Publishers. London. p. 337. 
By February 23, 1991, the coalition air forces had directed 94,000 &>rties and about 
39 per cent of the Iraqi's tanks, 32 per cent of its armoured vehicles and 48 per cent 
of artillery had been destroyed.890 Therefore, a ground attack into Kuwait 
appeared to be the right option take place.891 
There were still some attempts to avoid a costly ground war between Iraq and the 
coalition.89"2 President Gorbachev announced a new initiative on February 9, 1991, 
and sent a pe~nal envoy, Yevgeny Primakov to Iraq.893 On February 15, 1991, 
Iraq offered to withdraw, but on condition that the coalition forces withdrew from 
the region within one month and that Israel withdraw from West Bank and Gaza; 
this was entirely unacceptable to Washington and Riyadh. 894 Riyadh went further 
than just rejecting the proposal, by describing not only Saddam's latest move but 
also Saddam's allies King Hussein of Jordan and Ya&~r Arafat ofPLO: 
The crocodile tears shed by the lackeys of t.he Iraqi tyrant are in fact tears of 
panic ... After they stood by t.he defeated tyrant and tied their destiny to his 
success ... they realised too late they stood in the wrong place. (And yet). instead of 
returning to the right path. forgiveness and t.he forgiveness of those who they have 
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wronged, these minute and negligible people stagger in the sea of their mistakes. 
and continue to swim against the current.895 
Iraqi Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, went to Moscow on February 21, 1991, and Iraq 
then agreed to a Soviet peace plan but not all, UN requirements.896 Washington 
reacted on February 22, demanding immediate I raqi withdrawal starting by noon 
New York time (8.00pm Riyadh time).897 On February 23, President Bush said a 
cease-fire could only be considered after Iraq made a declaration of withdrawal and 
informed Iraq that if it failed to demonstrate an intent to obey with Security 
Council resolution 660, a ground war would begin.898 On February 23, Iraqi 
soldiers began burning Kuwait's oil wells. They set fire to 735 of Kuwait's 950 oil 
wells in a "scorched-earth" policy.899 The deadline passed and the coalition forces 
started ground offensive.900 During the air war, Saddam Hussein promised that 
"The mother of all battles" would start with the opening of hostilities on the 
ground.001 However, when the ground war started the promised "mother of all 
battles" turned into a disastrous defeat for the Iraqis.002 The U.S. 18th Corps, 
together with French Units, moved deep into Iraq from the west of Kuwait. They 
established a forward air base near the Euphrates river and then to cut the main 
road supply connecting Baghdad and Kuwait near Nasiriyah on the Euphrates 
river.90S At the same time, U.S. -7th Corps along with the UK 1st Annoured 
Division, crossed the Iraqi border from west of Kuwait and moved rapidly north to 
surround Iraqi forces in Kuwait and attack the Republican Guard division 
north-west of Kuwait (see Map 6).904 By the day's end February 24, 1991, the 
coalition reported holding outer edges of Kuwait City.~ Saudi and other Arab 
forces, together with the U.s. Marines, breached the Iraqi defence lines along the 
Saudi-Kuwaiti border and moved towards Kuwait City.OO6 Meanwhile, a majority 
of U.N. Security Council members demanded that Baghdad areept all 12 
resolutions before a cease-fire could begin, not just resolution 660 which called on 
Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait unconditionally.907 The next day, February 27. 
1991, at 1.30 GMT the Pentagon announced that American, Kuwaiti and Saudi 
troops had liberated Kuwait City and the operation to free Kuwait was in its final 
stageS.OO8 Later that day at 19.30 GMT, President Bush received secret briefings 
from Dick Cheney and General Powell that all military objectives had been 
achieved. He announced a temporary cease-fire to start at midnight New York 
time (8.00 am Saudi time) on February 28, 1991.9]9 That same evening. Iraq 
informed the UN that it accepted all 12 UN resolutions and agreed to send its 
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military commanders to meet their coalition counterparts within 48 hours.&IO On 
March 3, 1991, General Schwarzkopf and General Khaled Bin Sultan met with two 
Iraqi generals at Safwan, an Iraqi airstrip.&ll They agreed to meet the conditions 
for a permanent cease-fire.912 On the same day, the Iraqi government announced 
that it had agreed to; (1) release all prisoners of war and Kuwaiti civilians; (2) 
provide information showing the location of all mines; (3) avoid further skirmishes; 
(4) pay the Kuwait government for war damages; and (5) comply with all UN 
resolutions.sl3 
Peace in the Gull 
In just the 100 hours of the ground war, coalition forces captured over 73,700 
square kilometres of territory (250km inside Iraq).914 Fifteen per cent of Iraq was 
under coalition control (see Map 7).915 The Iraqi forces had been cut to pieces. Just 
seven of the original forty-three Iraqi divisions were capable of operations.Sl6 
Coalition casualties were notably low, almost as much harm had been done by a 
friendly fire as by Iraqi fire (138 were killed and 2,978 injured outside ofbattle).91i 
Approximately quarter of the American deaths and more than half the British 
fatalities had been due to friendly ftre. 918 A study in November 1990, by the Centre 
for Defense Information, Washington DC, estimated that: (1) the war would last 
three months; (2) the U.S. could expect about 45,000 casualties, including 10,000 
fatalities and around 1,000 missing in action; (3) the Iraqi forces would suffer 
about 150,000 casualties, of which 35,000 would be killed.91s In fact, the war lasted 
only 43 days.9al Nevertheless, after the predictions of thousands of casualties on 
the allies side, the total was very small. The U.S. casualties were 484, of which 
146 were killed in action, 338 wounded in action, and 24 missing in action. The 
Saudi casualties numbered were 213, of which 38 were killed in action, and 175 
wounded in action (see Table 13).921 There were also 183 non-combat deaths of 
which 78 deaths occurred during and after the war and 105 deaths during 
Operation Desert Shield. In addition, Iraq held prisoners of war (17 Americans, 12 
British, 9 Saudis, 2 Italians and 1 Kuwaiti).922 
Coalition material losses in combat included 27 U.S. aircraft and one helioopter: 
and 9 aircraft from Allied forces. 923 Non-combat losses included 8 U.S. aircraft and 
16 helicopters; Britain lost one aircraft; as did Saudi Arabia.~:;.t Civilian casualtips 
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In Kuwait were estimated by resident forces to number one thousand, although 
several hundred Kuwaitis died during the period of the Iraqi occupation in addition 
to 5,000 Kuwaitis who were taken from Kuwait to Iraq.925 
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Table 13 
Countries participating in Desert ShieldlDesert Storm by 
country, command and casualties <March 6, 1991). 
Country All Ground l\' aval JOint L: S Killed 
Forces Command In 
Command Action 
Afghanistan ,.. 308 
Argentina ,.. 450 
Australia ,.. 1,622 
Bahrain ,.. ,.. 223 
Bangladesh ,.. 2,231 
Be~um ,.. 600 
Canada ,.. 
,.. 2.275 
Czechoslovakia ,.. 198 
Denmark .. 100 
Egypt .. 33,677 11 
France .. .. * 14,600 :! 
Greece 
,.. 200 
Hungary (M) .. 38 
Italy 
,.. .. 1,950 
Kuwait 
,.. ,.. 9,643 1 
Morocco .. 1.327 
Netherlands 
,.. 132 
New Zealand 
,.. 
Nigeria * 481 
Norway 
,.. 227 106 
Oman * * 957 
Pakistan 
,.. 6,406 
Philippines (M) .. 156 
Poland (M) .. .. 488 
Qatar * ,.. 1,581 
Romam8(M) ,.. 384 
Saum Arabl8 ,.. 
,.. ,.. 95,400 38 
Senegal .. 496 
Sierra Leone 
,.. 24 
Smgapore \ \f) ,.. 30 
South Korea (M) .. 154 
Spain 
,.. 1.956 
Swedl'n (M) ,.. 525 
Syria 
,.. 14.300 3 
CAE * 
,.. 1,497 5 
t:K .. 
,.. ,.. 45.300 17 
l'.S.A .. 
,.. ,.. 540,331 146 
Total 12 26 15 185.351 595,022 
223 
M= medical unitJpersonnel (military and/or civilian) 
Sourre C'..enerlll Khaled Bin Sultan. ])e~..rt WarrioJ:. 1995. Harper Collins Publishers. London. p . .tZO. 
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in 
8CtJon 
2 
84 
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115 
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4f> 
338 
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Iraqi casualties were estimated by Saudi Arabia to be between 100,000 to 200,000 
killed and wounded.9213 A few weeks later General Schwarzkopf estimated as many 
as 150,000 Iraqi casualties.927 However, four months after the end of the war, the 
U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency disclosed that the estimates were that Iraq's 
casualties were somewhere in the order of 100,000 killed and 300,000 wounded.9'.?8 
Iraqi civilian casualties during the war were reported to be about 7,000 by early 
February 1991, with no reliable estimates as to fmal numbers.929 Refugee reports 
from Basra and other parts of southern Iraq suggested casualties later in war of 
about 10,000 civilian dead.93) Iraqi prisoners totalled about 111,000 (64,000 were 
taken by the U.S., 25,000 by Saudi troops, 17,000 by the Arab forces and 5,000 by 
the British).931 The government of Saudi Arabia built camps to house more than 
100,000 men.932 All of three camps were located at the north of Saudi Arabia 
which were under the Saudi command.933 Once the prisoners of war (pOW) had 
settled and the total reduced to 35,000 people (10,000 military prisoners and 
25,000 civilians) 14,000 indicated that they had no wish to return home at that 
time or emigrate to other countries.934 Therefore, the government of Saudi Arabia 
started in the end of 1991, to build a model city that should provide better 
conditions.935 The city is linked to Rafha.936 The city included school", a hospital, 
clinics, libraries and sports fields and many other facilities. 937 Rafha residents can 
make short occasional trips into town and each year and still (1996) the Saudi 
government arranges for large numbers of the resident to go on the pilgrimage to 
Mecca.938 U.S. government officials as well as United Nations High Commissioner 
for Refugees (UNHCR) and International Committee of the Red Cross (JCRC) 
officers visited the camp regularly and discuss camp conditions with the refugees.938 
The UNHCR and ICRC have established a 24 hour presence in the city.840 As a 
result, they consider the facility to be among the best in the world, offering 
comfortable accommodation and monthly salaries of $10 per person, all paid for by 
the Saudi government.941 It is the only refugee operation in the world financed by 
the host country.942 The ICRC stated that the amount the Saudis have spent on 
the Iraqi refugees amounted to 30 per cent of the sum which the UN refugee 
agency's entire yearly budget for 18 million refugees world-wide.943 
Iraq's material losses were estimated to number 476 combat aircraft out of a total 
of 689, with 141 aircraft destroyed in the air or on the ground and 200 in damaged 
shelters, with the addition of the 135 aircraft which had been moved to I ran and 
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which will never be returned to Iraq.&44 Iraq lost 3,700 tanks, 2,400 annoured 
vehicles and 2,600 artillery pieces (see Table 14).945 
Table 14 
Estimated damage to Iraq's military capabilities 
Type Pre-War Destroyed or Remaining 
Captured 
Comba.t Aircraft 689 476 213 
Tanks 4,280 3,700 580 
Armoured Vehicles 2,870 2,400 470 
Artillery 3,110 2,600 510 
Source: "The War in Numbers, from War in the Gulf', The Baltimore Sun, March 10. 1991. p7E, adapted from, 
Central Command of the Coalition and IT.S. Defense Department. See also Paul Rogers and 
Malcolm Dando, A Violent Pace, p. 121. and see also Khaled Bin Sultan, Desert Warrior. p. 20, 
357. 
The war cost between $58 billion and S77 billion of which the U.S. anted S15 
billion.&46 (The U.S. administration's estimates were made in late March 1991). 
The Arab Economic Report, an annual study by the Arab Monetary Fund, stated 
that Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Qatar and U.A.E. made S84 billion in direct payments 
to the U.S., Britain and France for military expenses of which $45 billion were 
from Saudi Arabia.947 The destruction of oil wells, pipelines, telecommunication, 
infrastructure, roads, buildings and factories cost Kuwait $160 billion and Iraq 
$190 billion.948 The hurriedly built military facilities, airstrips and camps, cost 
another $51 billion.949 The war contributed to a drop in gross national product for 
the region which has been estimated at 1.2 per cent for 1990 and 7 per cent for 
1991. The $45 billion contribution paid by Saudi Arabia to the allied enterprise, 
amounting to 57.3 per cent of its annual gross domestic product.9&) The Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait and resulting Gulf war have cost the region an estimated $620 
billion.951 
Saudi Arabia has also spent $28 billion on military construction, equipment and 
ordnance, including the supply of fuel, water, food, housing, transportation and 
other necessities at no cost to more than 685,000 foreign troopS.962 American forces 
alone were supplied with two million gallons of drinking water each day.953 The 
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fuel consumption of the two American Corps was about 4.5 million gallons, that 
was about 880 truckloads each day.954 A statement of the study mission to Saudi 
Arabia, which was in Saudi Arabia from November 25·30, 1990, and was 
submitted by Representative Robert Lagomarsino to House of Representatives, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, asserted that "The Saudis are contributing far more 
to this operation than is generally perceived".955 He also stated that Saudi Arabia 
would have a deficit of about $10 billion on its GNP for 1990, despite the huge 
jump in the oil prices.966 On January 8, 1991, Claiborn Pell, Chairman of the 
Committee of Foreign Relations, again raised the question of the Saudi 
contribution, "My understanding is that the increase in the price of oil has resulted 
in the Saudi receiving a windfall of about the same amount of money that it would 
take to keep all our troops in that part of the world" .967 Testifying in Congress, 
Alexander Haig, former Secretary of States replied to the Chairman's question: 
I am very sceptical of some of the references to this windfall that Saudi Arabia is 
allegedly areruing. I don't think anyone knows. I think that they have been 
generous. They are providing all of the oil. They are providing all of the 
facilities ... and they have also given a supplementary stipend to the U.S. to 
ameliorate our operational cost. .. But I am going to suggest that they are going to 
demonstrate far more generosity on the part of the kingdom than we are giving 
them credit for today. 958 
One who participated in the Desert Storm Operations, Lt Gen. William Pagonis, 
as..~rted that "We would have been in a very difficult situation if our host nation 
had been either poor, hostile or both".969 The government of Saudi Arabia also 
spent more than $1 billion to help resettle Kuwaiti refugees and refugees from 
other nations who fled the invasion.960 Holding the largest financial burden of the 
cost of both "Desert Shield" and "Desert Storm", Saudi Arabia took important steps 
to reduce the negative impact of the Gulf crisis on the stability of the international 
economy.961 
These two most important factors that brought success to the Desert Storm 
operations against Iraq were 1: the readiness of the Saudi military infrastructure 
and 2: the superior technology of the American military and the huge military 
capability of the coalition, especially the U.S., Britain and France.962 The Saudi 
military infrastructures enabled Saudi Arabia to provide logistical support to 
coalition troopS.963 On the other hand. the correct guidance systems of U.S. troops 
to fmd identify strikes against Iraqi military and strategic target. and the effective 
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u.s. command control, communication and intelligence capabilities were crucial in 
achieving the coalition's military objectives against Iraq effectively with the fewest 
possible casualties.964 
After Iraq was defeated and had withdrawn its forces from Kuwait, the Security 
Council adopted resolution 687, (April 3, 1991).005 It demanded that Iraq eliminate 
all its weapons of mass destruction and present the U.N. with full disclosure about 
all its chemical and biological weapons and facilities and all nuclear materials, and 
then co-operate in their destruction.966 It agreed that Iraq should compensate 
Kuwait and other foreign nationals and companies which had suffered as a result 
of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.967 All sanctions continued in place for anything 
other than medicines and health supplies.968 In addition, Iraq should accept the 
boundary with Kuwait.969 
Iraq had moved much of the crucial nuclear material to protect it from the 
coalition's bombing so that the bombing of Iraq's nuclear facilities simply risked an 
environmental holocaust with little advantage.97o Clearly, chemical, biological and 
nuclear weapons are dangerous, but it is possible that the issue could be better 
dealt with through negotiations calling for the dismantling of unconventional 
weapons programs and through U.N. imposed restrictions on chemical, biological 
and nuclear weapons production throughout the world.971 The United Nations 
were to review the situation every sixty days, and Iraqi compliance with the UN 
resolutions would be studied as a key element of any decision to reduce or lift 
sanctions.972 However, the lifting of the sanctions was tied to the elimination of 
Iraq's non-conventional weapons, and the set of processes for Iraq to compensate 
those who had suffered from its actions.973 The Iraqi's did not co-operate with the 
U.N. to give them full information about the non-conventional weapons or to 
destroy them, so the U.N. sanctions remains in place up to the time of writing 
(1996). 
In retrospect 
The United States' intervention in the Gulf crisis was motivated by a number of 
Nlasons. These involved: (1) an attempt to con~lidate its declining power in the 
global economy; (2) an effort to preserve access to the Gulfs oil ~~rves: (3) to 
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protect the integrity of its alliance structure in the Gulf states; and (4) to send a 
message to the Gulf countries that they must not challenge the U.S. dominance in 
the region.974 The American involvement was supposed to strengthen the U.S. 
position in the Gulf and in the Middle East in genera1.875 However, rather than 
reduce instability, the Gulf crisis might have increased the possibility that the U.S. 
will be involved in more crises in the region.976 
Its political purpose as home was it to make Americans feel more optimistic about 
their political and eoonomic future. 977 The Gulf war oonfirmed the U.S. as the 
dominant military power in the new world order.978 Dick Cheney praised the 
leadership of the u.s. in his speech on February 27, 1991, with the words: 
The bottom line is that this whole effort has been put together and held together 
by the leadership of the U.S.... This was one of the most sucressful achievements, 
not only from a military but also from a diplomatic and political standpoint, that 
this country has ever seen.979 
For President Bush, the victory in the Gulf war was that it would once and for all 
allow the U.S. to defeat the "Vietnam Syndrome".980 On February 17, 1991, about 
a week before the ground war, President Bush stated that the ooming U.S. victory 
in the Gulf war would defeat the Vietnam syndrome.981 In one of his first speeches 
after the war he said "By God, we have kicked this Vietnam Syndrome forever". 982 
The Gulf war was the perfect war for the U.S. It had the perfect enemy in the 
Iraqi president who was the perfect "evil dictator" whom the propaganda could 
demonise.983 Iraq possessed a Third World army that emerged threatening the 
region.984 To make this dramatic, Iraq had to be presented as dangerous enemy 
and then destroyed.985 Sucressful achievement would set the U.S. as the most 
powerful military force in the world and would demonstrate the U.S.' military 
power to resolve political conflicts and to establish U.S. political hegemony.986 
The Gulf war appeared at the same time to be a short-term solution to the political 
problems of President Bush and the U.S. military and affected no significant 
change in U.S. ~iety, which had over a decade of economic problems.98'i The new 
financial world created by the oil crisis of the 1970s made Congressmen ask what 
policies their government. were developing to deal with this new financial 
environment and how were they going to recycle petrodollars (see Chapter four).:& 
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Because of the special prestige achieved in the Gulf war, the U.S. government 
received 70 per cent of the initial contracts for U.S. companies to rebuild Kuwait. 
(The cost of rebuilding Kuwait is estimated to be S 160 billion}.989 The ~st of the 
contracts went to the rest of the Western Countries.900 In addition, Kuwait would 
finance its rebuilding by taking loans from Western Banks, and not by 
withdrawing from its capital reserve in the Western Banks, estimated at more 
than $120 billion.991 Although, Kuwait and Saudi Arabia invested heavily in the 
U.S. and Western economies, Iraq invested its wealth in other projects and areas; 
taking Kuwait petrodollars out of the U.S. bond market. This might have 
threatened V.S. economic stability, and if Saudi Arabia was also taken over by 
Iraq and its petrodollars were spent elsewhere, disaster oould follow.OO2 In fact, in a 
speech at a meeting of the Arab Co-operation Council in Jordan, on February 24, 
1990, Saddam Hussein told the members not to invest its money in the U.S. 
anymore but to invest in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union instead.993 In this, 
the Gulf war served as a handy replacement for the oollapse of the Soviet Empire, 
turning over a new target for domestic fears.994 
The Gulf war was also an appropriate war to test the Pentagon's weapons and 
strategies; to use up their overstocked supply of weapons and to create new ones. 
The arms environment needs a major war every twenty years or so to test their 
new weapons systems.995 Saddam Hussein remains in power after the Gulf war 
generated a dangerous environment, thus, securing further V.S. arms sales and 
military intervention in Saudi Arabia, which the V.S. tried to base on Saudi s>il for 
many years ago.996 The Gulf war also helped to increase the prestige of the 
military. thus, helping its fight against future budget cuts; to advance the 
vocations of officers; and to promote the fortunes of the war team.997 The Gulf war 
delivered the first major demonstration of the weapons technology which had been 
under development since the Vietnam period.~ In planning and fighting the war 
to some degree showed how well this largely untried technology would function. 999 
The Gulf war was the first U.S. attempt to fight a large-scale conventional 
manoeuvre war since the Korean war.lOOO Indeed President Bush was urged to 
choose and send a U.S. oombat reserve unit to Saudi Arabia to test, for the first 
time in a situation of potential war, a new plan in which civilian military reservists 
would join profeSSional troops. l(~ll 
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From the point of view of the U.S. defefl(~ industry, Iraq's decision to invade 
Kuwait could not have come at a better time; just as Congress was debating a plan 
to cut $24 billion from President Bush's proposed $307 billion defence budget for 
1991.1002 The Iraqi invasion rescued some U.S. local defence oompanies such as 
Douglas Aircraft, which employed about 8,000 workers in building the C-17 cargo 
plane.1003 Both houses of Congress have voted to limit spending on the C-17 until 
the plane was certified for flight, but Iraq's invasion of Kuwait changed that 
decision. 1004 After years of slow performance, eight of the main U.S. arms 
contractors noticed their stock value increase by $5.3 billion in the month after the 
Gulf war started.1OO5 Senator Bob Dole commented on that, "Saddam Hussein, for 
all the bad things he did, may have done us a favour, he sort of woke us up in 
America and woke us up in Congress" . 1006 
During the height of the Cold War, much attention was given to arms transfers to 
developing countries. 1OO7 These countries were frequently the focal point of conflicts 
and competition for influence between the West and the Communist bloc 
countries. 1OOS The new political and eoonomic environment generated 
internationally by the end of the Cold War had a dramatic effect on the world-wide 
conventional arms marketplace as well as on arms transfers to the developing 
countries. 1009 Post-Cold War reductions in national defence spending by most 
major arms exporting countries placed oontinuing pressures on the arms industries 
to search for foreign weapons contracts to restore declining domestic orders. The 
impact of the end of the Iran-Iraq war also detrimentally affected the arms 
industry.lOlO In the extremely oompetitive international foreign arms markets. the 
U.S. has proven to be especially successful, while other traditional arms suppliers 
have had great difficulty securing new contracts. lOll U.S. arms sales have been 
considerably assisted by its reputation its arms gained as a result of their effective 
use during the Gulf war. 1012 The U.S. has come to dominate in supplying arms to 
many of the developing oountries. 1013 From 1990-1993, the U.S. made S59.8 billion 
in anns transfer agreements with developing countries or 52.2 per cent of all such 
agreements. 1014 In the earlier period before the Cold War had ended (1986-1989), 
the Soviet Union was the single leading supplier, making $77.3 billion in arms 
transfer agreements with the developing countries. 1015 
Russia has been especially hard hit by the dramatically changing intRrnatJOnal 
political and economic order. 10l6 Rus.."ia recently has had few arms clipnts in the 
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developing countries. 1017 Between 1990 and 1993, that figure fell to 820,100 
billi 1018 Th on. ese arms transfer agreements with developing countries amounted to 
19.4 per cent of all such agreements. Testifying in Congress on behalf of the Bush 
administration about the $4,026 million arms sale to Saudi Arabia on June 19, 
1990, Mr Levine said "We should keep the kingdom (Saudi Arabia) on a military 
par with Iraq, for us to participate in such an enormous escalation of the arms 
competition in the region". 1019 
The leading arms suppliers are probably only willing to supply loans to those 
developing countries most capable of repaying them. 102O Other suppliers may well 
choose to not make such loans in the first place. 1021 In the case of the Gulf states, 
they are capable of paying and this reflects the particular importance of this region 
as a leading international arms market.1022 For the U.S., to supply the huge 
demand for arms to the Gulf countries would make them flood the oil markets to 
purchase weapons which could lead, in the final stage, to the decline of oil prices. 
That was one of the U.S. 's policies after the oil crisis of 1973-1974, which made 
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the Subcommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia, to ask in the mid 1970s "How the U.S. was trying to bring the oil 
prices down" (see chapter four).1023 The U.s. ranking in arms transfer agreements 
with the developing countries in 1993, was directly attributable to costly new 
orders from Saudi Arabia $9.5 billion and $2.2 billion from Kuwait. 1024 
Therefore, the Gulf crisis was no longer just about oil, but the way that oil would 
be translated into money and power: political, economic, and military. 1025 Saddam 
Hussein warned the U.S. that the oil weapon could well be applied again. 1r03 Oil 
played a significant role in the conflict. 1027 Had it not been for oil, Kuwait might 
not have been invaded in the first place and Iraq would not have been capable to 
afford the military power to do so and then challenge the U.S. in the Gulf. 10'~ The 
U.S. policy in the Gulf is to secure access to those oil supplies which will continue to 
be essential in spite of U.S.' energy conservation efTorts.1029 Acres.~ to the (;ulf 
implies the availability of oil imports in quantities adequate to meet U.S. domestic 
demand. lOoo For the U.S., these supplies must be continuous and they must be 
available at prioos which do as little damage to the U.S. eronomy as pos.~ible.l031 
These three: adequacy, continuity and "reasonable" prices form part of the 
defmition of a~ss. 1032 Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait would have 
performed his stated goal of dramatically mcreasing the pri(Xl of oil on the world 
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developing countries.IOli Between 1990 and 1993, that figure fell to $20,100 
billion. lOIS These arms transfer agreements with developing countries amounted to 
19.4 per cent of all such agreements. Testifying in Congress on behalf of the Bush 
administration about the $4,026 million arms sale to Saudi Arabia on June 19 , 
1990, Mr Levine said "We should keep the kingdom (Saudi Arabia) on a military 
par with Iraq, for us to participate in such an enormous escalation of the arms 
competition in the region". 1019 
The leading arms suppliers are probably only willing to supply loans to those 
developing countries most capable of repaying them. 102O Other suppliers may well 
choose to not make such loans in the first place.1021 In the case of the Gulf states, 
they are capable of paying and this reflects the particular importance of this region 
as a leading international arms market.1022 For the U.S., to supply the huge 
demand for arms to the Gulf countries would make them flood the oil markets to 
purchase weapons which could lead, in the final stage, to the decline of oil prices. 
That was one of the U.S.'s policies after the oil crisis of 1973-1974, which made 
Congressman Lee H. Hamilton, Chairman of the Subrommittee on the Near East 
and South Asia, to ask in the mid 1970s "How the U.S. was trying to bring the oil 
prices down" (see chapter four).1023 The U.S. ranking in arms transfer agreements 
with the developing countries in 1993, was directly attributable to costly new 
orders from Saudi Arabia $9.5 billion and $2.2 billion from Kuwait. 1024 
Therefore, the Gulf crisis was no longer just about oil, but the way that oil would 
be translated into money and power: political, eronomic, and military.l025 Saddam 
Hussein warned the U.S. that the oil weapon rould well be applied again. lO:» Oil 
played a significant role in the conflict.1027 Had it not been for oil, Kuwait might 
not have been invaded in the first place and Iraq would not have been capable to 
afford the military power to do so and then challenge the U.S. in the Gulf.l028 The 
U.S. policy in the Gulf is to secure access to those oil supplies which will continue to 
be essential in spite of U.S.' energy conservation efforts. 1029 A~ss to the Gulf 
implies the availability of oil imports in quantities adequate to meet U.S. domestic 
demand. 1030 For the U.S., these supplies must be rontinuous and they must be 
available at prices which do as little damage to the U.S. eronomy as possible. losl 
These three: adequacy, continuity and "reasonable" prices form part of the 
defmition of areess. 1032 Saddam Hu~in's invasion of Kuwait would have 
performed his stated goal of dramatically increasing the price of oil on the world 
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market. 1033 If he pursued the standards of the past, his greatly increased oil 
revenues would have gone to strengthen his already strong (relative to other Arab 
countries) military forces and to expand his developing and existing nuclear, 
biological and chemical arsenals. 1034 It was clear that this oould have threatened 
the future of Israel. 1035 General Khaled Bin Sultan stated: 
To see the war only in tenns of Western interest in the defence of oil or the 
protection of Israel obscures the true nature of the crisis by overlooking the impact 
of Saddam's move on regional politics and on the interests of regional players. 1036 
The clearest statement of U.S. policy came in a speech by Secretary of State, 
James Baker, titled, "Why America is in the Gulf", delivered before the Los 
Angeles World Affairs Council on October 29, 1990.1037 James Baker indicated 
three reasons for the U.S. involvement in the Gulf: (1) Saddam Hussein's 
aggression shattered the vision of a better world in the aftermath of the Cold War; 
(2) Iraq's aggression is a regional challenge which could prevent the resolution of 
other problems in the region; (3) Iraq's aggression challenged the global eoonomy, 
because the health of the global eoonomy would depend for the foreseeable future 
on secure access to the energy resources of the Gulf states. 1038 
In December 1977, the Committee on Energy and Natural Resources asserted in a 
Congressional report, that it would not take overt military action to secure a~ess 
to oil supplies, except perhaps as a last resort.1039 Thus, an invitation from Saudi 
Arabia, particularly to the U.S. and the granting of such rights, given its political 
consequence, could only come after a serious crisis had become evident. 104O The 
U.S. oould not playa significant military role without across to land bases on the 
Arabian peninsula. 1041 Therefore, the U.S. had not sent defmite signs to Iraq 
preceding the invasion that it would counter Iraqi actions along the border with 
Kuwait. 1042 
A~ording to the U.S. Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, she emphasised in her 
meeting with Saddam Hussein on July 25, 1990, that Bush desired Iraq's 
friendship, and she noted that the U.S. did not take a position on the border 
dispute between the two countries. The U.S. considered this a continuing problem 
bilateral issue between the two countries. 1043 In addition, on July 24, 1990, State 
Department Spokesperson, Margaret Tutwiler said much the same publicly and 
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added that the U.S. had no defence treaties with Kuwait. 1044 As Robert Gate 
commented on the Glaspie testimony before the Subcommittee on Europe and the 
Middle East, on March 21, 1991, "The idea that Saddam Hussein goes into a 
meeting with April Glaspie, and because she doesn't tell him that we are going to 
send 500,000 troops to the middle of the desert if he moves in Kuwait, he leaves 
the meeting and says 'God dam it, now I can do it', well, that is simply 
ludicrous" .1045 The Iraqis interpreted Glaspie's comments as showing a lack of 
interest in their invasion. I046 Surely, the U.S. could not say aloud to Saddam go 
and take Kuwait. That led Saddam Hussein not just to seize the disputed Rumaila 
oilfield and Bubiyan Island, but to seize the whole country. Besides, CENTCOM 
notified Washington on July 31, 1990, that an Iraqi invasion appeared 
imminent. 1047 Instead of the administration warning Iraq, they started to discuss 
what kind of action that should take in case of invasion. I048 Defmitely, Saddam's 
move was based on a clear calculation. However, the U.S. trapped him by sending 
signals about how important to the U.S. he was, and how having lost the Shah of 
Iran to police American interests in the Gulf, the U.s. might make Saddam 
Hussein occupy the role. l049 For instance, when the Iran-Iraq was started the U.S. 
adopted a neutral position in the hope of seeing the two potential regional powers 
destroy one another. !Ow As Henry Kissinger put it clearly in 1981, "The ultimate 
American interest was that both sides lose", the total cost of the war was $452.6 
billion to Iraq and $644.3 billion to Iran. l051 However, when it became evident in 
1982 that Iraq might lose the war, American policy changed and the U.s. actively 
followed a policy designed to save Iraq from being military defeated by Iran. lCll2 
The U.S. purposes were to prevent the spread of the Iranian revolution and the 
overthrow of Saudi Arabia and the other Arab oil producing states of the Gulf 
region. 1053 
The U.S. assisted Iraq by: (1) in February 1982, Iraq was removed from the State 
Department's list of terrorist countries; (2) the U.S. started to allow Iraq to buy 
American technology and military equipment; (3) Iraq was given access to trade 
with the U.S; (4) in 1984, Iraq and the U.S. returned to full diplomatic relations, 
which had been cut off during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. This gave the Iraq 
benefit of sharing U.S. intelligence data and satellite data showing Iranian troop 
strength and movements; and (5) with the collapse of oil prices in 1986, the U.S .. 
France. and other Western countries pre~nted Iraq with commercial and 
agncultural credits. 1054 
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In 1992, a Hou..qe Committee investigated U.S. policy towards Iraq, and was led by 
Chair Henry Gonzalez. Documents released by the committee revealed that at 
critical moments, Bush intervened on Iraq's behalf during and after the Iran-Iraq 
war. 100l The committee started investigating U.S. policy toward Iraq after U.S. 
authorities raided the Atlanta branch of the Italian-based Banca Nazionale de 
Lavaro (BNL) in 1989.1066 This BNL branch was key to a secret Iraqi anns 
technology acquirement network in the United States.1057 A federal grand jury in 
Atlanta charged three BNL-Atlanta officials in February 1991, of providing more 
than $4 billion in unauthorised loans to Iraq from 1985-1989.1058 The committee 
also revealed evidence that the Bush administration continued to share V.S. 
intelligence with Iraq until May 29, 1990, just two months before Iraqi troops 
invaded Kuwait. 1059 The Committee released an "Options Paper on Iraq" dated 
May 16,1990, marked "Secret", which contained a part on the pros and cons ofV.S. 
intelligence co-operation with Iraq.lOoo Intelligence exchanges had dropped since 
the Iran-Iraq cease-fire, but still provided Iraq with limited information on Iranian 
military activity.1001 On March 9, 1992, Gonzalez asked in a speech on the House 
floor. "Did the continuation of intelligence sharing well into 1990 enable the Iraqis 
to learn how to hide their military activities to escape V.S. bombing?,'I062 The 
investigation dramatically demonstrated that Bush was one of Saddam Hussein's 
best allies in Washington right up to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 1003 
Furthermore, the U.S. ~ld the latest and most advanced technology to Iraq in 
1988, when the Commerce Department permitted a V.S. company to sell models of 
two computers used in U.S. missile-tracking systems to the Iraqi missile-research 
centre. 1064 Thus, unlike Adolf Hitler (President Bush has repeatedly compared 
Saddam with Hitler), Iraq imported its chemical weapons plants, warplanes, and 
missiles which it had purchased abroad, unlike Hitler's Germany (1932-1945) 
which was the seoond most powerful industrial country in the world and self 
reliant for arms. 1065 In one of Saddam's defensive speeches on April 20, 1990, he 
claimed that the Western nations and the U.S. in particular, had been trying to sell 
him uranium for years, and now, after the seizure of U.S.-made nuclear triggers at 
Heathrow airport in London in March 1990, they were trying to frame him for the 
crime of developing a nuclear weapon. 1066 
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After the Iraqis spent billions of dollars with Western help to develop a nuclear 
weapon, Israel bombed Iraq's Osiraq reactor in 1981, just two years away from 
making a nuclear weapon. 1067 Ironically, at the same time as the invasion of 
Kuwait in the middle of August 1990, the CIA put out a report that Iraq was once 
again only two years away from making a nuclear weapon. 1068 It might be argued 
that the invasion of Kuwait introduced the V.S. with the perfect favourable time to 
destroy Saddam's military capability, especially his nuclear, biological and 
chemical weapons. 1069 The evidence suggests that the Bush administration was 
more eager to get involved in the crisis than the Saudis were to have the U.S:. 
help, including V.S. troops on Saudi soil.lo70 
Future Prospects 
The Gulf war reinforced the important growth in the V.S.-Saudi relationship. In 
Desert Shield and Desert Storm, Americans and Saudis found themselves in a new 
and deep relationship than previously. The Americans and Saudi Commanders 
worked side by side in Saudi Military Centre planning joint military operations. 
That experience was the true guide to enhance the relationship. 
The 1991 Gulf war, had a significant impact on the Middle East. The "new world 
order" supported by President Bush's visions, and a strong Saudi role is considered 
integral by the V.S. in order to deliver stability in the Middle East.I07l The U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia were rapidly able to call a coalition of more than thirty five 
countries. The U.S. commitment to the security of Saudi Arabia was first tested 
during the Gulf war and indicates that the U.s.-Saudi relationship would remain 
close at least in the near future. The U.s. force could effectively provide for the 
security of Saudi Arabia, which indicates the continuing need for the U.S. 
assistance and protection of Saudi Arabia. However, the Saudi's debt to the V.S. 
for its as.'3istance during the Gulf war may restrict Saudi capability to pressure the 
U.S. in any side, for instance over the Arab-Israeli dialogue. This may be 
compensated by the U.S. desire to see Saudi Arabia preserve its position as a 
dominant vice in the region's politics and preserve its status as the largest trading 
partner of the U.S. in the Middle East. 1072 
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Chapter Six 
Arab-Israeli ConOict Since the Gulr Crisis 
and Saudi Policy 
The 1990 Gulf crisis produced one of the many unpleasant setbacks for the 
Palestinians in recent times. 1 The Palestinians' position on the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait resulted in the PLO's international reputation rapidly deteriorating.2 The 
financial and diplomatic support from the Gulf Arab states, that had preserved the 
PLO for more than two decades, was withdrawn.3 Arafat himself was not granted 
permission to enter any GCC states, and yet these states were the PLO's most 
important source of funds. 4 This chapter will focus on how the Iraqi invasion 
affected the Saudi position towards the PLO. The chapter will di~uss the major 
developments on the Arab-Israeli peace process after the Gulf war and the impact 
of the peace process on U.S.-Saudi relations. 
The impact or the PLO position on the Iraqi invasion on 
Saudi-Palestinian relations 
On August 2, 1990, the Security Council adopted resolution 660 condemning Iraq's 
aggression and demanding an immediate and unconditional Iraqi withdrawal from 
Kuwait's territory. 5 An emergency summit meeting of Arab states was called on 
August 10, 1990, in Cairo.6 The Arab summit condemned the Iraqi aggression, 
and called for immediate Iraqi withdrawal and restoration of the legal government 
of Kuwait. Twelve out of the twenty-one members voted for the resolution. The 
PLO - along with Iraq and Libya - voted against the resolution. Jordan, 
Mauritania, and Sudan approved the resolution with reservation, while Algeria 
and Yemen abstained; Tunisia did not attend which the other Arab oountries 
interpreted as siding with Iraq. 7 
The PLO's reluctance to oondemn the invasion of Kuwait at the August 10, 
meeting of Arab states and Arafat's subsequent visits to Iraq. created considerable 
displeasure. Criticism by Arab states developed into an anti-Iraq ooalition which 
imposed economic and diplomatic sanctions. These resulted in the direct suffering 
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for Palestinian communities, and seemed to involve long-term implications for their 
political future. 8 
In contrast to the general Arab, American and Western countries' support for 
Saudi Arabia, Algeria, Jordan, Libya, Sudan, Tunisia, Yemen and the PLO 
publicly condemned the deployment of American troops in Saudi Arabia, on August 
8, 1990. They considered this more unfavourably than the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait. Jordan and the PLO called for an "Arab solution" to the problem.9 
Saudi Arabia became unwilling to support any of the pro-Iraq elements in other 
Arab countries. From the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait through to the Gulf war and 
after, the Saudi media agencies directed a bitter campaign against Jordan's King 
Hussein and the PLO leader, Yasser Arafat, for what the Saudis perceived as 
shameless support for Iraq. Saudi annual aid to Jordan of $48 million and the 
PLO about $72 million was completely cut off.lO Saudi Arabia closed its borders 
with Jordan preventing trade between Jordan, Saudi Arabia and the Gee states. ll 
In addition, on August 7, 1990, Arafat was warned about his attitude towards the 
crisis by King Fahd. 12 Thus, the PLOts international standing deteriorated rapidly. 
The PLO's policies resulted in hostility from Gulf states rulers and estrangement 
from international &>ciety.13 
As the PLO became more iSllated they decided to support the Iraqi offer of 
August 12, 1990, which linked Iraq's withdrawal from Kuwait with Israel's 
withdrawal from Palestine, including Jerusalem, the Golan heights, and southern 
Lebanon, as well as Syria's withdrawal from the Lebanon.14 
Arafat had established a temporary strategic arrangement. both diplomatic and 
military, with Iraq preooding the Kuwait invasion. Sinoo the U.S.' inability or 
unwillingness to influenoo Israel, and the deficiency of PLO diplomacy from 1988 
until suspension of the U.S.-PLO dialogue in June 1990, the PLO was persuaded 
that only Iraq had the requisite diplomatic leverage and military power to 
persuade Israel to give up the West Bank and Gaza Strip or at least to force Israel 
to come to the negotiating table. When the crisis started, Arafat reported that the 
United States would not fight battle-tested Iraq, and that if there was a war Iraq 
would either win or the United States would get bogged down in the de~rt. 
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Therefore, Arafat said just days before operation Desert Storm started, that if the 
United States and its allies wanted to fight "Then we say welcome, welrome, 
welcome to war. Iraq and Palestine will be together, side by side" .15 The link 
between the invasion of Kuwait with the Palestine problem was not created in the 
Iraqi leader's mind until ten days after the invasion. Arafat believed that he was 
working for the Palestinian people by supporting Iraq. However, the Gulf Arab 
states lost all sympathy for the Palestinian leadership in the light of the PLO's 
attitude. 16 
We must understand the reasons that induced some of the Arab rountries to 
support the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The widespread theory is that the invasion 
plan was organized in advance between the Iraqi president and his allies, who 
sustained him in exchange for a share of the booty. Ghazi Algosaibi, asserted that 
some Arab officials stated that the oil in the Arabian Peninsula was just a 
"geological coincidence" which did not give the people of Peninsula any more right 
than other Arabs to the oil. Algosaibi provides an interesting defence of the people 
of the Peninsula who believed that the discovery of oil in their peninsula was not a 
coincidence. Before the discovery of the oil the people of Peninsula had endured 
throughout their history many hardships and they had often died of hunger. They 
viewed the discovery of oil as a blessing bestowed by God, who provides a means of 
subsistence to whomever he pleases. Palestinians, Syrians, Lebanese or Egyptians 
who had previously worked for the government of Saudi Arabia teaching the people 
and giving them lessons in how to invest their money, now came to the peninsula 
to ask for work.17 Arab states were unhappy as the centre of gravity for financial 
and political power shifted from the metropolis (Cairo, Baghdad, Dama~us and 
Beirut) to the desert. 
However, in an article written by an Arab journalist, Mohammed Heikal, in the 
London Times of September 12, 1990, he states "The struggle for independence 
and the ownership of the oil was waged from the cities of Cairo, Baghdad, 
Damascus and Beirut". In his view, these cities represented the political oontre of 
gravity and should have been the financial centre as well. He adds "However, 
ultimately, it was the tribal leaders who obtained the oil and denied the cities the 
fruit of their labours" . 18 
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After the Iran-Iraq war, Saddam Hussein asked King Fahd to SIgn a 
"non-aggression" pact on April 1989, between Saudi Arabia and Iraq. The request 
sounded very strange to the King, who imagined that the political relationship 
between Saudi Arabia and Iraq, and the per~nal relationship between himself and 
the Iraqi president was almost an alliance. Nevertheless, King Fahd found it hard 
to reject Saddam's request and agreed to the pact. Saddam Hussein was oonfident 
that Saudi Arabia would not permit its territory to be used in a military campaign 
against Iraq. In contrast, Iraq refused a Kuwaiti request for a similar 
non-aggression pact, arguing that, bilateral problems between Iraq and Kuwait 
had to be resolved first. 19 
Many Palestinians supported the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. Abu AI-Abbas, leader 
of Palestine Liberation Front, sent 400 members to help the Iraqi army and the 
Ba'ath-spon~red Arab Liberation Front sent a further 300 Palestinians to 
Kuwait.w Many of these Palestinians worked on roadblocks. This placed them in 
confrontation with the local population. Some other Palestinians helped the Iraqis 
in interrogation and torture centres.21 Before the invasion, about 400,000 
Palestinians lived in Kuwait and Yassir Arafat himself had been an engineer in 
Kuwait and the Fatah had been started in Kuwait. 22 The Gulf Arab states 
provided regular annual financial support to the PLO which exceeded $72 million 
from Saudi Arabia, and $24 million from Kuwait.23 
The PLOts position generated deep divisions throughout the large Palestinian 
community. There was an economic cost of war which was sustained in the 
occupied territories, a shadow was cast over the future of the Palestinians of 
Kuwait.24 Most of the direct effect has been the damage to people's livelihoods. 
Thousands of Palestinians working in Kuwait lost their jobs. Thousands in other 
Gulf states came under suspicion as possible members of Iraqi support groups and 
in some cases they were deported.25 
The Middle East peace process 
The appearance of a powerful American-Arab alliance against Iraq allowed 
America an opportunity to carry out a general house clearing in the Middle East. 
They nevertheless avoided any linkage between the Gulf crisis and the Arab-Israel 
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dispute. Thus, President Bush told the U.N. General Assembly on October 1, 1990. 
that an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait would ease the solution of additional 
problems in the Middle East.~ Similarly, on January 29, 1991, during the Gulf 
war, Baker and the Soviet Foreign Minister met in Washington and "agreed that 
without a meaningful peace process - one which promotes a just peace, security and 
real oonciliation for Israel, Arab states, and Palestinians - it will not be possible to 
deal with the sources of conflict and instability in the region". 27 
After the U.S. led coalition's military victory against Iraq, President Bush ordered 
Secretary Baker to the Middle East once again to find new flexibility for peace 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours. In view of Israel's restraint and the 
Palestinian position in the Gulf war, Baker believed that Arab states should now 
be more willing to negotiate directly with Israel. 28 
In a statement issued in Riyadh by Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, Oman, Qatar, 
the United Arab Emirates, Egypt and Syria, the Arab allies expressed their 
appreciation for President Bush's speech on March 6, 1991, which dealt positively 
with the security of this region and the Palestinian question. In his speeches, 
President Bush had said that "A comprehensive peace must be grounded in United 
Nation Security Council resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of territory for 
peace. This principle must be elaborated to provide for Israel's security and 
recognition and at the same time for legitimate Palestinian rights".'11d 
On March 10, 1991, Secretary of State, James Baker, visited Saudi Arabia and told 
reporters on his way to Cairo and Israel that he had been exploring with the Arab 
coalition partners what steps they might be able to take to signal their 
commitment to peace and reoonciliation with Israel. 00 While in Israel, James 
Baker also met with a delegation of Palestinians. He found willingness on their 
part to oonsider new formulas toward making the peace process work.31 Syria, 
however, insisted that Israel first agree to relinquish Arab lands in areordance 
with the U.N. resolutions. 32 The Saudis felt that they should not be represented in 
the process, because the only parties to peace were the Israelis, the Palestinians, 
the Jordanians and the Syrians. They, therefore refused to join the dialogue. 33 
Meanwhile, Secretary of State, James Baker met Palestinian representatives in 
Israel at a session sanctioned by the PW.34 Baker insisted that Bush 
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administration was not negotiating with Arafat's organization.so The decision of 
the PLO chief Yasser Arafat to side himself with Saddam Hussein forred the U.S. 
to get rid of the notion that he must be the spokesman for Palestinians in any 
future negotiations with Israel. 36 
In February 1991, a report carried by London-based Mideast Mirror, quoted the 
leader of the PLO as saying that the U.S. had pushed Saudi Arabia into 
abandoning the organization's peace plan. This provoked an official Saudi source to 
condemn the involvement of the newspaper in publishing totally baseless claims. 
In a statement to the Saudi Press Agency, the Saudi souree noted that Saudi 
Arabia had supported the Palestinian cause ever since the first days of the 
disastrous events that had befallen the Palestinian people. This support would 
continue for what was a basic and vital cause of the Islamic and Arab nations.37 
Similarly. reacting to a Reuters analysis which had said that Saudi Arabia was 
planning to support alternatives to Yasser Arafat as leader of the PLO, and that 
Saudi Arabia was withholding its financial support to the PLO. an official Saudi 
source stated that this was a baseless claim. A similar response was brought by an 
item quoting Salim Al-Zanoun. Vice-President of the Palestine National Council, 
which said that Saudi Arabia had told a PLO envoy to repay its financial 
assistance.38 
Official Saudi sources, however, did avoid mentioning the PLO as an organization, 
or supporting it politically. The Saudis did not have seoond thoughts about the 
Palestinian cause, however. In fact, Saudi Arabia had always agreed with the 
Palestinians relating to their liberation until they considered new formulas toward 
making the peace process work after the Gulf crisis.39 In the words of Prince Saud 
Al-Faisal. the Saudi Foreign Minister, the Saudi position "Is based on the right of 
the Palestinians themselves to determine whether they want an independent state, 
or an entity with links to another oountry. or another solution".40 
Saudi Arabia considered participation in the conference unnecessary since Saudi 
Arabia had no territorial dispute with Israel and the Palestinians were going to 
negotiate their question face to face with the Israeli delegation.41 By implication, 
Saudis found it hard for them to sit with the Palestinian representatives who had 
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been against the Saudis during the Gulf crisis. The Saudis tried to find any excuse 
to prevent their participation in the peace conference which reflected the Saudis 
real anger at the Palestinian representatives. 
The U.S.-Saudi honeymoon during the Gulf war seemed to be coming to an end 
with a letter sent to King Fahd in April 1991, by 64 American senators.42 The 
letter urged him to rethink Saudi Arabia's decision to skip the Middle East peace 
conference.43 Senator Bob Packwood said, ttThis move by Saudi Arabia is a slap in 
our face.tt44 Senator Frank Lautenberg reacted to the Saudi's decision in this 
fashion: "We risked and lost American lives to assist Saudi Arabia. Now, when we 
ask them to help us achieve peace and stability in the Middle East, they say, 'no 
thanks'. tt45 
As guardian of Islam's holiest shrines, Saudi Arabia's position is different from any 
other Arab country, however.46 The Americans had a strong belief that Saudi 
Arabia's participation in the oonference with Israel was essential for any genuine 
peace process to sureeed.47 The Americans also believed that Saudi Arabia had in 
the past joined in the combined Arab war efforts against Israel, and that Saudi 
Arabia should now join in combined efforts with the United States and with others 
to bring peace to the Middle East.48 Moreover, the U.S. administration believed 
that Saudi moderation and influence would be a significant oontribution to the 
peace process between Israel and Arab countries. 49 Thus, a State Department 
source told the Associated Press that Saudi Arabia had led Secretary of State to 
expect their participation.5O 
The Saudi Council of Ministers on May 6, 1991, oondemned some hostile reports 
published by some Western media on Saudi Arabia's stand.51 The council restated 
its support for all efforts leading to the resolution of the Palestinian cause.52 In this 
respect, the oouncil expressed the Saudi government's weloome for the initiative 
taken by the U.S., as it rested on international legitimacy and followed the 
concepts of the U.N. Security Council re~lutions. 03 
Later, strong pressure was placed on the Saudis by the Bush administration. f)4 
Following this, the Gee states, led by Saudi Arabia, announced on May 11, 1991, 
that they would attend the peace conference as observers to deal directly with 
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Israel on such regional issues as the environment, water and arms oontrol. 55 This 
decision was de~ribed as promoting the Middle East peace process. 66 
V.S. officials believed the new decision by Saudi Arabia to attend the conference 
would enoourage Israel to reduce its difficult pre-oonditions for entering the peace 
conference. 57 Saudi Arabia's earlier refusal gave Israel further rea~n not to 
cooperate in the U.S. efforts and angered many members of Congress. 58 Besides, 
V.S. officials also believed that the decision might also entice Syria into 
compromise by showing that other Arab countries were ready to talk to Israel. 
This increased the possibility that Syria could not be left behind.59 At the same 
time, Jordan's role in any forthcoming discussion remained unclear, even though, 
the V.S. had areepted Jordan back into the peace process.so 
Secretary of State, James Baker, had visions of a peace negotiation on two levels, 
the main one being a conference that would lead to direct talks involving Israel, 
Syria, Jordan and the Palestinians.61 The point of those talks was to implement 
V.N. resolutions calling on Israel to trade territory for peace.62 The second level of 
the conference would deal with the region-wide issues of arms proliferation, 
shrinking water resources and other problems that threatened the area.63 
Secretary Baker told the reporters that the Gulf Arab states' action meant that 
Saudi Arabia and the five other states would be sitting down face to face with 
Israel in direct talks.64rfhe U.S. put forward a compromise solution that there be a 
joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation.65 
A great advance in encouraging the peace process, was Saudi Arabia's 
announcement of July 20, 1991, that it would join Egypt's offer to end the 
43-year~ld Arab boycott of Israel if the Jewish state would halt oonstruction of 
settlements in the oreupied territories.66 The Saudis have been de~ribed as 
perhaps the most influential participants in the boycott. This action was clearly 
taking a certain political risk both at home and abroad. The offer was made during 
a visit to Saudi Arabia by Secretary Baker.67 The government of Saudi Arabia 
issued a formal statement, after talks with Baker, saying "The Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia has closely followed both the positive position adopted by the Syrian Arab 
Republic under the leadership of President Hafez Assad to promote the peace 
process by agreeing to participate in the forthcoming peace oonference, as well as 
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the statements made by his Excellency Hosni Mubarak, President of Egypt, 
indicating that Israel should suspend the building of settlements, and in ~;'Uch a 
case it would be possible for the Arab oountries to take an appropriate step by 
suspending the Arab boyoott of Israel". 68 
The Saudi decision was of major importance to the U.S. As Mr. Baker said, "We 
are pleased to see this step by the Saudi government because it indicates a 
willingness to take concrete steps toward Israel, if Israel is willing to reciprocate. 
A suspension of the boyoott, of oourse, would signal for one thing a willingness to 
reconcile with Israel, and clearly reciprocal oonfidence-building moves of this 
nature have got to improve the climate for peace. Hopefully, they will make the 
possibility of progress towards peace much greater".69 
Meanwhile, Lebanon announced earlier in the day of July 20, 1991, that it would 
join Syria in supporting the U.S. - designed peace oonference. Undoubtedly, the 
Saudi and Lebanese moves were designed by the United States and were proposed 
to increase pressure on Israel to formally acknowledge that it would attend the 
peace conference on the eve of Secretary of State's visit in Israel on July 21, 1991.70 
A semor Saudi official commented briefly on July 21, 1991, after the Saudi 
announcement about the suspension of the Arab boyoott of Israel that it was "too 
early" to say whether the proposed suspension of the boycott would apply to both 
the primary and the seoondary boycotts. The Saudi officials also acknowledged 
that it was still not clear how many other Arab states would be ready to join in this 
proposal and particularly whether Syria would join, since the Arab League boycott 
office was located in Damascus the Syrian capital.71 
Indeed it was clear from Saudi ~urces that the whole plan had not been 
completely thought out by either the Arabs or the U.S. and that it had been 
created more for its political effect than its direct applicability. 72 Again, Saudi 
Arabia was engaging in a role behind the scenes to encourage other Arab states 
and the Palestinians to acrept President Bush's proposal for an Arab-Israeli peace 
conference.73 
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Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Sh am ir, perceiving the changed circumstances, 
conditionally agreed to attend the conference. 74 He would go if Palestinian 
representation could be satisfactorily resolved. 76 Thus, during the conclusion of the 
summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev to sign a START Treaty, the 
leaders declared that they would issue invitations for a Middle East peace 
conference for October 1991.76 Israel accepted the invitation provided that the PW 
and Palestinians from East Jerusalem would not be among the attendants.n 
Secretary of State, James Baker, agreed to the Israeli demand.78 The Israeli 
cabinet might also be willing to negotiate with new Palestinians that were not 
actively involved with the PLO. 79 
U.S. and Saudi Arabian interests harmonized when Saudi Arabia cut off aid to the 
PLO, which had alienated the Gulf states with its support for Iraq.so The Gulf 
states helped sideline the PW leadership, supporting the U.S. in their efforts to 
build a public relationship with moderate and respected West Bank leaders, less 
objectionable to Israe1.81 
In fact, Mr J ames Baker asked Prince Bandar Ibn Sultan, Saudi Arabia's 
Ambassador to the U.S., to attend the conference.82 King Fahd approved and 
Prince Bandar led the Saudi delegation to the Madrid conference on October 31, 
1991.83 During the conference, Secretary of States, James Baker, showed his 
appreciation of "King Fahd of Saudi Arabia, who demonstrated by word and deed 
that new opportunities for Arab· Israeli peace existed after the Gulf war and who 
per~nified this new approach in the Arab World".84 In another comment during 
the conference, Mr Baker said that more confidence-building measures were 
required from the Arabs and the Israelis, but his warm approval appeared to 
excuse Saudi Arabia.85 
The Saudis' symbolic weight was expected to be a major motivation for the Arab 
states to oooperate in planned actions on regional issues.86 The Saudis wanted to 
see steps taken by Israel, particularly progress in negotiations, before making 
concessions.87 The Bush administration realised that since the Gulf war, the Saudis 
had been able to accept that things had changed and that they were willing to see 
things in a new light.88 
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Actually, the Gulf crisis had a fundamental impact on the Saudi foreign policy and 
its regional orientation. The Gulf war have weakened the radical Arabs and 
provided the Saudis with the confidence to participate with Israelis in the Middle 
East peace process without fearing regional radicahsm.89 Furthermore, Saudi 
Arabia's post-war foreign policy has become more active and more open toward 
Israel. The Saudi Ambassador to the U.S. made public oontact with 
representatives from the American Jewish community and major Jewish 
organizations who shared the Saudi's vision of the Iraqi regional threat.90 
Again, Arabs saw Israel in the oonference hardening its position during the 
bilateral di~ussions about the Middle East. Syria and Israel were locked in 
argument over whether to hold a first meeting simply on prooodural issues. This 
led the Syrian Foreign Minister to announce his intention to return to Syria, 
leaving the prospect of direct Israeli-Syrian talks in doubt.~H However, Mr 
Mubarak and King Fahd put pressure on the Syrian President, who then ordered 
his Foreign Minister to remain at the Madrid peace talkS.92 
King Fahd believed that Arab moderates must make the task easier by avoiding 
inflexibility on their part. More confidence-building measures were required from 
the Arabs and the Israelis. King Fahd did not want the Arabs to lose this 
opportunity for face-to-face talks with the Israelis which points as a step toward a 
comprehensive peace. King Fahd had been waiting for these negotiations for many 
years. The oonference reflecwd his plan of 1981, which was to implement U.N. 
resolutions and for Israel to trade land for peace. 
Consequently, during the Madrid peace conference, the U.S. was forced to step in 
after the participants were unable to agree on any point.93 Thus, the U.S. invited 
Israel and the Arabs to talks in Washington.94 In fact, the Madrid peace conference 
was a good start. It reflects the changed environment in the Middle East and the 
significance of it lies in the fact that Israel was sitting down to negotiate directly 
with each of its Arab neighbours and with the Palestinians.96 
The new Washington talks included negotiations on territory, mutual security and 
peace between Israel and Syria, Jordan and Lebanon, and the prospect of limited 
autonomy for Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.96 The talks 
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launched the actual bargaining between the Israelis and the Palestinians and 
between Israel and its neighbouring Arab countries aimed at producing a 
comprehensive settlement of the Middle East oonflict.97 Saudi Arabia kept itself 
aloof from the peace talks in Washington.98 After all, it was unlikely that Saudi 
Arabia would be as enthusiastic in the support for either Arafat or King Hussein of 
Jordan.99 
The Madrid conference launched a series of bilateral and multilateral talks until 
President Bill Clinton came to office in early 1993.100 A progression of talks with 
regional leaders, including the Palestinians, over the previous two years had 
satisfied the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, that they all remained 
committed to the peace process. 101 
In April, 1993, the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks had arrived at a crucial phase. 
Essential to the success of the peace negotiations was some sign of the narrow 
differences between Israel and the PLO. 102 Although, Saudi Arabia remained aloof 
from the peace process, Saudi Arabia promised to increase its financial support for 
pro-PLO institutions in the occupied territories. The Palestinians had asked for 
the support from Saudi Arabia as a condition of continued participation in the 
talks. 103 
As a matter of fact, the negotiations between Israel and the Pill meant that the 
agreement between Israel and the PLO could almost be signed. The Western 
media disclosed the joint declaration of principles negotiated by Israel and the 
Pill. This marked the first step in what could become a comprehensive peace 
between the Jewish state and all its close neighbours. 1D4 
The Israeli-PLO negotiations represented a breakthrough in this crucial sense; the 
two parties made clear that they really wanted a deal and that they were prepared 
to take risks to achieve it. 105 The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, was 
disappointed over the Palestinian inability to decide and annoyed by Palestinian 
violence. The moment for a deal came when the PLO seemed in extreme need of a 
lifeline. lOS The turn in the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations can be traced to the 
collapse of the Soviet empire in 1992 and the 1990 Gulf war, when Saudi Arabia 
and other GCC states cut off millions of dollars in subsidies to the PLO. 107 With its 
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infrastructure and fighting power weakened in the occupied territories and around 
the world, the PLO agreed to U.S. efforts to upgrade leaders from inside the West 
Bank and Gaza as Israeli's negotiating partners. 108 
As to the deal itself, some of the risks are reflected in the outline of the deal, which 
is limited to a five-year period and does not address the final status of the 
territories. 1OO The PLO has agreed to much of Israel's concept of self-government: 
Jerusalem is left out; Israel's settlers are left out; and Israel keeps control of 
security. 110 The PLO would have to cease both terrorism and the intifada 
(uprising). 11 1 
The countdown to peace was as follows: 
September 13, 1993: Declaration of Principles which was signed In 
Washington. 
October 13, 1993: Declaration of Principles comes into effect. The Joint 
Israeli-Palestinian Liaison Committee formed to implement the Declaration 
of Principles. 
December 13, 1993: Israel and the Palestinians agree the protocol on the 
withdrawal of Israeli foroos from the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Israel 
immediately begins accelerated military withdrawal. 
April 13, 1994: Israel completes military withdrawal from Gaza and 
Jericho. Israel immediately transfers powers to nominated Palestinian 
authorities. The countdown of the five-year period of interim 
self-government towards a permanent settlement begins. 
July 13, 1994: Palestinian elections, which are to be followed by 
inauguration of a Palestinian Council and the dissolution of Israeli 
military-run civil administration in the occupied territories. 
February 13, 1996: Israel and Palestinians start negotiations on structure 
of permanent settlement. 
February 13, 1999: permanent settlement due to come into efTect.1l2 
Therefore, Israel makes Mr Arafat legitimate. 113 He would gain control of territory 
in both Gaza and Jericho, and limited autonomy for the rest of the Wpst Bank. 
which was the land lost to Israel in 1967. 114 It has been de~ribed as "peace by 
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pieoo" .115 Mr Arafat turned to Israel to be rescued. 116 Their proposed plan of 
Palestinian self-government reflected Mr Arafat's weakness and what seemed to be 
limited risks by Israel. 1l7 The PLO then used its newly-found legitimacy to spread 
its demands. lIS Israel's Ambassador to the U.S., !tamar Rabinovitch, said in 
September 1993 "Our choices were to completely try to vanquish the other side or 
to strike a good deal with the other", and he said also "And if we had vanquished 
the other side, we would have ended with excellent terms but with no one to 
complete them with. Right now we have a good agreement on our hands and 
possibly a partner to complete it with". 119 
The peace agreement was signed on September 13, 1993 at the White House. It 
was dependent on the results of continuing dialogue on several different questions 
such as the future status of Jerusalem.1ID President Clinton told a meeting of 
Jewish and Arab Americans after signing the agreement "A lot of the complicated 
details are left... Everyone must understand that this agreement now has to be 
implemented". 121 All the parties agreed that the White House ceremony witnessed 
by Pill Chairman, Y asser Arafat, and Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, 
marked the first step toward reconciling a generation full of hatred and violence. 122 
The U.S. led the way in trying to arrange funds for the Palestinians to promote the 
infrastructure in the West Bank and Gaza. l23 More than 40 countries agreed to 
contribute billions of dollars over five years to help the Palestinians. l24 The U.S. 
made a five-year pledge of $500 million. l25 On September 11, 1993, President 
Clinton asked King Fahd of Saudi Arabia to give his support. Clinton received 
assurances from the King that his government would contribute. l26 So, despite the 
Saudi disappointment with the PLO over its allegianoo with Iraq during the 
Kuwait crisis, Saudi Arabia assured the U.S. officials on October 1, 1993, that it 
would give $1 billion over 10 years (fhe Saudi oontribution up until 1995, has 
amounted to $300 million). 127 
To smooth the path of the peace process, it was well known that the U.S. has asked 
Saudi Arabia to reooive Mr Arafat on a visit to Saudi Arabia. Three years after the 
Gulf war, and due to the Saudi support for the Middle East peace process, the 
Saudi government areepted a written apology from Mr Arafat. 1~ Therefore, on 
July 9, 1994, Mr Arafat visited King Fahd in Saudi Arabia.1~ This was the first 
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visit by Arafat since August 1990.130 The PLO adviser, Nabil Shaath, announood 
after the visit that King Fahd had agreed to "Support the political and economic 
position of the Palestinian National Authority" .131 
Saudi Arabia welcomed the peace agreement signed by the PLO and Israel. The 
Saudi view of the Declaration of Principles was based on the right of the 
Palestinians themselves to detennine what is best for them. Sinoo the PID was 
satisfied with the peaoo agreement with Israel, Saudi Arabia would not reject it. 132 
The Saudi government wanted to see great progress towards a oomprehensive 
Middle East peace settlement. l33 Jordan's King Hussein and the Israeli Prime 
Minister, Yitzhak Rabin, signed a peace agreement on July 25, 1994, in 
Washington. The two leaders ended the hostility and talked on the issues still 
dividing them e.g. border problems, water and security. 134 Syria and Lebanon were 
still negotiating with Israel. l35 It is clear to observers that the Syrian delegation 
combined both its own views and those of the Lebanese in negotiations with the 
Israelis. l36 Syria insisted that they would never accept any peace agreement 
without a complete Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Israel refused 
point blank to give back any of the captured land unless Israel knew what benefits 
it would get in return. 137 
Another step in the peace process was taken by the Saudi government and other 
GCC governments when they ended the secondary boycott of Israel in late 
September 1994.138 President Clinton expressed appreciation during a visit to 
Saudi Arabia on October 25, 1994, for the role played by King Fahd in contributing 
to the peace process by ending the secondary boycott of Israel. 139 In return, King 
Fahd expressed his support for all the peace treaties. l40 In addition they expressed 
their commitment to continuing efforts to make real progress on the Israeli-Syrian 
and the Israeli-Lebanese treaty which would be based on U.N. Security Council 
resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of land for peace. loll 
Major factors influencing the peace process 
Later, the Israeli-Palestinians talks turned back to this central issue: land and 
peace. l42 The Palestinians need land, the Israelis need security. The September 
1993 Declaration of Principles was designed to satisfy these desires; definitely, it 
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has not. 143 Instead, continued expansion of Israeli settlements had generated 
hostility in the Palestinians and have been repeatedly attacked. 144 Israel did agree 
to freeze settlement buildings, a pledge which it had first made in 1992 and on 
which a oontroversial $10 billion in U.S. loan guarantees remained. l45 In spite of 
that, the settler population had increased since September 1993, when Israel 
announced its plan. On May 7, 1995, Israel announced its intention to confi~te 
53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem for Jewish housing. l46 More than 70 per cent 
of the oonfiscated land belonged to Palestinians. 147 
Consequently, public opinion throughout the Arab world seemed to become 
increasingly doubtful about the opportunity of the proooss achieving a 
comprehensive peace and it became increasingly critical of the PW leaders who 
had signed up to a deal which appeared heavily weighted in favour of Israel. Much 
of the opposition of the peace talks came from Palestinian groups such as Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad and other groups. 148 
Therefore, Arab Foreign Ministers agreed to seek an urgent U.N. Security Council 
meeting to stop Israel confiscating Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. l49 In a 
speech, the PLO Chairman, Yasser Arafat, told the Arab Foreign Ministers that 
the situation of slowly progressing peace talks with Israel oould not continue. He 
said also "Israel's practices in Jerusalem and the whole policy of settlements .... 
strike at the credibility of the peace process, raise questions about its value and 
undermine any prospect that it will continue, make progress or be 
oomprehensive".I60 Mr Arafat stressed the land confi~ation endangered the peace 
process, which had made little progress since the autonomous Palestinian 
Authority took over Gaza and Jericho at the beginning of July 1994.151 
The Arab League oonfirmed that Israel's oonfiscation of land violated the Security 
Council resolution which called for Israel to not oonfiscate lands in Jerusalem it 
captured in 1967.152 Israel also violated the Israeli-Palestinian agreement of 1993 
which left the negotiations about the Jerusalem for the seoond phase of the peace 
proceSS. I63 Hence, Arab League Secretary-General, Esmat Abdel Meguid, called in 
May 15, 1995, for a special Arab summit on Israel's plans to seize Palestinian land 
to build homes for Jews in East Jerusalem. l l>4 He also announced clearly "That the 
Arabs have a right to Jerusalem and that they will never sell it off" .156 In addition, 
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Abdel Meguid told reporters on May 15, 1995, that European oountries were 
supporting the Palestine position and Israel could not take the land and the 
peace. 156 
At a Security Council meeting on May 17, 1995, the U.S. alone used its veto to 
block a United Nations Security Council re~lution calling on Israel to cancel their 
decision to oonfiscate Palestinian land in East Jerusalem. 167 The rest of the 
Security Council, (14 oountries), voted in favour of the Palestinians to ensure that 
the Middle East peace process oould continue. 158 The U.S. used the excuse that the 
issue of the oonfiscated Palestinian land should be di~ussed between Israel and 
the PLO and not in the United N ations.169 
Arab reaction was against the U.S. after Washington used its veto. Israeli officials 
said relations with the Arab world had dropped to its lowest point since the 
1980s.1°O The Pill said that the move had caused the Palestinians to "lose faith in 
the U.S. at a time when the peace process was already close to oollapsing":61 
Public opinion in Gaza and the West Bank was not surprised by the American veto. 
They would have been surprised if the U.S. had voted against Israel's plan to seize 
land in East Jerusalem:62 In Jordan, the Government of King Hussein was 
coming under increasing parliamentary pressure to withdraw its new ambassador 
from Israel and to freeze the treaty. ISS Therefore, Jordan told the U.S. Ambassador 
in Amman that the American move, generally prompted by domestic American 
politics, had been both "immoral and hypocritical". 164 Israel Radio reported that 
news of the American veto had brought about the failure of peace negotiations. 165 
The Arab anger against the U.S. veto was coupled with anger at a report on May 8, 
1995, that U.S. Senate majority Republican leader, Bob Dole, had ordered 
Clinton's Democratic administration to start projecting a new embassy site in 
Jerusalem before the end of 1996. This would move the U.S. embassy from Tel 
Aviv to Jerusalem. l66 At the same time, House Speaker, Newt Gingrich, called for 
the relocation of the U.S. embassy to Jerusalem. 167 The Arab media responded 
angrily and asserted that Dole's proposal was against all the Security Council 
resolutions, such as resolution number 478 (1980) which called for Israel to cancel 
its plan to connect East and West Jerusalem in one state and call it the capital of 
Israe1. 168 The proposal came before the final talks about the status of Jerusalem 
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under the Israel and PW agreement in 1993. It would kill the peaoo pl"OreSS. I69 In 
addition, they affirmed that Dole's proposal was designed to please the Jewish 
lobby for supporting him financially in his presidential campaign for election to the 
White House at the end of 1996.170 For this rea~n, Arab diplomats became afraid 
that the American presidential elections would increase Israel's power to do as it 
pleased in Jerusalem and the Arab lands and that the Palestinians would pay the 
prioo for the per~nal benefits of American politicians as the Palestinians had done 
in the past. 171 
On May 18, 1995, Mr Gaffer AIIgani, 1995 Saudi's representative to the U.N. 
Security Council openly criticised the Israeli plan to seize land in Eastern 
Jerusalem. The Saudi representative condemned Israel's confi~ation of 
Palestinian lands. He asserted that although the peace proress had brought hope 
for the world community and the world wanted to achieve a comprehensive 
settlement based on UN resolutions number 242 and 338, the Israeli plans would 
generate violence between Arabs and Jews. 172 He also emphasised that when 
Saudi Arabia participated in the Middle East peace conference in Madrid and 
supported the peace process this was to allow the Palestinian authorities to 
reinforce their political base and generate public opinion towards a peace proooss. 
The U.S. should therefore, persuade Israel to reverse its decision about the 
confi~ation of Arab lands in Jerusalem.173 As a result, Saudi Arabia agreed to 
attend the Arab mini summit on May 27, 1995, in Morocco which would address 
the recent land confiscation in East Jerusalem and the extension of Jewish 
settlements in the holy city.174 In addition, the Jerusalem Committee of the 
Organization of the Islamic Conference would join the Arab mini summit. These 
states include Bangladesh, Indonesia, Nigeria, Pakistan and Senegal.175 
After the Arab countries took serious posture against Israel and the United States. 
The Pill called for negotiation with Israel to stop unless Israel canoolled its 
plans. 176 In Egypt, the Arab League received a message that Egypt was ready to 
stop its procedural normalization with Israel and that Egypt would support any 
resolution from the Arab League to dissuade other Arab countries from initiating 
any relations with Israel. 177 The Arab countries had strong doubts about the 
American position and its role in the peace proress. This led the Arab League to 
call an all Arab countries to put pressure on the U.S. to change its attitude. 178 The 
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Arab League described the American attitude as a dangerous precedent. The U.S. 
had previously used to abstain on any resolution relating to Jerusalem or vote for 
Palestinian control of East Jerusalem. 179 In fact, on May 22, 1995, Israel 
announced the suspension of its plan to confiscate 53 hectares of land in East 
Jerusalem which was welcomed by the United States. ISO Henoo, the mini Arab 
summit suspended their meeting and called on Israel to review the peace process 
with the PLO. 181 
After Israel decided to confiscate 53 hectares of land in East Jerusalem and the 
U.S. supported Israel by vetoing a proposed U.N. Security Council oondemnation of 
Israel's actions, Israeli officials saw the mini Arab summit as an important 
reflection of a return of Arab solidarity to oppose future challenges. 182 The 
Palestinians were willing to make peaoo but Israel, with U.S. support, 
demonstrated something different. The Palestinians, after fighting for statehood 
for 40 years, had now found themselves being presented with a maximum of 10 per 
cent of their land on which they may live. l83 Therefore, Palestinian officials and 
public opinion throughout the Arab world has grown increasingly doubtful about 
the chances of the process achieving a comprehensive peace sinoo the U.S. is so 
influenced by Israel. This is the reason they demanded mediators from European 
countries and Asia. 184 
Israel oould display to the world its influence within the American political parties 
but at the same time it revealed some weaknesses of the U.S. as a superpower. ISS 
The Israeli Prime Minister, Yitzhak Rabin's decision on May 22, 1995, to suspend 
the seizure of 53 hectares of the land in East Jerusalem was in response to the 
threat that his government would fall due to two motions of no-confidence in the 
Knessat over the planned land confi~ation. 186 The U.S. had vetoed a proposed UN 
Security Council oondemnation of Israel's seizure of land in East Jerusalem. 1B7 
Israel's decision to suspend the seizure of 53 hectares allowed them to contain Arab 
anger but made the U.S. lose its status as an honest intermediary in the peace 
proooSS.l88 The interests game between Israel and the U.S. must not continue to 
influence the Middle East problem, as it has done since the Middle East problem 
started. ISS For instanoo, before the Camp David agreement, President Carter told 
President Sadat that it would help him to be re-elected if President Sadat signed 
the agreement. In his second term President Carter would playa major part in the 
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solution of the Palestinian question and force Israel to renounce the policy of 
settling on the West Bailie 190 However, President Carter's campaign failed, 
because of the pro-Reagan Israeli counter campaign. 191 
At the present, Arab countries are not dependent on Israel, but it will not stay like 
this for ever.l92 King Fahd made a statement when he was Crown Prince and 
Deputy Premier on August 13, 1980, in answer to a question conrerning Israel's 
declaration that the whole of Jerusalem was its capital. He said: "Will the world 
blame us if we take matters into our own hands and defend our holiest of the holy 
plares against this Zionist, religious and military campaign. Words are no longer 
of any benefit. Statements are useless at these precise and critical moments. The 
Arab and Islamic nations are facing a unique challenge, a challenge supported by 
the strongest military power in the world as far as we are conremed, the question 
is to be or not to be". 193 At the end of the statement, the Crown Prince asserted 
that "I would like to say that quickly putting the Arab house back in order has 
become a pressing and urgent demand heading our list of priorities .... to bring all 
the Arabs together so that we can all stand together, this is inevitable, in one 
battle not matter how long this may take and how costly it may be, a battle in 
which we shall place all our belief, determination, energy and means regardless of 
the cost. We shall not rest until our Arab territories are liberated and the fraternal 
Palestinian people return proudly to their homeland to establish their independent 
state and its capital of Arab Jerusalem, God willing" .194 
The proliferation of weapons or mass destruction and the 
Arab-Israeli peace process 
Besides the confrontation between the Arab countries and Israel supported by the 
U.S. over the confIscation of land in East Jerusalem and Dole's proposal to move 
the American embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem, the Arab countries found 
themselves in another confrontation with Israel again supported by the U.S. This 
confrontation was over the rejection by the Arab states to renew their signatures 
on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), in view of the Israeli refusal to join 
the treaty. 196 The 1970 NPT had only a 25-year guaranteed tenn, which expired in 
April 1995. The NPT stipulated that the members would have to decide how to 
extend the treaty - for a fixed period or periods, or indefmitely.l96 
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The pre-emptive strike on the Osiraq Iraqi nuclear reactor in 1981, and its stance 
over the NPT, proved Israel's decision to maintain its nuclear monopoly.197 Israel is 
not a signatory of the NPT and has developed nuclear weapons to gain an ultimate 
deterrent that could persuade Arab countries that no military invasion could ever 
be successful because of Israel's capability to destroy the forces and the population 
centres of the Arab countries. 198 Israel saw the nuclear option not only as the 
ultimate means of guaranteeing Israel's security and survival, but also as a means 
of forcing the Arabs to come to terms with Israel and its existence. 199 A Russian 
Foreign Intelligence Service (RFIS) report, released early in 1993, confirmed the 
open secret that Israel had a large stockpile of 100 to 200 weapons.:m The RFIS 
also disclosed that Israel had been producing chemical weapons since the 
mid-1960s.~1 This disclosure was embarrassing for Israel, which had been 
pressuring Arab countries to renounce their chemical weapons programmes and 
which in January 1993, had signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (eWC), a 
treaty preventing the production, stockpiling and use of poison gas.:m 
The RFIS report al~ confirmed that the Israelis would have no difficulty in 
launching non-conventional warheads over long distanceS.~3 Israel had stockpiled 
the most modem missiles in the Middle East region.204 They include the 480 
kilometre (km) range Jericho 1, which was first deployed about 20 years ago, and 
the 750 kID range Jericho II, of which over 100 were deployed in the 1977-1981 
period.~5 The 1,300 km range Jericho lIB had been successfully tested and "as a 
result Israel's missile potential fully covered the regional boundaries".~ 
The Russian report stated that Israel had successfully launched a satellite in 
1989-1992, using its own Shavit rocket.207 The Shavit could also deliver a small 
nuclear warhead a distance of over 4500 kms, and the original design of the Shavit 
allowed it to develop its range to 7,000 kms.2a3 Israel al~ developed its own sea 
launched cruise missile. n The American Tomahawk sea launched cruise missiles. 
increased the capability of the Israeli navy in the Eastern Mediterranean to a level 
approaching the level of armament of certain North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
(NATO) countries.210 
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The Russian report stated that it has no direct evidence of an independent Israeli 
biological weapons programme.211 It marked, however, Israel's cooperation in a 
programme of biological research with top American military laboratories within 
the framework of the U.S. Defense Department programme for protection against 
biological weapons.212 
The chemical weapons convention provided significant leverage against Israel. 
Arab efforts, led by Egypt, lobbied for a linkage between Arab acceptance of the 
Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty and Israel's refusal to adhere to the NPT.213 
With the exception of Iraq, Libya, Syria and Sudan, the rest of the Arab countries 
signed the Chemical Weapons Convention Treaty.214 Most Arab countries argued 
that they should not limit their military options as long as Israel had atomic 
weapons and refused to sign the NPT treaty.215 Egypt had taken the lead by 
stressing that all regional countries should adhere to the existing treaties on 
chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons and should be subject to international 
inspection and ve rification. 216 
The imminent renewal and extension of the NPT conference forced a sense of 
urgency into the nuclear debate. Egypt ~ught to gain from the U.S. 
administration a decision to secure an indefmite and unconditional extension of the 
treaty and frequently raised the nuclear question with Israeli leaders.217 As the 
Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amr Musa, recalled at the UN General Assembly in 
September 1994, without Israel any extension of the NPT will generate a "Bizarre 
situation" since Israel was the only country in the Middle East who had refused to 
sign the NPT.21S The Arab League Secretary-General Assistant, Adnan Omaran, 
cited on April 17, 1995, that when Arab countries had signed the NPT more than 
25 years previously, they had received pledges from Western nuclear countries, 
that they (the Western countries) would convince Israel to join the NPT.219 He 
continued by saying that instead of oonvincing Israel to join the NPT, they had 
assisted Israel to beoome a nuclear country with approximately 200 nuclear 
weapons and nuclear missiles that could attack any Arab capital. He called for a 
Middle East nuclear weapon-free zone. He aloo expressed concern about the U.S. 
using its financial support as pressure to force oome countries to sign the NPT.23J 
He confirmed that the position of the Arab countries was clear with regard to the 
NPT and that they would not be deceived again.221 
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Since there was pressure on Arab countries to sign the NPT but none on Israel, the 
Arab media began to debate the Arab response to Israeli nuclear reactors. Most of 
them called for Arab countries to build their own reactors to counter the Israelis. 
For instance, Dr Azat Abdulaziz, a UN Consultant for Nuclear Affairs and previous 
Egyptian President of the Atomic Energy Agency, called on the Arab countries to 
move fast to gain atomic experience from the Central Asian republics resulting 
from the collapse of the Soviet Union.222 He called on Arab states to integrate their 
atomic potentiaL to counter the subsequent restrictions of Western countries on the 
atomic technology.223 He also said that as all Arab countries were members of the 
NPT treaty they had a right to consult any country to develop their own civilian 
use reactors, since these reactors were always under international inspection.224 
He stressed that it was a strange situation for the world community to decide to 
decrease their nuclear weapons, while they ignored Israel's nuclear capability 
which was primarily a threat to Arab countries.226 He encouraged the Arab 
countries to exchange their nuclear experience and to develop their own nuclear 
reactors. 
Again, the peace process implied a comprehensive peace in the region which had a 
nuclear dimension that included the "deterrence of Dimona", the site of Israel's 
nuclear reactor. ~ Israel declared that the nuclear question should be discussed 
after a comprehensive settlement including peace and normal relations with all 
Arab countries, Iran, the ex-Soviet Muslim republics and even Pakistan.227 
However, the Arab countries perreived that Israel's ooncern with non Arab 
countries was an excuse for not joining the NPT. The Arab oountries did not have 
authority over non- Arab countries to make them form a relationship with Israel or 
not. 228 
In Saudi Arabia's speech before the U.N. on April 24, 1995, regarding the review 
and extension of the NPT, Saudi Arabia's delegation led by Mr Muhammad 
Manoun Kordy, Deputy Foreign Minister for Economic and Cultural Affairs, 
stressed that Israel had been oontinuing its nuclear programme without acoopting 
international discipline and refusing to join the NPT treaty. He continued that 
this created a threat to regional security and affected the credibility and 
universality of the NPT.229 He accused the NPT treaty of being ineffective as it did 
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not succeed in its purpose. He continued that when the treaty was first signed 
more than 25 years ago there were five nuclear countries but now there were more 
and even the number of nuclear weapons held by each nuclear country had 
increased.2ro He stressed that Saudi Arabia had complained about some members 
of the NPT who had refused to sign the treaty and had developed their nuclear 
military abilities in the absence of international monitoring. He explained that 
this displayed a dangerous omission in the investigation system of the 
International Energy Agency.231 Thus, he advised the NPT conference to ~lve 
these problems and institute a satisfactory monitoring programme.232 When 
monitoring nuclear programmes, Mr Kordy suggested to the oonference that they 
learn some lessons from the committee for monitoring of the disarmament of Iraqi 
weapons of mass destruction.233 Finally, he called all the countries of the region, 
especially Israel (as the only one in the region which possesses nuclear weapons) to 
join the treaty and get rid of its nuclear stock and free the Middle East from 
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.234 
Since the NPT conference started on April 17, 1995, Israel was confident that the 
U.S. would maintain its conventional position towards its nuclear programme 
rather than yield to Arab pressure led by America's ally, Egypt.235 For its part, the 
U.S. has not frustrated Israeli hopes.236 The U.S. had put pressure on Egypt by 
threatening to reduce its economic support to Egypt if it did not sign the treaty or 
insist that Israel should join the NPT.237 The U.S. lobbied hard for indefinite 
extension throughout the conference, and won support from 103 oountries out of 
the total 178 signatory countries on the NPT.238 The counter proposal, called for 
rolling extensions automatically renewed every 25 years unless treaty members 
determined otherwise.239 The indefinite extension, favoured by the U.S., would 
recognize the permanence of the existence of the nations with nuclear weapons.240 
For the Arab part, Egypt introduced a proposal that called for the extension of the 
NPT treaty for five years. This protected the Arab national security, especially 
from Israel.241 
As has been noted the U.S., and the other treaty sponsors, had hoped to avoid a 
separate vote.242 The nuclear powers are pledged to prevent the proliferation of 
nuclear arms and they are committed to accomplish negotiations in good faith 
leading towards complete nuclear disarmament.243 Also, the nuclear powers are 
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committed to pursue a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty by 1996, and begin 
discussions to stop production of the fissile material required to produce 
weapons.244 In exchange, the nuclear powers pledged to share nuclear technology 
with non-nuclear countries for peaceful purposeS.245 However, in an official action, 
the Security Council rerolution approved on April II, 1995, pledged security 
guarantees obtained by the non-nuclear countries.246 Security Council resolution 
984 stated that no nuclear power will use atomic weapons against a non-nuclear 
signatory of the NPT and provides that the Security Council will immediately 
consider any nuclear attack against a country lacking nuclear weapons.247 The 
second part of the resolution is addressed particularly at the de facto nuclear 
powers, none of which has signed the NPT treaty: Israel, India and Pakistan. 248 
The resolution, still, did little to pacify the majority of non-nuclear countries 
signatory to the NPT, which perceived it as weak and insufficient protection 
against nuclear aggression. 249 
The issue of whether to vote over the extension of the treaty had annoyed the U.S. 
and its allies from the beginning of the conference.260 They argued for reaching a 
consensus but rejected a ballot because it appeared that such a vote might not be 
enough to win an indefinite extension of the NPT. A vote would have required a 
simple majority of the treaty's 178 signatories. 251 Therefore, the conferenre was 
expected to determine in favour of extending the treaty indefinitely with no legally 
binding conditions.252 Thus, Arab and u.s. delegates worked out a substitute 
compromise re~lution, which they adopted in the final hour before the conference 
had to make its decision public. It did not single out Israel by name but called on 
all states in the region that had not signed the treaty to do SO.253 
Later, after 24 days of intense negotiations, the conference President pronounced 
the decision on May 11, 1995, to extend the NPT indefinitely. 264 The extension was 
not approved by a vote, but by an aocordance of opinion. Thus, the nuclear nations 
avoided the opposition of non-nuclear nations.256 The decision for the indefmite 
extension came after President Clinton per&>nally campaigned for the indefinite 
extension.266 Acrording to the New York Times. in the 48 hours prior the final 
decision, President Clinton wrote "tough messages" to Egypt and Mexico stressing 
the Significance of the issue to the U.S.257 President Clinton made clear that the 
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U.S. would fmd it hard to understand why friendly nations that had received help 
from the U.S. were not more cooperative.258 
Similarly, to pacify the Arab countries, the conference called upon all countries in 
the region (Israel's name was eliminated by American representatives) to take 
practical steps for the establishment of an effective verifiable Middle East zone, 
free of weapons of mass destruction.259 This clause, which has been de~ribed as 
obligatory, is not very different from resolutions which the General Assembly has 
been adopting for more than 20 years without bringing Israel any closer to the 
NPT.260 
The U.S. secured the permanent extension of the NPT it had fought for.all Arab 
threats to withhold support for the indefinite renewal without Israel's signature on 
the NPT fizzled out on the last day of the conference when they joined the other 
countries, without a vote, to extend the treaty permanently.a32 In the meantime, 
Israel thanked the U.S. for pressing the Egyptian Arab attempts to fo~ it to join 
the treaty and, thereby, bring its nuclear programme under international 
scrutiny.:m Egypt pledged on May 12, 1995, to oontinue pressing the Jewish state 
and work for a nuclear-free Middle East. 264 Egyptian Foreign Minister, Arm 
Moussa, was disappointed by the American position over Israel and at the same 
time he said that he was disappointed by the international decision to extend the 
treaty indefinitely without Israel but he took some comfort from the attention 
focused on the problem.265 He also said "I can not describe the results of the New 
York conference as a victory but it is another step forward in the difficult process to 
rid the Middle East of nuclear weapons and, most importantly, the Israeli nuclear 
programme".a36 He continued "The end of the NPT oonference does not mean that 
the problem created by the existence of an Israeli nuclear programme has ended, 
because this problem still exists". 267 The Egyptian Foreign Minister did not 
mention how Egypt would oontinue to press Israel, but he confirmed that Egypt 
would "Continue to respect the NPT as it was renewed".~ He insisted that the 
treaty would only be credible when Israel joined it and stressed that Egypt's 
position "Reflected a common Arab stance".269 
During their periodic meeting on June 12, 1995, Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud 
Al-Faisal joined with the rest of Gee Foreign Minister and welromed the U.N. 
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Conference's decision that called for the establishment of a Middle East zone, free 
of weapons of mass destruction.270 The GCC's Foreign Ministers called on Israel to 
allow its nuclear reactors to come under international scrutiny.271 
Israel's exclusion from the NPT caused condemnation from Arab 00 un trie s. For 
instance, Syria's delegate to the NPT conference, Taber Hosami, said his oountry 
"Has respected the NPT's obligations since it became a member 25 years ago, but it 
can not accept that Israel does not become a member; Israel has a nuclear arsenal 
and continues to occupy a large part of its neighbours' territories, putting itself 
above international law" .272 Jordanian Foreign Minister, AbdulKarim Kabariti, 
said "There should be no exceptions in the NPT".273 PLO Chairman Vasser Arafat 
said "The U.S. forced 170 countries across the world to sign something they are not 
convinced Of'.274 He also accused the U.S. of forcing through the permanent 
renewal of the NPT against Arab wishes.275 
Since the decision on May 11, 1995, to extend the NPT indefinitely without Israel, 
Arab experts agreed that there has been manoeuvring to prevent Arab countries 
from possessing nuclear reactors for peaceful or non-peaceful purposeS.276 They 
asserted that a nuclear ban on trade with Arab countries was not a principle but 
there was a nuclear technological monopoly by the Western countries and they 
were reluctant to help.277 Dr Azat Abdulaziz, a U.N. Consultant for Nuclear Affairs 
and previously Egyptian President for Atomic Energy Agency, asserted that the 
nuclear monopoly hindered the development of the nuclear programmes in Arab 
countries.278 He gave Egypt as example. He stated that the Egyptian nuclear 
programme had been started at the same time as the Indian nuclear programme 
during the mid 1950s, but the Egyptian nuclear programme had almost been 
stopped because of American pressure in the 1980s.279 India, however, was now 
considered to be a nuclear power in possession of nuclear weapons.280 
The previous Egyptian Foreign Minister, Amoran Al-Shafei, commented on the 
pennanent extension of the NPT as unbalanced and offered no choice for the Arab 
countries, but to ooordinate the development of their nuclear capacities, since they 
already had the financial re~urres and the nuclear experts.281 In an interview on 
May 18, 1995, in the Egyptian daily newspaper Alahram, Egyptian Foreign 
Minister, Amr Moussa, warned that even if Israel did not intend to attack Egypt 
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now, there was no guarantee that after twenty years, for instance, they would not, 
since Israel had nuclear weaJX>ns and there was no deterrent nuclear weapon on 
the other side. 282 He confmned that Egypt would develop its peaceful nuclear 
programme and he advised Israel that they should not deride the potential 
Egyptian nuclear programme.283 He also asserted that Israel's refusal to join the 
NPT and the Israeli insistence on keeping their nuclear arsenal unmonitored by 
international inspectors threatened to open the door for nuclear competition in the 
Middle East.284 In addition, he warned that if there was no solution to the Israeli 
nuclear programme, it would prevent any progress towards cooperation in the 
region with Israel. 285 
Future prospects 
The PLO's absence from the rank of Saudi support after the Gulf war was noticed by 
observers as a positive factor in the U.S.-Saudi relations. Before the Gulf crisis, the 
Palestinian problem used to be almost the only factor that strained U.S.-Saudi 
relations. However, after the Gulf war the Palestinian issue would not neressarily 
be the most important problem in U.S.-Saudi relations, however, it could be ignored 
only at a significant risk. The occupation of Kuwait had become a problem with 
Palestinian issue taking a back seat. A oonflict that primarily appeared to have 
mainly negative consequences for the Palestinians, and the PLO may have produced 
pressure toward a peaceful resolution of their conflict with Israel. In whatever 
manner, the Arab states will press the U.S. more than ever before on the issue of the 
Palestinians. Saudi will not take the lead in negotiations with Israel, however, they 
may work in the right oontext to support Palestinians who are ready for peare with 
IsraeL Thus, there is no logical explanation to argue that Saudi Arabia may use its 
military force against Israel. The Saudis would increase their military forre because 
there are other threats appearing in the region against Saudi Arabia which are more 
dangerous than Israel or communism.286 For that reason, Saudi Arabia should not 
have a problem with the U.S. supplying arms in the future. 
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Chapter Seven 
U.S.-Saudi Security and Military Relations Since the Gulf Crisis of 1990 
In the period 1989-1992, the oontext for U.S. military planning changed 
dramatically. 1 The Soviet Communist threat to U.S. interests, in Europe and 
elsewhere, disappeared.2 Thus, the U.S. military would oppose many threats, 
oppose the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and prevent armed attacks 
upon U.S. friends or allies in developing countries where its interests were located.3 
This policy oonsidered the major threats to U.S. interests as arising out of regional 
instability or from aggressive regional leaders such as Iraq.4 Arising from 
opportunities from its role in the Gulf crisis, the U.S. is in a singular position to 
frame the new international system.5 On September 23, 1991, President Bush 
addressed the U.N. and assured his audience that, "The U.S. has no intention of 
striving for a pax Americana. However, we will remain engaged we will not 
retreat and pull back into i~lationism. We will offer friendship and leadership 
and, in short, we seek a Pax Universalism, built upon shared responsibilities and 
aspirations".6 In the president's statement was a lesson extracted from the Gulf 
war, that important American foreign policy interests can not be protected by 
unilateral U.S. accomplishments but will demand multilateral, co-operative 
arrangements with other states. 7 
In contrast, there was a physical difference in U.S. foreign policy when a draft 
"Defense Planning Guidance for the Fiscal Years 1994-1999", was released in early 
March 1992, to the press by an unnamed official. This document made the case 
that the U.S. should work to shape a world order dominated by one superpower. 
The U.S. should seek to make its leadership position permanent through a dual 
policy of oonstructive conduct and adequate military power to prevent any group or 
nation from challenging American primacy.8 The Defense Planning Guidance was 
much more definite than the concept of a new world order indicated by President 
Bush. Its ooncept favoured a view of a pax Americana much more than it did the 
pax Universalism cited by the president in his UN address.9 Obviously, the 
Defense Planning Guidance presented a traditional concept of security based on 
the balance of power rather than the collective security.lo In this, it stated that the 
U.S. should "endeavour to prevent any hostile power from dominating a region 
whose resourres would, under consolidated control, be sufficient to ~nerate global 
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power ... we must maintain the mechanisms for deterring potential competitors 
from even aspiring to a larger regional or global role".l1 
Because the U.S. is heavily dependent on oil from the Gulf, access to those 
resources is a key strategic interest for the U.S. 12 American interests require 
access to the plentiful energy resources of the Gulf not only for the U.S. but even 
more so for its allies.13 This conoorn of U.S. foreign policy, which demands the 
protection of that access from any external threat, has not diminished with the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. 14 The using up of oil resources in the industrialised 
world and increasing U.S. dependence on imported oil truly are increasing the 
importance of Gulf security to the United States. 15 
U.S.-Saudi security relations 
The Gulf war led to the deepening of the special relationship between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia, which was primarily conditioned by conooms about oil. 16 For many 
years, the security of the oil exported to the West and the succession of upheavals 
in the region persuaded the U.S. military planners of the importanoo of building 
sufficient friendly forces the Gulf area.17 After the Gulf war, U.S. officials desired 
that the war which was caused by Iraqi aggression would end the old assumptions 
about regional security and open up new opportunities for U.S. military 
co-operation with the Gee countries. 18 An American official said" ... One sees the 
Saudis as the key to future security arrangements".19 
In fact, since Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Bush administration had started indicating 
that the future of Gulf security would be connected to American forces laying down 
groundwork for security arrangement with the Gee states. Defense Secretary, 
Cheney, said to the reporters on August 19, 1990, that the U.S. presence in the 
Gulf could last for years. ID Differences between Washington and Riyadh on the 
aims of U.S. forces arose when James Baker appeared before the House of 
Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee in early September 1990.21 The U.S. 
Secretary of State said that the administration was planning a long-term military 
presenoo in the Gulfeven if Iraq withdrew from Kuwait.22 He summarised the new 
regional security policy as being possible to oppose the future military threat from 
Iraq, de~ribing that such an arrangement would include an international arms 
boycott of Iraq, the future arming of Iraq's Arab neighbours, and a U.S. naval or 
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ground force in the region.23 He said the resulting organisation would be 
something equivalent to NATO.24 
However, the Saudis reminded Mr Baker that a regional security structure already 
existed, and it wa~ called the Gulf Cooperation Council.26 Mr Baker modified his 
statement the next day, saying that the Bush administration had just started its 
thinking about its new long term security arrangements, and that his earlier views 
should not be equated with the concept that somehow the administration was 
calling for a NATO - type organisation in the Middle East. This should not cause 
any worries in Riyadh, or Moscow or among other capitals, he said. 26 
As a result, Saudi Arabia wanted to limit the public profile of its U.S. security 
connection. Z1 Therefore, in a statement to the press immediately after the Gulf 
war, Saudi Defence Minister, Prince Sultan, referred to a commitment on the part 
of the U.S. to withdraw its forces from Saudi Arabia once their mission was 
completed.2B Saudi Arabia also refused formal and more intensive defence ties with 
the U.S. including a proposed pre-positioning of two divisions and ground combat 
equipment in Saudi Arabia, and the free use of Saudi military facilities.29 In 
addition, Saudi Arabia refused to sign a status of force agreement that would have 
set the terms for American access to Saudi facilities.30 This matter was the main 
rea~n for the tension in U.S.-Saudi relations reported in mid - 1991.31 
The Saudi government has always been cautious of linking its foreign policy with 
the U.S. for two rea~ns. First, Saudi Arabia is sensitive to the political 
undesirability of a more closer Western alliance.32 Permanent military bases or 
free access to Saudi military facilities raised questions about the political 
independence of Saudi Arabia.33 Second, the Saudi government was under 
domestic pressure, especially, from conservative religious groups, to avoid the 
presence of any foreign forces on Saudi soil and to avoid also any foreign alliances 
that could contradict its Islamic legitimacy.34 The Saudi government was sensitive 
to the problems that the links with the U.S. aroused.36 It was this pressure that 
led King Fahd, in a speech to his country in late November 1990, to deny that 
Saudi Arabia had made any agreements for the permanent stationing of foreign 
forres in Saudi Arabia.S6 Similarly, in September 1991. during one of the U.S. 
confrontations with Iraq over the application of U.N. policies, Prinre Sultan 
expressed his concern that the U.S. was using Saudi Arabia as a military staging 
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area against Iraq. He urged Washington to spread out deployments of forces as far 
as Kuwait and even to use an airfield in Iraq itself. 3i The Saudis insisted that the 
strength of Saudi armed forces be increased to 200,000 and that they be provided 
with appropriate weapons and equipment. In addition, the Saudis wanted to build 
on their foroos' experienoo and achievements in the Gulf war, and transform their 
defensive army into a highly sophisticated mobile offensive force modelled on the 
American armed forces. 38 Apprehensive of the consequenoo of creating such a force 
in Saudi Arabia, Washington refused the Saudi proposal. 39 
After the Gulf war, American military per~nnel started to withdraw from Saudi 
territory. However, the last ground troops left Saudi Arabia in Deoomber 1991.4O 
In April 1992, the American army fmished its task of shipping home millions of 
tons of equipment that had been sent to Saudi Arabia for Desert Storm.41 
However, some U.S. forces in Saudi Arabia remained there to operate Patriot 
missiles and combat aircraft.42 Thus, in April 1992, Mr Cheney ordered the 
assignment of ground support equipment for 400 aircraft to be located in 
Southwest Asia.43 The Pentagon order for 1992 also assigned 200 battle tanks and 
200 APes to be stored in the region.44 In the Gulf region, the pentagon had about 
25,000 military personnel, manning a naval and marine task force and a powerful 
air arm of nearly 300 combat aircraft.46 
Nevertheless, the oontinuing military oo-operation between Saudi Arabia and the 
U.S. is based on a 1977 strategic co-operation agreement which included the 
sharing of military intelligence from the AW ACS planes that were stationed in 
Riyadh.46 The Saudis chose to continue their informal understanding with 
Washington. 47 
These are the differenoos between the U.S. and the Saudi ooncepts of deterrenoo, 
which have been confronted in their negotiations on across and pre-positioning. 
Areording to the U.S., the deterrent effect of the U.S. pre-positioning would be lost 
strength if it could not facilitate the effective intervention of V.S. forces in an 
emergency, e.g. the rapid deployment of Iraqi forces to the Kuwaiti border in 1990, 
their immediate advanoo into Kuwait and the threat to Saudi Arabia.48 
From the Saudi perspective, deterrenoo appears to be more existential in nature. 49 
The V.S. oommitment to Gulf security, demonstrated by Desert Storm, and the 
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remaining presence of a small amount of material combined to admit doubt into 
the calculations of a potential aggressor and thus, to deter attack.5O The success of 
Desert Storm without question supports this view, despite the fact that this suocess 
was due to a host of factors that might not come into play in a future crisis.51 
With the Gulf war over, Saudi Arabia returned to its usual connections with the 
U.S. 52 Some American officials believed that they may have overrated the Gulf 
war's effect on Saudi sensibilities about remaining closely connected to the U.S. 53 
One U.S. administration official said "Most people thought that you can not go 
through this experience without thinking you have got to do it differently next 
time".54 Thus, the Clinton administration, which came to power in 1993, has been 
running into difficulties trying to convince the Saudi government to accept an 
expanded U.S. security umbrella to guard against a similar crisis. The new 
Defense Secretary, William Perry, travelled to Saudi Arabia in March 1995, to 
persuade the Saudis of the advantages of the new American strategy of "dual 
containment of both Iraq and Iran".55 Perry's visit proposed that Saudi Arabia 
allow the U.S. to preposition equipment for a "rapid reaction" armoured brigade.56 
As the Bush administration had done during the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. 
Defense Secretary showed King Fahd and the Saudi Defence Minister, Prince 
Sultan bin Abdulaziz, satellite photos to demonstrate that Iraq had rebuilt its 
military facilities destroyed by allied bombing during the Gulf war, including 
plants related to artillery production, chemical warfare and the manufacture of 
rocket engines. 57 Mr Perry asserted this as proof of the immediate threat Iraq 
posed to its Gulf neighbours. He also asserted the importance of Saudi Arabia 
continuing to provide facilities for use by U.S. warplanes and naval vessels as 
Kuwait had done before.58 Although Saudi Arabia did not agree to base on its land 
equipment to supply a U.S. annoured brigade for use in an emergency. However. 
Mr Perry said that Riyadh agreed in principle that material for such a brigade 
must be pre-positioned somewhere in the Gulf region, through not in Saudi 
Arabia. 59 
Observers in the region had two perreptions of the situation. There is a large 
group amongst Arab public opinion which expresses itself in press oommentaries, 
which suggests that the U.S. was purposely playing up the supposed threat 
presented by Iraq and Iran just to frighten the Gee oountries into providing the 
U.S. with bases and buying more American weapons.ED The serond perception was 
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that Washington could be preparing the groundwork for a military action against 
Iraq or Iran.61 
Another U.S. effort came in October 1995, when Saudi Defence Minister attended 
the 50th Anniversary of the United Nations. On October 25, 1995, he said to the 
Secretary William Perry that Desert Storm had proved its strength. Saudi Arabia 
had modem arms technology which allowed Saudi Arabia to rely on these arms to 
hold off any attackers long enough to get American assistanoo.62 On the same 
oreasion, President Clinton stated (on October 28, 1995), that American forces in 
the region assisted in the stability of the Gulf security and that the Gulf was secure 
and stable because of the presence of the U.S. forces in the Gulf. This had been 
proven by the American forces' support of Kuwait in October 1994, when Iraq 
threatened Kuwait with invasion again.63 
After the Gulf war, Washington found itself even closer to Riyadh. It still wanted 
to establish a permanent land base on Saudi soil, a goal that the U.S. had been 
looking forward to for many years. The Americans were oonvinced that in the 
future there was no way the U.S. could repeat a major military operation in the 
Gulf region without areess to some or all of Saudi Arabia's facilities.64 Since the 
U.S. was unsuccessful in getting the Saudis to accept pre-positioned equipment, 
Michael MacMurray represented in mid 1995, that in the view of the Pentagon the 
U.S. defence focus should be on improving the Saudi's capability to defend itself.65 
He asserted that Saudi Arabia and its neighbours could defend themselves without 
outside help against a threat such as that posed by Iraq and Iran; until a point 
when the Saudis would have to call for U.S. assistance.66 The u.S. is still trying to 
develop greater strategic oo-operation with Saudi Arabia through joint planning, 
training, exercises, ooalition warfare exercises and pre-positioning.67 The U.S. also 
attempted to promote the ability for the U.S. military forces and those of the 
Saudis to work together through the sale of advanced equipment and weaponry.68 
In short, there is a combined ~lution which involves improving the Saudi 
capabilities and improving American ability to assist the Saudis.69 
However, some American military strategists are uncomfortable with the 
arrangement, which appears to pressure the U.S. to respond to threats to Saudi 
sovereignty without preset plans in place. 70 The U.S. seems to be oommitted to 
diplomatic, economic, and even military responses. 71 Dr Jamil Merdad. who works 
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in the Saudi Foreign Ministry, explained that Saudi Arabia was concerned that it 
was in trapped by regional threats that the V.S. had created. He asserted that if 
the V.S. removed the source of the regional threats, the V.S. would lose its role and 
its presence in the Gulf region.72 The U.S. administration has been criticised by 
some members of Congress and some military analysts who say that the White 
House still needs to define V.S. interests and assess the potential threats before 
deciding what is required for an adequate regional defence.73 Representative Lee 
H. Hamilton, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Europe and 
the Middle East, has said that American forces should be small in number, remain 
primarily naval and over-the-horizon. 74 He preferred that the major peacekeeping 
roles be met by the Gulf Cooperation Council, the Arab League and the United 
Nations.75 
Gulf security and its effect on the relationship between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia 
The "Damascus Declaration" 
Immediately after the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia and the rest of the GCC members 
saw the continuation of the Arab forces in the Gulf region as the key to a joint 
peacekeeping force which would maintain post-war security in the Gulf and contain 
Iraq.76 Therefore, Foreign Ministers of the GCC states, Egypt and Syria issued the 
Damascus Declaration.77 They agreed to co-operate over regional security. 
Egyptian and Syrian forces would be stationed in the region and would be 
available for rapid deployment along with the other GCC forces supported by the 
V.S. Navy in the GUlf.78 The charter of the Dama~us Declaration stressed that its 
signatories would co-ordinate and co-operate its policies in political, security, 
economic and cultural areas. 79 
On March 10, 1991, the Foreign Ministers who had signed the Damascus 
Declaration met in Riyadh with Secretary of State James Baker.&) Mr Baker 
expressed the V .S.' support for the Dama~us DecIaration.81 The groundwork had 
evidently been laid for an Egyptian, Syrian and GCC military alliance, under an 
umbrella ofV.S. support.82 
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From the U.S. view, Egyptian and Syrian participation in a security arrangement 
for the Gulf would advance deterrence in the short term and provide a lasting 
political context for Western involvement. It would al~ support political stability 
in Egypt and Syria by supplying financial aid to their economies from Saudi Arabia 
and Kuwait.83 The Damascus Declaration had been designed to contain Syria 
within a moderate Arab party far from Iran and at the same time to exclude Iran.84 
Syria was drawn into active involvement in the peace process with Israel. 
In February 6, 1991, Secretary of State, James Baker, admitted before the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee that economic elements, especially &)me Arab 
resentment that oil was not more equally distributed, had played a role in leading 
to the Gulf war and would continue to be one of the basic ~urces of conflict in the 
region.86 To ease these stresses, Mr Baker suggested the creation of an economic 
organisation through which the oil states could fund the reconstruction and 
development of their neighbours without oil.86 Thus, in February 7, 1991, Mr 
Baker favoured the creation of a multinational "Middle East Development Bank" to 
achieve these goals.87 
Mr Baker's proposals were among several ambitious projects for econoDllc 
reconstruction following Desert Storm.88 Therefore, in the meetings leading up to 
the Damascus Declaration, Egyptian delegates appeared with their own plan for 
the oil-Gulf states to contribute $15 billion annually to their neighbours.89 In late 
March 1991, Gee ministers decided to provide Egypt and Syria with financial aid 
of $5 billion to integrate them into the reoontly declared "new Arab border".oo This 
was in addition to the Gee grants to Egypt and Syria for their troops presence in 
the region of 35,000 and 20,000 soldiers respectively.91 
Almost immediately, however, Saudi Arabia and the rest of Gee states started to 
back away from Damascus Declaration.92 There are four possible rea&)os for the 
Saudi Arabia and the Gee states reassessment and distancing from the Damascus 
Declaration. First, the Saudi and Kuwaiti treasuries had reached their limits 
during the Gulf war. This open-ended commitment to Egypt and Syria, along with 
the financial compensation for their troops presenre in the region, was too much.93 
Second, there were fears that the Gee relations with Egypt and Syria might 
change in the long term because of changes in domestic politics in Syria and Egypt. 
Both Syria and Egypt are influenred by their past historical, ideological and 
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political differences from the monarchic Arab countries. The Gee states did not 
want to see Egypt and Syria declare themselves as protectors of the Gee.94 Third, 
the presence of the troops in the Gulf would become at the very least an 
annoyance, and they could be a threat to the Gulf monarchies.96 Fourth, the Gee 
states feared that the Damascus Declaration and the presence of forces would 
cause Iran to react very negatively which would cause a deterioration in 
Gee-Iranian relations.96 The Iranian government condemned the Damascus 
Declaration which it saw as an effort to isolate Iran from the Gulf, and asserted 
that Gulf security was a responsibility restricted to the states in the Gulf itself.97 
Meanwhile, Saudi Arabia saw the end of the Gulf war as an ()(X;asion to improve 
relations with Iran, since Iran had acted responsibly during the Kuwaiti crisis.98 
When the Gee Foreign Ministers met in Kuwait on May 5, 1991, to di~uss 
security issues in the region, they announced that they were having intensive 
communication with Iran over Gulf security matters. This went down painfully 
with Egypt, which wanted to maintain Gulf security as an entirely Arab affair.99 
Therefore, the displeasure of Egypt and Syria with the reluctance of their Gee 
states to follow through with practical implementation of the Damascus 
Declaration became visible. 1OO On May 8, 1991, Egypt ordered the withdrawal of 
its troops from the region. WI Syria al&> began the withdrawal of its troops from the 
Gee states in June 1991. 102 
The indecisive rounds of discussions that followed illustrated that it was going to 
be significantly harder to produce such a security agreement than may have been 
imagined in the days following the liberation of Kuwait. 103 To propose practical 
measures to enhance Gulf security, the Dama~us Declaration states met again in 
May 1991.104 This meeting was unable to resolve the differences that separated 
the Gee from Egypt and Syria. 106 By the end of June, there were reports that the 
Gee states were requiring amendments to the Damascus Declaration about 
dropping plans for a permanent Arab force. tOO Later, Egypt proposed a plan which 
would deploy 30,000 troops supplied equally from between Egypt and Syria.107 The 
Gee states agreed only to deploy 6,000 troops, but, later the Gee states pointed 
out that they would prefer not to have any troops on their &>il.l~ The Dam~us 
Declaration Foreign Ministers met again on July 15-16, 1991. I~ The final 
statement of the meeting enclosed no reference to a permanent presence of 
Egyptian-Syrian troops in the Gulf.llo By the end of July 1991, all Egyptian and 
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Syrian troops had left Saudi Arabia and the Gee region.lll At a summit meeting 
between Egypt's President Mubarak and Syria's President Assad on July 18, 1991, 
Assad told the reporters "A permanent presence is not requested, and we will not 
impose ourselves, but we are ready to participate in defensive operations if that is 
requested of us at any time". 112 
In addition, when the states of the Damascus Declaration met in November 1991, 
they could not come up with any consensus on producing integrated joint forces or 
plan for Gulf securityY3 The Gee states refused to allow Egyptian and Syrian 
troops to be stationed in their region. 114 Egypt and Syria were only seeking to 
claim what they could in the way of the Gee financial aid as compensation for 
their deployment of troops in the region. 116 However, the Gee states only agreed 
to Saudi and Kuwaiti bilateral aid payments to Egypt and Syria. 116 Therefore, by 
the summer of 1991, it had become evident to all members that the Damascus 
Declaration was an agreement on security co-operation rather than an actual 
military alliance. In fact the Gee states wanted to see it that way.ll7 
The Saudis perceived the structure conceived by the Damascus Declaration as a 
forum within which consultations about future security arrangements with Egypt 
and Syria could take place. If a crisis required the presence of Egyptian and 
Syrian troops in Saudi Arabia, as was necessary after the invasion of Kuwait, the 
groundwork had already been laid. 118 On the security question, the Damascus 
Declaration appears to be little more than a framework for natural bilateral 
consultation and limited co-operation. This might take place among any Arab 
states within the Arab League. The League itself was supposed to be have been 
founded for that purpose.1l9 However, the Arab League was in disorder, and 
needed to reassert its principles. Some of its key members established the 
foundation for a new start. 1~ These key members set out the Damascus 
Declaration's charter which affirmed their intention to breathe a new spirit into 
joint Arab action and promote brotherly co-operation among the members of the 
Arab family. 121 
However, when relations had been established between Iran and the Gee states, 
Saudi Arabia was forced back to the Dama~us Declaration.l22 In April 1992, 
Iranian authorities on Abu Musa island, expelled about 80 Indian workers. Iran 
jointly administers the island with Sharja (a state of the U.A.E.). The reason for 
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the expulsion was the failure of the workers to get Iranian visas, even though the 
workers were employed by UAE agencies. l23 In August 1992, Iran turned away a 
group of mostly Egyptian teachers, who worked on the island for the UAE 
government. l24 The Iranian Foreign Ministry asserted that continued foreign 
involvement in the Gulf made it necessary for Iran to strengthen its position on the 
island. 125 
The Gee states reacted to the Iranian actions on Abu Musa by returning to the 
Damascus Declaration for a ~ussion.l~ Egypt had been pressuring the Gee 
states to implement the decisions of the Damascus Declaration, but the Gee 
suspended the Foreign Ministers meeting until May 1992.127 However, after the 
second Iranian action, the members of the Damascus Declaration met on 
September 10. 1992. and agreed to support the UAE in its position on the island 
and two other Tunbs islands, which were occupied by the Shah of Iran in 1971. 128 
They al~ agreed to keep in regular contact with each other .129 
The Gee states have regularly met with their Arab partners in the Damascus 
Declaration.1ro However, they have not actually done anything to implement the 
proposals even when threatened. 131 For instance, on October 7, 1994, Iraq started 
a threatening military movement on the Kuwaiti border.132 The U.S. immediately 
. sent soldiers and aircraft carriers.133 The presence of the American forces was 
enough to get the situation under control. lS4 However, Kuwait's attitude of reliance 
on the U.S. has brought criticism from Egypt and Syria. l36 At a meeting of the 
Foreign Ministers of the Damascus Declaration on October 19, 1994, the Egyptian 
Foreign Minister accused Kuwait of relying more on the military capabilities of the 
U.S. and other Western countries and ignoring the importance of Arab forces. l36 
For Gee states, defence against decisive aggressors will still require a U.S. or 
Western military protection. 137 The Egyptians and Syrians are lacking the ability 
of rapid deployment and it would take weeks and maybe months for Arab forces 
from outside the Gulf to deploy for war against a threat from a country such as 
Iraq. 138 
The high dependence the Gee states place on their bilateral relationships with the 
U.S. will ensure that the Damascus Declaration for all practical purposes remains 
dormant. l39 However, a renewal of interest in it will eventually be based on the 
reassessment by the Saudis and the Kuwaitis of their long-term security 
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strategy.l40 At this time, the U.S. commitment to the Gee states remains strong 
and it is likely to continue ~ in the foreseeable future. l41 
Apart from sharing the commitment to counter Iraq, the economic and financial 
aid priorities of Egypt and Syria are distant from the security objectives of the Gee 
states. 142 Egypt desired that its contribution to Gulf security would attract in 
return economic investments by the Gee states and that it would extend their 
labour markets for Egyptian workers. 143 In fact, the number of Egyptian workers 
had increased in Saudi Arabia after the Gulf war to about 1.2 million. This 
provides more complications than security.l44 Moreover, Egypt had been 
disappointed by the Kuwaiti decision to limit the number of Egyptians to be 
allowed back to work after the liberation. l45 Egypt also lacked a positive 
commitment to counter Iraq. For instance, General Nonnan Schwarzkopf stated 
in his memoirs before Operation Desert Stonn that he and Mr eheney told 
President Mubarak that the U.S. might use Egypt as a base for military aircraft. l46 
President Mubarak reacted angrily because he was not threatened by Iraq's 
aggression and he was not ready to allow the allies to operate from his territory. 147 
President Mubarak said to them "I don't think we need to decide that right now". 148 
Syria, on the other hand, searched for a role to play in promoting Gulf security to 
increase the foreign aid of the Gee to offset the aid that it had lost as a result of 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. 149 In December 1992, the Gee summit put 
forward May 1993, as a date for the founding of the Arab development fund 
pledged in the Dama~us Declaration. l50 $6.5 billion of the pledged $10 billion had 
been committed by Gee members at the end of 1992, though the plans were to be 
completed by the fall of 1993.161 
The Damascus Declaration group appeared under unusual conditions. l62 It was a 
reaction against the temporary events imposed by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 153 
It also advocated a greater degree of investment in aid to Egypt and Syria by the 
Gee states and thus has given it the appearance of economic rather than security 
co-operation. l64 However, the cordial attitude of Gee states towards Egypt and 
Syria is the result of the liberation of Kuwait. 166 This cordiality has evidently been 
inadequate in binding them to a fonnal collective security arrangement. 166 As the 
fonner Secretary-General of the Gee, Abdullah Bishara, said the trust between 
the Gee states on one hand, and Egypt and Syria on the other hand, is the most 
important element in the oo-operation among them. Their relations must be based 
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on trust and confidence. 157 He noted also "There is no such thing as free Arab 
money or open borders. We do not areept this. We are countries in every sense of 
the word" .158 
Up to the present time, 1996, the members of the Damascus Declaration have 
regularly met and proclaimed their allegiance to the Damascus Declaration. l59 A 
communique issued by their meeting in December 1995, for instance, repeated 
their demand for Iraq's full compliance with U.N. Security Council resolutions and 
held the Iraqi regime responsible for the sufferings of the Iraqi people. loo In 
addition, they renewed their support of the UAE in its dispute with Iran over the 
sovereignty of the islands of Abu Masa and two Tunbs. 161 Now Iraq is contained 
and Iran makes Gee states only a little upset without being seriously hostile. 
Several Gee states have important relations with Iran. l62 Thus, Saudi Arabia and 
the Gee are following their own security agenda. ISS 
The Saudi Arabian security policy during the post-war years has remained in 
flUX. I64 That flux is caused by Saudi Arabia's desire to preserve a balance among 
its relationships and not to depend on anyone pillar to assure its security.165 
Self-reliance is better that the presence of foreign troops, but not enough for real 
defe~ce.l66 Saudi planners believe that the U.S. connection is significant and must 
be improved on but still kept at arm's length. 167 Saudi maintains relations with 
the Damascus Declaration and Iran but without selecting one over the other. This 
policy allows the Kingdom to keep its options open. 168 
u.s. -Saudi security relations and the Gee 
The Gulf war has left the U.S. with the problems of how best to protect its security 
interests in the Gulf in the long term. 169 These interests include the continued 
supply of oil at a reasonable price, the security of the Gulf Cooperation Council 
states and the prevention of anyone power from obtaining control over the Gulf oil 
reserves. 170 An official text from the Department of State, seeks to layout the 
principal elements of U.S. policy in the GUlf.171 The text was addressed to the 
National Security Industrial Association on March 22, 1994, by Deputy Assistant 
Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, Toni G. Verstanding.172 He said that 
the greatest danger to regional security in the Gulf "Lies in the threats which may 
come from either Iran or Iraq" .173 Mr Verstanding asserted that the strategic 
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principle for the U.S. in the Gulf is to protect American interests in two areas: the 
security of U.S. allies and in the free flow of oil at stable prires. 174 In seeking that 
balanre, the U.S. focuses on two sets of key objectives: (1) limiting the ability of 
either Iran or Iraq to threaten regional stability; (2) supporting the defensive 
capabilities of U.S. friends in the region, individually; in tandem with their 
regional partners; and in arrangement with the U.S. and other friendly outside 
powers.176 
Sinoo the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia has become the key to any attempt to create 
strategic stability in the Gulf. 176 As Saudi Arabia demonstrated during the Gulf 
war, it could co-operate closely with the U.S. and the West in checking Iraq or 
Iran. l77 However, Saudi Arabia lacks the manpower and skills to make military 
foroos large enough to defend its territory.178 For the U.S., Saudi Arabia is not 
capable of being a proxy for Western military forces or as a pillar of Western 
security.179 It has many of the vulnerabilities of its smaller neighbours, and it can 
only achieve security through a rombination of co-operative defenoo efforts with 
members of the GCC states and the United States. ISO On the other hand, Saudi 
Arabia has the resources and the population to act as the rore of the GCC's efforts 
to build regional security.181 
The U.S. government believes that one of the clear lessons of the past decade has 
been that containment of regional threats by itself is not adequate. 182 The U.S. 
also acts to work with the GCC in the region to develop a powerful regional 
deterrent to those who would threaten its security or stability .183 To support the 
security of the U.S. allies in the Gulf region, the U.S. is: 
Encouraging the members of the GCC to work more closely together on 
collective defence and security arrangements; 
Assisting individual GCe countries to meet their legitimate defence 
requirements, including arms sales that increase their abilities to manage 
co-ordinated operations with the U.S. and other GCe foroos; 
Working to strengthen American capability to act rapidly in the area by 
maintaining a strong force there, and by pre-positioning vital equipment 
and material, and by concluding a defence acress agreement with the Gee 
states. 184 
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Therefore, the U.S. objective is to increase regional stability, deter threats, 
increase the level of threat at which direct U.S. military action would be needed, 
and to decrease the probability that the U.S. and Gee would have to fight to drive 
away all aggression. 186 
As a consequence of the Gulf war, the Secretary of State, James Baker, advised the 
Gee states that they should build a security system based on three stepS.I86 First, 
the Gee states should co-ordinate their forces more effectively using the 
mechanism of the Gulf Cooperation Council to produce a multinational GCe 
peninsula force; second, the U.S. should strengthen its military ties with the Gee 
states and preserve a limited military presence within the Gee states, (This 
presence would take the shape of pre-positioned equipment, training missions, 
periodic deployments of air and naval units for joint exercises); third, the U.S. 
should work with the Gee in developing a greater role for regional and 
extra-regional players, principally Egypt, Syria, Britain and France. 187 
However, the Gee sees its defence strategy in terms of a series of circles. The 
former Gee Secretary - General Abdullah Bishara, on occasion of five years of 
liberty of Kuwait from Iraqi invasion, described them thus: The first circle is made 
up of the six partners of the Gee and form the main defence of their states; the 
second circle, is the "Damascus Declaration"; and the third, is the U.S. and the 
Western countries, notably Britain and France. 188 
Undoubtedly, the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait came as a severe shock to the Gee 
states, and they re~lved that they would be ready to face any future aggression. 189 
After the Gulf war, the possibility of establishing a purely Gee-based force was 
investigated By October 1991, Sultan Qabus of Oman presented a proposal to 
build a joint force of 100,000 men (The Gee had already a joint force for some 
years called, Peninsula Shield, but it was small only 10,000 men).loo The Omani 
proposal was welcomed by the Gee states' rulers. 191 However, the proposal for a 
100,000 troops was not implemented. l92 The main reason was due to the decrease 
in the oil revenues of the Gee states after the Gulf war. 193 Therefore, the GCe 
states decided initially that each member of the Gee states must start to build its 
own independent force as well as reinforcing their existing troops within the Gee 
joint force, the Peninsula Shield. This lets the Gee states determine in the future 
the number of the unified forces. l94 In response to reporters in November 1994, the 
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Saudi Defence Minister, Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, dismissed any prospect of 
differences between the Gee states about the proposal for a 100,000 man Gee 
force and stated that the plan for the force was still alive and that it was going to 
exist. 196 
At the same time, since the strategy of defence was inadequate, the Gee sought 
assistance from outside ~urceS.I96 The "Dama~us Declaration" delivered a 
possible option for security within a pan-Arab framework, however, it could not 
rely fully on future support from Egypt and Syria. 197 By the end of 1991, this policy 
had been revised by the Gee states, who explicitly stated that they would support 
future assistance from Western forces, most notably the United States. l98 This was 
emphasised by Kuwait in September 1991, when the Kuwaitis signed a 10 year 
defence agreement with the United StateS. l99 This agreement did not provide 
permanent bases in Kuwait for the U.S., but did provide permanent access and the 
positioning of American weapons and equipment in Kuwait, periodic joint exercises 
and training of Kuwaiti forces by the United States.!m This agreement signalled 
the collapse of efforts from the U.S. to shape a defence agreement with the Gee 
and the beginning of an attempt to replace it with bilateral agreements with each 
Gee state.201 
There is no doubt that after the Gulf war, the Gee states looked to the U.S. as 
their initial security ally.ID2 The Gee states wanted protection and the U.S. 
wanted to protect them. 3:>3 The Gee arms purchases were arranged as much to 
maintain the political relationship with the U.S. as to provide self defence.~ The 
U.S. thought that by selling arms to all Gee states it would be easier to intervene 
in the future, and to operate or co-operate with local foroos if they had standard 
equipment.205 
More important, in view of Kuwait's experiences, as the Minister of Defence said, 
the principle of Arab &>lidarity and respect for each others' sovereignty had been 
tom apart by Iraq.3:>6 When Kuwait signed the defence agreement with the U.S., it 
declared that its purpose was "To maintain the oountry's security, safety and 
stability and ensure the safety of its borders against the expansionist ambitions of 
the Iraqi regime". 3)7 The Islamic Constitutional Movement, the political grouping 
of the Kuwaiti Muslim Brotherhood, publicly supported the defence agreement 
with the United States.r08 While worrying about American cultural influences in 
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the state, they perceived no alternative to a strong connection to the United 
StateS.rofi A poll commissioned by the Kuwaiti News Agency in early 1993, found 
that 72 per cent of respondents supported the defence agreements with Western 
countries, though only 43 per cent were in favour of a permanent American force in 
the country, with more Kuwaitis desiring an international force stationed in 
Kuwait.21o In the meantime, Kuwait had been expanding its military co-operation 
with other Western countries, like the United Kingdom.211 In February 1992, 
Kuwait and the United Kingdom signed a memorandum on security co-operation 
in the defence of Kuwait, as well as providing training and joint exercises.212 The 
agreement was to run for ten years, but unlike the U.S.-Kuwaiti agreement, there 
was no pre-positioning of military equipment in Kuwait.218 Since 1991, the U.S. 
had signed a security agreement with everyone of the six Gulf Cooperation Council 
except Saudi Arabia.214 
The U.S. renewed it commitment to the GCC states when Iraq moved foroos 
toward the Kuwait border in the middle of 1992. The U.S. responded with the 
heavy deployment of force. 216 Again, the U.S. commitment was demonstrated on 
October 7, 1994, when the U.S. deployed its forces to Kuwait in response to what 
was believed to be threatening signs by Iraq.216 The Foreign Ministers of the six 
members of the Gee, joined by the U.S. Secretary of State, Warren Christopher 
and the U.K. Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, met in Kuwait on October 12, 
1994, in order to review the threat to peace and regional security presented by 
Iraq's recent provocative actions.217 The ministers agreed that mobilisation of 
resources and deployment of forces should continue until they were assured that 
Iraq no longer presented an immediate threat.218 The coalition-GCC forces should 
remain at the highest degree of readiness so long as the threat to Kuwait 
existed.219 They agreed about the importance of further enhancement of the 
coalition - through the improvement of GCe military co-ordination of the 
continuing deployments and joint activities in the region.~ 
Compared with the period prior to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the U.S. now has 
better bilateral arrangements with the Gee. It has signed areess agreements and 
defence co-operation agreements with Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman and the 
UAE.221 It has also strengthened its co-operation with Saudi Arabia.222 The U.S. 
Defense Department estimates that in 1980 it would have needed three months to 
deploy one division to the Gulf.223 By 1990, the primary deployment for Desert 
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Shield was completed within three weeks.224 Defence agreements concluded after 
the Gulf war have shortened the time plan even further.2:?li When Iraq again 
threatened Kuwait in October 1994, the U.S. moved heavy units from Georgia to 
Kuwait in just three days.~ 
The U.S. has adequate equipment in Kuwait for a brigade.227 This includes air 
forre and navy equipment stored throughout the region.228 With 20 U.S. warships 
patrolling the Gulf and military access agreements signed with most of the GCC 
states, the U.S. obviously has the objective of enlarging its presence in the Gulf. 
President Bill Clinton finally presented his strategy in February 1995, to protect 
American interests in the new world order.229 The plan is called "A National 
Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement".230 The Pentagon was then 
able to make up its regional strategies in terms of the President's strategic 
vision.231 In May 1995, Secretary of Defense, William Perry, disclosed the new 
"United States Security Strategy for the Middle East". 232 The Pentagon admits 
that the U.S. will be even more dependent on Gulf oil early in the next oontury 
than it is at present.233 Therefore, both documents stress the importance of 
"maintaining the unhindered flow of oil from the Gulf to world markets at stable 
prices".234 The White House used the phrase, "at reasonable prices". The GCe 
states could see the implication that as there were dependent on the U.S. for 
regional security they should sell their oil at an affordable price.236 
While the Gee states are interested in military co-operation with the U.S., they 
are generally concerned about U.S. domination, especially small state like 
Bahrain.236 Bahrain and the other small states are so tiny that any U.S. influence 
is felt strongly. 237 However, in Saudi Arabia, an American presence can be less 
obtrusive because of their huge territory compared to other GeC stateS.238 
In addition, despite the fact that the U.S. drove the Iraqis out of Kuwait, there is a 
strong sense among Gee states that the U.S. is guilty of "overkill" and conspired 
with the Iraqi regime to invade Kuwait.239 For instance, the AI Riyadh newspaper, 
on the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the liberation of Kuwait, stated that 
Saddam Hussein was implementing a foreign oonspiracy to continue his presidency 
of Iraq.240 The newspaper areused the U.S. of advising Iraq to launch a war 
against Iran in 1980. when Saddam Hussein and Henry Kissinger. met in one of 
the U.S. military bases in Turkey. It is alleged that they agreed on the defmite 
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time to start the war against Iran.241 The newspaper oontinued that the U.S. has 
planned from the late 1970s to allow Iraq to invade Kuwait to achieve U.S. 
objectives directed at Gulf oil. The newspaper called this the big camouflage.242 
More recently, the failure of the U.S. to respond to Serbian aggression against 
Bosnia from 1992 until mid 1995, has increased cynicism over the U.S. motives in 
liberating Kuwait.243 The American government know that the American public 
will support a war for oil or to save Israel, but little else.244 The Gee states know 
this, and many still feel bitter.246 It is obviously that a U.S. presence will be 
accepted only as long as a foreign military presence is going to protect them from 
aggression.246 
There is another important threat to the GeC stability and that is possible 
conflicts among the Gee states themselves. This oould stop oil shipments and 
deliver opportunities to Iraq and Iran to spread their influence.247 The Gee states 
do not want either Iraqi or Iranian hegemony over the Gulf region.248 The fact 
remains that although the Gee states are linked by similar political systems and 
have many shared interests towards the outside world, they realise their interests 
differently on a number of questions.249 They work together in a crisis, e.g. the 
Iran-Iraq war that gave birth to the organisation in 1981, and the Iraqi invasion of 
Kuwait in 1990.260 However, when the crisis is over, the differing objectives and 
arguments are moved into the forefront. 261 Since Saudi Arabia carries most of the 
burden of defending the Gee states, the post-war political impression of Saudi 
Arabia has become a Slurce of strain within the Gec.2D2 Qatar and Oman fear 
Saudi domination.253 They perceive Saudi leadership within the Gee ooalition as 
decreasing their own position, which they have always been keen to show as being 
independent.204 
In spite of the present violations of the U.N. resolutions on the Gulf war by Iraq, 
Qatar defected from the United stand of the Gee coalition and sought a 
co-operative relationship with the Iraqi regime. Qatar returned its ambassador to 
Baghdad in late October 1992.256 That happened shortly after a serious clash 
between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in a dispute over their common frontier on 
September 30, 1992.266 Two Qataries and one Saudi were killed.267 The Qatari 
side responded angrily and in October, 1992, the Qatari government suspended its 
1965 border agreement with Saudi Arabia.258 The Defence Minister of Qatar 
provoked Saudi Arabia when he called for Iranian protection against Saudi 
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Arabia.~ Saudi officials accused Qatar of moving border posts into Saudi territory 
during the Gulf war, while the world's attention was focused on the liberation of 
Kuwait.260 However, in December 1992, Qatar agreed to reaffmn the 1965 
agreement and the two sides accepted a one year deadline for a fmal demarcation 
of their border according to that agreement.~l 
There are differenres among the GCC states themselves on how to deal with 
neighbouring states, notably Iraq and Iran. The meeting of the Gulf Cooperation 
Council heads of states in Riyadh in Derember 1994, has underlined the differenres 
of approach members take towards Iraq and Iran.a>2 Officially, the summit stuck 
to the previous re~lutions of the council.263 The final communique of the summit 
condemned Iraq in strong terms, accusing it of violating UN resolutions and 
threatening Kuwait.264 On Iran, the GCC supported any peaooful measures that 
the UAE might take to regain Abu Musa and the Tunbs. and served notire that 
Tehran had to respect all GCC state's sovereignty and stop meddling in their 
affairs if it wanted a better relationship with its GCC neighbours. ~ 
The Omanis sent their naval commander to Tehran and hosted an Iraqi cultural 
festival shortly before the summit. ~ The Omani view was that it was the GCC's 
interest to adopt a more conciliatory approach to both the big powers rather than 
follow the doubtful logic of" dual containment". 267 Omanis believe that it is useless 
for the GCC to base its policy on Iraq in the hope that their might be a change of 
regime in Baghdad. The Omanis are persuaded that Saddam Hussein oould 
survive indefinitely, and that the GCC states should try to allow him back into the 
fold of Arab nations.263 The Omanis also believe that the GCC states can influence 
Iraq instead of leaving Iraq in the lurch when Western oountries are seeking 
retribution from Iraq.~9 As for Iran, Omanis are asking the GCC for trade and 
economic co-operation with Iran. The GCC states can develop shared interests 
with Iran and that will neutralise its disruptive potential and lessen its fears of 
being victimised by the West and its Arab allies.270 
Qatar sent a military delegation to Iraq in December 1993.2'11 When the U.S. 
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, raised the U.S.' concern toward Qatar's 
rapprochement with Iraq and Iran, Qatar's Foreign Minister responded "Qatar 
lives in the middle of neighbours whom it is difficult to deal with. Accordingly, 
maintaining good relations with Iraq and Iran is essential for our interest".272 The 
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Gee summit held in Oman in December 1995, was tough on Iraq. It underlined 
the threat presented by Iraq's weapons programme and supported the 
maintenance of sanctions. While expressing sympathy for the suffering of the Iraqi 
people, it blamed Saddam Hussein's regime for not following the UN resolutions. 273 
This was in spite of two messages that were ~nt to the Gee summit from Saddam 
(carried through the Omanis and Qataries) calling for a reconciliation.274 In fact, 
the UAE, Bahrain, Qatar and Oman have all indirectly suggested that they 
wanted to see sanctions eased and proress of repair initiated.275 However, the 
summit failed to reflect their de sires. 276 The summit also urged Iran to refer the 
dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunbs to the International Court of Justice.277 
In addition, Oman and Qatar follow different paths in foreign relations from the 
rest of the Gee states, in particular with Israel. Oman has become the first Gulf 
state to establish trade links with Israel. 278 The decision by Oman and Israel to 
exchange trade was taken during a meeting at the U.N. on September 30, 1995, 
between Oman's Foreign Minister and the Israel's Foreign Minister. 279 However, 
in December 1994, the Israeli Prime Minister, Rabin visited Oman for talks with 
Sultan Qabus. This is the highest public contact between one of the Gee states 
and Israel to date.280 
Qatar has also held public meetings with Israeli officials related to trade 
co-operation and hosted a round of Middle East multilateral peace talkS.281 There 
was no immediate reaction from the other Gee states, but implicitly it was seen as 
being definitely unacceptable.282 
These differences were highlighted at the final communique of the Gee leaders 
summit held in Muscat on December 6, 1995.283 This resulted in the new Emir of 
Qatar, Sheik Hamad Al-Thani, walking-out of the closing ceremony. This has 
created the most public split within the Gee since its beginning in May 1981.284 
The row was about who to appoint as the next Gee secretary-general to replace 
the UAE's Fahim AJ-Qasimi.286 Saudi Arabia nominated its former Ambassador to 
France, Jameel Al-Hujeilan. Qatar nominated its Under-Secretary, at the Qatari 
Foreign Ministry, Abdulrahman Al-Atiya.286 Before the closing ceremony of the 
summit, the matter was put to a vote which resulted in a 5-1. victory for the Saudi 
nominee Jameel Al-Hujeilan.287 
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The identity of the secretary-general was not the real issue.288 The Qataris felt 
embarrassed when all the other members of the Gee supported the appointment 
of the Saudi nominee. Qatar expressed its embarrassment through its boyrott of 
the fmal session. ~ The Qataris were adamant on their stand even though all the 
others supported the Saudi nominee. They felt purposely ignored by the Saudis.200 
Qatar's border dispute with Saudi Arabia was at the source of this matter and it 
has made Qatar rourt Iraq as counterweight to Saudi dominance and it has even 
courted Israel to win favour with the United States.291 Eventually, during a 
meeting for the Gee Foreign Ministers on March 17, 1996, Qatar agreed to the 
Saudi nominee Mr Al-Hujeilan.292 
These events are all the more disappointing because the Gulf war was perceived by 
many in the region as a historical turning point that could speed up the process of 
Gee integration.293 A strategy of self-reliance in defence and security is 
inadequate.294 Self-reliance is politically difficult and militarily ineffective.296 The 
inadequacy of self-reliance is to some degree a simple matter of numbers.296 The 
Gee states plan to spend up to $10 billion a year on arms purchases until the end 
of the century, but their small armies might find it difficult to absorb the advanced 
arms.297 Purchasing weapons is unlikely to make a difference in the defence of a 
state without proper training and better morale.298 Kuwait's enormous supply of 
weapons did not make much impression on Saddam Hussein in 1990.~ Even so, 
the combined population of the Gee states is close to that of Iraq's, but no one in 
1990 suggested that the Gee states rould, by themselves, handle the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait.300 The mobilisation of citizen manpower into armed forces 
would require obligatory military service, which is a real demand of the state over 
its citizens. 001 The population growth rate in the Gee states is among the highest 
in the world. 002 Acrording to the 1993 census, the total population of the six 
member states is 23,767,388. The population is expected to reach 32,000,000 by 
the year 2000.303 Another major block to effective self-defence is their inability to 
adopt a unified defence policy is the political context of the states.304 A demand for 
military service by the state over its citizenry is avoided by the United States.305 It 
is also avoided by the Gee states because such a demand could bring forward 
pressure for citizens to have a say in state policy.303 Today's regional allies rould 
prove oostly to keep friendly.307 In other words, the Gee states rely on the U.S., 
but the Gee states need to be aware that the U.S. may not be available next time, 
unless it is obviously in their self-interest.308 
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As a result, the Gee states can be expected to continue to rely on a mix of these 
three security elements: self-reliance, regional balancing, and their Western 
connection in the foreseeable future. 300 For &>me time to come, the "new world 
order" indicates that the Gee states will continue to suffer from a status quo 
guaranteed by the West, along with its concomitant eronomic disparities. 310 The 
American led war against Iraq has played a significant role guaranteeing billions 
of dollars in potential weapons sales to the Gee states.311 It also guaranteed the 
Gee states' need for u.s. protection. Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gee states 
pay the major cost to the U.S. for the Gulf security under the policy of "dual 
containment" against Iran and Iraq. S12 
u.s. -Saudi security relations in the context 
of the U.S.' "dual containment" straten 
When President Bill elinton came into office in early 1993, he inherited from 
President George Bush a foreign policy towards the destroyed Iraq and less 
i&>lated Iran.sls The Gulf war of 1990-91, had overturned some of the results of the 
Iran-Iraq war.314 By rehabilitating Iran and weakening Iraq, Iran assumed an 
increasing importance in Gulf security.315 The U.S. had shown a renewed interest 
in supporting the defenoo of the regional states by encouraging a collective security 
arrangement in the Gulf.316 It was not in the U.S.' interest or the interest of the 
Gee states to be dominated by Iran or Iraq.317 Thus, the initial long-term U.S. and 
allied objective was to prevent such a development.3Is The U.S. and its allies 
followed this objective by balancing Iran and Iraq's power against each other.319 
On February 24, 1994, Martin Indyk, then special assistant to President elinton 
on Middle Eastern affairs, attended a symposium in Washington De where he 
explained U.S. strategy in the Gulf.:m He said "The end of the Cold War and the 
elimination of the Soviet empire al&> eliminated a major strategic consideration 
from our calculus in the Gulf'. 321 He oontended "We no longer have to worry that 
actions would generate Soviet actions in support of our adversaries in the 
region".3~ In addition, he stated "As a result of the Iran-Iraq war and the Gulf 
war, a regional balanoo of power between both oountries has been established at a 
much lower level of military capability. This makes it easier to balance the power 
of both of them" .323 "We came into office in a favourable strategic position in the 
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Gulf that made it possible for us to reject a policy for building up one of these 
powers against the other in favour of continuing the hostile policies". 324 The U.S. 
strategists had given birth to a new policy called "dual containment", which strives 
to keep the balance of power between Iran and Iraq at a militarily low level so they 
can not threaten American interests in the Gulf region. 325 
President Clinton's National Security Adviser, Anthony Lake, one of the authors of 
the dual containment policy, called the Middle East, "A region of vital interest to 
the United States" .326 On May 16, 1994, Mr Anthony Lake outlined U.S. interests 
in the region, in which, he included the flow of oil, the stability of friendly Arab 
nations, a secure and lasting peace between Israel and her neighbours, and the 
containment of Iraq, Iran and Libya.327 To explain "dual containment" he cited 
Iran's calls for the destruction of the "Zionist entity" and Saddam Hussein's plans 
to mobilise the Arab world against Israel. 328 He, therefore, asserted that the U.S. 
would dramatically reinforce its efforts to isolate and oontain the threats from Iran 
and Iraq.329 
Since Iraq is already constrained by international sanctions the focus is on 
constraining Iran.3ro Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, 
Toni G. Verstanding, outlined on March 22, 1994, the U.S.' concerns about Iran's 
behaviour in five areas: 
its quest for nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction, and the means 
for their delivery; 
the continued involvement of the Iranian government in terrorism and 
assassination world-wide; 
its support for violent opposition to the Arab-Israeli peace process; 
Iran's threats and subversive activities against its neighbours; and 
its dismal human rights record at home.331 
In fact, Iran got arms from the former Eastern bloc (Ukraine, Russia, Bulgaria and 
Czechoslovakia) and from North Korean and China.332 Iran bought, in 1992, three 
Russian built attack submarines.333 It acquired advanced conventional missiles 
and a large number of long-range anti-ship missiles.334 Iran has also been able to 
go on with the production of chemical weapons and acquire biological weapons. 336 
Iran has started a major programme to rebuild its armed forces after its massive 
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losses during the Iran-Iraq war, and it is searching to re-establish itself as a power 
in the Gulf.336 Iranian nationalists believe that Iran's history, location and the size 
of its territory and population give it the right to play such a role. 337 The Iranians 
were shocked by the amount of destruction against Iraq during Desert Storm and 
decided that only the possession of nuclear weapons could protect them.338 These 
weapons would prevent the U.S. and its allies from intervening to oppose them and 
make it cautious in how it directed a war against them.339 Some believe that the 
U.S. would not have launched a war against Iraq to liberate Kuwait if Iraq had 
had nuclear weapons. 34O Therefore, a very important step was taken by Iran when 
it made an $800 million deal with Russia, in January 1995, to complete the 
construction of two reactors at Bushehr which had been started in 1974, but had 
been abandoned after the Iranian revolution.341 
Iran's alleged decision to possess nuclear weapons is said to date back to the last 
stages of the Iran-Iraq war. Iran was worried because of the Iraqi use of chemical 
weapons and its nuclear programme.342 Iranian efforts were motivated not only to 
deter possible Iraqi action, but also Israeli or American actions. 343 The weapons of 
mass destruction would compensate for the Iranian military's weakness in 
conventional arms.344 
For the U.S. and its allies, Iran's conventional build-up could be justified for 
legitimate self-defence.346 However, with the delivery of equipment from Russia 
and elsewhere, the balance of power will start to tilt in Iran's favour. 346 Some of 
the equipment, such as weapons of mass destruction, missiles and submarines, not 
only increase the possibility that Iranian efforts could be not only for self-defence, 
but also to further ambitions for regional hegemony. 347 
Russia has been pursUlng its policy with no attention to the U.S.' "dual 
containment" strategy.348 The U.S. failed to break the Russia-Iran deal relating to 
the nuclear reactor at Bushehr.349 Russians have argued that as NATO expands 
into East and Central Europe, one of the possible Russian responses could be to 
increase strategic co-operation with Iran.360 The Russian government official 
reported that Russia and Iran in many cases share the same political goals, "Iran 
is a ~uthem neighbour and it is impossible for us not to deal with it". 361 In 
addition, the Russian Minister of Energy made it clear to the Middle East 
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Television Broadcast Centre that Russia felt free to assist Iran with its nuclear 
programmes as long as the U.S. is assisting Israel with its nuclear reactors.362 
In fact, American officials have no doubt that Iran will become a nuclear power in 
the future. The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) said in 
September 1994, that Iran could produce a significant number of nuclear weapons 
within eight to ten years and Iran is trying to purchase ready made Russian 
nuclear bombs.363 That makes the prospect of Iranian nuclear weapons a serious 
risk in the American view. 354 Therefore, Secretary of Defense, William Perry, made 
three criteria for deciding whether a threat affects U.S. vital interests.365 The first, 
if it threatens the survival of the U.S. or its key allies. 366 The second, if it threatens 
critical U.S. economic interests. 367 The third if a threat poses the danger of a 
future nuclear threat.358 
American concerns toward Iran have risen since early March 1995, when Iran 
installed anti-ship missiles and coastal artillery on two of the three islands that 
both Iran and U.A.E. claim.369 The U.S. explained the Iranian actions as being 
part of Iran's plan to control oil shipments through the Straits of Hormuz.300 The 
fact remains that if Iran acquired arms or acted, the U.S. could not ignore the 
Iranians.:3EH For the U.S., it is Iran's capabilities and not its intentions, at least for 
the foreseeable future, that is the issue.362 
Under pressure from the Republican dominated Congress and Israel, the Clinton 
administration announced a total trade embargo on Iran on April 30, 1995.363 The 
U.S. has been determined to limit exports of dual technologies and financial 
assistance and credits from Western nations in order to put pressure on Iranian 
policies and to limit its future military capability, particularly with regard to 
weapons of mass destruction.364 The Washingtpn Post reported that reasons for 
imposing the embargo on Iran were, as Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, 
stated, "That Iran's behaviour - what Washington's views as its support for 
terrorism and quest for nuclear weapons - is not only outside the bounds of 
areeptability but also a direct threat to many vital interests of the United States 
and its allies". 366 Mr Christopher perreived not a diplomatic abstraction but a 
living threat, a terrorist country that if left to its own devices would shortly have 
nuclear weapons and use them to intimidate its neighbours, undermine Israel and 
control oil transport lines.366 The U.S. did not succeed in organising joint economic 
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sanctions on Iran from European countries and its Asian trading partners. ~7 
Meanwhile, Middle Eastern commentators did not miss the opportunity to indicate 
that the regional state most comprehensively armed with non-conventional 
weapons was Washington's closest foreign ally, Israel, and that the White House's 
fear of nuclear weapons did not spread out to the estimated 220 bombs in the 
Israeli arsenal.368 Many criticised the U.S. trade embargo on Iran which they said 
would solve nothing.369 Iran would find other buyers for the 650,000 barrels of oil 
which it was selling per day before the U.S. boycott, just as Libya had found other 
buyers for the oil which it had been unable to send to the U.S. since the Reagan 
administration imposed a boyoott in 1986.370 Unilateral U.S. steps with only 
limited international support are unlikely to have significant effect on Iran.371 The 
U.S. intended its strategy to i~late Iran from Syria because of its opposition to the 
Arab-Israeli peace proress and then the U.S. could dictate Gulf policy without 
interference.372 
The Fourth Annual U.S. Middle East Policymakers Conference held at Virginia 
Military Institute on September 17-18, 1995, examined the peace process and Gulf 
security. 373 At the conference, Dr Shaul Bakhash criticised the current U.S. 
methods facilitating change in Iran and urged the U.S. to realise Iran's legitimate 
national security worries when formulating u.s. policy in the Gulf region. 374 Mr 
Zalmay Khalilzad, Director of the Greater Middle East Study Centre, perceived 
another problem with the "dual containment" strategy in that it might generate 
expanded co-operation between Iran and Iraq.375 Indeed, an Iranian delegation led 
by Ali Khorram, senior adviser to the Foreign Minister, had visited Baghdad in 
May 1995.376 In return, Baghdad promised they would send an Iraqi delegation to 
visit Tehran in the near future. 377 The Iranian media observed the need to oppose 
what they called, the common enemy, the U.S., and its policy of "dual 
containment".378 The Iranian Foreign Minister said that both countries were now 
determined "To end their frozen bilateral relations and push actively towards 
normalisation" . 379 
The Clinton administration hopes that the mutual mistrust of Iran and Iraq will 
prevent or limit their co-operation in spite of their common hostility to the U.S. and 
its strategy of "dual containment".~ For Iran, the U.S. is unlikely to allow the 
Iranian nuclear programme to become too advanced. 381 N; Mr Zalmay Khalilzad 
believes that the U.S. is determined to slow down the Iranian nuclear programme 
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by its "dual containment" strategy. This strategy oould be "vital as it can provide 
the time to develop appropriate response capabilities and doctrines". 382 Iraq, 
already restrained by sanctions, is no immediate threat to regional security.383 
Iraq has not complied with the UN resolutions, and the U.S. might have to use 
forre to make Iraq abide by all the terms of its rease-fire agreement with the 
United Nations. There are particular problems associated with the "no-fly" wnes 
over the Kurdish areas of northern Iraq and in the Shi'ite 5Outh. 384 However, the 
U.S. fears the alternatives open to Saddam Hussein. He has more than 7,000 
experts and engineers in nuclear technology. Iraq oould rebuild its nuclear 
reactors and possess a nuclear weapon relatively rapidly. 386 Therefore, the U.S. 
will treat both Iran and Iraq as outcasts ~ long as they oontinue their current 
policies. 386 American officials stated that even though the Iranian revolution 
happened more than 17 years ago and that Saddam was defeated more than 5 
years ago, but the U.S. could not moderate their policies. 387 They made this 
statement when the CIA was asking for more financial support for its secret 
operations related to "dual containment" strategy.388 
Furthermore, it is in the U.S.' interest for the GCC states to develop better 
defensive abilities and co-operate among themselves.389 For that reason, the U.S. 
especially welcomed the determination at the GCC summit meeting in Riyadh, in 
1993, to approve a number of recommendations made by the GCC Defence 
Ministers to enhanre GCC oo-operation and oo-ordination.300 These included joint 
efforts in the subject of air defence command and control. 391 Such a development 
would decrease the U.S. burden, and must be pressed for much harder than in the 
past. 392 
In fact, the GCC states share the U.S. concerns about the revitalisation of Iran 
over time, with the present weakening Iraq.393 They have shared with the U.S. 
their ooncerns about the Iran's growing military capabilities and ambitions and 
how they will affect the stability of the Gulf.394 However, the ideological tone that 
characterised relations during the Iran-Iraq war has sinre been replaced by more 
normal diplomatic exchanges.395 Meetings between the GCC states and Iran are 
part of the regular diplomatic routine in the region.396 Saudi Arabia perceived the 
end of the Gulf war as being an opportunity to improve relations with I ran. 397 In 
Saudi opinion, Iran had acted responsibly during the Kuwaiti crisis. 398 In addition, 
sinre the death of Ayatollah Khumayni, Iran had moderated its desire to spread its 
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ideological message across the GUlf.399 The improvement in Saudi-Iranian 
relations extended across the Gee states contacts.400 In August 1991, Iranian 
Foreign Minister, Velayati, said in an interview that the GeC states "Have invited 
us to reassess the status of the members of the Council ... They have ~mehow come 
to the conclusion that they must seek Iran's co-operation, or else it will be 
impossible to defend regional security". 401 
The GCC Foreign Ministers and GeC Security General, Abdullah Bishara, met 
with Velayati in New York in late September 1991, during the U.N. General 
Assembly meeting.402 They issued a statement laying out the principles over which 
their relations would be founded, including an agreement of respect recognised 
international boundaries, never to resort to force or the threat of force to re~lve 
differences, and non-interference in internal matters. 403 In November 1991, the 
GCC Secretary-General announced that "Iran is an essential participant with the 
GCC states in the security of the waters of the Gulf. It is impossible to guarantee 
that security without an understanding with Iran".404 
Iran exploited its close relations with the GCC states to undermine the American 
position in Gulf defence plans. The Gee states confirmed their belief in the need 
to depend on outside powers, for security, and so Velayati explained that the 
strategic reasons why the Islamic Republic of Iran emphasised co-operation with 
GCC states was to weaken the foreign presence. 406 Tehran's increasing military 
might, on the one hand, and the Iranian moves in April, 1992, on Abu Musa island, 
on the other hand, oonfirmed to the Gee the need for the U.S. role in Gulf 
defence.400 Iranian Foreign Ministry sources were quoted as saying that continued 
foreign involvement in the Gulf made it essential for Iran to reinforce its position 
on the island. 407 
The V.A.E. raised the issue of Iran's role, on Abu Musa and the two Tunb islands 
(Great and Lesser Tunb) occupied by the Shah in 1971, at the GCC.~ The GCC 
summit in December 1992, expressed its strong support for the V.A.E., accusing 
Iran of occupying Arab land and stating that improved relations with Tehran 
depended on "a strengthening of trust".400 The following annual meeting of the 
Supreme Council of the GeC was used to study the developments in the 
relationship between the GCe and Iran. The Supreme Council deplored Iran's 
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failure to respond to the V.AE.'s calls to reach a peaceful ~lution to the issue .. uo 
And it called on Iran to refer the dispute to the International Court of Justice. 411 
However, Iran agreed to negotiate with the V.AE. They met in Qatar in 
November 1995, but the meeting failed to solve the dispute .. H2 Thus, the U.A.E. 
insisted that Iran agree to go to the International Court of Justice to solve the 
dispute.413 The V.A.E. explained that Iran had rejected this solution because Iran 
did not hold any documents that justified its possession of the three islands.414 
Furthermore, the tension over the islands rose when Iran installed on March 1, 
1995, anti-ship missiles and coastal artillery on the three islands.415 The Gee saw 
the military installation as an attempt to threaten oil shipments through the 
Straits of Hormuz and provoke the Gee states in general.416 
The Gee states ooncerns about Iran's geopolitical ambitions increased as a major 
Iranian rearmament programme began to build up a conventional and 
non-conventional weapons industry.417 The Saudis' view of Iran's increasing 
military might was that it could be explained by the following reasons: 
- Iran's concerns about Iraqi power in the future; 
- Iran's intentions in Iraq, and possible invasion of Iraq or part of it; 
- Iran fears of the V.S. presence in the Gulf; 
- Iran's legitimate desire to playa role in Gulf and restore its military power; 
- Iran's intentions to export its ideology to other Muslim oountries; and 
- Iranians believe that the American presence in the Gulf would not remain 
that long and Iran with its military might oould impose its policy on the Gee 
states, especially on the oil strategy.418 
The Saudis base their explanations of Iranian intentions towards the Gee states 
on the following evidence: 
- Some Iranian political leaders are calling to export their revolution to the 
Gee states and challenge them to establish the extreme of principles of the 
Islamic revolution; 
- Many Iranian leaders charge the Gee states with the responsibility for 
causing Iran's defeat during Iran-Iraq war; 
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- Iran's government charges the Gee states with the responsibility for the U.S. 
presence in the Gulf which poses a direct threat to Iranian interests and limits its 
military role in the Gulf; 
- Some Iranian leaders believe that Iranian economic problems are caused by the 
oil strategy of the Gee states; 
- Some Iranian religious leaders have ~me hostility against the Gee states which 
is encouraged by Persian nationalism; 
- Some Iranian leaders have hostility against the Gee states because of the 
Sunni-Shi'ite ideological conflict; and 
- Iran thinks that it can rely on the Shi'ite minority in the Gee states to 
support Iran.419 
The Saudis justified their support for Iraq, both fmancial and moral, that came 
after the third year of Iran-Iraq war when the balance of the war collapsed in 
favour of Iran and the Iraqi territory threatened to collapse.420 The Gee states 
tried to persuade Iran to end the war by peace, but Iran rejected the (Gee states 
and the world community's) call for an end to the war. 421 Iran insisted on getting 
revenge on Saddam Hussein and on invading Iraq.422 The Saudis felt threatened 
not only by the ideological threat of the Iranian revolution which it continued to 
wage against the Gee states, but also by its military power which threatened Iraqi 
territory. The Saudis had no other alternative but to support Iraq to counter 
balance the expansion of Iranian ideological and military threat. 423 The Saudis 
perooived that the ideological threat from Iran was a more immediate danger than 
the long term threat of Iraqi hegemony in the region.424 The long-term threat could 
be dealt with by a military build up to improve Saudi Arabia's deterrence.425 
Iran and Iraq have a relationship in which a pennanent balance of power is hard 
to preserve.426 The stronger power appears from these conflicts not only to want to 
dominate its competitor, but to expand its influence to the Gee states as wel1.427 
The Gee states have been too weak to maintain this balance between Iran and 
Iraq.428 The Saudis understood that some risk was involved in maintaining Iraqi 
power against Iran during the Iran-Iraq war.429 The Saudis and Kuwaitis paid the 
price when Iraq used the same military might to invade Kuwait in 1990, and 
threatened Saudi security.4~ As the Saudi newspaper AI Riyadh commented, the 
Gee states had been trapped into supporting Iraq in the Iran-Iraq war, which only 
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served the ambitions of the instigators of the war. The Gee states would not be 
forced again into paying for another war. 431 
Therefore, the GeC states VIew Iran and Iraq as imminent threats which 
necessitate the presence of the U.S. in the Gulf to offer any significant security for 
the Gee stateS.432 The GCC states explained the American presence in the Gulf as 
being necessitated by the Cold War, when the Soviet Union threatened the Gulf 
region through its allies Iraq and south Yemen. Iran used to be an important 
strategic location for the NATO against the Soviet Union.433 The Gee states also 
blamed the presence of U.S. troops in the region after the Gulf war in 1991, on 
Iran as it possesses the largest regional navy in the Gulf.434 Iran has missiles, 
mines, anti-ship missile and has acquired three submarines.435 The Gee states 
concluded that the cause of the U.S. presence in the Gulf, was Iran's occupation of 
Abu Musa island.436 
Equally importantly, the Saudi Defence Minister, Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz, stated in 
an interview on March 27, 1996, that some Gee states were keeping foreign troops 
on their territory, because of Iran's behaviour. The Gee states did not desire the 
presence of foreign troops but needed them to maintain peace in the re gion. 437 
Similarly, after the Gulf war, the Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud AI-Faisal, and 
other senior Saudi government officials stated that Saudi Arabia did not want to 
have any foreign troops or a large quantity of Western military equipment 
stationed on its soil, but at the same time they needed to provide the country with 
some guarantee against a future Iraqi (or Iranian) attack.438 
Furthermore, the Saudi's viewed Iranian economic problems as being caused by 
Iran's huge purchases of weapons and its spending on activities to export the 
Iranian revolution.439 The economic problems also connected to the U.S. boyoott of 
Iran.440 On the oil strategy, the GCC states, especially Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and 
U .A.E. hold the largest quantity of oil reserves in the world, and this gives them 
the right to follow a moderate policy of oil production and oil prices. 441 The Gee 
states justified their policy as maintaining the stability of the oil market, 
particularly, when the oil production from non-OPEC countries exceeds the 
production of 0 PEC countries. 442 
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The Saudis believe that Iran is planning to dominate the GCC states, or ~me of 
them to increase its oontrol over the oil reserves and expand its authority. They 
believe that Iran has the intention and the ability.443 Saudi Arabia was especially 
conrerned at the expansion of Iranian influenre in Qatar, observing it as part of an 
Iranian plan to divide the GCC.444 Saudi Arabia was al~ suspicious that Iran may 
have been, at least in part, behind the domestic disturbances in Bahrain in 1995, 
and in early 1996.445 Thus, King Fahd of Saudi Arabia asserted to his nation on 
February 7, 1995, that Saudi Arabia was well connected with the GCC states and 
that Saudi Arabia would not allow anyone to come between the GCC states.446 
The Saudis explain Iran's opposition to the U.S. military presenre in the Gulf and 
the GeC security ties with the U.S. because it prevents Iran from attaining its 
regional objectives. 447 Iran has been pressing for regional security arrangements 
that include Iran and exclude the U.S. 448 This is ~mething the GCe states reject 
unless Iran holds back its WMD and missile programmes and agrees to the new 
order in the Gulf.449 As for religious ties, the Sunni-Shi'ite ideological oonflict has 
meant there is little improvement in Saudi-Iranian relations.450 However, with 
Iran's revolutionary orientation, it is difficult for Saudi Arabia to predict any way 
in which Iran oould be involved in Gulf security arrangement.451 Although, Iran's 
current policies are more agreeable to the GeC states, its main points remain 
unclear.452 The Saudi government is cautious and believes that the responsibility 
is on Iran to demonstrate its role as a power for peace and stability rather than 
agitation. 453 
The view from other states of the GCC was expressed by the Omani Minister of 
State for Foreign Affairs, Yusifbin Alawi, in January 1993.454 He responded to the 
question about the threat presented by Iranian rearmament thus: "The size of 
Iran's armament is not new ... I do not believe that things will develop to a point 
where anyone could imagine that Iran would launch a military attack on the Gulf 
region ... what is said about this possibility is nothing but political propaganda". 406 
Furthennore, Anthony Cordesman, a military expert, said "Iran's land forces can 
not easily cross the Gulf. They are not a direct threat to the ~uthern Gulf states, 
but Iran is a power that is rebuilding serious military capabilities".456 However, it 
is unlikely that Iran could ever use such weapons without being subject to 
international military response and even the threat of it would cause an 
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international outrage. 457 In addition Iran, unlike Iraq, is not seeking revenge 
against the Gee states. 458 
Equally important, Iranian officials responded to such accusations by saying that 
the Gee states serve only the interests of American arms manufacturers and the 
a~leration of the arms race in the region.459 In the Gulf region an arms build-up 
by one country has implications for others.400 The Saudi insecurity and 
nervousness at Iran's arms build-up started in the 1970s.'«31 The Saudis saw the 
Shah as a potential dominator of the region:t62 The situation has not improved.463 
An arranged Saudi arms build-up in the 1980s was seen by the Iranian as a 
challenge to its role in the Gulf.464 Likewise, Iran's military programme of 1990s is 
perooived as a reason for the Saudis to need more arms.465 The result is an arms 
, 
race in the Gulf in which mainly the U.S. supplies Saudi Arabia and Russia 
supplies Iran. 400 The U.S. and Russia are the world's biggest arms merchants. 
Saudi Arabia and Iran are the world's two biggest arms purchasers.467 
A closed conference was held by the Emirates Centre for Strategic Studies in Abu 
Dhabi early 1995, about the relationship between Iran and the Gee states.468 The 
conference concluded that the arms race in the Gulf region would continue as long 
as there was a lack of confidence and Iran might push the region into a nuclear 
arms race if Iran possessed nuclear weapons.469 The conference also concluded that 
there would be no improvement in the relationship between Iran and the Gee 
states so long as Iran does not resolve its dispute with the United Arab 
Emirates.47o This interpretation has been confirmed by the Saudi Defence 
Minister, Sultan Ibn Abdulaziz. An interviewer from the BBe asked him on March 
27, 1996, to comment on the declaration of the president of the Islamic Republic of 
Iran, in which Iran stated that it wanted good relations with the Gee states, 
especially Saudi Arabia.471 He said that Saudi Arabia had a similar desire to Iran 
for a good relationship, but there were some problems with Arab countries such as 
the U.A.E. which had to be resolved or they had to agree to go to the international 
court. 472 Actually, the Saudis believe that Iran seems to want to normalise 
relations with the Gee states, but without sacrificing its principles.473 Despite 
differences on some issues like Abu Musa and the other Gulf islands, the Gee 
states and Iran kept their trade and economic links open to co-operate on questions 
of the environment and possibly to consult with one another within the structure of 
oPEe.474 The Omani Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Yusif bin Alawi, has 
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said "There remains the firm truth that there are common interests between Iran 
and the Arab states of the Gulf'. 475 
The uncertainty of Iraqi's future adds many security concerns for Saudi Arabia.476 
With Saddam still in power, Saudi Arabia can not approve Iraq joining in any 
security arrangement in the Gulf. 477 The Saudis are anxious to see Saddam 
Hussein replaced. 478 The dilemma with Saddam, is that the devil you know is 
better than the one you don't.479 If Saddam fell, Saudi Arabia would likely become 
more vulnerable. m A succes&>r regime might try to get revenge or if Iraq was 
broken into parts it could cause a power struggle between Syria and Iran for 
control of Iraq, and possibly lead to a pro-Iranian Shi'ite state located in southern 
Iraq, next to the Saudi border.481 In addition, at the end of 1995, King Hussein of 
Jordan called for a federation with Iraq.482 Saudi Arabia and Kuwait would see an 
Iraq-Jordan confederation as a threat to their oountries.483 
In late 1991, the Saudi government decided to adopt an assertive policy concerning 
Iraq.484 By then it was evident that Saddam's regime was not likely to fall because 
of economic sanctions and that Saddam, who was challenging the U.N. inspectors, 
had decided to rebuild his military power.485 The important security question 
facing the Saudi government in the immediate future, was whether Saddam 
Hussein could survive long enough, and with sufficient capability, to threaten 
Saudi Arabia again.486 At that time, the Saudis started publicly to support a group 
of exiled Iraqi opponents of Saddam's regime called the Free Iraq Council.487 Also 
the Saudi government gave its blessing to a congress of Iraqi opposition 
movements, including Shi'ites, Kurds and other organisations, which met in 
Damascus in January 1992.488 The Saudi government met the leaders of this 
coalition in February 1992, which included Ayatollah Muhammad Baker 
Ai-HakiM, the head of the Tehran-based Iraqi Shi'ite leaders.489 However, the 
Saudis still worried about its connections with Tehran.490 
Many observed that any system to ensure the stability of Gulf security must 
include all eight Gulf countries (the Gee states, Iraq and Iran).491 However, the 
preronditions for the development of collective security as an instrument of 
ensuring regional order have not yet been met.492 Trust between the Gulf countries 
which is required for co-operation over security arrangements in the Gulf simply 
does not exist and there is little prospect of it being established.493 
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Iran and Iraq are unlikely to challenge the V.S. directly as long as they perceive 
that it has the capability and will to prevent the domination of the region by a 
hostile power.494 Both are likely to test the U.s. and its allies on occasions as 
Saddam Hussein did in October 1994, when he moved his troops, including 
Republican Guard units, to the Kuwaiti border withdrawing them after the V.S. 
sen t more troops to the region. 496 
With the continuing U.N. enforced arms sanctions against Iraq, the greater the 
prospec~ are that the balance of power in the Gulf will be weakened.496 The 
build-up of Iranian military forces is likely to tilt the balance of power in favour of 
Iran. This greatly increases the chances of a third conflict in the Gulf region unless 
the threat of direct U.S. intervention in the Gulf maintains a regional balance of 
power.497 The U.S. is still willing to fight as the Americans believe that oil is 
threatened by Iraq and Iran.498 The U.S. Secretary of Defence, William Perry, 
. assured the Saudis during his visit in January 1996, that the V.S. was ready to 
fight if there was a reason to protect the region.499 
U.S.-Saudi military relations 
Since the Iraqi take-over of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, and the threat that the 
Iraqi military might move against Saudi Arabia, the Bush administration was to 
try to complete the delivery of a $4,026 million arms package that Saudi Arabia 
had requested in June 1990. In the latter part of 1990, the U.S. delivered many of 
the 1,177 armoured vehicles and 2,000 TOW anti-tank missiles for the Saudis, 
which it earlier had scheduled for delivery in 1992, or 1993.500 The rest of the 
package was approved in late 1990 and 1991 (see Table 15). 
In addition, Bush sent Defense Secretary, Dick Cheney, to Saudi Arabia on August 
5, 1990, in the hope of obtaining approval to send U.S. armed forces to prevent an 
Iraqi attack on Saudi Arabia should the need arise. Cheney carried a large 
amount of intelligence (see Chapter 5) to show the Saudis the full extent of the 
potential Iraqi threat and to persuade the Saudis to allow the U.S. to use Saudi 
airstrips and naval installations to respond to Iraq's military manoeuvre. If Saudi 
Arabia refused Cheney's request it might then be impossible for Washington to 
force Iraq out of Kuwait. 601 
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Saudi Arabia allowed U.S. troops to land on its territory on August 7, 1990.502 On 
the same day, squadrons of U.S. air force F-15 and F-16 aircraft departed for Saudi 
Arabia, together with the 82nd Airborne Division as well as the U.S. 24th Infantry 
Division.OO3 Ironically, the Division had been part of the U.S. Rapid Deployment 
Force (RDF) which Saudi Arabia had refused to allow to come close to their border 
since the early 19808. Even the USCENTCOM participated in the U.S. 
deployment force in Saudi Arabia.504 
The Bush administration waived a Congressional limit on the number of 
U.S.-made F-15 aircraft for Saudi Arabia, allOwing 24 more planes to be sent in 
addition to the 60 planes, which were originally ~ld in 1978. During this crisis, 
Congress provided President Bush with whatever he believed to be necessary to 
protect American interests. 006 The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was the occasion of 
emergency sales to the Saudis. Up to this time, these sales would not normally 
have been viable. Saudi Arabia got all the arms that it had requested since 1985, 
and without Congressional opposition. 
The Kuwait crisis al~ provided the basis for the president's WaIver of 
Congressional bans on legislation concerning the sales of Stinger anti-aircraft 
missiles and the sales of 105mm depleted uranium anti-tank shells. After 
exercising the special waiver authorities available to him in U.S. law, in August 
1990, President Bush ordered that 200 Stinger missiles and 50 Stinger launchers, 
as well as 15,000 depleted uranium shells for M-60 tanks, be sold immediately to 
Saudi Arabia. The president further ordered the emergency sale of 150 M-60A-3 
tanks to Saudi Arabia. In these cases, the U.S. arms export law would normally 
demand the president to give Congress 30 calendar days to review an individual 
sale proposal. The president used the powers available to him to waive this review 
period. 506 
In August 1990, the estimated total value of the emergency arms sales package for 
Saudi Arabia was $2.231 billion. The estimated sales price of the 24 F-15 aircraft 
and the AIM-9L Sidewinder and AIM-7F missiles was $2 billion. The 150 M60A-3 
tanks had an estimated sales price of $206 million. The 200 Stinger missiles and 
50 Stinger launchers were sold for an estimated price of $12 million, and the 
15,000 105 mm depleted uranium anti-tank shells were sold for an estimated $13 
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million. In light of the crisis, those in Congress and others who would have likely 
opposed significant Saudi arms sales such as these withheld major criticism of 
them.507 
Shortly, after the emergency arms transfers of August 1990, the Bush 
administration started to design additional arms sales to Saudi Arabia based on 
the new military threat presented by Iraq. Therefore, the White House announced 
that the U.S. would sell $21 billion in arms to Saudi Arabia and that the package 
would be presented to Congress in phases.508 During the executive branch 
consultations with Congress, it became clear that many lawmakers believed that 
such a heavy package should undergo careful review by Congress and not be 
approved quickly before the Congress recessed in 1990. The executive branch 
decided to submit for Congressional review a large Saudi arms package in late 
September 1990. Included in that review were those items considered most urgent 
for Saudi requirements. Final decisions on other major items that might be sold to 
the Saudis were postponed until early 1991. Due in part to this approach by the 
executive branch, no full-scale effort to block the first phase of the sale package 
was made before the 101st Congress ended 509 
Congress received formal notification of the major Saudi arms package on 
September 27, 1990. This $7.3 billion package cleared the law review period 30 
days later. Its principal elements were as follows: 
• An Armoured vehicle package, including 150 MIA2 tanks; 200 Bradley 
Fighting Vehicles, TOW (Tube-launched, Optically tracked, Wire-guided) 
missile launchers, and 1,750 TOWIIA anti-tank missiles; 207 Ml13 
Armoured Per~nnel Carriers; 50 M548 Cargo Carriers; 17 M88Al 
Recovery Vehicles; 43 M578 Recovery Vehicles (cost: $3.135 billion); 
• 150 Tube-launched, Optically-tracked, Wire-guided (TOW) IIA missile 
launchers, night vision sights and support equipment, spares and parts 
(cost: $33 million); 
• 9 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS), including vehicle mounted 
rocket launchers, 2,880 tactical rockets, 50 practice rocket pods, 9 M755A2 
command post carriers, training and training equipment, 20 ANNRC-46 
radio sets (cost: $64 million); 
• 6 Patriot fire units, 384 Patriot long-range air defence missiles, six 
ANIMPQ-53 radar sets, six engagement control stations, 48 launcher 
stations (cost: $984 million). 
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• 12 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, 155 HELLFIRE missiles, 24 
HELLFIRE spare missile launchers, six spare engines, and associated 
equipment (cost: $300 million); 
• 8 UH-60 MEDEVAC helicopters, six spare T700-GE701C turbine helicopter 
engines (cost: $121 million); 
• Upgrade of the Royal Saudi Naval Forces Command, Control and 
Communications (C3) system (cost: $307 million); 
• 10,000 wheeled vehicles, including 1,200 High Mobility Multipurpose 
Wheeled Vehicles (cost: $1.8 billion). 
• 7 KC-130H Hercules tanker aircraft (cost: $252 million); and 
• 8 C-130H and 2 C130H-30 transport aircraft ($320 million).510 
Saudi Arabia accepted splitting the arms package into two parts and promised the 
U.S. that it would cover all of the hundreds of millions of dollars of the operating 
costs of the U.S. forces based in Saudi Arabia. Also Riyadh promised to cover the 
extra costs of all of the U.S. troops stationed in Saudi Arabia including fuel, water, 
transportation and other expenses as well~ The aid commitments by the U.S. and 
its allies to the anti-Iraq, Gulf effort totalled $20 billion at the end of 1990, of 
which $12 billion came from Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab 
Emirates.511 
Bush administration officials testified in October 1990, that the Saudi anus 
package was an essential part of a comprehensive approach to strengthen the 
defensive capabilities of the Persian Gulf states and to improve their security. If 
deterrence failed, then it would be expected that the Saudi military would slow, if 
not stop, the attacking forces until outside reinforcements could arrive. The basis 
of this strategy was the strong defence ties between the United States and Saudi 
Arabia and the rest of the GCC states.512 For the Saudis, the availability of 
American troops and anus sales provided the crucial difference between Bush and 
the previous American presidents. In the Saudis' view, President Carter's 
measures would not have gone beyond a boycott against Iraq while President 
Reagan's measures would not have gone beyond the dispatch of warships or air 
raids.513 In fact, after the invasion, President Carter said "It would be a mistake to 
send U.S. troops to the Middle East unless Iraq also invades Saudi Arabia".514 
President Carter believed that President Bush had taken the right economic and 
political steps to address the invasion in its first few days. However, President 
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Bush's opposition to the Iraqi move developed and gained an unprecedented 
unanimity in the international community. President Bush made use of his 
per&>nal connections with other leaders which he had developed over twenty years. 
He had known King Fahd for fifteen years, for instanre. President Bush used his 
experience as an oil man and fully understood what the Iraqi invasion meant (see 
Chapter 5). The Bush administration argued that the threat presented by Iraq to 
Saudi Arabia and the GCC states was clear, by comparing their military forces. 
For instance, Saudi Arabia was outnumbered 10-to-l by Iraq in main battle tanks, 
4-to-l in comb at aircraft, and more than 8-to-I in artillery. The military forms of 
all six GCe countries combined were less than half of those of Iraq, Iran, Syria or 
Egypt.515 (see Table 10 in Chapter 5). 
The September 1990, arms package fitted into this larger strategy by addressing 
the deficiencies in the Saudi force structure. Up to the time of the invasion of 
Kuwait, the Saudis had not taken the threat of a land invasion seriously. Now 
they needed to deal with that threat and were committed to build sufficient land 
Corres to deter Iraq.516 
Opposition to the arms sales by those generally concerned with Israel's security 
were not voiced, in the face of Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and the very real threat to 
Saudi Arabia. 517 These arms sales appeared appropriate for American interests 
and equipped sufficient forres to deter the Iraqis who were trying to create a 
linkage between a &>lution to the Kuwaiti crisis and the Palestinian problem.518 
This obviously effected Israel and, thus, the lobbyists were silenred. Israel, on the 
other hand, expressed concern about the U.S. decision to provide Saudi Arabia with 
sophisticated new weapons. In response, the U.S. promised to provide Israel with 
a number of F -15 fighters, helicopters and Patriot anti-missile systems. However, 
Israel Cought the proposed sale unless it got $1 billion in emergency U.S. aid to 
oounter the Saudi sale.519 
The Bush administration testified in October 1990, that any additional arms 
package would focus on a further effort to improve Saudi and GeC abilities to 
defend themselves against Iraq or other aggressor states' threats. Thus, on July 
29, 1991, the administration proposed the sale of a $365 million package of bombs. 
air-to-air missiles. spare parts, and logistic support for Saudi Arabia.52) In 
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addition, the Bush administration notified Congress of the latest in a growing list 
of U.S. arms transfers to Saudi Arabia which was worth about $4.2 billion.52 ! 
On December 5, 1991, the Bush administration formally notified Congress of its 
plan to sell 14 Patriot missile frre units, 758 Patriot missiles, including equipment, 
spare parts, and support to the value of $3.3 billion. The Bush administration 
justified the arms sale as being totally defensive equipment, but some key House 
members responsible for foreign policy issues, including Representative Dante 
Fascell, Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Representative Lee 
Hamilton, ranking majority member of that Committee, and Representative David 
Obey, Chairman of the House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign 
Operations, criticised the proposal. They asserted that such a massive arms sale to 
the Middle East would imply that the U.S. was not serious about implementing 
initiatives to control Middle East arms sales.522 It is noteworthy that in London on 
October 18, 1991, the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council had 
stated that their aim was to obtain compliance to the guidelines concerning major 
arms sales to the Middle East with the objective of reducing arms sale to states in 
that region. Representative Mel Levine of the Foreign Affairs Committee further 
opposed the timing of the Saudi notification, which was being made in December 
1991, during Congressional adjournment, thus, preventing a vote which might 
have blocked the sale.523 
Others, including Senator Claiborne Pell, Chairman of the Foreign Relations 
Committee and Set. Jesse Helms, its ranking minority member, agreed to the 
timing of the notification, remarking that the Patriot missile was a defensive 
weapons system which did not raise major concerns as might other arms sales. 
Finally, in January 1992, after the 30-day arms sales notification period had 
ended, the Patriot sale was cleared for executive branch implementation.524 
Other sales were also made to Saudi Arabia in the summer of 1992. The Bush 
administration notified Congress on June 10, 1992, of its plan to sell $1.881 billion 
of weapons, maintenance and support services to Saudi Arabia, including 8UH-60 
MEDEVAC helicopters, 362 HELLFIRE missiles, 3,500 HYDRA-70 rockets, 40 
HMMWV vehicles. and maintenance and support for Saudi F-15, F-5 aircraft and 
Apache helicopters. 626 
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Since the F-15 aircraft did an excellent job in air-to-air combat against the most 
advanced aircraft in the service of potential enemy nations during the Gulf war, 
Saudi Arabia requested the U.S. for more F-15s to fulfIl the air defence role until 
after the year 2000.5~ Therefore, on September 11, 1992, President Bush 
announced his decision to sell 72 F-15 fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia worth $9.2 
billion. 527 
On September 14, 1992, President Bush formally notified Congress of his intention 
to sell the 72 F -15XP fighter aircraft to Saudi Arabia, along with 24 aircraft 
designed to perform defensive air-to-air combat missions. 528 The sale also included 
900 AGM-65DIG Maverick missiles, 300 AIM-95 and 300 AIM-1M missiles, 600 
CBU-87 bombs, 700 GBU-I0-12 bombs and technical support and spare parts.529 
In fact, before President Bush notified the Congress about the F-15 sales, he 
formally submitted $10 billion in loan guarantees to Israel to pre-empt Israel and 
its U.S. supporters from mounting a major campaign to persuade Congress to stop 
the sale from going through.530 
In testifying to Congress on September 23, 1992, on behalf of the F-15 sale, Under 
Secretary for International Security Affairs, Frank Wisner, underscored the fact 
that this sale of F -15s was important to American military interests and that they 
would increase the Saudi ability to operate jointly with U.S. forces, using Saudi 
infrastructure, should American forces have to return to the region during another 
major crisis. He al&> stated that the Middle East today had changed from that in 
which the Carter administration had consulted with Congress on the fIrst F -15 
sales in 1978, or in which the Reagan administration had obtained approval for the 
AWACS sale in 1981. According to Wisner, Saudi Arabia had observed the 
understandings on which those earlier sales were based and served as a reliable 
security partner with the U.S. in different circumstances.5.'31 At the Madrid 
Conference, Wisner stated, Saudi Arabia had played a critical role in the wake of 
the Gulf war, in assisting to form what will be a new, more oonstructive, and more 
secure Middle East reality for their American friends in the region. He emphasised 
that strong U.s.-Saudi security relationship was the best way to ensure there was 
no oontradiction in the United States' support for Saudi Arabia and Israel.632 
Finally, about the impact of this F-15 sale on Israel, he said; "The Middle East 
remains a dangerous neighbourhood, but the dynamics of the region have changed 
radically in the past two years. The notion of a unified Arab Camp motivated by 
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its most radical elements to confront Israel's military was dealt a serious blow by 
Iraq's invasion of Kuwait and defeat in the Gulfwar".533 
Nevertheless, when America sold Saudi Arabia its first 60 F-15s in 1978, certain 
assurances had been given to the United States by the government of Saudi Arabia 
about specific restriction. These assurances had been lived up to, and they still 
remained valid. Particularly, in regard to the security of Israel, America confrrmed 
that the Saudi government still considered itself bound by these same assurances 
with regard to the additional new 72 F-15. Therefore, the American were confident 
that Saudi Arabia would live up to its assurances and only use these aircraft, as it 
had used all the other weapons that America had sold them, for purposes of 
self-defence and advance regional stability. 534 
In the case of the AWACS sale to Saudi Arabia in 1981, the American 
Government Accounting Office confirmed that in 1988, the assurances were being 
lived up to. The AWACS stationed in Saudi Arabia enabled America to observe the 
Iran-Iraq war and monitor threats to Saudi Arabia from the war. 535 
The F-15s sale was seen by the Bush administration as an important signal of the 
U.S. oommitment to Saudi Arabia and as a warning to any potential aggressor. 536 
The sale promotes vital U.S. foreign policy and security interests in the Middle 
East and the Gulf regions. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia would have to take concrete 
steps to: 
help build an increased capability to deter and defend against future 
aggression; 
buy more time, in the event that deterrence fails, to mobilise support from 
the Saudi government; 
develop the interoperability that will allow the U.S. to reinforce Saudi 
Arabia more effectively; and 
help contribute to stronger and more stable post-crisis security 
arrangements, regardless of the end of Saddam Hussein. 537 
Thus, when the aO-day Congressional review period had expired, President Bush 
had the authority to proceed with the Saudi F-15 sale. As events developed the 
Saudi government signed the letter of offer and acceptance (LOA) on May 5, 1993, 
and signed the agreement with the U.S. on January 29, 1994.538 
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Members of Congress heard testimony requesting support for the sale of F -15 to 
Saudi Arabia and arguing that without the sale, more than 10,000 American jobs 
might be lost in Missouri. The Bush administration urged the sale, pointing out 
that European and other aircraft manufacturers were eager to take America's 
place as the principal supplier to the Saudi military, a position that had already 
oreurred in the previous decade. Also, the administration argued that maintaining 
the U.S. aerospace industrial base through arms sale enabled America to continue 
producing the best defence items in the world. 539 
Advanced weapons sales to Saudi Arabia usually drew opposition from pro-Israeli 
forre. But this request was especially oontroversial because it included 48 F-15 
ground attack aircraft.540 Frank Wisner testified to Congress that the 
air-to-ground aircraft could provide Saudi Arabia with an offensive air force that 
could deter threats from neighbouring states. It would not alter the essential fact; 
that Saudi forces were for defence and they were needed because they lacked 
manpower and had vast borders. Acoording to Wisner, Israel's security would be 
unimpaired by this sale and America would continue to consult with Israel to 
ensure its security was maintained.541 
As a result, to compensate for the Saudi F-15XP aircraft, Israel reached agreement 
with the U.S. on January 28, 1994, to purchase 20 F-15I fighter-bombers, one of 
the U.S.' most sophisticated weapons. The value of the contract was estimated at 
$2 billion and the aircraft were due to arrive in Israel in late 1997. The agreement 
included an option for Israel to purchase five more F-15Is at a later time.542 
Israel has had 51 older-model F-15s since 1976, but the newest planes would 
enable Israel to reach its distant potential enemies. The F-151 is a specialised 
long-range version of the F -15 that has been sold only to Israel. In addition, the 
F-15I is capable of carrying more weaponry than its predecessors and has better 
night-vision. It also has air-to-air and air-to-ground missile systems. In oontrast, 
Saudi F -15s do not have the sophisticated radar and other systems that would be 
included in the aircraft sold to Israel.643 
Table 15 shows that the military sales to Saudi Arabia from 1965 to 1994, 
amounted to over $52 billion. In fact, during the period from the Gulf crisis until 
the end of 1994, Saudi Arabia purchased from the U.S. more than $25 billion, 
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which was almost equal to the previous years. Chart 1 provides a picture of anns 
sales agreements between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia which rose dramatically 
from 1986-1989 period to the 1990-1994 period (Chart 2). Agreements with Saudi 
Arabia rose from $4.1 billion in the earlier period to $25,722 in the later period, 
over a 6 fold increase. 
Date 
1965-1970 
1971-1972 
1973-1980 
1981-1985 
1986-1989 
31·8-90 
31-8-90 
31-8-90 
31-8-90 
27-9-90 
27-9-90 
27-9-90 
27-9-90 
27-9-90 
27-9·90 
27·9·90 
27·9·90 
27·9-90 
22·3-91 
22·3·91 
22·3·91 
10·7·91 
14·7·91 
24-7·91 
5·12·91 
1-6-92 
1-6·92 
1·6·92 
1-6-92 
1·6-92 
29·1·94 
1990-1994 
Total 
Table 15 
U.S. military sales to Saudi Arabia in 'U.S. 1965 -1994 
Construction and training programmes not included 
Cost Weapon SystemJSeI'Vlce 
$370,500 
$320,600 
$15,869,600 
$6,400,000 
$4,100,000 
$2.0 billion 24 F-15C and D aircraft with AIM-9L Sidewmder and AIM-7F Sparrow air-to-air 
missiles. 
$206 million 150 M-60A3 maIn battle tanks. 
$13 million 15,000 rounds of M-833 105mm depleted Uraruum antltank arnmurutlon for M-60A3 
tanks. 
$12 million 50 stinger ground-to-air missile launch tubes and 200 stlnger missiles. 
$33 million 150 TOW II anti-armour rrussile launchers WIth rught VlSIOn slghts. 
$307 million Engineenng, technical, and logistlc servlceS for upgrade, refurblShment, operatlon, and 
maintenance programme for Royal SaudI Naval Force. 
$300 million 12 AH-64 Apache helicopters; 155 Hellflre rrusslles; and 24 Hellfire launchers. 
$1.8 billion 10,000 tactical wheeled vehicles. 
$984 million 6 patriot missile batteries, with 48 launchers; and 384 missiles. 
$121 million 8 UH-60 Medevac helicopters and spare engmes. -
$64 million 9 Multiple Launch Rocket systems (MLRS) and 2,880 MLRS rockets. 
$3.14 billion 150 M-1A2 main battle tanks; 200 ~i·2 Bradley Fightlng Vehlcles; 1,750 TOW lLA 
antitank missiles; 207 M-133 armoured personnel carriers; 50 M·458 cargo carriers; 9 
M-557 A2 armoured command posts; 17 M-88A1 recovery vehicles; and 43 M-578 
recovery vehicles. 
$572 million 7 KC-I30H tanker aircraft and 10 C-130H transport 8lrcraft. 
$158 million U.S. Army Corps of Engineers services for SaudI Arabia's Army Ordnance Corps. 
$300 million Spare parts and maintenance services for SaudI Air Force. 
$461 million Spare and repair parts related to Operation Desert Storm. 
$123 million 2,300 High Mobility Multipurpose Wheeled Vehicles (HMMWVs). 
$350 million "Contractor support" for E·3 AWACS surveillance and battle management aircraft and 
KE-3 tanker planes. 
$365 million 2,000 Mk-84 2,000-pound general purpose bombs; 2.100 BY·87 antitank and 
antipersonnel cluster bombs; 700 AIM·1M 8lr·to·air missiles, unspecified number of 
laser·guided bomb components; "miscellaneous munitlons components;' and spare and 
repair parts. 
$3.3 billion 12 Patriot missile batteries, with 758 missiles, one traming Unit, and one mamtenance 
float fire unit; 14 AN!MPQ-53 radar sets; 14 engagement control statlons; 751aunchmg 
stations; and support equipment and training. 
$157 million Contractor maintenance, training, and support for F-5 aircraft. 
$495 million Contractor maintenance, training, and techrucal seTVlces for F·15 aircraft. 
$400 million U.S. Army Corps of Engineers support and moderrusatlon of SaudI Arabla Ordnance 
Corps' logistic system. 
$223 million 8 UH·60 MEDEV AC helicopters; 4 spare engines with spare and repair parts; deSlgn and 
construction to repair facilities. 
$606 million 362 Hellflre missiles; 3,000 Hydra-70 rockets; 40 HMMWV vehicles; construction of 
support facilities for Apache helicopters including firing ranges, hangars, simulators and 
spare parts. 
$9,200 billion 72 F-15XP aircraft., includIng 48 ground·attack and 24 air-defence verslons; 24 spare 
engines; 48 sets of navigation and targeting pods; 900 AGM-65D/G Maverick misrues; 
300 AIM-9S and 300 AIM·1M air-to-air missiles, 600CBU·87 bombs; 700 GBU·10112 
bombs, spare and repair parts; support and training. 
$25,722,000 
$52,782.700 
Sources Anthony H. Cordesman, The Gulf and the Search for StrateiPc Stability, 1984, p. 254, from years 1965-1980 Anthony 
H. Cordesman, The Gulf and The West, 1988, p. 54, from year 1981·1985. Richard F. Gnmrrutt, ConventlQnal Arms Transfen to 
the thu-d World 1986-1993, CongressIOnal Research Service, July 1994, p. 59 from years 1986-1989 House of Representallves, 
ComrruUee on Foreign AffIW'S, Sub comrruUee on Europe and the Middle East and on Arms Control, Internatlonal secunty and 
lClence, September 23, 1992, p. 86 from years 1990·1994. 
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Chart 1 
Arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia. 1986-1989 
supplier percentage of value 
5.00% 13.00% 
9.00% 
IIDI UNITED STATES 
• CHINA 
~ MAJOR W. EUROPEAN 
• ALL OTHERS 
Source: Richard F. Grimmett. Conventional Arms Transfers to the Third World. 1986·1993. Congressional 
Research Service. The Library of Congress. July 29. 1994. p. 33. 
Chart 2 
Arms transfer agreements with Saudi Arabia. 1990-1993 
Source: .. chart 1. 
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§I UNITED STATES - 87% 
o CHINA & RUSSIA - 2% 
• ALL OTHERS - 4% 
• MAJOR W. EUROPEAN -
8% 
Security and military relations prospects 
U.S. sales to Saudi Arabia have always had a symbolic significance. They are an 
indication not only of the U.S.' concern for Saudi-U.s. political-military ties but 
also has implications for Israeli security. Securing the compatibility between 
strengthening the Saudi military ability and preserving Israeli security has been a 
point of controversy that continually faces American policy makers in evaluating 
the merits of any prospective sale of sophisticated military equipment to Saudi 
Arabia. 6-44 
Additional to this, was the Saudi's need for extensive new American arms. Saudi 
Arabia's defence build-up in the wake of the Gulf crisis has been recognised by the 
U.S. Congress as being in response to actual threats to the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia and the congress recognises that these arms will probably not be turned 
against Israel. On the other hand, when U.S. interests were threatened by 
the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Saudi Arabia got most of the sophisticated 
weapons including F -15s without Congressional opposition. President Bush 
exercised his special waiver authorities available to him under U.S. law to sell 
weapons to Saudi Arabia.545 The arms sales were seen as a reassurance that the 
U.S. considered Saudi Arabia as an accountable partner. The arms sales after the 
Gulf crisis of 1990 evidenced that the Israeli lobby could no longer exert an 
absolute rejection of U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia. The Arab-Israeli conflict does 
obstruct co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, but the Gulf crisis has 
narrowed their differences about the Arab-Israeli conflict which resulted in the 
aloofness of Saudi Arabia from the PLO and the involvement in the Arab-Israeli 
conflict. 
Since the Gulf crisis, U.S.-Saudi relations can be characterised as co-operative. The 
analysis of the U.S.-Saudi co-operation over the Gulf crisis revealed that 
U.S.-Saudi co-operation was associated with Increase interdependence. 
Nevertheless, security relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia have not been 
without tension. The appropriate response over a long - term U.S. presence in 
Saudi Arabia finds the two countries at odds. In fact the tension over security 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia has decreased since the Gulf crisis because the 
U.S. has now managed to negotiate defence agreements with all the GCC states 
except Saudi Arabia. In addition, now that the Soviet threat has disappeared, 
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regional threatg seem comparatively easy to contain. The defence agreements with 
the rest of the Gee countries and Desert Storm have shortened the time and 
increased the a~ss to Saudi Military facilities in case Saudi Arabia had to call for 
U.S. assistance. Therefore, U.S.-Saudi security relations has been characterised by 
co-operation rather than conflict since the U.S. has shown its commitment to the 
security of Saudi Arabia and the co-operation between the two states during Desert 
Stonn. 
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Chapter Eight 
U.s.-Saudi Economic and Political Relations Since the Gulf Crisis of 1990 
U.S.,saudi economic relations 
To understand V.S.-Saudi economic relations after the Gulf crisis, it will first be 
useful to write about the Saudi economy after the Gulf crisis if we are to have a 
complete picture about V.S.-Saudi economic relations. 
Saudi Arabia's economy 
The Kuwait crisis in 1990, turned the Saudi government's finances upside down for 
the first time. The government announced that the crisis cost $55,000 million, 
including transfers to the V.S. and other members of the anti-Iraq coalition.! 
The decrease in oil prices in 1993, combined with the Kuwait crisis, made the 1994 
budget smaller than the budget of 1993. In the budget of January 1, 1994, King 
Fahd announced a 19 per cent cut in government spending. The budget had a 
total expenditure and revenue of SR 160,000 million (about $42.666 million), 
implying the goal of a balanced budget for the first time since 1982.2 Table 16 
shows this clearly with the budgeted government revenue and expenditure for 
1993 and 1994. The 1994 target was SR 160 billion for both revenue and 
expenditure whereas in 1993, the planned expenditure and revenue was SR 197 
billion and SR 169 billion, respectively. 
The Kingdom has acted to enhance national and regional security. It is pressing 
ahead with an inclusive plan to advance its security against all possible threat'). 
The government's budget for 1994 has a reduction in the allocation for defence and 
security. Defence has accounted for about 30 per cent of total budget expenditure 
since the end of the Gulf war. The Kingdom's fmancial pressures came to light at 
the beginning of January 1994, when the Washingtpn Post reported that Saudi 
Arabia was asking to reschedule payment') due for arms sales from V.S. companies 
at a cost of $9.2 billion. First reported in Wall Street Journal, January 29, 1994, it 
was signed in Riyadh by Saudi officials and representatives of McDonnell Douglas 
Corp, General Dynamics Corp, Hughes Aircraft Co., FMC Corp, and Raytheon Co. 
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Representing the U.S. government was a delegation led by Army Lt. Gen. Thomas 
Rhame. who heads the Pentagon's foreign military sales programme. 3 
Revenue 
of which: 
oil 
domestic 
investment 
Espenditure 
of which: 
projects, operations, 
maintenance 
Deficit 
Table 16 
Budgeted government revenue and expenditure 
(SR billion) 
1993 
169.2 
134.3 
26.5 
8.4 
197.0 
53.0 
-27.8 
Sources: Saudi Arabia. Country RePOrt, The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1st Quarter 1994. P.Il. 
1994 
160.0 
nJa 
nla 
nJa 
160.0 
43.0 
0.0 
Under the new payment plan. Saudi Arabia paid $1.5 billion in 1994-1995; the 
remaining $6.2 billion will be paid by international lending institutions. The 
Saudis will guarantee repayment of the loans and will pay the interest.4 
But the government of Saudi Arabia was looking forward with confidence to the 
budgets of the future. Finance and National Minister. Mohammed Ali Abalkhail. 
sought to allay fears about the Kingdom's liquid reserves and other financial 
matters in a letter to the New York Times in August 1993. He said "The Saudi 
currency is covered by a special reserve of hard currencies that exceeds $20.000 
million". However, I argue here that the Saudi government does not have to 
convince the world about its liquid reserves of hard currencies. because its real 
reserve is oil, of which the largest quantity is still under Saudi soil. 
U.S.-Saudi economic relations 
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia maintained strong and strategic oommercial relations 
during the 1990s. For example. the Washingtpn Post reported that Saudi Arabia 
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had reached an agreement with the United States and five of the biggest defence 
contractors on plans to restructure $9.2 billion in purchases of American arms over 
the next two years. 5 Mter just two weeks, on February 16, 1994, M.B.C. 
television in London (Middle East Broadcast Centre) announced the sale of U.S. 
commercial airliners to Saudi Airlines worth a total of $6.2 billion. 
In 1993, the government of Saudi Arabia decided to purchase replacement aircraft 
for its commercial airline, Saudi Airlines. After intense oompetition between 
American and European fIrms, a telephone call that President Bill Clinton made to 
King Fahd finalised the agreement.6 The President of the United States 
announced on February 16, 1994, that the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia intends to 
purchase the entire replacement fleet from U.S. oompanies, Boeing and McDonnell 
Douglas. The agreement was signed by the American Secretary of Commerce and 
the Ambassador of Saudi Arabia in Washington. The order for 60 or more aircraft 
to renew and expand Saudi's fleet. 7 
A fact sheet released from the White House on February 16, 1994, pertaining to 
the announced sale of U.S. - commercial airlines to Saudi Airlines stated: ''The sale 
will support 100,000 of jobs for about 10 years not only in California and 
Washington where the planes will be built, but in Missouri, Kansas, Arkansas, 
Utah and elsewhere, where Boeing and McDonnell Douglas have extensive 
operations. In addition, major subcontractors, including United General Electric in 
Ohio, will benefit significantly from this order. This purchase continues the strong 
commercial relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia, particularly in the 
field civil aviation. It complements the important political and strategic 
relationship. " 
As a result of these economic ties between the United States and Saudi Arabia, the 
Americans and Saudis created in Riyadh a permanent Saudi-American Council of 
Businessmen on April 4, 1994. The Saudi Finance and National Economy 
Minister, Mohammed Abalkhail, stated at the opening of the Council on April 4, 
1994, that Saudi Arabia hosts more than 1,300 joint ventures. The United Stated 
is the biggest investor in Saudi Arabia. It holds 209 joint ventures, amounting to 
$11.5 billion.8 Table 17 shows the levels of trade of Saudi Arabia with its major 
trading partners. As is clear, the U.S. dominates Saudi Arabia's imports and 
exports. Table 18 shows the main destinations of Saudi Arabian exports in 1992, in 
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percentage tenns. Table 19 shows the main Saudi Arabian imports in ] 992. The 
U.S. is clearly the most important trading partner for both Saudi Arabian exports 
and imports. Table 20 shows U.s. trade with the Near East and North African 
countries in 1992, 1993 and 1994. Saudi Arabia dominated the U.S. export market 
and at the same time dominated the U.S. import market. 
Table 17 
Trade of Saudi Arabia with major trading partners 
($000; monthly average). 
USA Japan France Italy CK 
Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Sep Jan-Sep Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 
Import. 1991 1992 1992 1993 1991 1992 1991 1992 1992 
Crude 1.005,944 940,476 828,057 778,252 269,191 233.140 193.567 174.088 141.783 
Petroleum 
Jan-Dec 
1993 
159,525 
USA Japan UK GER ITALY 
Expon.fob Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 
IDcI 1991 1992 1991 1992 1992 1993 1991 
pod • 
• hipping to 
foreign oil 
oompanie. 
536,778 585,305 324,430 404,167 289,511 228,573 190.834 
Source: Saudi Arabia. Country Report. The Economist Intelligence Unit, 1st quarter 1994, p.23. 
Table 18 
Main destinations of export 1992, % of total 
USA 
Japan 
South Korea 
France 
Singapore 
Netherlands 
Source: As table 17 
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20.2 
18.4 
5.3 
5.0 
4.7 
4.2 
Jan-Dec Jan-Dec Jan-Dec 
1992 1991 1992 
226,030 141,386 166,905 
Table 19 
Main origins of imports 1992, per cent of total 
liSA 
Japan 
ex 
Germany 
Italy 
France 
Source: as table 17 
20.9 
14.2 
to.6 
8.1 
5.9 
5.3 
More than 70,000 Americans live and work in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 
"They are the biggest civilian community in the Kingdom", the Saudi Deputy 
Minister of Commerce, Dr Abdul Rahman AI-Zamil, said in an interview. 9 Dr 
AI-Zamil has been described by Richard H. Curtis, a retired U.S. Foreign Service 
Officer and at present the executive editor of the Washington Report on Middle 
East Affairs, as "The man who introduces Saudi Arabia and Arabs to 
Americans". 10 
Dr AI-Zami! stated that the strong commercial connection between the United 
States and Saudi Arabia go back for many years when King Faisal sent thousands 
of Saudis to the United States in 1962, to study and train. When the Saudi human 
resources returned from the United States, they became an active part in the U.S. -
Saudi economic and commercial relations. Thus, the Americans had the 
opportunity to build the bridge to Saudi Arabia and formulate the commercial and 
industrial policies of Saudi Arabia. 
"Why is the United States the fIrst country to have permanent joint ventures with 
Saudi Arabia", Dr. AI-Zamil asked himself. The answer is because the Saudis 
generally like doing business with Americans, who have obtained a reputation in 
Saudi Arabia as straightforwar<l dependable people who would deliver what they 
promised to their clients. 
Dr AI-Zami! continued by saying that there is another perceptual factor which 
strengthens U.S. - Saudi commercial relations. Saudis are convinced that U.S. 
businessmen would deliver the merchandise more speedily than the businessmen 
of Europe and the Japanese, because European and Japanese governments were 
often involved in the their negotiations. However, I believe that the strong 
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commercial relations between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia had a strong basis in the 
earliest stages of their relationship. The Americans assisted the development of the 
Kingdom by supplying the transportation infrastructure, the hospitals, the 
education institutions and the communication and water networks. This allowed 
the Saudis to test American material and skills. The Saudis became confident of 
American technology and skills and &> continued to import it. 
Table 20 
U.S. trade with Near EastJNorth African countries 
1992, 1993, January-June 1993, 1994 
(In millions of dollars) 
U.S. ~neral Exports 
1992 1993 
Total Area 21.339.9 21.346.3 
% oClJ.S. Total 4.8 4.6 
Arab Countries 
Near East 12,028.6 11.814.4 
Bahrain 488.7 653.1 
Iraq .5 .4 
Jordan 249.9 362.7 
Kuwait 1,326.9 1,009.0 
Lebanon 310.8 376.5 
Oman 257.4 265.3 
Qatar 189.1 166.3 
Saudi Arabia 7,163.3 6,665.6 
Syria 168.3 185.8 
UAE 1,552.4 1,811.4 
Yemen 321.2 318.3 
Gaza * * 
West Bank .2 * 
Arab CoWJ,tritl§ ~ ~,~95.0 
NorthAfri~ 
Algeria 676.6 898.0 
Morocro 493.2 602.1 
Libya .. .. 
Tunisia 232.5 232.3 
Egypt 3,087.3 2,762.6 
Non'Arab ~ 5,036.9 
Countries 
Near East 
Iran 747.5 616.2 
Israel 4.074.2 4,420.2 
Induding Special Category Commodities 
Exports. C.a.s.; Imports· c.i.f. 
N/A • Not available; * . less than $100,000 
IT.S. 
General 
lmnorts 
Jan-June Jan-June 
1993 1994 1992 
11,032.9 10,115.1 19,270.4 
4.8 4.1 3.4 
5,981.6 5,142.8 12,961.3 
330.2 310.2 71.2 
.7 .8 .. 
196.0 137.7 18.6 
514.0 498.5 310.0 
182.9 201.1 28.5 
105.4 134.4 207.3 
80.6 77.8 76.0 
3,444.1 2,859.9 11,285.7 
105.4 97.6 45.0 
827.3 748.6 871.9 
195.0 66.7 46.3 
* 1.2 * 
* * * 
2,399.6 2.437.7 2,405.6 
452.6 631.2 1,693.8 
371.4 243.2 194.8 
.. .. .. 
154.4 155.0 51.4 
1,421.2 1,408.3 465.6 
2,651.7 2,534.6 3,903.5 
413.3 127.7 .8 
2,238.4 2,408.9 3.902.7 
1993 
19.145.6 
3.2 
11.999.2 
1094 
.. 
20.1 
2,003.4 
27.9 
305.0 
72.3 
8,431.5 
144.7 
774.5 
110.4 
* 
* 
2,619.1 
1,710.8 
201.1 
.. 
43.4 
663.8 
4,527.3 
.2 
4,527.1 
Source: U.S. Department ofCommeroe. Compiled by: Offioeofthe Near East. August 22,1994. 
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Jan.June Jan.June 
1993 1994 
9,896.6 8,855.3 
3.4 2.8 
6.541.9 4.986.8 
51.9 70.0 
.. . . 
7.4 14.8 
730.2 822.4 
14.0 12.7 
91.9 173.5 
36.3 44.3 
5,047.2 3,504.9 
64.0 48.4 
441.8 231.1 
57.2 64.0 
* * 
* * 
1.184.9 UQ:4.,,2 
849.8 875.3 
95.1 98.9 
.. .. 
25.7 32.1 
214.3 297.9 
2,140.8 ~ 
.1 .5 
2.140.7 2.563.8 
Therefore, Saudi Arabia plays an important role as a major U.S. trading partner 
and market for U.S. goods and services. The U.s. Department of Commerce 
confirmed that at any given time throughout the 1980s, more than a million 
Americans owed their jobs directly to the long-standing Saudi preference for 
American technology, military hardware, and commercial exports. The U.s. 
Department of Commerce confinned that in 1991 every one billion-dollars Saudi 
Arabia spent on American goods created 40,000 more jobs for Americans. 11 
Excluding the number of dollars Saudi Arabia spent on American goods, acoording 
to the American Businessmen Group of Riyadh, studies indicated that on the 
average, one American employee in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia generates more 
than thirteen additional jobs in the United States. 12 
The position of oil in U.S. - Saudi relations 
It has long been a standard declaration of the U.S. government to say that one of 
its main policy interests in the Gulf is to "secure access to oil at rea~nable 
prices". 13 American motorists are paying less for gasoline now than they have at 
any time since World War 1I.14 However, oil remains, as was demonstrated in the 
Gulf crisis of 1990-1991, an essential element in national power, a main factor in 
the world economy, a critical focus for war and conflict, and a decisive force in 
international affairs. 15 
U.S. oil imports are at the highest level ever, and are still growing rapidly.ls In 
1994, the U.S. started to import more than half of the oil it consumes. 17 The U.S. 
produced 6.6 million bpd and imported 8.9 million bpd. 1B The total oil reserves of 
the U.S. (34.1 billion barrels) will be exhausted by the year 2000. 19 It is estimated 
that 97 per cent of the world's oil is found outside the United States.~ The Gee 
states areount for 46.3 per cent of the proven world oil reserves; add Iran and Iraq, 
and the Gulf has 65.6 per cent of the world's oil reserves. 21 Together the Gulf 
states have proven oil reserves of 655.5 billion barrels out of the global total of 
1,012 billion barrels.zz At least 60 per cent of the world's oil comes from the eight 
Gulf states.28 The Gee states areount for 464.54 billion barrels, which priced at 
$20 a barrel is worth $9,290.8 billion.24 Saudi Arabia itself possesses proven oil 
reserves 261.2 billion barrels, about 56.2 per cent of the Gee proven oil reserves, 
32.8 per cent ofOPEe and about 25.6 per cent of the world's proven oil reserves.26 
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Saudi Arabia produced 8.4 million pbd 14.1 per cent of the world total, and is the 
largest producer of oil in the world.26 It has 61 oil and gas fields, only 23 of which 
have ever been drilled; one field alone contains more oil than the U.S., Canada and 
Europe combined.27 One third of U.S. oil imports come from the Gulf.28 
Thus, U.S. dependence on Gulf oil would certainly rise to a very significant level in 
the future.29 As long as U.S. involvement in the Gulf assists the deterrence of 
short-term disruptions of oil, continued involvement in the Gulf remains in the best 
interest of America.30 Short-term disruption in Gulf oil production could have a 
destructive effect on the U.S. economy and also the world economy. 31 In 
1972-1973, during the oil crisis, the U.S. economy had shrunk by more than 5 per 
cent a year. It was driven into a recession from which it did not recover until 
1976.32 Inflation jumped to the 9 per cent range. 33 Western industrial countries 
as a group suffered about 2 to 3 per cent loss in economic output in 1974 because of 
the Arab oil embargo against the U.S. and Netherlands.34 
The U.S. benefits from its continued American control of "petro dollars".36 Many of 
the assets of the GCC states and their citizens are invested in Wall Street and U.S. 
Treasury bills.36 "Recycling" these vast sums into U.S. dollars has been a major 
source of profits for American banks. 37 A meeting in Washington in April 1993, of 
the American-Gulf Chamber of Commerce, reported that direct Gulf investment in 
the V.S. totalled $407 billion as of the beginning of 1992.38 This in turn, permitted 
the V.S. government to run large external deficits in financing the defence of its 
empire.39 In the early 1990s, the combined annual GNP of the GCC states 
exceeded $130 billion, of which the U.S. annually gained the single largest share in 
terms of the sales of goods and services to GCC countries.4O U.S. trade with the 
Gee countries has frequently yielded a surplus in favour of the United States.41 
In the mid 1990s, the U.S. exported $25 billion (excluding arms deals) per year in 
goods and imported about $13 billion.42 These exports support more than 650,000 
U.S. jobs and are the main source of livelihood for nearly 2.4 million Americans.43 
More than 700 V.S. branch companies operate in the GeC states and employ 
16,000 Americans who are the direct means of support for more than 50,000 
American dependants in the Gee region.44 
Furthermore, the U.S. enjoys significant financial benefits from its involvement in 
the Gulf region.45 What would be immediately damaging to the U.S. economy 
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would be any effort to denominate the world prire of oil in anything but dollars.46 
As the world oil price is now set in dollars, the U.s. is protected from the effects of 
currency fluctuations on its energy imports47 . When the dollar fell in relation to 
other major currencies, in the mid 1970s, there were many complaints from the 
Gulf region and suggestions that the prire of oil be changed from the dollar to a 
basket of currencies.48 However, the Iranian Revolution stopped such complaints 
by underlining the dependence of the GCC states on the United States for 
security.49 The decline of the dollar since the Kuwait crisis has not caused the 
same complaints to be repeated.5O This continued dependenre of the GCC states 
on the U.S. for security after the Gulf war, has enabled the U.S. to ensure the flow 
of Gulf oil to the market at a "rea~nable price". 51 
Another aim of American strategy in the Gulf was to keep the Soviet Union out of 
the Gulf and to destroy the Soviet Union's military power through an oil prire war. 
In the mid 198Os, the Soviets generated about $25 billion a year from their exports 
of oil, natural gas and gold. 52 This represented about 90 per rent of their income 
from exports (Oil: 70 per cent; natural gas and gold: 20 per cent).53 Thus, low oil 
prices threatened the Soviet military machine while high oil prices could pay for 
expansion, oil being a major source of foreign exchange for the Soviets.54 On the 
other hand low oil prices, reduced inflation and stimulated the American 
economy.56 In the mid 1980s, the price of oil fell by $3 a barrel, and the inflation 
rate in the U.S. dropped by 1 per cent.56 If the oil producers sold barrels of oil at 
1978 prices ($15), it has been calculated that, real interest rates would drop to 3 
per cent, inflation would be removed, employment would rise and the standard of 
living of average-income Americans would be driven upwards. 57 
The decline of Soviet military power was the only way to redure the increase in 
American military spending.58 A defence analyst, Earl Revenal, has estimated 
that the U.S. commitments to the defence of Europe alone is nearly equal to the 
federal deficit. 59 The fastest way to reduce the federal deficit and end the largest 
single long-term danger to the American economy is to break OPEC and reduce oil 
prices.60 As George McFadden said "if you were secretary of defence the best place 
to spend your time would not be on weapons procurement but on breaking the 
price of oil".61 Since Saudi Arabia dominates OPEC, he observed that the Western 
economies would find it advantageous to see Saudi Arabia blow Up.62 In his view 
the U.S. would not get much of an advantage through weapons procurement, the 
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critical factor is in the price of oil. Bring oil prices down and the U.S. economy 
takes off. When the oil prices go down more oil is produced. The glut of oil would 
keep the price of oil down. 
After the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia fulfilled its obligation to the U.S., its protector, to 
maintain the flow of Gulf oil to the market at a "reasonable price". By mid 1991, 
oil was $16.5 a barrel; a price lower than in 1974.63 In January 1992, Hen~n 
Moore, U.S. Deputy Secretary of Energy, said that the U.S. appreciated the Saudi 
position to "resist calls to raise prices".64 Higher oil prices add about $3 billion to 
the U.S. trade deficit for each dollar a barrel price increase.65 
As a matter of fact, the reduction of the American consumption of imported oil, 
using taxes to reduce oil prices, has been a determined aim since the oil crisis of 
1973-1974.66 In the second half of the 1970s, the traditional U.s. response to 
higher oil import dependence was a plan to increase domestic oil production and 
decrease oil consumption. This could save the U.s., Western Europe and Japan 
about 6.5 million barrels of oil each day.67 In a Congressional report in December 
1977, the U.S. Senate Committee on Energy and National Resources, asserted 
that: 
The action that the U.S. takes domestically to reduce its dependence on oil imports 
will be an essential factor in determining access to those supplies which remain 
crucial; with reduced U.S. oil-import demand, the oil supply/demand situation 
would less clearly favour the oil producers (in the absence of an OPEC production 
programming scheme) and the question of access to oil for Western Europe and 
Japan might be considerably eased with a reduction in U.S. import demand freeing 
quantities of oil for sale elsewhere. Access to those supplies still needed may be 
easier to the extent that the need for access is reduced by U.S. domestic energy 
efforts. 68 
For the Americans, the alliance system could not remam untouched by the 
economic and political consequences of the oil supply disruption. Oil shortages or 
price rises that resulted in a shortage of oil in Western Europe and Japan were 
unaoceptable.69 U.S. aocess to oil includes an adequacy and continuous of supply of 
oil "at reasonable prices" not just for the U.S. but for Western Europe and Japan 
whose future will affect the United States. 70 
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During the 1980s, because of both falling oil prices and falling production, Saudi 
revenues fell sharply from $102.2 billion in 1980 to $28.5 billion in 1986.71 Even 
though, it became evident in 1986, that the U.S. oil import dependenre would 
increase, the oil security policy relied almost entirely on the strategic petroleum 
reserve, 650 million barrels.72 In addition, the U.S. has several strategies on oil 
security policy which are under discussion.73 For instanre, the U.S. Department of 
Energy is studying the possibility of building up the SPR more quickly by leasing 
oil from export countries and negotiations took plare with Saudi Arabia, Kuwait 
and other countries in the early 1990s.74 The U.S. and European Union are 
playing a role in controlling the demand for oil in the 1990s.75 Governments have 
imposed defensive tax increases to keep down oil demand growth. 76 
The Americans proposed an energy tax in 1993. (Each cent per gallon of tax 
imposed would raise $1 billion per year in U.S. tax revenues).71 The Gulf Oil 
Ministers, complained that it was directed entirely at oil importS.78 Ali Ahmed 
Baghli, the Oil Minister of Kuwait said "Saudi Arabia and us, we were the ca~~ of 
putting prices down. Iran and Libya and those revolutionary countries, they were 
asking for higher prices. And now, instead of saying thank you, you are treating us 
this way, it is not fair".79 Taxes would reduce global demand and sharply cut the 
revenues of the oil-producing countries.so While the Gee states have not yet 
responded harshly to the proposed elinton energy tax, the Kuwaiti Oil Minister 
has noted that they could in the worst case increase the cost of oil and reduce their 
development programmes.81 They could also reduce their contributions to social 
welfare programmes throughout the Gulf, potentially adding to instability in the 
Gulf region.82 
Many in the Gee states are afraid that the proposed energy tax foreshadows 
policies that may erode the reserves of friendship won by the coalition during the 
liberation of Kuwait.83 Saudi Arabia is still hard pressed for cash to speed up its 
payments for war debts and economic development.S4 In fact, it has been reported 
in 1994, that a higher oil prices of $1 a barrel would add $2.3 billion to the Saudi 
annual oil revenue.85 The Saudi Foreign Minister, Saud AI-Faisal, criticised the 
energy tax in his speech in the General Assembly of the U.N. on October 5, 1994.86 
He stated Saudi concerns about the oil tax, which and how it effected its main 
export.87 He said that although Europe and the U.S. imposed more tax on oil, 
there were continuing government subsidies for other energy sources which 
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contained much higher levels of carbon, such as coals.88 The Saudi government 
believed that the tax proposed did not arise out of concern for the environment and 
violated the principles of international trade which is based on the law of supply 
and demand. 89 
The European Union, on the other hand has imposed the highest energy tax in the 
world "carbon tax".oo European countries gain from the tax on oil more than $90 a 
barrel, while the oil producers sell each barrel of oil for $15 (1995).91 European 
treaties gain six times the revenue from a barrel of oil than the oil producers 
themselves.92 In addition, the European Union's trade with the GCC countries has 
frequently yielded a surplus in favour of the E.U. This surplus amounted to $9.4 
billion in 1995.93 
The U.S. has imposed tax on oil because it is cheap. If the oil prices were raised, 
the U.S. government would not increase the tax. The U.S. administration often 
states its need to get oil from the Gulf "at a reasonable price", but none of the 
administrations dermed the phrase "reasonable price". Logically, at a "reasonable 
price" would mean the consumer price i.e. after the government had imposed its 
tax. Governments used to subsidise coal to make its price "reasonable" and 
available for anyone. How would the U.S. and the European Union react if Saudi 
Arabia decided to share their concern about protecting the environment from 
carbon by increasing the price of oil and by reducing its oil productions? 
Although, Saudi Arabia will not resist higher oil prices,94 Saudi Arabia would 
probably be anxious to accommodate the U.S. and other major consumers in trying 
to moderate oil prices, run up by the Gulf war.96 In March 1994, Iran and others 
in the 12-nation OPEC had wanted 1 million barrels per day taken off the oil 
market to raise oil prices and support their debt-laden economies.96 Former Saudi 
Oil Minister, Hisham Nazer, said that other members were welcome to cut 
production, but that Saudi Arabia would not do 80.97 OPEC delegates commented 
that without the co-operation of Saudi Arabia, the world's biggest oil producer, a 
supply cut would be inetTective.98 This perspective alarmed the U.S. in particular 
and the U.S. insisted that Saudi Arabia adopt a low oil price.99 The Saudis believe 
that regional security is threatened when the gap between the demand and the 
supply of oil shrinks. This makes the market more sensitive to conflict and 
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accidents which effect Saudi security as a whole. 1°O For Saudi security, it is best to 
keep the production of oil higher than the demand to maintain a moderate price. 
However, in the long term, a young and more self-assured Saudi leadership is not 
likely to be quite ~ responsive to the desire of the U.s. in its oil policies. lOl In 
addition, the Saudis put many hopes about the new world market which is going 
be located in Asia, especially China and Japan. loo According to some reports, in 
the next century China and Japan will depend more on Gulf oil, which allow the 
Saudis to state that where there is the foreign investments good foreign relations 
would follow. 103 In spite of that, Saudi experts predict that they will maintain good 
relations with the U.S., but it would not be as special as relations at present. 104 
Thus, the oil market realities in the early part of the next century would be 
important in determining Saudi political policies as well as its relations with the 
United States.106 
At present, it appears there is a balance in the oil relationship between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia. Access to the world's biggest reserves and supplies are 
important to the U.S.; access to the world's biggest oil-consuming market is 
important to Saudi Arabia. lOO The U.S. policy can successfully safeguard American 
interests in the region, and supply oil at "reasonable prices". (An increase in the 
price of oil is unlikely in the next few years).107 The suggestion made in the mid 
1970s by former Oil Minister, Ahmed Zaki Yam ani, has come to completion: the 
U.S. guarantees Saudi security in return for cheap Oil. 108 Furthermore, for the 
U.S. the politics of the Gulf remain tied to the politics of the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The mix of oil and the Arab-Israeli conflict could blow up in America's face as it did 
in 1973.109 To the extent, that U.S. involvement in the Gulf prevents this linkage, 
such involvement serves American interests. 110 
U.S.-Saudi political relations 
When Iraq invaded Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the Persian Gulf once again became 
the centre point of American Middle Eastern policy and enhanced the relationship 
between the United States and Saudi Arabia. 
The U.S. announced its willingness to protect its interests in the region. Therefore 
President Bush sent his Secretary of Defense, Richard Cheney, to Saudi Arabia on 
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August 5, to convince King Fahd that his Kingdom was at risk and that the United 
States was committed to protecting Saudi Arabia. lll Saudi Arabia agreed to apply 
to the U.S. for protection on August 7. 11 '2 Washington immediately sent aircraft 
and additional naval forces to Saudi Arabia and to the Persian Gulf.113 (See 
Chapter 3) 
The United Nations Security Council adopted Resolution 660 condemning 
Baghdad's aggression and demanded an immediate and unconditional Iraqi 
withdrawal from Kuwait's territory. 114 The Soviet Union co-operated with the 
United States throughout the crisis to great effect. Several European countries 
provided international cover for American operations and were led by the United 
Kingdom and France. 115 
For domestic rea~ns (see chapter 5), King Fahd wanted to have not only U.S. 
troops on Saudi ~il but also support from other Arab countries to defend Saudi 
Arabia against Iraqi aggression. An Arab League emergency summit meeting was 
called on August 10, in Egypt. 116 12 out of the 20 members present voted to 
condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. 117 
President Bush strongly condemned the Iraqi invasion and called for Iraq's 
immediate and unconditional withdrawal. 118 With the Iraqi troops moving toward 
the Saudi border, Bush warned Iraq not to invade Saudi Arabia. President Bush 
stated that "The ~vereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of vital interest to the 
United States. This decision, which I shared with the congressional leadership, 
grows out of the long standing friendship and security relationship between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia". 119 The Bush administration was clearly the 
leading actor in this rush of events. 
The Gulf crisis also allowed huge American arms sales to Saudi Arabia. Bush used 
his emergency authority to put through a $2.3 billion sale of 24 F -15 CID air 
superiority fighters, 200 Stinger missiles, 50 Stinger launchers, 150m-6-A-3 main 
battle tanks and 15,000 rounds of depleted uranium anti-armour shells. I:;,) The 
administration made clear its intention to inform Congress about an 
unprecedented $23 billion sale to Saudi Arabia.121 The United States planned that 
the security arrangements for the region would depend on the significant 
expansion of the military abilities of Saudi Arabia and other GCC stateS. I22 
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Under-Secretary of State for International Security Affairs, Reginald 
Bartholomew. explained that the administration's reasoning was as follows: "We 
seek through this sale to help build an increased capability to deter and defend 
against potential aggressors in the area, to buy more time in the event of 
deterrence failure, for mobilisation of support from friendly governments, to 
enhance inter-operability that will allow the U.S. and other friendly forres to 
reinforre the Saudis". 128 
On September 2, 1990, King Fahd received a U.S. delegation. l24 He mentioned the 
Kingdom's "Strong warm and long relationship with the United States, and that 
this closeness had never been a secret". 126 Moreover, he wished that there would be 
enough oil available on the world markets at regular prices, and that. therefore, no 
countries were hurt as a result of Iraqi aggression. 1~ The British Energy 
Secretary, John Wakeham, hailed the role of Saudi Arabia as being an excellent 
way by which Saudi Arabia has shown its great capabilities. 127 He noted that this 
action had saved the world from an economic crisis. 128 
On November 1, 1990, King Fahd met, in Jeddah, with U.S. President George 
Bush. l29 Both leaders agreed to double American troops in Saudi Arabia in 
aocordance with General Norman Schwarzkopfs recommendations. They 
confirmed that the friendly forces would immediately withdraw when the crisis 
was over or when the government of Saudi Arabia asked them to. l30 
Washington had built up a strong force in Saudi Arabia. By November, U.S. 
ground and air force units were spread to the threatened areas of Saudi Arabia. 
The forces included more than 430,000 army personnel and marines and more 
than 1,500 combat aircraft. 131 A central command forward headquarters was also 
established in Saudi Arabia 132 
The economic noose around Iraq was further tightened when the Security Council 
passed another resolution, ordering universal economic sanctions. On November 
29, 1990, the United Nations Security Council passed resolution 678, giving Iraq 
until January 15, 1991, to comply with resolution 600 and withdraw from Kuwait 
and authorised the use of force to dislodge Iraq from Kuwait. 133 
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The deadline, January 15, came and went. Saddam continued to strengthen his 
defenres in Kuwait. On Thursday, January 17, 1991, 26 hours after the expiry of 
the U.N. deadline, the sirens of Iraq went off as the coalition aircraft launched an 
attack on Iraq.l34 
On Sunday, February 24, the day the ground war began. l36 Within less than 
forty-eight hours of fighting, the backbone of the Iraqi army had been broken. l36 
On February 26, Iraq announred a speedy withdrawal from Kuwait. 137 
The scale of the United States military deployment in the Kingdom of Saudi 
Arabia - half of all U.S. combat forres world-wide - was a shock even to the 
American people. l38 But the principle of U.S. military support for Saudi Arabia 
should come as no surprise. President Franklin D. Roosevelt declared in 1943, 
"The defence of Saudi Arabia is vital to the defence of the United States". 139 
Similarly, President Bush's address on August 8, 1990, recounting the historical 
ties between the two countries said "My administration, as has been the case with 
every president from President Roosevelt to President Reagan, is committed to the 
security and stability of the Persian Gulf. The sovereign independence of Saudi 
Arabia is of vital interest to the United States. This decision, which I shared with 
the Congress and leadership, grows out of the long standing friendship and the 
security relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia". 140 All the 
subsequent presidential doctrines of intervention have had the Persian Gulf and its 
oil at the centre of their sights. 
Deployment of upwards of the 525,000 American military personnel to Saudi 
Arabia was possible because the Soviet threat and the need for a large U.S. troop 
presence in Europe had evaporated. 141 The Bush administration intervened 
militarily in order to offset Iraq's capability to control the Gulf politically following 
the successful and unchallenged conquest of Kuwait. 142 
When the war ended, the United States would act as "peaoomaker" when President 
Bush announced on February 27, 1991, that Secretary of State, James Baker 
would be touring the Middle East and the Soviet Union in March, for consultation 
on the future of the region. 143 The United States analysts argued that a 
settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict was possible. They noted that the Gulf war 
had hardened the settlement of the Arab- Israeli dispute. 144 This initiative came 
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when the PLO itself was pilloried in the Gulf states for supporting Iraq during the 
Gulf war. On October 29, 1990, the New York Times reported that Saudi leaders 
had had "second thoughts" about their rather confrontational attitude towards the 
PLO leaders. Saudi Arabia confirmed the Kingdom's continued support to the 
Palestinian people in their legitimate struggle to achieve their just demands for 
return of their homeland and the establishment of an independent state. 
On May 6, 1991, the Saudi's Council of Ministers renewed its support and 
continuous backing of all the efforts leading to the resolution of the Palestinian 
question which was the major issue at all international levels. 145 The council 
expressed the Saudi government's welcome for the initiative taken by the United 
States, shouldered by U.S. Secretary of State and directed and followed up by 
President George Bush. 146 King Fahd repeatedly expressed the firmness of the 
Kingdom's stand on the Palestinian cause as the basic and vital cause of Islamic 
and Arab nations. (See Chapter 6) 
Economic and political prospects 
The Gulf crisis made the American-Saudi relations stronger than ever before. 
Saudi forces worked closely with the U.S. during the Gulf war and this was a 
unique moment in the history of the two countries. The Gulf crisis has bound the 
two countries together at the very highest levels. The acquisition of U.S. arms and 
the co-ordination of joint logistical planning made the Saudi's base their defence 
policy on a guaranteed U.S. intervention if necessary.147 The planning of this 
policy was effective in creating a joint U.S.-Saudi military command during the 
Gulf war. Saudi Arabia sought to develop its relationship with the U.S. because of 
its leading position in providing advanced military know how and technology. 148 In 
exchange, the Saudis would guarantee a stable supply of Saudi oil to the 
industrialised world. 149 The U.S. commitment to Saudi security was first tested 
during the Gulf crisis. 150 Despite the difference over methods and policy objectives 
and despite tensions over oil and Camp David Accords, the U.S. - Saudi alliance 
continued to remain a special case for co-operation. 151 
Since the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the U.S. has increased 
its military and political superiority in the Gulf. The U.S. is speeding up the 
progress towards a regional security system. The overall goal is to secure a 
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permanent security structure for all the GCC states, particularly the central 
regional actor Saudi Arabia. Thus, the U.S., would gain an unchallenged military 
position as well as considerable political control in the region. (See Chapter 7). 
Since the Gulf war ended, the relationship between the U.s. and Saudi Arabia 
has been more harmonious than ever before. This is due mainly to the Saudi's 
aloofness from the PW. The Saudis support for the PW leadership has cooled 
since the PW supported Saddam Hussein during the invasion and occupation of 
Kuwait. Added to that now that the PW have signed a peace agreement with 
Israel (in September 1993), the Pill is now able to address its problems with Israel 
directly. This has lessened the need for Saudi Arabia to become involved in 
Palestinian issues. This new situation has removed the major point of contention 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia. (See chapter 6). 
The Arab-Israeli problem does obstruct co-operation between them, but the Gulf 
crisis has narrowed their differences about the Arab-Israeli problem. In February 
and March 1991, senior Saudi spokesmen informed American officials of their 
willingness to move in the direction of normalised relations with Israel, as long as a 
settlement acceptable to the Palestinians was attained. l62 The issue which has 
affected the relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia the most is the 
Arab-Israeli conflict. So, after the Gulf war of 1991, their relationships associated 
with increased bilateral interdependence contributing to increased co-operation. 
Nevertheless, the co-operation between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia during the Gulf 
crisis has tied Saudi Arabia politically to the U.S. in the period after the Gulf crisis. 
The U.S. used the political strength that derived from its military success in the 
Gulf war to influence Saudi Arabia on the economic issue. Saudi Arabia has made 
a commitment to buy new civilian aeroplanes and military hardware from the 
U.S .. This was pushed for by President Clinton in spite of Saudi Arabia's 
announcements of budget cuts due to the cost of paying for the Gulf war. In 
addition, the U.S. has increased the tax on oil which has forced oil prices and 
production to decrease. Saudi Arabia will have to use its important position in 
OPEC to restrain oil prioo increases to support the U.S. because the U.S. 
guarantees Saudi security. 
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The U.S. used its forces to gain political influence. The U.s. has the military 
capability to keep Iraq's threats in check after the Gulf war. The U.8.'s ability to 
deter Iraq serves as an indirect protective role, which it can use in bargaining on 
other issues with Saudi Arabia. This bargaining tool is important for the U.S., 
whose ally, Saudi Arabia, is concerned about potential Iraqi threats. Thus the U.S. 
has the advantage of Saudi Arabia's desire for protection which it can link to the 
issue of economics. Saudi Arabia has long attempted to use its oil wealth as a 
foreign policy tool to buy off threats to its security when victory could not be 
determined by military means. The Saudis recognise this reality. That is why the 
Saudi government welcomed the arrival of half a million American troops onto 
Saudi soil after August 2, 1990. Political researchers believe that international 
hostilities can be reduced by involving hostile nations in interactions that benefit 
them. 163 
To conclude; the political analysis of international interdependence can be made by 
thinking of asymmetrical interdependencies as a sourre of power among 
countries. 154 Different types of interdependence lead to potential political 
influence. l50 A less dependent actor in a relationship often has a significant 
political resource. l66 Asymmetries in dependence provides sources of influence for 
actors in their dealings with one another. 157 Less dependent actors can often use 
their interdependent relationship as a source of power in bargaining over an issue 
to effect other issues. 168 
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Conclusion 
Since World War II Saudi Arabia has been an important ally of the U.S. in the Gulf 
region. However, U.S. policy is motivated by a consideration of Israel. l Of all the U.S. 
alliances in the Middle East, none is important as that between the U.S. and Israe1.2 The 
alliance with Saudi Arabia is a "special relationship" but secondary to that with Israel, 
which stands at the top of the U.S. alliance structure in the Middle East. 3 The U.S. gave 
Israel economic aid during the Gulf crisis, and in the Saudi case, the U.S. gave it military 
protection which the Saudis paid for under the Operation Desert Shield. 4 The Secretary 
of State, Warren Christopher, asserted to the Israelis in 1994, 
I want to make clear to you in unmistakable terms that the U.S. will continue to stand 
with Israel. For more than four decades the U.s. has stood by Israel It reflects our ideals 
and reinforces our interests. This country believes in you. We believe in the idea of Israel, 
and we have an unshakeable commitment to your security and well being. 5 
The Saudi media believe that Israeli and U.S. interests will, in future, oppose Saudi 
interests. For instance, AI Riyadh newspaper stated on May 24, 1995, that the Israeli 
attitude displayed the difficulty of achieving a stable peace with Israel. 6 It continued by 
saying that the problem was not just a problem of land - but that Israel's source of power 
(with U.S. support) could dominate the region.7 The U.S. gives the Saudis what it wants, 
denies them what it does not want them to have, exploits them in times of trouble and 
bargains with them during times of disaster.8 A world with only one superpower could 
present a threat to Saudi interests in the region, particularly if the U.S. were to continue 
to support Israel's interests to dominate the region.9 For example, many Arabs are 
uneasy about watching the further punishment of Iraqi people in the name of the U.N., 
while Israel's latest bombing raids of the areas surrounding Beirut (in April 1996) killed 
more than 160 per&>ns and has not been punished.10 
Because of regional instability, the Saudis follow a very cautious foreign policy.ll Saudi 
Arabia has tried to maintain its links with its Arab wartime allies, without permitting 
that link to become a real military alliance. 12 Saudi Arabia and other GCC states, who 
together had spent billions of dollars supporting such pan-Arab causes as the recovery of 
Israeli occupied Palestinian lands and had put its own security at risk during the oil 
embargo of 1973 and during Saddam's war against Iran. I3 Maybe even more shocking to 
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Saudi Arabia was the stand initially taken by some Arab governmentB in support of the 
Iraqis. 14 The Saudis blamed these Arab governments and their people because they 
supported Saddam Hussein freely while Iraqi people were forced to follow Saddam's 
orders. For the Saudis before the Kuwaiti crisis, it was an Arab national obligation to 
support Arabs. After the crisis, the Saudis and other Gee states drew their own 
conclusions about the meaning of Arabianism. 16 This appears to suggest that Arab world 
will never be the same after the Gulf war. 16 This crisis has shaken Saudi Arabia, which 
led a senior Saudi official to say "We do not give a damn anymore about Arab unity, which 
never existed anyway. You are going to see us defend ourselves". 17 
The Gulf war led Saudi Arabia to the re-evaluation of itB previous policy, especially in the 
security context. 18 Since the Gulf war, Saudi Arabia has decided to double itB armed 
forces to 200,000 troops over the next five to seven years. 19 It could not aspire to match 
the far higher military power of its larger neighbours.20 The Saudi population in 1992 
was about 10 million of which 60 per cent of Saudis were under 21.21 The Saudi armed 
forces including the National Guard totalled 111,500.22 Iraq, with less than double the 
Saudi population, had a military force at least eight times as large as Saudi Arabia in 
1990.23 Syria, with a population only two million greater than Saudi Arabia had armed 
forces of more than 400,000 in 1991.24 Jordan, with less than half of the Saudi 
population, had armed forces of 101,000 in 1991.25 Israel, al~ with less than half of the 
Saudi population, had armed forces of 141,000 and a reserve force of over 500,000 in 
1991.~ Thus, Saudi Arabia had the human re~urces of power, but its military 
manpower, was well below the neighbours. In fact, during the Gulf crisis Saudi Arabia 
organised, for the first time in its history, military training for 170,000 Saudi volunteers.27 
The Saudi government argued that they must use superior technology ~phisticated 
military equipment to compensate for limited manpower.28 However, what could the 
sophisticated weapons do for Saudi Arabia when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. 
326 
In U.S. Dollars 
250000 -
200000 
150000 
100000 
50000 
IRAN 
Chart 3 
Military expenditures per soldier 
IRAQ SAUDI ARABIA U.S. 
Source: Proposed sales and ypuades of major defence equipment to Saudi Arabia, House of Representative, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science and on 
Europe and the Middle East, June 19, 1990, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, 1991, p. 28. 
Chart 3 illustrates the military expenditures in Saudi Arabia per ~ldier in the 
1980s was $223,592.29 Iran with all of its significant acquisition of weapons and its war 
with Iraq was $5,974 per person, Iraq was $7,000; and in the U.S. it was $66,000.30 The 
other chart (No.4) explains the idea of a per capita expenditure for the total people in the 
country. In 1990 in Iran it was $113, in Iraq it was $730, and in Saudi Arabia it was 
$1,100. This compares to the U.S. expenditure of only $1,415.31 After the Gulf war, Saudi 
Arabia bought just from the U.S., sophisticated weapons worth more than $25 billion.32 
Can the Saudis absorb the major new weapons?33 In this case, military analysts pointed 
out that the Saudi armed foroos need better educated manpower to have professional 
armed foroos.34 If Saudi Arabia had a strong army, Saddam Hussein would not think of 
invading Kuwait, whether the U.S. sent wrong signals to Saddam Hussein to invade 
Kuwait or not. 
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After five years, the Gulf crisis is unfinished. The Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein has 
survived and the Iraqi armed force is still superior to Saudi Arabia's and the rest of Gee 
states in terms of the size of its military manpower.35 In spite of the impact of the Gulf 
war, the real problem is still to be faced.as This is when the impact of Iran's nuclear 
programme has reached the point where it becomes a significant threat to Israel and U.S. 
interests in the region.87 There is no way that the U.S. could repeat a major military 
operation in the Gulf region without access to some or all of Saudi Arabia's facilities. 38 
Maybe, the U.S. administration could ensure that the Saudis finanoo the biggest share of 
any future military operation by bullying Saudi Arabia into the future crisis, as they did 
during the Gulf war. By shouldering the biggest financial burden of the cost of the Gulf 
war, Saudi Arabia has made important moves to decrease the negative impact of the Iraqi 
invasion on the stability of the international economy.39 
Future U.S. policy will be based on asserting military and political power over economic 
power in the Gulf region.40 It is naive to think that U.S. forces will withdraw from the 
Gulf region in the near future. 41 The Gulf war can be seen by the U.S. as the achievement 
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of all its Cold War goals: the Soviet threat was ended, the Arab- Israeli peace process got 
underway and the flow of oil was secured in the medium term. 42 
The military intervention in the Gulf is a signal that the U.8. is not sure about its world 
role.43 Many analysts have argued that once the European Common Market becomes a 
unified currency zone, the U.8.'s competitive position within the global economy will be 
weakened. 44 Through a military presence in the Gulf, the U.S. would enjoy closer 
economic ties with Saudi Arabia and the rest of the Gee states, while strengthening its 
competitive position against Europe.45 In fact, the U.s. sought, in the Gulf war, to 
perform militarily what it could not perform economically.46 
Furthermore, the U.S. looks to Saudi Arabia to finance its interests in the Middle EastY 
The distribution of wealth in the region could shrink American fmancial assistance to 
some countries in the Middle East. On February 6, 1991, Secretary of State, James 
Baker, admitted before the House Foreign Affairs Committee the creation of an economic 
organisation through which the Gee states could fund the reconstruction and 
development of their poorer neighbours.48 Next day, Mr Baker recommended the creation 
of a multinational "Middle East Development Bank" to achieve these objectives which was 
founded in 1995.49 In spite of the Saudi financial situation after the Gulf war and the fact 
that Jordan had sided with Iraq during the Gulf war, the U.S. proposed that it would 
assist Jordan to restore its relations with Saudi Arabia and other Gee states and would 
insist that they provide Jordan with the 75,000 barrels of oil daily free of charge.50 All the 
U.S. pressure on Saudi Arabia to help Jordan financially was motivated by the peace 
agreement that Jordan signed with Israel. Shortly, on January 15, 1996, Saudi Arabia 
expressed its readiness to supply Jordan with all the oil it needs. 51 Thus. the U.S. 
military intervention in the Gulfbases U.S. policy on asserting its political power over the 
economic power of the Gee states. 
The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is mainly conditioned by concerns for 
oil.52 The U.S. has a direct and continuing interest in the petroleum resources of Saudi 
Arabia. 53 For the indefmite future, the U.S. and its allies simply can not do without 
adequate supplies of oil from Saudi Arabia.54 If Saudi oil exports were to be stopped, the 
effect on the world economy would be similar to the Great Depression of the 1930s.55 The 
U.S., therefore, will continue to look to Saudi Arabia to use their oil production at a 
rea~nable price and to help meet emergency shortfalls in supply. IX) Oil will be essential 
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until the world fmds an attractive alternative to it, and al~ finds substitutes for 
petrochemical products. 5 7 
On the other hand, one of the most striking economic realities in Saudi Arabia and the 
Gulf states is that oil prices and revenues have been lower than they were in 1974.58 At 
the same time Saudi Arabia's population doubles every 12-13 years.59 In another 12 
years ooping with this kind of change will be a problem for Saudi Arabia and for strategic 
partnership.60 It is an eoonomic reality that will be much more ~nduring than the 
temporary cash problems arriving from the Gulf war or depressed oil priooS.61 The Saudis' 
American friends make things no easier for their partnership.62 The Saudis perooive the 
important role played by the U.S. in improving Saudi security.53 But the Saudis do not 
believe that this is the U.S. contribution for which the Saudis should be expected to pay 
such a high prioo.64 Morally and politically, American analysts are urged to avoid creating 
more damage than neoossary to achieve their military objectives. This could have 
negative oonsequences in the long term relationship between Saudi Arabia and the United 
States.66 The ooming decade will show whether actions taken in the aftermath of the Gulf 
war have set in motion forces that oould upset the domestic stability of these oountries 
and threaten Saudi relations with the U.S. 
Saudi Arabia is not seen as a strong friend of the United States because of memories of 
the oil embargo, oil price increases and hostility towards Israel.66 There is no strong 
pro-Saudi lobby in the United States oompared to the Israeli lobby, and an administration 
that seeks to sell arms to Saudi Arabia will always have to defeat the ooncem of the 
friends of Israel in Congress.67 In fact, Israel appears to always have a strong say on the 
sale of arms to Saudi Arabia. 68 
Some will go so far as to point that all the problems in the region will clear onre the 
Palestinians have been given a state of their own.69 Indeed the American victory in the 
Gulf has not yet been won; only a permanent peace can be oonsidered true victory.70 As 
Michael Hudson, a Professor of Arab Studies at Georgetown University, said that a 
permanent ~lution will only occur if a peace agreement is reached or there is "such a bad 
eoonomic turndown that even the oil oountries could not afford jets and missiles" .71 Since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union, challenges and threatens U.S. interests in the region will 
be regional, rather than global. 72 Other threats to U.S. interests may include oonflicts 
between Israel and Arabs. Since the politics of the Gulf remain tied to the politics of the 
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Arab-Israeli conflict, the most evident and long standing concern has been the difficulty of 
continuing American support for Israel while maintaining and developing relations with 
the GCC states.73 
The translation of their relationship into a natural modus operandi involves manoeuvring 
and bargaining by each side to obtain the most advantageous terms. This is due to their 
diverse interests. Saudi Arabia has attempted to use its oil as a tool of foreign policy to 
press the U.S. about its policy toward Israel. The U.S. for its part, has supplied Saudi 
Arabia with the military assistance while seeking in return to affect Saudi Arabia's oil 
production and price decisions. This connection gave way to more complex relationship of 
interdependence, involving shared as well as divergent interests and, therefore, increased 
the potential for adversarial bargaining as well as agreement, antagonism as well as 
co-operation. Saudi Arabia's strategic, political and economic significance has increased 
with the growing dependence of the U.S. on imported oil.74 Despite the various changes in 
East-West relations, U.S. - Saudi relations has been characterised by a degree of 
continuity.76 The U.S. and the Saudis have shared interests and shared concerns in the 
follOwing areas: oil (flow and price), military security, economic and commercial ooncerns, 
and politics.76 Indeed, arms and oil compose the backbone of the U.S. - Saudi relations. 77 
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have both preserved a degree of ambivalence, toward their 
mutual relations almost from the very beginning of their relationship.78 Their increased 
bilateral interdependence generated increased co-operation but also differences. 79 Prior to 
the Desert Storm, there was increased bilateral co-operation as in 1974 Joint Eoonomic 
Commission; and there was increased bilateral conflict concerning oil, arms, the Israeli 
and Palestinian issues, and a suitable response to the Soviet Union's challenge in the Gulf 
region.so Motives are continuously being examined on both sides.81 Some analysts such as 
Keohane and Nye define world interdependence as "A state of being determined or 
significantly affected by external foroos", therefore, interdependence simply means mutual 
dependence.82 They argue that interdependence in world politics refers to "Situations 
characterised by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different 
countries". 83 
Linkages of the component sets of the U.S.-Saudi relations have always existed, e.g. oil, 
military security, economic and commercial concerns and politics.84 In times of differences 
these linkage have tended to become more explicit.86 For instance, the oil weapon was 
used by Saudi Arabia against the U.S. in 1973. This connected oil and politics.86 The 
331 
different positions taken by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is affected by the fact that the 
United States' is the world's largest oil consumer and Saudi Arabia is the world's largest 
exporter of oil.s7 
Shared oil and regional security interests have demanded continuity in U.S. - Saudi 
relations from the beginning.88 In the beginning, the U.S. government preserved a 
non-interventionist stance on oil policy, leaving its oil companies in Saudi Arabia to 
determine the oil price and the level of production.89 When control over price and the 
production rate transferred from the oil companies to 0 PEC members, Saudi Arabia 
started to direct oil operations as a matter of government policy.90 Since then, Saudi oil 
policy has reflected the Saudis' desire to see higher oil prices, but it has also reflected its 
interest in preserving market stability.91 It is not the Saudi economy which is based on 
oil, so much as the economy of the U.S. which is tightly connected to the price of oil.92 
Saudi Arabia, as a leading OPEC member has played a much larger role in controlling oil 
matters than the United StateS.93 
When control over the price and the levels of production was transferred from the oil 
companies to Saudi Arabia, the U.S. was forced to make a government-to-government 
relationship with Saudi Arabia on the question on oil.94 In the fIrst place, the U.S. was 
conremed about the flow of oil, and negotiated for a time to buy equity in Aramoo.96 
These govemment-to-govemment relations are still a vital and integral part of U.S. oil 
policy.96 However, the Arab oil embargo on the U.S., operated mainly by Saudi Arabia, 
must have made it clear that the U.S. could not control the oil in such a way.97 It has 
been far more the case that where oil and politics are connected the connection is negative 
and works against U.S. interests.98 
The threat to use force, as the U.S. did in 1975, when faced with the possibility of a fut~ 
oil embargo, is so oostly, it is difficult to make credible. A military action is an act of 
desperation.99 The complex layers of political and economic interdependence overcomes, 
the need for military force which is irrelevant when resolving disagreements on eoonomic 
issues among oountries. 1OO 
There is likely to be a greater connection between oil and politics in the more positive 
context of the pursuit of extending U.S. co-operation in areas of interest to the Saudis.101 
Saudi Arabia would go beyond what its narrow oil interests might dictate, in moderating 
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oil pnces, to develop mutual trust and co-operation in pursuit of Saudi political 
interests.1OO The agreement between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia for a Joint Eoonomic 
Commission, in the mid 1970s, to co-ordinate and bilateral trade relations is an 
example. 103 This level of co-operation oorresponds to the increase in the level of 
interdependence between the two countries - this is shown by the total amount of trade 
between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia.104 
The connection between oil and security has always been close. lOO As Saudi Arabia has 
become the world's leading oil exporter, the U.S. ooncern for securing the flow of Saudi oil 
has increased. This has meant that its concern for oil field security and regional political 
stability has increased.1°O This connection has established a mutuality of interests in 
military and security operation that has made the U.S. - Saudi military relations 
continuous over these years and has overcome the crises that have confronted the 
relationship. 107 
The U.S. has pushed the selling of arms to Saudi Arabia in recognition of Saudi 
moderation over the control of oil prices. H13 In other words, security assistance is a 
trade-off for price concessions. 1OO The mutual interdependence, S)ught by the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia does not stop the parties from trying to acquire the most advantageous 
termspossible. llo An example of this is that while using its important position in OPEC 
to restrain oil price increases, Saudi Arabia, in return, used it leverage to secure American 
military assistance and to influence U.S. policy in different issues, particularly, the U.S. 
policy toward Israel.1l1 The former Saudi Oil Minister, Ahmad Zaki Yarnani, asserted in 
July 1979, that if the U.S. could not compel Israel to withdraw from the oreupied 
territories, it "must be prepared to face the oonsequences ... you can not expect Arabs to 
co-operate on oil unless there are positive incentives on the political front". 112 
Eoonomic and commercial relations have expanded independently of the other areas of 
interests. lIS For the most part, U.S. policies appear to recognise these mutual interests, 
and future policies of the U.S. requires it to support the Saudis in ways which influen~ its 
decisions over the disposal of its wealth. 114 U.S. - Saudi trade has grown over the past 
years in parallel. In 1979 American companies signed non-military contracts in Saudi 
Arabia worth nearly $6 billion. Actual exports from the United States to Saudi Arabia in 
1980 amounted to $5.8 billion; U.S. purchases from Saudi Arabia were mo~ than double 
that amount. While the overall level of Saudi-purchases from the United States an' likflly 
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to remain at a high level - but the level of non military trade will always be imbalanced in 
favour of Saudi Arabia. The U.S. desires to ease its balance of payments problem by 
drawing oil revenues back into the U.S. economy.l15 In fact, military sales have increased 
most rapidly as a proportion of the total U.S. exports to Saudi Arabia. This further ties 
the U.S. to Saudi ArabiaYs 
The United States, inspires general ambivalence even though it achieved superpower 
status after World War 11.117 It has many competing interests, not only with Saudis and 
in the Middle East generally but al~ globally. lIS Therefore, U.S. diplomacy seeks to 
balance these contesting interests through trade-offs and compromises.1l9 The U.S. 
position towards Saudi Arabia has primarily been concerned with not meeting Saudi 
Arabian demands which could commit the U.S. to a deepening relationship. l~ 
Particularly, after the creation of Israel in 1948, the Arab-Israeli problem has been a main 
difficulty for the U.S., as the White House has ~ught to avoid clashes between its 
commitments to Israel and those to Saudi Arabia.121 
Another major factor has been imposed by the nature of U.S. interests after the Cold 
WarY~ The absence of a global competitor, like the USSR, has enhanced the global 
security environment for the United States. l23 U.S. leaders do not want their own 
unilateral acts based on the national interest to be restrained and want to instigate 
multilateral operations like the Gulf war. 124 The disappearance of the Soviet threat has 
not changed the fundamental orientation of U.S. interests. l25 
The U.S. has kept in mind that Saudi Arabia and other oil producers are pursuing their 
own self-interests at present by supporting moderate price growth aimed at increasing 
both world-wide oil demand and OPEC's share of the world oiI,126 The U.S. can not 
assume that this unprecedented convergence of interests will always exist- the short term 
political or economic pressures within the Gulf region will not arise again to allow 0 PEC 
to use a strategy of high prices. 127 
It is clear that having won the war of 1991, the U.S. will increase its ties to the GCC, 
especially to Saudi Arabia. l28 These ties help increase the chances of price stability and 
put constraints on tendencies to disrupt oil supplies or to use oil as a political weapon. 129 
The U.S. has reduced its vulnerability, and made its sensitivity less serious politically.l~ 
Power is seen as the "Ability of an actor to get others to do ~mething they otherwise 
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would not do" .131 If one side seeks to upset the status quo, then it gains at the expense of 
the other.132 Military power dominates economic power in the sense of that economic 
means alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military forre. 133 
Keohane and Nye asserted against derming interdependenoo in terms of situations of 
"evenly balanced mutual dependence" .134 They stated that asymmetric independenoo is a 
power resouroo in situations of complex interdependence, which often provides influence 
for those dealing with others. l36 Those who are less dependent are often able to use the 
interdependent relationship to gain bargaining power and influence other issues. l36 Power 
can be thought of as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise 
would not do and it can also be conooived in terms of control and outcomes.137 The 
traditional view of power was that military power dominated other forms. But military 
foroo supported by economic and other resources would clearly be the dominant source of 
power.l38 In the United States - Saudi Arabia relationship, the fact that Saudi Arabia has 
a modest military force which we can not compare with the United States' shows that it is, 
therefore, not a major factor in the bargaining process. However, the Saudis can take 
advantage of their superior position on economic power, such as oil. Nevertheless, the 
absenoo of force lays down the concept of complex interdependenoo. l39 
The Gulf war and its accomplishments had consequenoos which have put in motion forces 
that oould upset the domestic stability of Gee states, particularly Saudi Arabia. These 
forces could threaten Saudi Arabia's relations with the United stateS. I40 The U.S. forces in 
Saudi Arabia areounted for 6,000 soldiers in 1996.141 The Saudi people rejected the 
presence of American troops on their soil. For the Saudi people, it is unjustifiable for the 
U.S. after the Gulf war to ignore their demands since the situation in the Gulf region is 
under oontl'Ol, Saudi people thought the presence of American troops in Saudi Arabia was 
to seize the oil fields, not protect Saudi Arabia. Those who see greater interconnection not 
in terms of benefits, but rather as presenting threats to national, ethnic, language and 
most importantly religious identity. The risks of interdependenoo is that it will overturn 
the balance in favour of the United States. The V.S. must struggle to preserve the peace 
that has followed. 142 Balancing various interests and goals would present the real 
challenge to the V.S. in the coming decade. 143 Meeting this challenge will become urgent 
for the U.S. because its interdependence with Saudi Arabia and the Gulf economies are 
counted upon to grow in the source of the decade. 144 
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Distorting interdependence would bring regional charges that Saudi Arabia is a 
subordinate country to the United States and that the U.S. security umbrella is extended 
to assure cheap oil for the U.s. and its allies at the expense of the Gulf countries. t45 To 
some degree, however, this order was fmanced by the capability of the U.S. to tax Saudi 
Arabia and the rest of the GCC states. l46 In addition, the U.S. has increased the tax on oil 
because it is cheap. The U.S. administration often states its need to get oil from the Gulf 
at a "reasonable price". The Clinton administration now relies on access to cheap Saudi 
oil, Saudi political assistance in the Arab world and financial support for U.S. strategic 
and economic objectives world-wide.147 An agreement was reached, for example, to 
increase repayment terms for the Saudis to pay for U.S. weapons and to seek commen;ial 
bank loans to finance some of the more costly deals. l48 In the case of commercial relations 
between Saudi Arabia and the U.s. before the Gulf war, commercial relations have 
generally been free of government interference by either country .149 However, in early 
1994, a telephone call that President Bill Clinton made to the Saudi government 
promoting the sale of $6.2 billion worth of U.S. - made air transports, which represented a 
fundamental change in the U.S. government's attitude towards Saudi Arabia. l50 In fact 
the U.S. used its political strength with Saudi Arabia that derived from U.S. military 
success in the Gulf war of 1991 to influence Saudi Arabia on economic issues.15l The 
American deterrence capability serves an indirect protective role which it can use in 
bargaining on other issues, such as trade, with Saudi Arabia. As Keohane and Nye 
asserted military power dominates economic power in the sense that economic means 
alone are likely to be ineffective against the serious use of military force. 152 
Unprecedented financial and eoonomic disorder in Saudi Arabia came with growing 
world-wide oompetition and pressure from the industrialised oountries to continue large 
military and industrial purchases.15s Saudi Arabia in return has suffered heightened 
concern about national defence. 1M Saudi Arabia's multi-billion dollar commitments to buy 
new civilian and military hardware from the U.S., coming after its budget cut 
announcements, are a good illustration of both the pressure and the concem. l55 In fact, 
exploiting the Saudi eoonomy is big business. tOO The U.S.' obsession in protecting their 
interests in Saudi Arabia threatens the Saudi economy and presents risks to the 
continued flow of oil. 157 It oould even push their relationship to breaking point. The 
problem has been expressed thus; Saudi Arabia is a developing country is pursuing justice 
while the U.S. is an industrial oountry and is trying to maintain the existing order. lOB 
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An additional, major challenge to U.S. interests in Saudi Arabia is neither Saddam 
Hussein nor Iran. 157 Rather, it is the slow but sure growth in opposition to the United 
States from inside Saudi Arabia. 158 On November 13, 1995, a new source of inconsistency 
appeared on the scene when four Saudis planted a huge bomb which blew up a U.S. 
operating military centre in Riyadh. 1OO The bomb killed six people including one member 
of the U.S. military force, four U.S. civilians and 60 others were injured including 30 U.S. 
citizens. ISO The U.S. embassy in Riyadh received a statement in early 1995, saying that 
foreign forces in the Arabian Peninsula must be pulled out by the end of June, or they 
would become a legitimate target. 16l This is a means of expressing their disaffection with 
the status quo. 
The U.S. can do little to influence this change. 162 It also realises the limits of its capability 
to help the Saudi government and so is cautious of performing assistance that could be 
counterproductive. l63 In addition, the U.S. is practically powerless to respond in cases of 
internal insecurity.l64 It is an era in which the U.S. will probably continue to feel their 
way warily for the foreseeable future. This will pose the real threat to oil access and price 
stability.l65 The U.S. will continue to be dependent on Saudi oil and therefore vulnerable 
if Saudi Arabia goes the way of Iran. lOO Despite the U.S. remains the world's most 
powerful country, this does not mean that the U.S. is able to obtain its own way on every 
issue. 167 
I argue here, that since the Gulf war, asymmetrical interdependence between the U.S. 
and Saudi Arabia has become weighted in favour of the U.S. Unless the balance of power 
is equalised willingly by the U.S., internal Saudi opposition to the U.S. within Saudi 
Arabia will try to equalise it. This has been shown by the fact that a Saudi opposition 
group blew up the American centre in Riyadh. If the U.S. wants a stable status quo, the 
U.S. can, jointly with Saudi Arabia, gain by establishing a balance of military power and 
eoonomic power between them. 
The U.S. and Saudi Arabia have respective primary interests in common, which oould 
expand their awareness of these mutual interests. The U.S. and Saudi Arabia need to 
perroive that their mutual interests can be better achieved once they have dermed their 
areas of common interest. 168 The lack of balance has resulted in bad faith. l69 In 
attempting to preserve U.S. interests and continued ties with Saudi Arabia, the U.S. will 
have to be increasingly sensitive to expressions of anti-American feelings and charges of 
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u.s. neo-coloniali~t ambitions.172 Therefore, less military visibility may once again be the 
better stance to take. 173 
The U.S. must turn back to the policy of fostering interdependency between consumers 
and producers.174 Harming relations with long-term energy suppliers, would in turn harm 
U.S. economic growth.176 Stability and growth promote each other, the greater the 
stability the more investment results.176 This lead to higher growth, which in its turn 
contributes to stability, mainly by enabling all to get a share of the growing number of 
advantages. I77 In the opposite way growing instability prevents economic activity.l78 
Growth decline adds further stress upon the instability. Most economic interdependence 
involves the potential of joint profits or joint losses. Mutual realisation of possible gains 
and losses and the risk of worsening each state's position through overly strict rules over 
the distribution of profits can limit the use of asymmetrical interdependence. 179 Saudis are 
investing heavily in the U.S., tying their economy more closely to the United States. 1 III 
On the other hand, the flow of investment capital to the U.S., generated by oil re~urres 
will be required to reduce the national deficit and to stimulate a slow-growth economy. 181 
The U.S. must carefully maintain bilateral relations with Saudi Arabia and keep the 
doors open to future Saudis' investments. 182 The cost of not maintaining balanced 
relations with Saudi Arabia would be to destroy the future economic growth of the United 
States. Saudis that take part in domestic politics would not look favourably on American 
companies if U.S. policy were unfair.ls3 It has become obvious that, in the near future, 
only a few oil exporters and newly industrialised countries will be able to join the major 
industrial countries in having the ability to effect global economic conditions. l84 Therefore, 
a harmony with Saudi Arabia, because of its important position within OPEC, appears to 
be increasingly important to the U.S. Oil exporting countries are becoming ever more 
important as markets. In fact, ~me argue, that economic ties provide an opportunity to 
conduct war by other means. l86 Asymmetry, in the benefits ~iated with economic 
interdependence, is perceived as directing greater conflict reduction on the part of the 
participant that benefits most. 186 
The conclusion of this study, is that increased interdependence between the U.S. and 
Saudi Arabia can be characterised until the 1990 Gulf crisis, by both increased conflict as 
well as co-operation. The increased conflict was in such areas as the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
the oil embargo, arms sales and the appropriate response to Soviet threats. The increased 
Co-operation was in such areas as the Joint Economic Commission in 1974 and 
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co-operation over dealing with the threats posed by the Iran-Iraq war. Acrordingly, 
conflict and co-operation can be seen as consequences of interdependence. While 
interdependence leads to increased conflict, it can have beneficial phased that bring 
greater co-operation. 187 
The increase in interdependence between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia can be characterised 
since the Gulf crisis of 1990, as increase co-operation e.g. the co-operation over the Gulf 
war of 1991, arms sales and the Arab-Israeli peace talks. Therefore, increased 
co-operation can be seen as the absence of high levels of conflict. Increased 
interdependence is coupled with decreased conflict. This is due to the fact that a reduction 
in threats is a consequence of one country being especially sensitive or vulnerable to 
another's actions which in turn can interfere with the anticipated benefits of 
interaction. I88 Thus, the costly aspects of interdependence appears to generate conflict, the 
beneficial aspects of interdependence appear to reduce conflict. I89 
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